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Abstract
This thesis examines the development and operation o f the EU ’s legislative 
framework on the deliberate releases of GMO products as a case study o f social regulation 
operating within a predominandy technical framework. The examination of the founding and 
implementation of this particular licensing framework has allowed for a reconsideration o f the 
normative power of EU institutional structures in affecting the design and the outcomes of 
the application o f the relevant authorization provisions. It is argued that in the case of the EU 
agricultural biotechnology framework, the particular institutional settings created for the 
formulation and interpretation o f its provisions have been o f decisive importance in 
elaborating a proceduralised ‘science-based’ prior authorization scheme as the preferred 
framework for granting commercial permits. It is further argued that the particular risk 
assessment and management practices have ‘captured’ the operation o f this framework, 
perpetuating its self-referential character, and have as a result undermined the acceptability of 
the correspondent authorization decisions. The analysis and findings are based on 
documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews with regulators, risk assessors, public 
interest groups and biotechnology experts at the national and European levels.
More precisely, the thesis argues that contrary to its defined objectives, the 
apparently proceduralised model o f Community regulation, based on a decentralized and 
open-ended risk analysis structure, is in fact limited in accommodating ‘alternative’ 
conceptualisations of what constitutes ‘acceptable risk’ in the field of genetic engineering. The 
examination of the operation o f the Deliberate Release regime has exposed a twofold 
misrepresentation regarding the apparently pluralistic and reflexive prior authorization 
control. Firstly, whereas the proceduralised framework has been destined to offer an all- 
embracing deliberation structure, the authorization decisions are exclusively based on EFSA 
opinions as the sole form of acceptable evidence. This practice has limited both the actors 
participating in the process and the range of factors considered. Secondly, the examination of 
the risk assessment practice demonstrates a dilution of the objective character o f the 
conclusions reached in the context o f the science-based licensing framework. The introduced 
proceduralisation paradigm is underdeveloped and lacks sufficient guarantees to ensure the 
consideration of all relevant viewpoints. It is concluded that, consequently, the non- 
hierarchical and open-ended structure suggested by this administrative model, leaves space 
that was destined for deliberation and reflection to be captured, in normative terms, by 
dominant institutional practices.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to examine the various ways transnational regulation deals 
with the challenges of controlling novel technological risks in view o f the science-democracy 
dichotomy. The analysis focuses specifically on the institutional design and operation of those 
decision-making structures that have been established for the evaluation and management of 
the risks and effects of agricultural biotechnology within the European Union (EU). This 
particular field o f genetic engineering (also referred to as agricultural biotechnology) requires 
special attention, as it constitutes the sole form of modem biotechnology that involves the 
direct and uncontained interaction o f its products with the natural environment.
This introductory chapter firsdy identifies those features o f this technological sector 
that render it a distinct object of legal and institutional focus compared to other technological 
sectors. Its particularities relate to its scientific basis, the nature o f its potential risks and the 
socioeconomic debates that have been developed in relation to the interpretation o f the 
relevant technical data. The private nature of biosafety research and the persisting divergences 
between those opposing and supporting the commercial development o f agricultural 
biotechnology constitute some further novelties in the development of this technological 
sector. In light of the special features of this rapidly developing technological field, law is 
expected to serve multiple purposes. Amongst these, the most important are: the control and 
management of the potential environmental risks, the creation o f favourable conditions for 
the commercialization of genetic engineering products and the establishment o f public trust 
in the Community’s efforts to assess and control the potential effects of this open-field 
application of modem biotechnology.
The planned release o f GMOs (genetically modified organisms) into the environment 
poses particular challenges to EU decision-making structures. First of all, due to the limited 
knowledge on the behaviour o f a GMO in different ecosystems and agricultural contexts, an 
EU-wide risk assessment model in the field of agricultural biotechnology needs to involve the 
consideration o f the potential effects o f GMO releases upon the vast variety o f types of 
natural habitats found in the European continent. Moreover, the multi-sectoral character of 
agricultural biotechnology, in terms of its association with several policy domains such as 
agriculture and industry, public health and environmental protection, poses a novel challenge 
to an institutional framework characterised by deep seated functional specialization. Further,
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in light o f the conflicting interests involved in the development of agricultural biotechnology, 
EU multi-level risk governance structures face particular difficulties in formulating a 
harmonised ex-ante authorisation framework that would also provide space for the 
consideration o f a variety of factors. In addition, EU ’s traditional foundation o f its licensing 
decisions on a sound science risk assessment narrative is challenged in a field in which high 
scientific uncertainty and high potential risks coincide, calling for a re-articulation and fine 
tuning o f the terms o f the relationship between expertise and public decision-making.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section seeks to frame the 
motivation for the study. It first, discusses the main features o f agricultural biotechnology as a 
technological sector, which is a relative newcomer in comparison not only to other fields of 
industrial activity, but also with other forms of modem biotechnology. Secondly, it refers to 
the challenges that these particular features pose to traditional science-based licensing 
approaches, and finally it examines the particularities that characterise the process for the 
development o f a regulatory structure for genetic engineering at the EU level. The second 
section o f the chapter frames the research questions, and the third section briefly outlines the 
research strategy. The final section, offers a brief outline o f the thesis; a road map for the 
read ahead.
1.1. Why Agri-Food biotechnology?
Agricultural or plant biotechnology for, elsewhere, ‘green biotechnology) is a set of enabling 
techniques for bringing about specific mandate changes in deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), or 
genetic material, in plants, animals and microbial systems. It has been based on molecular 
techniques applied to traditional breeding strategies, where genetic material is mixed through 
natural crossing. During the last 20 years, questions about genetic engineering have come to 
occupy a central place in shaping public debates about the future. While genetic engineering 
as a science has been utilized and applied in a similar fashion in laboratories, research projects 
and industry across the globe, regulatory efforts for the formulation o f the most appropriate 
forms o f control, or even the precise identification o f the object o f regulation, have varied. 
Genetic engineering technologies have in fact aroused worldwide attention and the 
discussions about the need for controlling the associated risks have migrated from the
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confines of scientific laboratories and expert control circles to public regulatory arenas and 
international multilateral negotiation venues. Genetic engineering has thus become an 
example of the emerging tendency for the regulatory control o f science and technological 
development to be based beyond the state.
In view of the high scientific uncertainty and disagreement about the volume and 
character o f the risks o f its applications and the multitude of conflicting interests and 
conceptualizations, agricultural biotechnology recasts the ways in which science and politics as 
well as the need for both efficiency and democratic legitimacy relate in the frame of the 
respective regulatory decision-making structures. In view of the particularities of agricultural 
biotechnology as a technological sector and as an object o f regulatory attention and safety 
control, the study examines the Commission’s efforts to formulate a common regulatory 
framework for the control o f open-field GM O releases. As a multi-sectoral issue, its efforts to 
shape an authorization control framework on GMOs have raised the challenge of not only 
coordinating policymaking horizontally across a large number o f public and private actors 
with diverse perspectives about the aims and the content of EU regulation, but also vertically 
within the Commission considering the high amount of DG s that expressed an interest in 
participating in its drafting.
Since 1980, the European legal framework on genetic engineering has addressed a 
wide array of issue areas. Around 1986, the Commission’s regulatory interest focused on the 
environmental and internal market dimensions o f modem biotechnology. It became 
associated with the drafting of a Directive on the control of deliberate releases that challenged 
the capacities of the Commission’s administrative structures and institutional environment to 
articulate a set of rules that would meet a wide variety of interests without compromising its 
normative and operative force. The adoption o f the Directive in 1990 marked the beginning 
o f the operation o f one o f the most contentious authorization frameworks at the Community 
level. This has been evidenced in its deficient implementation and in the political questioning 
of the need for a supranational licensing approach in the field of agricultural biotechnology, as 
well as o f its particular normative orientation.
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1.1.1. What is particular about agricultural biotechnology as a technological field?
This section examines those features of agricultural biotechnology that evidence its a- 
typical character in comparison to other technological applications. These special elements 
relate to its scientific basis, the nature of its potential risks and the debates that have been 
developed in relation to its promises and perils. In examining the major scientific features of 
agricultural biotechnology, one should first of all make reference to the relatively limited 
experience of open-field application in this technological sector in a commercial context. 
Agricultural biotechnology has been the product o f an extensive technological development 
that has become commercialized solely during the last 20 years which in turn explains the 
small number of its end-products. In contrast to the existence of broad databases and of well- 
established theories on the hazards of physical technologies in the fields o f nuclear and 
chemical technologies, ‘the study of the hazards of biotechnology is as yet in an embryonic 
state.’1 As a result o f the fact that the ‘commercial applications of biotechnology in plant 
improvement are still in their infancy,’2 there is an absence o f an integrated historical biosafety 
database on the behaviour o f different GMOs in a variety of open-field contexts. In view of 
the fact that ‘there is no reservoir of precedents into which one can readily dip for historical 
parallels to the production and use o f laboratory-crafted living organisms,’3 as well as that the 
time-scale for the development of the effects of the interaction between genetically modified 
living organisms and complex ecological ecosystems is usually long, no valid long-term 
prediction can be made, nor can conclusive evidence be offered.
An additional idiosyncrasy of agricultural biotechnology in its scientific dimension 
relates to the acknowledgment of the existence o f high scientific uncertainty in relation to the 
prediction and assessment of the long-term and indirect effects and of risks that have been 
associated with the introduction o f GMOs into the environment. Considering that individual 
genes are being introduced into highly complex genetic structures and the resultant organisms 
are being propagated in complex ecosystems, even if a GMO has been tested and found safe 
in the ecosystem where it is manufactured, it may develop unintended consequences in other 
ecosystems. According to Gaisford et al., ‘Given the complexity of natural ecosystems, it is 
not possible to know with certainty whether or not the new organisms will interact with those
1 J. Ravetz and J.M. Brown, ‘Biotechnology; anticipatory risk management’ in J.M. Brown (ed), Environmental 
Threats (Belhaven: London, 1989) 67-68
2 L. Bisch, W.B. Lacy, J. Burkhardt and L.R. Lacy, Plants, Power, and Profit-Social, Economic, and Ethical 
Consequences o f  the New Biotechnologies (Basil Blackwell: Cambridge (MA), 1991) 1
3 S. Jasanoff, ‘Product, process, or programme: three cultures and the regulation of biotechnology’ in M. Bauer, 
Resistance to new technology-nuclear power, information technology and biotechnology (CUP: Cambridge, 1995) 312
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in the existing environment in ways that will have consequences that are undesirable, or for 
that matter catastrophic.’4
Aside from the limited experience on assessing genetic engineering hazards and the 
incomplete theoretical basis of knowledge on the extreme ecological complexity of natural 
ecosystems, it is also the case that in genetic engineering, ‘unlike nuclear science, private firms 
are in the driver’s seat.’3 Agricultural biotechnology constitutes a matter o f private business 
where public control has been limited to setting legal boundaries and formulating incentives 
for investment and commercialization. Kenney states that ‘In contrast to biomedical 
applications o f biotechnology, which originated in the university, the use o f biotechnology in 
agriculture has been pressed by MNCs (multinational corporations) whose executives grasped 
biotechnology’s potential applications to agriculture even earlier than the university 
administrators.’6 Considering that most o f ‘the innovations in agricultural biotechnology {...} 
are science driven rather than need-driven,’7 there is an ‘industrial ‘capture’ o f its development 
that has shaped the line of research away from non-market, such as ecological considerations.8
Further, it should be noted that agricultural biotechnology has become particularly 
contentious as the risks attributed to the planned releases of GMOs ‘make them candidates 
for fundamental objections.’9 With biotechnology, ‘the public’s scrutiny has come at the early 
stages o f innovation, before the technologies are on line and before products are marketed. 
One cannot say the same about the introduction of nuclear and chemical technologies.,ll> 
Nelkin has pointed out that *.. .advances {in biotechnology} have been the focus o f persistent 
public opposition, and indeed biotechnology has replaced nuclear power as the symbol of
4 J.D. Gaisford, J.E. Hobbs, W.A. Kerr, N. Perdikis and M.D. Plunkett(eds.), The Economics o f  Biotechnology^Edward 
Elgar: Cheltenham, 2001) 53
5 Y. Tiberghien and S. Starrs, The EU as Global Trouble-Maker in Chief: A Political Analysis o f  EU Regulations and 
EU Global Leadership in the Field o f  Genetically Modified Organisms, paper presented for presentation at the 2004 
Conference of Europeanists, Organised by the Council of European Studies (CES) (March 11-13, 2004, Chicago) 12
6 M. Kenney, Biotechnology: The University-Industry Complex (Yale University Press: New Haven 1986) 223
7 S. Krimsky and R.P Wrubel, Agricultural Biotechnology and the Environment-Science, Policy and Social Issues 
(University of Illinois Press: Urbana, IL 1996) 240
8 A.A. Snow, ‘Genetic Modification and Gene Flow-An Overview’ in D.L Kleinman,. A.J. Kinchy and J. Handelsman 
(eds), Controversies in Science and Technology-From Maize to Menopause (The University o f Wisconsin Press: 
Madison, 2005) 111; see also, L.L. Wolfenbarger and P.R.Phifer, ‘The ecological risks and benefits of genetically 
engineered plants’ (2000) 290 Science 2088-93; R. Dalton, ‘Superweed study falters as seed firms deny access to 
transgene’ (2002) 419 Nature 655; A.A. Snow (2004) Genetically engineered organisms and the environment: Current 
status and recommendations, position paper of the Ecological Society of America, Ecological Applications. 
http://www.esa.Org/pao/csaPositions/PanersAj:eo position.htm
9 R. E. LOfstedt, B. Fischhoff, I. R. Fischhoff, ‘Precautionary Principles: General Definitions and Specific Applications 
to Genetically Modified Organisms, (2002) 21(3) Journal o f  Policy Analysis and Management 399
10 See note 7 at 1-2
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‘technology-out-of-control’.11 As Juanillo has stated, ‘Agricultural biotechnology is a 
compelling example of how a technology that might be thought to be a beneficial scientific 
breakthrough can galvanize widespread public cynicism, resentment and heated protests in 
many parts of the world.’12
In reality, it has been the coexistence of a unique blend of great promise and risk that 
has been associated with the commercial development o f agricultural biotechnology, which 
has led to a high degree o f controversy in the field that constitutes a distinct feature of this 
technological sector. According to Bailey, ‘{ajgricultural biotechnology represents 
technological progress to some and disaster to others'13 that has been ‘characterized by an 
astounding melange of enthusiastic promises, apocalyptic predictions, wishful thinking, 
scientific evidence, and moral debate.’14 Agricultural biotechnology has been characterized as 
‘truly double-edged in terms o f its environmental implications.’15 This results from the ‘co­
existence’ of a ‘promethean’ enthusiasm about the capacity o f genetic engineering16 to ‘yield 
cleaner and more efficient alternatives to many wasteful processes and polluting products,’17 
to improve the biological potential of crops and livestock and to introduce desirable 
nutritional characteristics in food crops18 with an array of serious concerns related to the 
‘potential impact on health and on the maintenance of genetic diversity and ecological balance 
before they are introduced to the market and thus to the environment.’19 On the one hand,
11 D. Nelkin, ‘Forms of intrusion: comparing resistance to information technology and biotechnology in the USA’ in M. 
Bauer, Resistance to new technology-nuclear power, information technology and biotechnology (CUP and Science 
Museum, 1995) 381
12 N.K. Juanillo, ‘The Risks and Benefits o f Agricultural Biotechnology-Can Scientific and Public Talk Meet? (April 
2001) 44(8) American Behavioral Scientist 1246
13 B. Bailey, ‘Preface’ in B. Bailey & M. Lappd (eds.), Engineering the Farm: The Ethical & Social Aspects o f  
Agricultural Biotechnology (Washington: Island, 2002) xvi and xvii
14 T. Bemauer, Genes, Trade and Regulation-The Seeds o f  Conflict in Food Biotechnology (Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, 2003) 42
15 J. Vogler, and D. McGraw, “An International Environmental Regime for Biotechnology” in A. Russell and J. Vogler 
(eds), The International Politics o f  Biotechnology: Investigating Global Futures, (Manchester University Press: 
Manchester, 2001) 124
16 J. Dryzek, The Politics o f  the Earth: Environmental Discourses, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1997); see also, 
G.J. Persley, ‘Agricultural Biotechnology and the Poor: Promethean Science’ in G.J.Persley and M.M.Lantin (eds.), 
Agricultural Biotechnology and the Poor: An International Conference on Biotechnology (Washington, DC: CGIAR, 3- 
21 2000)
17 WCED (1987), Our Common Future (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1987) 218
18 See: M.D. Mheta, ‘Biotechnology Unglued: Science, Society, and Social Cohesion (UBC Press: Vancouver, 2005) 28; 
T. Braunschweig, Priority Setting in Agricultural Biotechnology Research: Supporting Public Decisions in Developing 
Countries with the Analytic Hierarchy Process (2000) 16 ISNAR Research Report, The Hague: ISNAR; J.I. Cohen (ed.), 
‘Managing Agricultural Biotechnology: Adressing Research Program Needs and Policy Implications’ (1999) 23 
Biotechnology in Agriculture Series (Wallingford: CAB International); UN ECA, Harnessing Technologies fo r  
Sustainable Development, UN Economic Commission for Africa, ECA Policy Research Report (Addis Ababa,2002); C. 
James, ‘Global Status of Commercialized Transgenic Crops’ (2002) 27 ISAAA Briefs (Ithaca, NY: ISAAA); Serageldin, 
I. (2000) ‘The Challenge of Poverty in the 21st Century: The Role of Science’ In G.J.Persley and M.M.Lantin, eds., 
Agricultural Biotechnology and the Poor: An International Conference on Biotechnology, 25-31 Washington, DC: 
CGIAR
19 WCED, Our Common Future (Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 1987) 219
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industry sources claim that biotechnology is more precise than conventional breeding and 
therefore should prove less threatening to public health and the environment. On the other, 
some researchers and public interest groups remain sceptical about its hidden ecological 
consequences and its potentially irreversible risks and raise concerns about whether the 
widespread use of genetically modified products could accelerate the decline in global 
biological diversity.’20
In terms o f the prospective benefits of agricultural biotechnology, its development 
has been associated with the emergence o f a major contribution to agriculture. It offers 
increased yields by making plants resistant to insects and diseases; plants that will withstand 
physical and chemical stresses; improvements in plant nutrition; decreased use of chemical 
pesticides, herbicides and fertiliser requirements; the development of hardier and more 
productive hybrids; plant growth that will allow harvesting of fruit and vegetables of uniform 
ripeness; and the production o f new foods from either unexploited plant species, or by new 
products that will reduce mankind’s dependence on 18 basic crops.
In terms o f the risks, due to ‘genetic modification’s ability to link together quite 
distinct forms of life that could not occur in nature’,21 the potential environmental risks such 
as toxicity, environmental pollution, unintentional gene flow, the displacement of native 
species, the degradation of local ecosystems or the transformation of the introduced species 
into pests might be unique and irreversible. Their irreversible character stems from the fact 
that ‘once released, they {GMOs} cannot be recalled, retrieved or neutralised.’22 A minor 
change in an organism’s genetic composition can upset delicate local ecosystems and have 
devastating environmental and economic effects. This assessment reflects that GMOs are able 
to travel considerable distances,23 their potential harm cannot be contained24 and can cause an 
ecological disaster on an unprecedented scale. Unlike a chemical pollutant, where the amount 
o f the pollutant released into the environment is fixed and will decline over time, a living 
biological ‘pollutant’ has the potential to grow and reproduce without limits.25 Molin states
20 S. Murphy, 'Biotechnology and International Law’ (2001) 42 Harvard Journal o f  International Law 47
21 D. Barling, ‘The European Community and the Legislating o f the Application and Products of Genetic Modification 
Technology’ (Autumn 1995) 4(3) Environmental Politics 468
22 S. Tromans, ‘Promise, Peril, Precaution: The Environmental Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms’ (2001) 9 
Indiana Journal o f  Global Legal Studies 187, 188
23 R. Seidler, L. Watrud and E. Georg, ‘Assessing Risks to Ecosystems and Human Health from Genetically Modified 
Organisms’ in P. Callow (ed.), Handbook on Environmental Risk Assessment and Management (1998) 110, 120
24 M.R. Powell, ‘Science in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Dispute Resolution’ (September 1997) Resources fo r  the Future 
(RFF) Discussion Paper: 97/50, Washington DC: RFF. Available at http://www.rfT.org/disc papers/1997.htm
25 On this issue, there is an extensive bibliography. See however for a brief account, P. Berg, D.Baltimore, H.W.Boyer, 
S.N.Cohen, R.W.Davis, D.S.Hogness, D.Nathans, R.Roblin, J.D.Wtson, S.Weissman, and N.D.Zinder, ‘Potential
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that ‘Once released into the environment, the spread o f a GMO can be difficult to arrest/26 
whereas Deatherage points out that ‘...adverse environmental changes are more often 
impossible to reverse than chemical pollution because living organisms reproduce while 
nonliving compounds tend to dissipate.’27
Thus the agricultural biotechnology sector is characterised in both its structure and 
development as an idiosyncratic field of industrial innovation that is open-field in character. 
The next section, examines exactly how its features constitute novel challenges for the 
traditional, science-oriented control paradigm.
1.1.2. Agricultural biotechnology as a sui generis object of regulatory control
In the case of agricultural biotechnology, regulators are faced with challenges that 
differentiate this regulatory field from other similar areas o f regulatory attention that may also 
be science-driven, environmental in character or, in relation to their effects, commercial in 
their nature and private in their interests. The idiosyncratic challenges o f agricultural 
biotechnology require the formulation o f regulatory responses that depart from the traditional 
command and control or self-regulation paradigms. Setting the appropriate safety standards 
for releasing transgenic organisms into the environment has been the most contentious issue 
in the regulation of biotechnology. This is due to the structural difficulties in identifying and 
quantifying the variety of the potential long-term impacts and low probability-high 
consequence risks of GMOs that might prove irreversible, uncontrollable and indeterminate.
In view of the potential of GMOs to multiply, colonise and adapt to the natural 
environment over time -features that are absent from purely chemical and physical
Hazards of Recombinant DNA Mlocules’ (July 6,1974) 185 Science 991-94 and M.J. Reiss and R. Straughan, Improving 
Nature? The Science and Ethics o f  Genetic Engineering (Cambridge University Pres: Cambridge, 2001) especially the 
6th chapter on the genetic engineering o f plants and A. A. Snow and P. M. Palma, ‘Commercialisation of Transgenic 
Plants: Potential Ecological Risks’ (February 1997) 47(2) BioScience 94
26 S. Molin et al., ‘Biological Containment of Bacteria and Plasmids to be Released into the Environment’ in W. 
Klingmuller (ed)) Risk Assessment fo r  Deliberate Releases (1988) 127
27 S.D. Deatherage, ‘Scientific uncertainty in regulating deliberate release o f genetically engineered organisms: 
substantive judicial review and institutional alternatives’ (1987) 11 Harvard Environmental Law Review 216; In the 
same article, Dr. Alexander observes: {Deferring from chemicals, air pollutants, and radiation, microorganisms are able 
to increase in abundance. The problem of detrimental effects, if  it exists, is magnified simply because living organisms 
reproduce, often at very rapid rates. Other types of environmental stresses tend to be dissipated with time, but the 
potential harm from living organisms may spread and become increasingly severe.’ In Environmental Implications o f  
Genetic Engineering: Hearing Before the Subcommittee, on Investigations and Oversight and the Subcommittee on 
Science, Research, and Technology o f  the House Common Science and Technology, 98* Cong., Is* Session 28(1983), 
statement o f Dr. Martin Alexander, Cornell University)
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environmental disturbances- the required regulatory measures on biosafety28 inherendy aim at 
the protection of the environment. In the case o f the regulation o f plant biotechnology, the 
required regulatory control is expected also to cover the experimental aspect of its 
development due to the open field character of its application although ‘rarely, if ever, does 
social regulation start in scientific laboratories and branch out to other sectors (agricultural, 
industrial, domestic, and occupational).29 In relation to the atypical character of the regulatory 
initiatives in the field o f biotechnology, Krimsky refers to three elements that differentiate 
plant biotechnology from other technological sectors where environmental norms have been 
developed: genetic engineering grew out of a laboratory setting and was only cast as an 
environmental issue years later, it does not define a characteristic substance, event, or 
industrial sector and none of its products has been implicated in human disease or ecosystem 
disruption.30
Considering the absence of sufficient databases and experience in relation to the 
possible effects o f the GMO releases and the sui generic character of genetic engineering 
risks, the formulation of ex-ante regulatory measures and evaluation procedures that would 
precede the open-field releases o f the products o f genetic engineering in the frame of which 
notifiers would be obliged to provide detailed information on the organism in question and to 
seek the prior informed consent of the relevant national authority is considered as necessary. 
Biosafety regulation should provide the grounding for the designation o f formalised 
emergency response procedures and strategies so as to prepare also for those situations when 
these transgenic life forms are accidentally released, react in an unpredictable or unstable 
manner upon release, or are simply released in excessive quantities. Further, considering that 
plants cannot be uniformly resistant to specific diseases, pests or climate conditions and 
natural ecosystems are characterised as dynamic in their functions where the conditions are 
constantly changing, each release should be evaluated individually.
A further challenge for genetic engineering regulators is how to balance the range of 
interests and perspectives and to take into consideration a mosaic o f different social, ethical, 
environmental and public health concerns, interests and risk perceptions. In view o f the
28 As it has been noted, ‘Generally, biosafety is an all encompassing reference to safety measures relating to potential or 
actual adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, including risk to human health, 
arising as a consequence of the application of the modem science of biotechnology.’ A.H. Qureshi, ‘The Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety and the WTO-Co-existence or incoherence?’ (October 2000) 49 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 835
29 S. Krimsky, Biotechnics & Society- The Rise o f  Industrial Genetics, (Praeger, 1991) 182
30 Ibid
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societal character o f agricultural biotechnology risks, there is a need for establishing 
participatory regulatory structures, expanding the risk assessment so as to incorporate 
comparative evaluations and socio-economic criteria, and adopting liability clauses for 
potential financial harm to non-GM farmers as well as for damage to the environment and 
human health. Further, the predominantly private nature o f biosafety research imposes an 
additional burden on regulators in terms o f moderating the relevant informational 
asymmetries between industrial notifiers and public risk assessors through the collection and 
wider dissemination o f the necessary notification information. In this direction, the 
formulation o f the necessary structures for the constant dissemination o f technical 
information, but also for the provision of procedural opportunities for the various 
stakeholders to submit their views and express their ethical and socio-economic concerns 
should become a necessary element of a genetic engineering regulatory framework. The social 
unease with regard to the consequences of the planned open-field releases o f GMOs and the 
information asymmetries due to the private control of the development o f the genetic 
engineering sciences call for an authorization framework that would encourage public 
involvement and the incorporation of social concerns and lay views into its risk analysis 
structures.
The examined regulatory challenges of agricultural biotechnology indicate its unique 
character as an object of regulatory control. The next section illustrates the particular 
challenges that the efforts to shape a common regulatory framework at the EU level pose to 
the capacities of EU decision-making structures to accommodate multiple, and mostly 
opposing, interests and conceptualisations.
1.1.3. Deliberate Release o f GMOs: challenges for the E U ’s regulatory governance 
structure
Due to the inherently complex character o f agricultural biotechnology, the regulation 
of the marketing of genetically modified foods and crops at the EU level constitutes a unique 
case for examining the capacities of the EU institutional framework to cope with the 
multitude o f challenges posed upon EU regulatory governance structures when shaping the 
main elements of the relevant control regime.
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Firstly, there are reasons o f science and technology, which alone render the EU’s 
GMO regulatory framework a unique case. Due to the potentially sui generis hazards that 
each release of GMOs might cause in different ecosystems, an EU-wide risk assessment 
model in the field of agricultural biotechnology would need to create the necessary 
mechanisms so as to take into account the special features of the entirety of European bio- 
geographical regions. At the EU level, the prediction o f the effects of agricultural 
biotechnology ‘is difficult because of the wide variations in environments, complexities of 
ecosystem processes, and the large numbers o f different species that exist within most 
environments.’31 Moreover, the multi-sectoral character of agricultural biotechnology, in 
terms o f its association with several policy domains such as agriculture and industry, public 
health, environmental protection and sustainable development, research and technology 
development, consumer protection, trade and competitiveness, poses a novel challenge upon 
the EU institutional framework considering the far-reaching intra-Commission functional 
specialization.
In terms of the institutional structure o f the EU, the first challenge stems from the 
high degree o f fragmentation and vertical allocation of duties among a multiplicity of 
Commission Directorates-General, each o f which is responsible for different policy areas. 
Thus, the shaping of a horizontal regulatory framework on genetic engineering would require 
not only the accommodation o f overlapping, and mostly conflicting, policy goals such as the 
establishment of an internal market, industrial and agricultural competitiveness, research and 
technological development, environmental and consumer protection, but it would also 
necessitate the institutional interface and coordination o f a multiplicity of organisational units 
in the Commission, all o f which have competing interests. The absence o f a permanent intra- 
Commission coordination structure, as well as o f an administrative code for the negotiation 
and elaboration of issues that fall under the competences o f more than one Directorate 
General (DG), in combination with the institutional practice o f delegating drafting powers to 
one single DG, indicate the difficulties in the establishment o f a regulatory framework that 
would be broadly acceptable, and in the formulation of unified negotiation outcomes that 
would not compromise its normative force.
31 U.S.Congress, Office o f Technology Assessment, New Developments in Biotechnology-Field Testing Engineered 
Organisms: Genetic and Ecological Issues (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988) 88
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Further, the need for an EU-wide harmonised regulatory framework for the control 
o f the release of agricultural biotechnology, which would remove those national barriers that 
might hinder the free movement o f GMO products across the Union, but that would also 
retain scope for national discretion in view of the environmental character o f plant 
biotechnology seems to constitute a delicate political exercise for all actors involved, in view 
of the quasi-federal structure of EU’s regulatory risk governance structures. The Community 
legal system’s efforts to shape a common regulatory narrative that would resolve the endemic 
inter-institutional competition and the associated organisational conflicts present a unique 
interest, considering the need for a comprehensive and well-balanced regulatory framework 
for the placement of GMO products in the Community market and environment. The focus 
on agricultural biotechnology as the main research field can be further attributed to the 
challenges that this particular technological application has posed to the EU governance 
framework. This is mainly a question of a disputed risk regulation considering the variety of 
different rationales that have been deployed in relation to the need for safety controls over 
GMO releases. More concretely, the dual need for facilitating the internal trade of agricultural 
products and at the same time enacting safety control procedures in a field of high 
commercial competition and uncertainty leads to constant ‘framing’ battles. These definitional 
struggles highlight ‘the new power of risk’32 and inter-institutional conflicts over whether 
GMOs pose unique risks. They further call into question the model o f regulatory control that 
should be established, as well as the role o f science in informing authorisation decisions and 
in defining norms of governance for biosafety.
Finally, and not least important, the introduction o f agricultural biotechnology in 
Europe has come at a time when there is a general mistrust towards experts’ opinions and a 
general questioning of the authority o f scientific judgments in informing and founding 
regulatory decisions. Moreover, the formulation o f control rules on agricultural 
biotechnology poses fundamental questions about the terms of the relationship between 
scientists or expert institutional structures and the European public, and how these might 
affect the framing of the rules of licensing and managing this particular new technology. This 
implies that the EU has been faced with the additional challenge of developing a highly 
complex regulatory framework under a very high degree of scrutiny, and great opposition to 
its trying to assert its legitimacy. In a field o f value contestation and plurality of interests that 
touches upon the interference with nature, the socio-economic control o f the biotechnology
32 U. Beck, ‘Risk Society Revisited: Theory, Politics and Research Programmes’ in B.Adam, U.Beck and J.van Loon 
(eds.), The Risk Society and Beyond (London: Zed Books, 2000) 5
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products and applications, the need for respect of environmental protection, as well as on 
concerns about the sustainable character of the agricultural and farming system in Europe, the 
efforts in shaping common authorization elements offer ‘an excellent example for the 
emerging tendency o f science and technology development and its political negotiation being 
gradually relocated from the local and transnational level.’33
Moreover, especially in Europe, agricultural biotechnology in its commercial 
development, raises significant ethical and socio-economic questions that are pertinent to the 
special role that small farms, traditional farming practices and local agricultural norms hold in 
the frame of the various regional and national agricultural and social contexts. Agricultural 
biotechnology has in fact raised questions about the potential economic effects of its 
widespread commercialisation upon the sustainability of conventional agricultural methods 
and European rural economies, as well as upon the global competitiveness and market 
position o f the European Union in the field o f frontier technologies. As a result, it is 
imperative that there is a social risk assessment approach in place in terms of information 
gathering, assessment o f potential impacts, and management of the potential risks. The task 
o f the Community regulator may be not an easy one in view of the need for accommodating a 
mosaic of genetic engineering interests, as well as for resolving the relevant conflicting views 
given the basic methodological and epistemological disagreements in interpreting biosafety 
information, and for arriving at socially acceptable risk management decisions.
The authorization of GMOs and GMO products into the European natural and 
agricultural environment has created severe public unease and political turmoil amidst a 
number o f food crises and uncertainties relating to the potentially irreversible risks associated 
with public health and biosafety. European institutions have been increasingly subject to 
criticism related to their ability to cope with the evermore complex regulatory challenges 
posed by the gradual harmonisation of rules and procedures across sectors and countries. 
Many academic studies have so far shed light on the several aspects o f the contentious 
operation o f the established licensing framework and on its effects upon the EU ’s 
institutional balance, external trade relations and its relationship with its Member States and 
public interest groups. The Union’s institutional response through the authorization process 
has, however, been overshadowed by extensive legal, political and international relations 
analyses o f the operation of this framework. The question of whether the EU institutions
33 H. Gottweis, ‘Transnationalizing Recombinant-DNA Regulation: Between Asilomar, EMBO, the OECD, and the 
European Community’ (December 2005) 14(4) Science as Culture 325
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have responded to the specified challenges of agricultural biotechnology in an integrated and 
balanced manner is yet to be answered. The following section sheds light on the particular 
questions raised and discussed in this study and introduces the main conceptual pillars.
1.2. The Questions
The thesis deals with the negotiation and implementation of the European Unions’s 
GM Deliberate Release Directive (DRD 1990/220, later 2001/18). Motivated by a wave of 
research dealing with the role o f institutional structures in the European Union across a wide 
range o f policy areas, I ask: Did any specific features o f the institutional structures under 
which the Deliberate Release Directive was negotiated, formulated and implemented shape 
the substance o f the legal framework and /or the outcome o f the established prior 
authorisation process? If  so, how? Which exacdy were the mechanisms underlying this 
process, and what have the long term consequences of this process been on the framework 
and its stated objectives?
The study will approach these questions on two main fronts. Firsdy, it will analyse the 
role o f institutional arrangements for the negotiation of rules on the control of the planned 
releases o f GMOs, examining whether and how this particular negotiation context affected 
the wording and the structure o f the authorization framework. Secondly, the thesis will 
examine the organisational and interpretational practices of the constellation of institutional 
actors, in charge of the operation of the established risk analysis framework. This will be 
contrasted with the regime’s emphasis on proceduralism as its preferred form of structuring 
decision-making for the assessment of GM-related risks. The thesis approaches the 
development and operation o f the EU’s legislative framework on the deliberate release of 
GMOs as a case study o f social regulation operating within a predominantly technical 
framework. In the frame of this research, agricultural biotechnology has been used as an area 
in which the capacity o f proceduralism to accommodate contending rationalities and 
introduce a less-hierarchical form of authorization control is assessed against the constraints 
and priorities set by the institutional context within which this administrative paradigm 
operates.
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In light o f the fact that debates about agricultural biotechnology have posed 
fundamental questions about how expert and non-expert forms o f argumentation should 
relate to public regulatory decision-making, the examination o f the procedure to authorize 
GM products at the EU level offers insights into the wider debates regarding the weight that 
should be given to scientific judgments in informing regulatory decisions in areas of high 
scientific complexity and uncertainty.
1.3. Analytical and Empirical Framework
The thesis employs two different conceptual models to frame the analysis o f the 
interaction between institutions and specific decision-making outcomes. The objective is to 
identify those causal links that might elucidate the particular role o f the institutions. These 
appear in the form of organizational arrangements and institutional practices, in the framing 
o f the prior authorization frameworks as well as in the normative force o f the 
proceduralisation paradigm in challenging traditional decision-making structures. The strand 
of historical institutionalism was chosen so as to suggest the particular role institutional 
arrangements played in the framing of the Deliberate Release framework. As the chosen 
regulatory paradigm for the adopted regime, proceduralisation is analysed in terms of how the 
organizational settings have responded to the challenges posed by the implementation o f the 
regime.
1.3.1. The Historic-Institutional development o f the DRD
The core of the ‘new institutionalist’ theoretical approach, in its various versions, is 
commonly characterized as bringing the role o f institutions and institutional structures into 
focus as objects of theoretical and empirical inquiry. The main assumption o f this approach is 
that institutions matter. Its main focus is on establishing the causal link between 
organizational practices and institutional structures, as well as on rules, beliefs and 
conventions built into the wider environment.34 As has been noted, ‘the aim of contemporary
34 See on this issue, P.J. DiMaggio, and W. W. Powell “Introduction” in W. W. Powell and P. J. DiMaggio (eds.), The 
New Institutionalism in Organization Analysis, (University o f Chicago Press: Chicago, 1991) 1-38; P.J. DiMaggio and 
W. W. Powell. “The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields,” 
(1983) 48 American Sociological Review 147-60; E.S. Clemens, and j. M. Cook “Politics and institutionalism: 
Explaining durability and change” (1999) 25 Annual Review o f  Sociology 441-66.
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institutionalism is to guide inquiry into which of many more-or-less stable features of 
collective choice settings are essential to understanding collective choice behaviour and 
outcomes.’35 In other words, new institutionalism ‘posits a more independent role for political 
institutions’36 and argues that the latter ‘structure political situations and leave their own 
imprint on political outcomes.’37
The identification of the impact o f the institutional environment upon regulatory 
outcomes, and the search for an explanation o f the exact role o f institutions in policy-making 
as the main objects o f analysis in the frame of this study seem to be better achieved via the 
use of historical institutionalism, its process-tracing historically-contextual approach and its 
micro-institutional analytical focus. As this theoretical approach brings the organisational 
structure at its sub-systemic level, which is exactly the locus o f policy-making in the EU, into 
a central explanatory position, it is particularly instructive in reconstructing the historical 
development of the genetic engineering framework, which took place within the Commission. 
Historical institutionalism is employed also for the identification o f the causal links between 
institutional arrangements, as a source of contextual constraints and/or opportunities, and 
decision-making outcomes but also in order to critically assess the role of institutional 
arrangements in shaping regulatory outcomes and in defining decisional processes.38 
Moreover, it moves beyond the traditional macro-institutional examination of the European 
Union’s decision-making procedures and sheds light on the Commission’s internal 
administrative fragmentation in terms of the functional specialisation of its composite units. 
This is seen as a crucial explanatory factor for its long-winded behaviour as an agenda setter 
and rule-maker on genetic engineering issues. Specifically, we can explore how its main 
organizational features such as administrative fragmentation and the presence of weak 
institutional structures o f inter-service coordination, affected the outcome of the relevant 
decision-making procedure. The dependant variable in this case is the policy outcome as it 
appeared in the form of the 1988 Commission proposal, but also in the eventually adopted 
Deliberate Release Directive 1990/220 and in its revised version (2001/18).
35 D.Diermeier and K.Krehbiel, ‘Institutionalism as a methodology’, 15(2) Journal o f  Theoretical Politics 124
36 J.March and J.Olsen, (1989) Rediscovering institutions: the organizational basis o f  politics (The Free Press: New 
York, 1989) 26
37 K. Thelen and S. Steuinmo, ‘Historical institutionalism in comparative politics’ in S.Steinmo, K.Thelen and 
F.Longstreth (eds.), Structuring politics: historical institutionalism in comparative analysis (Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, 1992) 9
38 S. Bulmer, ‘Institutions and policy change in the European Communities: the case of merger control’ (1994) 72(3) 
Public Administration 425
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1.3.2. Proceduralism: policy outcome and paradigm
Proceduralisation (or else proceduralism) is, in principle, focused on ‘how best to 
design and implement policy, rather than with normative concerns.’39 It also addresses the 
manner and the methods via which substantive ends can be achieved rather than their 
specification and imposition. The proceduralisation paradigm views the regulatory system as 
flexible and dynamic, ‘the concept of the end-point o f the decision-making process, which is 
the fundamental basis of substantive rationality, is thus abandoned.’40 Pursuant to the 
Commission’s viewing o f the proceduralism paradigm, institutional and regulatory design has 
been associated with the acknowledgment o f the need for the establishment o f an inclusive, 
all-encompassing deliberation structure, where non-expert forms o f knowledge and wider 
social constituencies are consulted prior to the formulation of the final authorisation decision 
and with a renewed emphasis on strengthening the social verification of the reliability o f the 
findings o f science.
In this study, proceduralisation is approached neither as being devoid o f substantive 
content, nor as a means for orientating the under examination authorisation framework 
towards a specific normative direction or the fulfilment o f a specific legislative target. It is a 
conceptual approach that aims at strengthening the information capacities o f the actors 
involved in its operation, deploying the necessary knowledge-generating structures and 
ensuring the constant updating of the respective knowledge base. The study views 
proceduralism as the outcome of an intra-Commission compromise over the preferred form 
of structuring the process for the evaluation of genetic engineering risks, but also as the 
reflection o f the weak character of the institutional settings in which the negotiation o f the 
DRD took place.
The choice o f proceduralism as the main type of organisation of the decision-making 
procedures and structures for the implementation of the relevant authorisation norms, in turn 
has signified the empowerment of the array of institutional actors that has been put in charge 
of the implementation of its procedural norms as well as of the interpretation o f its 
unqualified and abstractly worded substantive aims. Thus, the study further examines how
39 J.Black, ‘Proceduralizing Regulation: Part I’ (2000) 20(4) Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies 598
40 K. Getliffe, ‘Proceduralisation and the Aarhus Convention: Does increased participation in the decision-making 
process lead to more effective EU environmental law?’ (2002) 4 Environmental Law Review 105
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and in what ways the institutional practices that have been developed within the 
organisational context of the Deliberate Release framework, at both the risk assessment and 
risk management levels, have shaped the operation of the procedural paradigm, in terms of 
how the predominant institutional practices have conditioned the expected inclusive and 
reflexive outcomes o f this administrative paradigm as well as its neutral or non-purposive 
character. Since this paradigm, operating within a specific institutional setting, has become 
subject to multiple interpretations and decisions, its various conceptual shortcomings come to 
the surface.
1.3.3. Empirical methods of qualitative research
For the purposes o f this study, a qualitative research approach is employed as it is best 
suited to investigate complex and diversified social phenomena in context. The latter cannot 
be well captured by mathematical formalisation and quantitative techniques. By using 
qualitative research methods, the researcher undertakes a process o f inductive data analysis, 
which facilitates the application of historical institutionalism and proceduralisation in sub- 
systemic levels of government. Qualitative research pays particular attention to the 
idiosyncratic features o f processes, seeking to understand the uniqueness of each case.
The empirical analysis o f the historical evolution o f the DRD is based on two distinct 
methods: process tracing, through documentary analysis and semi-structured elite interviews 
and e-questionnaires, both o f which were directed at regulators, N G O s and scientific bodies 
at the national and European levels. The latter offer distinct perspectives insofar as the 
interviews require on-site immediate replies and imply an interaction with the interviewer, 
whilst the questionnaires have a pre-defined and limited amount o f questions, to which 
answers can be thought out and reviewed. Thus, we are able to triangulate the three different 
sources o f data and thus apply and combine several research methodologies in the study of 
the same phenomenon or historical process in order to corroborate and establish the validity 
o f the data collected, safeguard the reliability of the created database and achieve a better 
understanding o f the domain under investigation.
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1.4. Some preliminary answers
The negotiation and implementation o f the licensing framework for the commercial 
release of GMOs is particularly well-suited to an assessment o f the normative power o f the 
EU’s institutional structures in elaborating an inclusive risk analysis framework of reflexive 
character, due both to the novel challenges posed by this particular object of regulation, but 
also due to the evolving nature of the EU institutional context, in which the framework was 
negotiated and implemented. It is found that in the case o f both the negotiation and the 
implementation o f the regulatory framework on the control o f planned releases o f GMOs 
(Deliberate Release Directive 1990/220, later 2001/18) institutions, in the form of 
administrative arrangements and/or o f standardised interpretation and management practices, 
have in fact shaped its structure and largely predetermined the outcome of its operation.
It is argued, that in the case of the EU agricultural biotechnology framework, the 
particular institutional settings and arrangements created for its formulation and application - 
such as the appointment of the Directorate General o f the Environment, Nuclear Safety and 
Protection (DGXI) as the main drafter of the negotiation process and the creation o f an EU- 
wide expert-based risk assessment network structure including the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA) GMO Panel- have been decisive for the framework’s emphasis on 
procedures as the means for the establishment of a heterarchical administrative model that 
could secure inclusiveness and would promote space for new forms of argumentation. Its 
institutionally-driven development has not only shaped its structure in terms o f its emphasis 
on the design o f procedures, as well as on the generation o f scientific accounts, but has also 
had a long-lasting impact on the interpretation o f its provisions, its legislative output and the 
conceptualization o f its risk analysis framework. In putting forward this argument, I suggest a 
different approach for the examination of the operation o f technological risk decision-making 
frameworks o f regulatory character that departs from the traditional discussions on the 
assessment o f the validity and soundness o f those arguments expressed in favour either of 
science or of non-scientific argumentation as the main basis for shaping technological risk 
decisions. This departure is materialised through the identification o f the blurred boundaries 
between science and politics. More significantly, this is also the case via the use of.the 
institutional context not as a starting point that tends to be sidelined in the debates on risk 
regulation being projected as devoid of an internal logic and effected by instrumental value, 
but as the main explanatory factor and determinant of how technological risk is identified,
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conceptualised and controlled at a transnational level. In other words, the thesis examines 
systematically the institutional and organisational conditions that support the operation of a 
proceduralised risk assessment framework as the terms o f interpretation and implementation 
of the latter seem to be institutionally driven.
In the first part o f the thesis, the empirical findings suggest that the institutional 
framework within which the Deliberate Release framework was shaped became of decisive 
importance for its particular framing and its subsequent orientation. The shifts in the 
organisational structure for the coordination of the drafting procedure for the enactment of 
common rules on modem biotechnology primarily affected the definition of the scope o f the 
regulatory framework, and paved the way for a capturing o f the deliberation process by 
whichever D G  became more active exactly when the need for a Directive on genetic 
engineering applications was recognised at the Community level. It is argued that the 
appointment o f DGXI as chef de file for the preparation o f a DRD became a critical juncture 
that led to a development of the subsequent negotiation procedure along an environmentally- 
driven path, after which some of the regulatory options initially under consideration were no 
longer available. At the same time, the involvement o f a wide range of DGs into the 
negotiation procedure, the structurally weak position o f DG XI within the Commission and 
the need for achieving a consensus on the structure and the main features of the DRD, led to 
the drafting o f a proposal that bore the features o f an inter-institutional compromise in the 
form of a proceduralised regime. A sa result, it is argued that the procedural character and the 
prominent role of science in the proposed framework reflected the interaction among utility- 
maximizing actors with divergent rationales and different conceptual approaches towards the 
scope and the form of regulatory control.
It is further argued that particular interpretation practices, as developed by the 
Commission and the EFSA GMO Panel, have ‘captured’ the operation o f the prior 
authorisation framework. The standardisation o f practices, which are based on an expert- 
control driven ‘reading’ of the prescribed risk assessment and management duties that have 
been associated with the particular institutional context and organisational environment 
within which the Deliberate Release framework is operating, has diluted the inclusive and 
reflexive aspects o f this proceduralised regime. As a result, these institutional practices have 
weakened the regulatory force of the risk assessment conclusions and correspondent 
authorization decisions, perpetuated the self-referential character of the established licensing
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framework and failed to accommodate the various conceptualisations o f what constitutes 
acceptable risk in the field o f genetic engineering at the EU level. The examination of the 
operation o f the Deliberate Release regime has exposed a twofold misrepresentation 
regarding the portrayal o f the prior authorization control as pluralistic and reflexive. Firstly, 
whereas the proceduralised framework has been destined to offer an all-embracing 
deliberation structure that takes into consideration a wide array of factors and accommodates 
a variety of different conceptualisations, it takes only ‘available scientific evidence’ into 
account as the sole form of acceptable regulatory information.
The exclusive focus of the established authorisation practice on those forms of 
argumentation that derive from particular sources of scientific information have prevented a 
range of actors from becoming engaged in the respective deliberation framework in a 
meaningful manner. As a result of this practice, a variety o f risk assessment factors have not 
been taken into account at the level of shaping the required risk assessment conclusions, thus 
proceduralism, through its exclusive focus on objective ‘hard’ scientific data, has failed to 
deliver particularly inclusive, broadly acceptable and socially robust regulatory outcomes. 
Aside from this flawed projection of proceduralism as an instrumental means o f creating an 
all-encompassing risk assessment framework, the examination o f the risk assessment practice 
indicates a further misrepresentation of this administrative paradigm as the carrier of sound 
and value-neutral information. More specifically, the thesis evidences the inadequacy of this 
particular science-based risk assessment framework o f procedural character in offering 
objective risk assessment evaluations and in reflecting on the limitations of science in the field 
of agricultural biotechnology.
1.5. A  Road M ap
The first part of the thesis seeks to frame the terms o f the discussion by establishing 
the research design and the regulatory context of the object o f study. Chapter 2 discusses the 
research strategies employed in the thesis. It firstly frames the conceptual approaches utilized 
to define the object o f enquiry and the causal mechanisms under study. Secondly, it outlines 
the empirical framework under the qualitative process-tracing method, which was carried out 
through the use o f historical documentary analysis, semi-structured interviews and e- 
questionnaires and the resort to the triangulation method for the verification and validation of
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the collected data. The second part of the thesis is focused on the evolution of the 
negotiations that led to the adoption of the DRD. Chapter 3 reconstructs the Commission’s 
initial efforts to formulate a common regulatory framework on different aspects of genetic 
engineering and examines the various initiatives by different Commission DGs to establish 
and expand their own competences as utility maximization efforts within a context of 
institutional uncertainty. Chapter 4 focuses on the intra-Commission deliberation proceedings 
for the shaping o f the 1990 Directive on Deliberate Release as the first piece o f legislation 
aimed at setting control mechanisms for the release of GMOs. It focuses on how the various 
institutional arrangements utilized at this stage were decisively important in defining the 
Deliberate Release Directive as a proceduralised science-based regime.
The third part is an in-depth examination of the implementation of the DRD, before 
and after its subsequent revisions, and evaluates the role o f proceduralism as an institutional, 
rule-shaping and implementation paradigm. Chapter 5 provides a detailed account o f the 
initial implementation o f the established authorisation framework and the main problems that 
emerged during its operation, which led to its eventual revision and the further strengthening 
of its procedural features. Chapter 6 discusses the operation o f the amended licensing 
framework in relation to its procedural and inclusive character, as well as with regard to the 
separation of its risk analysis framework between an expert-based risk assessment stage and a 
broader policy-based risk-management one. Finally, Chapter 7 examines EFSA’s risk 
assessment practice within the context of the reflexive nature of the established procedural 
paradigm and questions the apparently objective and a-political character of its opinions. 
Finally, Chapter 8 provides some overall conclusions about the role of institutional 
arrangements and practices in shaping the structure and the normative orientation of the prior 
authorisation framework, the interplay between science and politics in the field of agricultural 
biotechnology, and the capacity o f proceduralisation as a new form of governance at the EU 
level to offer an efficient, legitimate and commonly acceptable risk analysis framework.
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Chapter 2: Research D esign
This chapter introduces the analytical and empirical framework o f the thesis. It 
examines the main conceptual and theoretical paradigms used for the assessment of the 
development and operation o f the deliberate release framework and describes the data and 
the main methodological tools for the empirical analysis.
2.1. Analytical Framework
In analysing the role of organisational structures and science in the negotiation and 
implementation of the DRD, two specific paradigms have been used to formulate the 
analytical framework. Institutionalism and the procedural rationality paradigm are used to 
define the object of analysis, the research questions and structure the identification o f causal 
links. To this end, the next section reviews historical institutionalism in terms of how it views 
the interaction between institutional and organisational structures and policy outcomes. The 
framework will later be applied in the analysis o f the relationship between intra-Commission 
negotiation schemes (institutions) and the Deliberate Release Directive as a proceduralised 
regime (policy outcome). The following section approaches procedural rationality and 
proceduralisation as both a normative framework and a regulatory technique. This will allow 
for an assessment o f whether the established science based Risk Assessment and Management 
procedures have indeed achieved the formulation of the inclusive reflective regulatory regime 
that they set out to create, seeking to generate a sufficiently broad knowledge base for the 
regulation o f a policy field characterised by scientific uncertainty and epistemological 
controversies.
2.1.1. Historical Institutionalism
New institutionalism encompasses a multiplicity of approaches including rational 
choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism.41 Although
41 See more in P.A. Hall and R.C. Taylor, ‘Political science and the Three New Institutionalising’ (1996) XLIV Political 
Studies 936-57; V. Lowndes, ‘Varieties of New Institutionalism: A Critical Appraisal’ (1996) 74:2 Public 
Administration 181-97; J. March and J. Olsen, ‘Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions’ (1996) 9:3 
Governance 247-64; W.R. Scott, Institutions and Organisations (SAGE: London, 1995) 24-32; B. Rothstein, ‘Political 
institutions: an overview’ in R.E.Goodin and H.-D.Klingermann (eds), A New Handbook o f Political Science (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 1996) 133-66
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new institutionalism is not yet considered a unified body of theoretical thought, it should be 
noted that the core of this theoretical approach, in its various versions, is commonly 
characterized as bringing the role o f institutions and institutional structures into focus as 
objects o f theoretical and empirical inquiry. The main assumption of this approach is that 
institutions matter and its main focus is on the extensive influence that institutions might 
exert upon regulatory outcomes. Thus, it focuses on establishing the causal link between 
institutional structures and organizational practices as well as on rules, beliefs, and 
conventions built into the wider environment.42 As has been noted, ‘the aim of contemporary 
institutionalism is to guide inquiry into which of many more-or-less stable features of 
collective choice settings are essential to understand collective choice behaviour and 
outcomes.’43 In other words, new institutionalism ‘posits a more independent role for political 
institutions’44 and argues that the latter ‘structure political situations and leave their own 
imprint on political outcomes.’45
The various strands of new institutionalism examine the ways in which institutions 
structure incentives, define roles, prescribe or proscribe behaviour or procedurally channel 
politics and alter political outcomes. Thus, they provide the necessary analytical framework 
for the identification o f the causal links between institutional arrangements, as a source of 
contextual constraints and/or opportunities, and decision-making outcomes, in our case with 
reference to the legislative proposal for the Deliberate Release (DR) framework. Although 
neo-institutionalist theories, in general, have been criticised for their inability to justify the 
emergence and transformation of institutions, this study is interested in neither o f these 
processes. It is in fact focused on trying to identify why and how institutions and 
organizational arrangements have mattered and are causally significant in the formulation of 
the DRD. The hypothesis is that the multiple and ever-changing institutional settings in which 
this framework was negotiated shaped the policy outcome determining the regulatory 
paradigm it would follow. Furthermore, this paradigm favoured and perpetuated many of the 
inherited institutional practices at the expense of its own objectives.
The explanatory value of historical institutionalism is employed both in the 
identification o f these causal links, and in the critical assessment o f the role of institutional
42 See note 34
43 D.Diermeier and K.Krehbiel, ‘Institutionalism as a methodology’ (2003) 15(2) Journal o f Theoretical Politics 124
44 See note 36
45 See note 37
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arrangements in shaping regulatory outcomes and in defining decisional processes.46 Its 
process-tracing approach is o f particular relevance as it focuses on the sub-systemic level of 
governance structures as the main determinant o f specific policy outcomes, which is exactly 
the locus of policy-making in the EU. Also o f importance are its attention on political 
developments that unfold over time in a historical context and its eclectic nature that includes 
the use of both calculus and cultural approaches to institutionalism.47 It has been noted that; 
‘A central goal o f most Historical Institutional analysis is to estimate the impact o f variations 
in institutional forms and configurations on a particular outcome or set of outcomes,’48 as is 
the case in this study, in which focus lies on how the shifts in the negotiation settings over the 
five years in which the possible ways of regulating biotechnology were under discussion and 
the DRD was negotiated altered its content.
There are no claims that the policy outcome is the result o f the actors that create it, or 
merely a function o f the positions of the actors49 involved in the negotiations. Rather the idea 
is that institutional settings and practices frame the space for the negotiations between the 
individual actors, in effect playing a crucial role in the policy outcome. Historical 
institutionalism takes ‘history seriously, as something more than a set o f facts located in the 
past.’50 In it ‘individuals and their interests are significantly constrained by institutional 
factors.’51 Broadly speaking, it stresses the centrality of institutional environments and the 
organisation o f policy- and decision-making in affecting policy outcomes.52 Indeed, historical 
institutionalism represents an attempt to illuminate how political struggles ‘are mediated by 
the institutional setting in which {they} take place.’53
46 S. Bulmer, ‘Institutions and policy change in the European Communities: the case of merger control’ (1994) 72(3) 
Public Administration 425
47 On this issue, see P.A.Hall and R.C.R.Taylor, note 41 at 940,950
48 E. S. Lieberman, ‘Causal Inference in Historical Institutional Analysis A Specification of Periodization Strategies’ 
(November 2001) 34 (9) Comparative Political Studies 1012-1013
49 In the context of institutionalist analyses, the actors can and will refer not only to individuals, but also formal and 
informal institutions.
50 P. Pierson and T. Skocpol, “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science” in I. Katznelson and H. V. 
Milner (eds), Political Science: State o f  the Discipline (W.W. Norton: New York, 2002) 698
51 E. Schon-Quinlivan, Administrative reform in the European Commission: From rhetoric to re-legitimisation, Paper 
based on the EU-CONSENT Workshop ‘The Commission and the European Civil Service’ (Sciences Po, Paris: 21-22 
June 2006) 7
52 See on this issue, P.A. Hall, Governing the Economy. The Politics o f  State Intervention in Britain and France (Polity 
Press: Cambridge, 1986) 19
53 G.J. Ikenberry, ‘Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign -Economic Policy’ in G.J.Ikenberry, 
D.A.Lake and MI.Mastanduno (eds), The State and American Foreign Economic Policy (Cornell University Press: 
Ithaca, NY, 1988) 222-3
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More specifically, there are two mechanisms whereby institutions shape not only the 
negotiation environment but also the substance o f policy outcomes that are of relevance to 
this study, both o f which are derived from historical institutionalism. The first derives from 
rational choice theory, and refers to the calculus approach, in which actors act strategically in 
order to maximize their utility. In this case, institutions are said to provide actors with a 
combination of certainty regarding other actors’ actions and constraints on their own, so that 
by defining the boundaries of the negotiation stage, each actors’ actions will be determined by 
their space for movement and their expectations o f other actors’ actions. In turn, the path 
dependency o f policy outcomes relates to very particular cases o f conjectures in which out of 
a set of possible paths, one is chosen ‘which result{s} in unanticipated effects and constrained 
choices, which are very difficult to reverse.’54 These conjectures can only be identified a 
posteriori, but they allow for an examination of the endurance and historical continuity o f 
institutional structures in specific contexts.
It needs to be mentioned that historical institutionalism is particularly instructive in 
elucidating the context-dependent development o f policy frameworks, as well as the causal 
links between the institutional context and policy-making outcomes, which is the case within 
the European Union. This is true, firstly because the EU has gradually become an extensively 
institutionalised organisational framework for policy- and decision-making, as one can notice 
by the number o f institutions and administrative bodies that have been established under its 
realm. Secondly, the micro-institutional and/or organisational focus of historical 
institutionalism on sub-systemic levels of governance and on the various forms o f 
organisational differentiation beyond official projections of institutional unity and coherence 
allows this interpretative approach to be used to examine the specific institutional 
configurations and administrative organisation o f decision-making structures within the 
functionally compartmentalised EU. Indeed, it has been noted that ‘institutionalist 
explanations of EU decision-making are most compelling at a systemic level.’55 The particular 
value o f historical institutionalism in elucidating specific aspects o f EU governance is its 
capacity to offer institutional explanations o f ‘the involvement o f key institutions and actors 
in the transfer o f competence at particular junctures o f the integration process.’56 This 
analytical approach o f sub-systemic governance is helpful in unveiling the role o f various
54 See note 51
55 J. Peterson and E. Bomberg, 'Rationality, Structure and Power in EU Governance: A Process Dominant Approach ’ 
paper prepared for the biennial conference of the European Community Studies Association Centre, (Seattle, 29 May-1 
June 1997) 11
56 S.J. Bulmer, ‘New Institutionalism, The Single Market and EU Governance’ ARENA Working Papers 97/25, 10
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institutional arrangements that usually remain unexamined in the frame of a negotiation 
process. One such was the appointment of D G  Environment as chef de file. The question 
becomes whether and how these organisational arrangements had an impact upon the focus 
and the structure o f the Commission’s initiatives.
The thesis’ objective is to establish how the Commission’s inner administrative 
settings became of crucial importance in the negotiation of the DRD. Thus, the object o f the 
analysis is in line with historical institutionalism, because it seeks an explanation of the role of 
institutions in policy-making through a process-tracing historically-contextual approach, and 
its micro-institutional analytical focus. As this theoretical approach brings the organisational 
structure at its sub-systemic level into a central explanatory position, it is particularly 
instructive in reconstructing the historical development of the genetic engineering framework, 
which took place within the Commission. Moreover, it moves beyond the traditional macro- 
institutional examination o f the European Union’s decision-making procedures and sheds 
light on the Commission’s internal administrative fragmentation in terms o f the functional 
specialisation o f its composite units as a crucial explanatory factor for its long-winded 
behaviour as an agenda setter and rule-maker on genetic engineering issues. Specifically, we 
can explore how its main organizational features such as administrative fragmentation and the 
presence o f weak institutional structures of inter-service coordination, affected the outcome 
of the relevant decision-making procedure. The dependant variable in this case is the policy 
outcome, as it appeared in the form of the Commission’s 1988 proposal, but also the 
eventually adopted DRD 1990/220 and the revised DRD 2001/18.
The analysis views each Directorate General as an autonomous actor with its own 
policy-making agenda, in order to examine the various ways in which the Commission’s 
internal divisions affected its policy outputs in terms o f the content of the authorisation 
framework it eventually proposed. The influence o f the Commission’s differentiated 
institutional structure, in organisational, procedural and normative terms, is assessed alongside 
the effects of the absence of effective policy coordination mechanisms within the 
Commission on the particular formulation o f the 1988 proposal and the general framing of 
the genetic engineering control issue.
The actors’ utilities can be defined as their objectives within the negotiation structures 
for the establishment o f the DRD. Coombes’ conceptualisation of the Commission as a
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multi-organisation and a ‘...porous organisation...in which different styles o f administration, 
implicit mission statements and different normative approaches compete for domination’57 is 
utilised. The Directorates General, are consequently approached as relatively self-contained 
quasi-autonomous actors with a wide range of executive, supervisory and legislative functions 
that pursue their own policy or institutional objectives in accordance with their functional 
responsibilities and are characterised by their own organisational identities and administrative 
cultures. To this end, the organisational interests, ideologies and value orientations pertinent 
to each Commission D G  involved are used as proxies for their utility. We can then see what 
seem to be departures from their positions, which cannot be explained solely by a 
maximization o f their interests. This is an attempt to assess the role o f institutional 
constraints or the lack thereof in altering their negotiation strategies. Through these 
mechanisms, the effects of the institutional settings upon the Commission’s regulatory agenda 
on genetic engineering and the DRD can be evaluated.
The calculus approach further allows us to trace the shifts in each Commission D G ’s 
position throughout the period under-study and to examine whether the shifts in the 
institutional settings affected the Commission’s legislative targeting in the area o f genetic 
engineering. In particular, there are three organisational structures of interest, one was 
framed by the establishment of the Biotechnology Steering Committee (BSC), and one was 
shaped through the founding o f Biotechnology Regulation Interservice Committee (BRIC) 
and its eventual transformation after the appointment o f DG XI as chef de file. Within this 
continuously changing organisational environment, specific Commission DG s such as DG 
Research, Industry and Environment were examined in terms o f how they made use o f these 
structures to maximise their utility.
Despite the criticisms that have been expressed against this strand o f new 
institutionalism, in terms o f placing too much emphasis on the institutional (negotiation) 
context as the sole explanatory device accounting for all policy outcomes, the emphasis on 
the role and the positions o f the Commission’s DGs in the process for the drafting o f EC 
biotechnology policy can be justified by their role as proxies for a wide array o f rationalities 
that were developed both in and outside of the Commission about the volume and the 
manageable character of the potential genetic engineering risks, the familiar or novel character
57 D. Coombes, Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community: a portrait o f  the Commission o f the EEC (G. 
Allen and Unwin: London, 1970) 291
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of these particular technological hazards, as well as about the capacities of science to provide 
long-term safety guarantees in this complex field of technological applications.
2.1.2. Procedural Rationality
Procedural rationality (also referred to as proceduralisation or proceduralism)58, has 
become an umbrella term that is used to indicate all those conceptual approaches and 
regulatory techniques that are focused on the organisational, procedural and institutional 
design of a decision-making framework and in general the setting up of procedures, rather 
than substantive rules and the process or steps taken in arriving at a decision.59 Under 
procedural rationality legal control is ‘indirect and abstract, for the legal system determines the 
organisational and procedural premises o f future action.,6<1 This particular neutral and 
restrained legal form of administrative control centres on the setting out o f common and 
abstract procedural requirements and the establishment o f organisational rules on governing 
decision makers. It is related to the style and structure o f decision-making, and as has been 
noted, this new approach to environmental governance lays emphasis upon the 
‘methodological and procedural aspects of decision-making.’61 According to Taylor, 
‘{Procedural rules do not speak as directly to the shape of the final decision as ‘substantive’ 
rules and are less powerful and efficient in influencing policy outcomes but they have greater 
generality.’62 In the case of the DRD, procedural rationality can be seen both as the policy 
and institutional outcome of the negotiation process and as the defining factor o f the 
institutional settings for the implementation of the Directive.
58 These terms are used interchangeably throughout this analysis to describe the regulatory focus on the formulation and 
organization of a system of multiple procedural obligations and an emphasis on the design and implementation o f a 
given policy rather than on the formulation of substantive standards for the shaping of specific outcomes.
9 See H.A. Simon, ‘Bounded rationality and organizational learning’ (1991) 2(1) Organization Science, Special Issue: 
Organizational Learning: Papers in Honor o f (and by) James G. March 125-134; K.H.Ladeur, ‘Social Risks, Welfare 
Rights and the Paradigm of Proceduralisation’, (1995) 2 EUI Working Paper in Law, S. Faucheux, G. Froger and G. 
Munda, ‘Toward an integration of uncertainty, irreversibility, and complexity in environmental decision making’ in J. 
van den Bergh and J. van der Straaten (eds.), Economy and ecosystems in change: analytical and historical approaches 
(Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 1997) 50 - 74
60 G. Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modem Law’ EUI Working Paper in Law 1982/14,255
61 K.-H. Ladeur, Towards a Legal Concept of the Network in European Standard-Setting in C. Joerges and E. Vos (eds), 
EU Committees. Social Regulation, Law, and Politics (Hart: Oxford/Portland, 1999) 165; S. Faucheux, G. Froger and G. 
Munda Toward an integration of uncertainty, irreversibility, and complexity in environmental decision making in J. van 
den Bergh and J. van der Straaten (eds.), Economy and ecosystems in change: analytical and historical approaches 
(Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 1997) 57
62 S. Taylor, Making Bureaucracies Think: The Environmental Impact Statement Strategy o f  Administrative Reform 
(Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA, 1984) 230
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Procedural measures and institutional structures aim at establishing legislative 
frameworks for the control of risk associated with technological applications characterised by 
weak knowledge bases and high scientific uncertainty, in the context of disagreements over 
the socio-economic and ethical consequences and the exact object of regulation. Whereas for 
some, it is simply a regulatory technique and/or strategy, for others proceduralisation signifies 
a radical change in the philosophy of environmental regulators when facing problems of 
implementation.63 Accordingly, proceduralisation has been associated with a multiplicity o f 
targets that range from entirely substantive ones, in terms of its role as a new legal paradigm 
seeking to enhance democracy, decentralisation and the establishment of heterarchical rather 
than hierarchical forms o f control,64 to purely instrumental viewings o f it as a new technique 
for socio-economic organisation of the obligations of the actors involved that can be applied 
in any field o f public policy.65 As a result, under procedural rationality, institutional and 
regulatory design has been associated with the acknowledgment of the need for the 
establishment of a structure in which non-traditional knowledge producers and wider social 
constituencies are consulted prior to the formulation of the final authorisation decision and 
with a renewed emphasis on the strengthening o f the social verification o f the reliability o f the 
findings o f science.
Firstly, under procedural rationality there is a recognition that any perspective framed 
in the regulatory arena is necessarily incomplete and provisional by nature. The establishment 
of proceduralised regimes has been associated with the acknowledgment of the need for the 
de-monopoli2ation of expertise and for the moderation of the existing informational 
inequalities and the ‘opening’ of traditional assessment practices. Knowledge is viewed not as 
certainty but as an object of constant elaboration, which should be adjusted to the changing 
conditions set by the latest technological developments and to the evidence collected through 
the acquisition o f the relevant regulatory experience.66
63 C. Knill and A Lenschow (eds), Implementing EU Environmental Policy: New Directions and Old Problems 
(Manchester University Press: Manchester, 2000)
64 J. Scott, ‘Flexibility, “ Proceduralization”  and Environmental Governance in the EU’ in J. Scott and G. de Burca 
(eds), Constitutional Change in the European Union (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2000) 274-5; see also, J. Mashaaw, 
‘Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory’ (1981) 61 Boston University Law Review 885 and J. 
Mashaw, ‘Dignitary Process: A Political Psychology of Liberal Democratic Citizenship’ (1987) 39 University o f  Florida 
Law Review 433.
65 Richardson, G, ‘The Legal Regulation of Process’ in G. Richardson and H. Genn (eds), Administrative Law and 
Government Action (Oxford, 1994) 111-113
66 See on this issue, N. Lebessis, and J. Paterson, ‘Proceduralising European Law: Institutional Proposals’ in O.De 
Schutter, N.Lebessis and J.Paterson (eds.), Governance in the European Union (Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities: Luxembourg, 2001) 274
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According to this particular conceptualisation, the proceduralisation paradigm is 
structured upon the assumption that scientific knowledge is inherently limited in informing 
regulatory decisions and that in general there is no privileged viewpoint in the sense that no 
expert or stakeholder can claim to have an unquestionable understanding o f problems, 
objectives and means. In other words, the emphasis on procedural rationality has been 
associated with the recognition of the limitations of scientific knowledge and of technical 
expertise to offer holistic responses to the challenges of novel technological applications that 
are characterised by high scientific uncertainty and potentially irreversible risks.
Procedural rationality is a means o f transcending the boundaries between different 
forms o f expertise and most importantly o f encouraging the regulatory structures to expose 
and address the inherent limitations and unexamined assumptions and uncertainties 
underlying expert views. Thus, apart from its all-encompassing character that involves the 
need for integrating wider social constituencies into the decision-making procedures, in order 
to gather a diversity o f perspectives and to consider all forms o f public justification, 
proceduralisation also aims at establishing responsive and reflexive forms o f decision-making. 
Responsive or reflexive law ‘is an intriguing concept that corresponds to the trends in the rate 
and scope of change and the inherent reflexivity o f scientific and policy knowledge.’67
Reflexivity in proceduralist regimes is evidenced not only through its focus on the 
development o f structures that might facilitate the dissemination and constant assessment of 
the information entering into the decision-making processes, but also in the establishment of 
a pluralistic scientific expertise that could moderate the structural inequalities in power and 
information. In this respect, the aim of this conceptual approach has been associated with the 
‘nature of the conflicts and the choices that implicitly or explicitly will have to be resolved 
through time.’68 Teubner’s conceptualization of reflexive law is particularly relevant, as 
according to him it ‘seeks to structure bargaining relations so as to equalize bargaining power’ 
{...} and ‘affects the quality of outcomes without determining the agreements that will be 
reached. Unlike formal law, it does not take prior distributions as given. Unlike, substantive 
law, it does not hold that certain contractual outcomes are desirable.’69
67 D.J.Fiorino, ‘Rethinking environmental regulation: perspectives on law and governance’ (1999) 23 Harvard 
Environmental Law Review 467-468
68 S. Faucheux, G. Froger and G. Munda, ‘Toward an integration of uncertainty, irreversibility, and complexity in 
environmental decision making’ in J. van den Bergh and J. van der Straaten (eds.), Economy and ecosystems in change: 
analytical and historical approaches (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 1997) 61
69 G.Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modem Law’ (1983) 17 Law and Society Review 256
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A further qualification o f the paradigm relates to the distinction between instrumental 
and dignitarian viewings o f proceduralised regimes. The first one associates the design o f the 
procedure with the actual outcome of the decision-making structure, thus procedural 
requirements and organizational arrangements can be formulated and inserted into the corpus 
of the legislative framework as long as they confer objectivity, precision and rationality to the 
final decision. This instrumental viewing sees proceduralism as a means to facilitate the 
delivery o f a ‘correct’ outcome in terms o f its technical accuracy providing guarantees for its 
application efficiency, uniform implementation and for its contribution to the achievement of 
the set legislative objectives. The second, dignitarian viewing approaches the design of 
procedural arrangements and the formulation of procedural obligations independently of the 
final outcome, focusing instead on the protection o f specific values that relate to the 
procedural rights of individuals or groups, in terms o f safeguarding the procedural equality of 
the actors involved and the fairness of the deliberation process as such.
In the context of the dynamic cycles whereby institutions affect policy outcomes, 
proceduralism is seen as the outcome of the evolution o f the institutional settings in which 
the negotiation for the DRD took place. This policy choice in turn feeds back into the 
process, as it specifically sets out to focus on the procedural and organisational structure for 
the implementation of the regulatory regime, so that at the stage of implementation 
proceduralism goes on to define the institutional setting in which the decision-making 
processes take place. Thus, the study further examines how and in what ways the institutional 
practices that have been developed within the organisational context o f the Deliberate Release 
framework, at both the risk assessment and risk management levels, have shaped the 
procedural paradigm, in terms o f how institutions have altered its expected outcomes and its 
neutral or non-purposive character. Since this paradigm, operating within a specific 
institutional setting, becomes subject to multiple interpretation decisions, its various 
conceptual shortcomings come to the surface.
Here, the regulatory emphasis on the organisation and specification o f the procedural 
aspects o f the required risk assessment and management of modem biotechnology risks is 
approached in relation to the specific structural features o f the process of regulatory control 
of new technologies. Furthermore, the context-related problems that have become associated 
with the required consultation procedures are: the limited understanding o f the problems 
under consideration due to the division between expert and lay forms o f knowledge, the
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fragmentation o f expert knowledge in a multi-disciplinary policy environment and the 
informational inequalities among the main actors involved in the process o f risk assessment 
and management.70 All these are examined. In other words, the thesis views proceduralisation 
beyond its potential for infusing flexibility at the different levels of European decision-making 
governance with reference to the distribution o f competence among the supranational, the 
intergovernmental and the local levels. Although relevant to the broader discussion on 
proceduralism, the operation and the effects of the application of this particular form of 
organising legal obligations on the discussions about the need to enhance the democratic 
character o f the EU ’s decision-making procedures in terms o f the decentralisation of its 
substantive aspects and centralisation of the procedural ones, as well as the reinforcement of 
the subsidiarity principle, are not addressed.
More concretely, under this form of administrative rationale, we assess the regime’s 
ability to reconnect experts with society, as well as with the multiple non-scientific concerns 
of the latter beyond specific substantive targets and expert-driven legislative strategies. The 
thesis examines whether the range of stakeholders that can become involved and o f 
viewpoints that can be taken into account in the frame of the operation o f a safety-driven 
framework o f a technical character is being broadened at the level o f its design and 
implementation, reinforcing the inclusive function o f the established institutional structures. 
The proceduralisation paradigm is also seen to be a mode of safeguarding the self-referential 
and reflexive character of the science-based decision-making structure in terms o f second- 
guessing the data produced and re-articulating the employed interpretative model o f decision­
making in view of the inherent uncertainties and subjective assumptions of experts. Thus, the 
extent to which the framework has indeed led to a re-evaluation o f the role o f science in the 
field o f genetic engineering is assessed. In identifying the presence or absence o f the 
procedural rationality, allows for the assessment of the role of the institutional settings in 
policy making and, in effect, questions whether policy making can be de-contextualised from 
the institutional settings where it is created and implemented.
2.2. Empirical Framework
Having established an analytical framework, attention shifts to the methodology, in 
particular to ‘research methods (which) represent lines o f action taken towards the empirical
70 See note 66 at 272-275
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world’71, to define a strategy for the examination of the DR framework. A qualitative research 
approach, which investigates the why and how of decision making, as opposed to what, 
where, and when of quantitative research and broadly refers to "any kind o f research that 
produces findings not arrived at by means o f statistical procedures or other means of 
quantification,"72 was employed. Qualitative research is best suited for investigating complex 
and diversified social phenomena in context, which are not well captured by mathematical 
formalisation and quantitative techniques. By using qualitative research methods, the 
researcher undertakes a process of inductive data analysis, which facilitates the application of 
historical institutionalism and proceduralisation in sub-systemic levels of government. 
Qualitative research has a strong interpretative character. It is aimed at discovering the 
meaning, events have for the individuals who experienced them, and the interpretations of 
those meanings by the researcher. It pays attention to the idiosyncratic features o f processes, 
seeking to understand the uniqueness of each case.
The empirical analysis o f the historical evolution of the DRD was formulated as 
process tracing, which was constructed through documentary analysis and semi-structured 
elite interviews and questionnaires, both o f which were directed at regulators, NG Os and 
scientific bodies at the national and European levels. Insofar as the interviews required on­
site, immediate replies and implied an interaction with the interviewer, the questionnaires 
offered distinct perspectives as they contained a pre-defined and limited number o f questions, 
to which answers can be thought out and reviewed. Thus, we were able to triangulate the 
three different sources of data, applying and combining several research methodologies in the 
study of the same phenomenon or historical process so as to corroborate and establish the 
validity o f the data collected, safeguard the reliability o f the database and achieve a better 
understanding o f the domain under investigation.
Implicit in this approach is the need to collect large amounts of data, from a wide 
range o f sources, usually via extensive documentary research. The objective was to re-build a 
detailed account o f a process in which information was corroborated and validated across 
sources, allowing the researcher to establish “the validity of causal relationships.. .well-suited
71 N.K. Denzin, The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods (Prentice-Hall: Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ, 1989) 292
72 A. Strauss and J. Corbin, Basics o f  qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures and techniques (Sage 
Publications Inc: Newbury Park, CA, 1990) 17
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to testing theories in a world marked by multiple interaction effects.’73 The first step was the 
documentary analysis to enable a detailed reconstruction of the process of negotiation of the 
90/220 Directive from 1984 to 1990 when the final draft was approved. We then worked 
with the implementation at both the national and Community levels and the initiatives for the 
revision o f the DRD and for the establishment of a centralised Community Agency on issues 
o f food protection.
This analysis was based on four main sources of evidence:
• published EC documents: Commission Communications, Green Papers, policy 
proposals, speeches, Council Decisions, European Parliament (EP) Resolutions, 
Opinions of the Economic and Social Committee.
• unpublished Commission documents: internal policy drafts, notes and working 
documents, meeting reports, position papers, internal and external memos and 
letters, meetings agendas and minutes, and correspondence all of which were 
provided in confidentiality by Commission officials.
• press publications: documenting Commission policy-making and the various 
positions o f the member states throughout the process, and
• secondary sources: academic and policy research dealing with the negotiation.
Efforts were made to ensure that all pieces o f relevant and available documentary 
evidence from the Commission were collected. Difficulty was encountered with collecting 
data from many of the people involved in the negotiation for the 90/220 and for its various 
amendments, as they have since retired. However, key members of the negotiation team 
offered access to their personal archives, enabling access to internal policy drafts, working 
documents and meeting agendas and minutes.
Furthermore, specific archive and documentation centres and libraries provided a 
significant amount of historical material. These were D G  Research’s BIODOC archive, the 
Library o f the UK Food Standards Agency, the Library of the UK Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the Library o f the European Food Safety Authority in 
Parma and the British Library of Political and Economic Science (BLPES). The collection of 
the empirical material was primarily conducted on-site in the Commission’s offices in 
Brussels. Secondary literature and publications, press reports and similar documents provided 
additional interpretations o f EU ’s policy efforts, which were compared and contrasted with 
the arguments raised in interviews and with those put forward in official documents. Most of
73 P.A. Hall, Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics, paper presented at the Conference on 
Comparative Historical Analysis in Brown University (April 27-29,2000)
47
the articles used in the frame of this research came from trade, scientific and research 
journals, biotechnology newsletters, legal periodicals and newspapers. The study also 
benefited from the examination of a large number of articles in newspapers, reviews and 
periodicals, etc.
Some relevant documentation was unavailable for examination, primarily having been 
classified as confidential because it contained minutes o f discussions between Commission 
officials and representatives o f member states in the Regulatory Committees of the 90/220 
and the 2001/18 Directives, or because they contained information on authorisation cases 
that are still pending. Concerning the request for the explanatory memorandums and the 
Commission proposals regarding those Commission Decisions that had been dealt with the 
authorisation o f GMO products under Directives 2001/1 8 /E C  and 1990/220, access was 
granted by the Commission’s services on products for which a Decision has already been 
adopted under Directive 2001 / l  8/EC.
2.2.1. Semi-structured interviews
Apart from the resort to access historical documentation and archives, invaluable 
empirical evidence was acquired through formal and informal semi-structured interviews, 
conducted through field work in six visits to various national and supranational institutions, 
during which access was gained to policy participants o f various ranks, including high-level 
European officials, member state representatives, European Parliament staff members and 
interest group representatives.
Interviews have more recently been considered as indispensable to process tracing 
studies, as a means to corroborate information when used in the context of triangulation. 
Although, traditionally process tracing for historical analysis has been associated with 
documentary and archival analysis, elite interviews in particular are being advocated as they 
provide detailed accounts of a specific policy process, insofar as they enable the uncovering of 
the actual motivations and perspectives o f the key participants in a process, and enable 
‘reconstructing the decisions and actions behind’ a particular chain o f events.74 To this end, 
the study made use o f two different approaches for the selection o f those actors that fall
74 O. Tansey, Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case fo r  Non-probability Sampling, Politics Paper (Nuffield 
College, Oxford, 2006) 6
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under the definition of elite interviewees; these were the positional and reputational.75 
According to the first, the researcher identified desirable respondents on the basis of their 
position within a specific organizational structure or by virtue o f their membership, 
involvement or portfolio in the frame of a specific decision-making procedure. Pursuant to 
this approach, an initial list o f actors was made according to their position within the 
Commission and the national governments. According to the reputational approach, 
respondents were selected on the basis of whether these actors were deemed influential in a 
particular political arena.
The interviews conducted in this research study were semi-structured.76 The choice o f 
this specific interview technique is justified by the multiple advantages that it offers, especially 
in relation to the collection o f qualitative data.77 First o f all, semi-structured interviews are 
conducted with a fairly open framework, but with a fixed set of topics to be covered. They 
consequently allow for focused, conversational, two-way communication and for a much freer 
exchange between interviewer and interviewee. This type o f qualitative interview is 
characterized by ‘a low degree o f structure imposed by the interviewer; a preponderance of 
open questions; a focus on ‘specific situations and action sequences in the world of the 
interviewee’78 rather than abstractions and general opinions.’79 The majority o f questions were 
created during the interview, allowing both the interviewer and the person being interviewed 
the flexibility to probe for details or discuss issues. A further advantage of this technique was 
that the interviewer could probe areas suggested by the respondent's answers, of which the 
interviewer had no prior knowledge or of that had an importance that was not apparent at the 
outset. As has been noted, ‘Although the researcher typically begins with some basic ideas 
about what the interview will cover, the interviewee’s responses shape the order and structure 
of the interview. {...} Each interview is tailored to the research participant.’80
75 See on this issue, B. Denitch ‘Elite Interviewing and Social Structure: An Example from Yugoslavia’ (1972) 36 Public 
Opinion Quarterly 143-58; and S. Weming Rivera, P. M. Kozyreva and E. G. Sarovskii, ‘Interviewing Political Elites: 
Lessons from Russia’, (December 2002) 35(4) PS: Political Science and Politics', K. Farquharson, ‘A Different Kind of 
Snowball: Identifying Key Policymakers’ (October 2005) 8(4) International Journal o f  Social Research Methodology
76 See on this issue, B. L. Leech, ‘Asking Questions: Techniques for Semistructured Interviews’ PS: Political Science 
and Politics, (Dec. 2002) 35 (4) 665-668.
77 See on this issue, C. Schmidt, ‘The Analysis o f Semi-structured Interviews’ in U. Flick, E. v. Kardorff and I. Steinke 
(Eds.), A Companion to Qualitative Research (Sage: London, 2004) 296-302
78 S. Kvale, ‘The qualitative research interview: a phenomological and a hermeneutical mode of understanding’(1983) 14 
Journal o f  Phenomological Psychology 176
79 N. King, ‘Qualitative Reesarch Interview’ in C. Cassell and G. Symon (eds), Qualitative Methods in Organizational 
Research: A Practical Guide (Sage Publications: London, 1994) 118-134
80 K.G. Esterberg, Qualitative Methods in Social Research (McGraw-Hill: Boston, 2002) 87
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Considering that the issues discussed in this research study were of a highly 
confidential and conflicting character, the less intrusive character o f semi-structured 
interviews, in terms o f the open-ended character of the questions raised, allowed respondents 
time and scope to talk about their opinions on a particular subject. The open-ended character 
of the questions posed also allowed for some questions to arise naturally during the interview 
“You said a moment ago...can you tell me more?”. Further, semi-standardised interviews 
allowed the exposition of a stock of knowledge on the topic at hand, as well as of the various 
implicit subjective assumptions to come to the surface and become articulated.81
Between 2004 and 2007, thirty interviews were conducted, either in person or by 
phone, with key actors that had become related with either the negotiation process for the 
formulation of the Deliberate Release framework or with its actual implementation both in 
the Commission (Research, Health and Consumer Protection, Environment, Commission 
Legal Service) and in the European Parliament, experts from other European bodies (EFSA, 
Scientific Steering Committee, Scientific Committee on Plants, European Group on Ethics in 
Science and New Technologies, Comite Europeen de Normalisation (CEN)) and at the 
national level (national Ministries o f the Environment and competent authorities for the 
supervision of the implementation of the Deliberate Release Directive in the UK and 
Greece). Furthermore, interviews were conducted with interested parties outside of the 
Commission including environmental non-govemmental organizations (Greenpeace, Friends 
of the Earth, GeneWatch), biotechnology consultancies and independent scientists and 
research centers. The elite interviews included four Heads of Commission Units, members of 
the Management Board of EFSA and the directors of the various competent national 
authorities, all o f whom participated in the negotiation of the DRD at some stage.
2.2.2. Semi-structured e-questionnaires
Following the same rationale and topics that were covered in the semi-structured 
interviews, open ended question questionnaires were sent through electronic mail to key 
actors, to follow up on some of the interviewees’ thoughts and to extend the number of 
sources. However, this means of interacting with actors proved useful not only as a means of 
accumulating the information and points o f view and increasing the contact time with
81 See: U. Flick, An introduction to qualitative research (3rd edition) (Sage: London,2006) 155-161
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interviewees, but also as a means o f acquiring answers that can only be the result o f a more 
thought out reply to the questions set out. Approximately ninety replies to these 
questionnaires were received from: Commission officials (DGs Internal Market and Services, 
Enterprise and Industry, D G  SANCO (Consumer Policy and Health Protection), 
Environment, Research and Agriculture); Members o f the European Parliament, the 
European Social and Economic Committee, European Food Safety Authority, the Scientific 
Committee on Plants, the Scientific Steering Committee, the CEN, the Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre and European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies; officials 
from competent national authorities and national ethics committees (Sweden, Denmark, 
Spain, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Finland and Slovenia); the European Association for Bioindustries (EUROPABIO); 
and several N G O s (GRAIN, GM Watch, GeneWatch).
2.2.3. Triangulation
The variety o f data collected and analysis techniques employed in this study offered 
the opportunity for the application of the multi-method approach of ‘triangulation,’82 as the 
combination o f methodologies in the study o f the same phenomena, for the verification o f 
the information provided.83 This was seen as an appropriate strategy for ensuring the 
credibility o f the qualitative analyses and the preferred line in the social sciences,84 as a means 
of addressing the various inconsistencies in both methodological and evidentiary terms.83 As 
has been noted; ‘Triangulation is typically a strategy (test) for improving the validity and 
reliability of research or evaluation of findings.’86 The combination of multiple methods, 
empirical materials, perspectives and observers in a single study ‘is best understood {...} as a
82 See notes 71 and 81
83 N.K. Denzin and Y. S Lincoln, The Landscape o f Qualitative Research (Sage Publishing: Thousand Oaks, CA, 1998); 
C..Marshall and G.B. Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research (3rded.)(Sage Publishing: Thousand Oaks, CA: 1999); 
T. A. Schwandt,. Qualitative Inquiry: A Dictionary o f  Terms (Sage Publishing: Thousand Oaks, CA: 1997)
84 See more on this issue, in P.V. Aelst and S. Walgrave ‘Who is that (wo)man in the street? From the normalisation o f 
protest to the normalisation o f the protester’ (2001) 39 (4) European Journal o f  Political Research 461-486; P.H. J. 
Davies 'Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in the Study of the Intelligence 
and Security Services' (2001) 21(1) Politics 73-80; D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds) Theory and Methods in Political 
Science (2 ed) (Palgrave: Basingstoke, 2002) C hp.ll; D. Marsh and M. Read Private Members’ Bills, (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1988); D. Marsh, D. Richards and M. Smith ‘Bureaucrats, Politicians and Reform in 
Whitehall: Analysing the Bureau-shaping Model’ (2000) 30 (3) British Journal o f  Political Science 461-482.
85 See: G. Gaskell. and M.W. Bauer Towards Public Accountability: beyond Sampling, Reliability and Validity’ in M. 
W. Bauer and G. Gaskell, Qualitative Researching with Text, Image and Sound : A Practical Handbook fo r  Social 
Research (Sage: London, 2000) 345
86 N.Golafshani, ‘Understanding Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research’ (December 2003) 8(4) The Qualitative 
Report 603
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strategy that adds rigor, breadth, and depth to any investigation,’87 even if one can never be 
sure that an account is true, since there is no independent and absolutely reliable access to 
reality.88
Having created three rather extensive databases, one containing official and unofficial 
documentation on the negotiations for the formulation o f the DRD, as well as on the 
discussions for its revision and the ad hoc meetings for the examination of the various 
authorisation cases, a second one consisting of data collected in interviews organised with a 
wide array of stakeholders and a third one containing press reports and various secondary 
sources, the goal of the triangulation method was to provide a cross-reference between 
interview data and the collected archival records. Whilst official Commission documents and 
secondary sources provided an initial overview of the issues under examination, interviews 
with key stakeholders were used to corroborate the breadth and depth o f documentary 
findings but also to guide the acquisition o f further documentary material. Specifically, 
‘methodological triangulation’ and more concretely the ‘between—method’ or ‘across-method’ 
triangulation which involves the combination of dissimilar methods to measure the same 
unit89 was carried out. As Marotzki has noted, this particular type o f triangulation involves 
‘the combination o f reactive procedures {such as interviews}, and non-reactive procedures 
{such as documents}’90 making ‘it possible to capture different aspects o f the research issue.’91 
More specifically, a ‘triangulation triad’ o f primary sources (such as interviews) and 
documentary sources with published secondary-source information was considered as the 
‘optimum solution.’92
2.3. Concluding Remarks
This chapter introduced the theoretical paradigms and empirical methods that have 
been used for the framing and analysis of the issue under discussion. To this end, it discussed 
the relevance o f historical institutionalism and proceduralism to the structuring o f the
87 U. Flick, ‘Triangulation revisited: Strategy of validation or alternative?’ (1992) 22 Journal fo r  the Theory o f  Social 
Behaviour 194
88 See: N.G. Fielding and L.L. Fielding, Linking Data (Sage: London, 1986)
89 See note 71 at 301-304
90 See: W. Marotzki, “Forschungsmethoden der erziehungswissenschaftlichen Biographieforschung“ in H-H. Kruger & 
W. Marotzki (Hrsg.), Erziehungswissenschaftliche Biographieforschung (Opladen, Leske & Budrich: 1995) 55-89
91 U. Flick, ‘Triangulation in Qualitative Research’ in U. Flick, E. v. Kardorff and I. Steinke (2004), see note 77 at 180
92 P.H.J. Davies, ‘Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation o f Elite Interview Data in the Study of the 
Intelligence and Security Services’ (2001) 21(1) Politics 78
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analytical framework and to the identification o f the main causal links and the setting of the 
necessary points o f reference and illustrated the main methodological tools used for the 
collection of the relevant empirical evidence. The following chapters reconstitute the history 
behind the foundation and development o f the EU authorization framework for GMO 
releases and examine the role of institutions in the design and normative orientation of this 
licensing regime.
53
Chapter 3: Initial Shaping o f genetic engineering rules (1982-1986): com petence  
m axim ization under institutional and scientific uncertainty
The chapter provides a brief historical account o f the drafting of regulatory 
instruments on genetic engineering. The chapter examines the Commission’s initial efforts to 
shape a coherent legislative control framework on genetic engineering despite the friction 
between the field’s multi-sectoral character and the particular functional, vertical specialisation 
o f the Commission’s composite organisational units (Directorates General). This 
fragmentation, exacerbated by each D G ’s internal autonomy, became the basic institutional 
constraint in the Commission’s efforts to formulate common positions and created the need 
for the founding of inter-service groups for the establishment o f a minimum organisational 
coordination, mostly between D G  Research and D G  Industry. The competence battles 
between these particular Directorates General conditioned the Commission’s attempts to 
shape a unified regulatory narrative. The main DGs acted more as carriers o f regulatory 
initiatives in those fields of genetic engineering that related to their sectoral interests, as they 
sought to maximize their respective organisational utilities through the expansion of their 
competences into a new area o f public policy and regulatory interest. The conflicting nature 
o f their interests left little space for actual interaction. This led to an erratic approach on 
behalf o f the Commission in setting the objectives of its regulatory initiatives in the field of 
biotechnology. In the end, the established ad hoc coordination structure proved insufficient 
to mediate the approaches o f the main DGs involved towards the preferred uses o f genetic 
engineering and their control.
Further, the chapter finds evidence of the ad hoc character o f the Commission’s rule- 
shaping settings in the field o f genetic engineering. This can be seen to exemplify the 
Commission’s lack o f a coherent and consistent strategy on the development and control of 
life sciences and modem biotechnology. A situation that eventually resulted in the creation of 
a regulatory patchwork o f low binding force, rather than of an integrated system of rules. The 
Commission’s initial interest in enacting uniform regulatory safety standards when conducting 
rDNA (Recombinant Deoxyribonucleic Acid) research was motivated by concerns regarding 
its potential effects on workers’ health and safety. This interest was soon replaced by the need 
for the establishment of standardized regulatory conditions for the creation of a friendly 
environment for industrial investment in the development o f modem biotechnology and for 
enhancing the competitiveness of European bio-industries and agro-food production. The 
Commission’s eventual shift o f regulatory interest towards the establishment of internal
54
market conditions for the free movement of biotechnology products materialised through the 
formulation o f a minimum set o f guidelines for controlling novel technological risks to the 
environment and public health. This will be analysed in the following chapter.
The first section examines the efforts of D G  Research and D G  Industry to become 
engaged in the formulation of legislative measures for the protection of the health of 
biotechnology workers, while also strengthening the competitiveness of European 
bioindustries. As biotechnology became more prominent in the Commission’s policy agenda, 
several DGs sought to establish some form o f competence over this new multifaceted policy 
field. This intra-Commission negotiation process was marked by ever-changing objectives. 
Initially, the research potential stage in the development o f modem biotechnology in Europe 
allowed D G  Research to acquire a dominant institutional position within the Commission. 
Gradually, the power for initiating and drafting biotechnology rules within the Commission 
was shifted to D G  Industry. Section 2 analyses the failure of the operation o f inter-service 
coordination mechanisms to provide the necessary incentive/constraint structures to ensure 
cooperation among the D G ’s and to lead to a sustainable political compromise within the 
Commission.
3.1. Claiming competences in an unsettled policy environment
It needs to be mentioned that the problem of tensions and of ‘fierce internal 
conflicts’93 within the European Commission is not a recent phenomenon. Indeed, the very 
nature o f the Commission — a single institution encompassing large and relatively self- 
contained Directorates General (DGs), a collection of feudal fiefdoms94— is a recipe for 
fragmentation95 and internal tension.96 Owing to the internal divisions running through it,97
93 T. Christiansen, ‘Tensions of European Governance: Politicized Bureaucracy and Multiple Accountancy in the 
European Commission’ (1997) 4 Journal o f European Public Policy 73-90
94 D. Coombes, Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community (George Allen & Unwin: London,1970)
95 As Weale notes: Since, at the European level, DGs are the guardians of their sectoral interests, it is hardly surpising 
that sectoral complexity makes for difficult decision-making in institutional terms.’In A. Weale, “Environmental rules 
and rule-making in the European Union” (1996) 3(4) Journal o f  European Pubic Policy 608
96 As Mazey and Richardson note: ‘One o f the features of the EC policy process is the rather high degree of sectorisation 
of policy making. Whilst sectorisation and segmentation are present in all bureaucracies and agencies, the European 
Commission is especially segmented.’ S. Mazey, and J. Richardson, ‘EC policy making: an emerging European policy 
style?’ in J.D. Liefferink, P.D. Lowe and A.P.J. Mol (eds.), European Integration and Environmental Policy London 
(Belhaven Press: London/New York, 1993) 121
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authors have for some time regarded it as a ‘multi-organization,’ in which the policy-making 
o f different administrative units creates different bureaucratic and organizational logics.98 
More specifically, the high degree of functional specialisation and the sectoral segmentation o f 
its internal organisational structure has become a permanent feature of the Commission’s 
operation as a policy initiator.
Each one o f the Commission DGs involved in the formulation of genetic engineering 
rules approached the need for control of the various applications o f genetic engineering in 
instrumental terms, as utility-maximizers and sought to promote and safeguard those aspects 
o f modem biotechnology that would allow it to maintain what it considered to be under its 
own sphere o f policy influence and that might enable an extension o f its competences. The 
latter was done in an ad-hoc manner, which might in turn have been the main reason behind 
the Commission’s ever-changing objectives in the field o f genetic engineering. Each D G  
acted as a competence-maximizer and attempted to create its own ‘expert-based hierarchy’ as 
a means o f adjusting the framing of the need for the control o f genetic engineering risks to its 
own organisational self-interests.
Although the need for an ‘integrated’ approach had been advocated in the 1983 
Commission communications99 on the basis o f the FAST (Forecasting and Assessment in the 
Field o f Science and Technology) report,100 in practice the structure o f the Commission, with 
its quasi-autonomous Commissioners in combination with the multi-sectoral and boundary- 
crossing character o f modem biotechnology led to the creation o f a patchy institutional 
negotiation setting that undermined the efforts for an operational and meaningful 
convergence and failed to achieve the required inter-service cooperation. Before examining 
the operation of the created inter-service coordination structure, the regulatory initiatives of 
DGs Research and Industry, as the first main carriers o f policy initiatives in the field o f 
genetic engineering within the Commission, are analysed.
97 As it has been noted, ‘The Commission is a compartmentalized bureaucracy, where many directorates-general 
resemble self-governing statelets’ in L. Hooghe, The European Commission and the Integration o f  Europe: Images o f  
Governance (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2001) 23
98 See more in L. Cram, ‘The European Commission as a Multi-organisation: Social Policy and IT Policy in the E U \ 
(1994) 1(1) Journal o f  European Public Policy 195-218.
99 COM(83)672, final, ‘Biotechnology in the Community’, Communication from the Commission to the Council, 
Brussels, 3rd October 1983 and European Commission (1983), Biotechnology: The Community’s Role, COM(83) 328 
final, 8 June 1983, Brussels: Commission of the European Communities
100 FAST {‘Forecasting and Assessment in the Field of Science and Technology’} report, recommending Community 
Strategy for European Biotechnology, January 1983, Commission of the European Community, DGXII
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3 .1.1. DGXII: Science, Research and Development
Until the late ‘70s-early ‘80s, the development o f biotechnology in Europe was still at 
the research stage and the initial efforts of the Commission (of D G  Research in particular) to 
institutionalise its interest in the field of genetic engineering were focused on the provision of 
financial support for any relevant research initiative.
Given that no explicit reference was made in the basic Treaties to the powers of the 
Community on issues of research and/or industrial character, no specific legal basis was 
obtainable for the justification o f the adoption o f ad hoc legislative measures on genetic 
engineering, or even for the assumption of research initiatives at the Community level. Thus, 
D G  Research resorted to the general wording of Article 235 EC101 as a suitable legal basis to 
justify its R&D (Research and Development) initiatives in the area of modem biotechnology. 
Since the adoption o f a proposal for the initiation o f a Community research programme, 
based upon this particular Treaty provision, would require a unanimous vote in the Council, 
D G  Research was forced to identify those aspects of genetic engineering that would have a 
Community dimension, in order to justify the Commission’s involvement into this novel 
technological sector. The establishment of minimum safety requirements in a regulatory 
format relating to the conduct of rDNA research was chosen as the subject matter requiring 
further elaboration at the Community level, because its centralised control could prevent any 
potential conflicts in relation to the required safety safeguards and standards that might arise 
among those countries participating in the frame of the proposed Multi-annual Community 
Programme of Research and Development in Biomolecular Engineering.102 The focus on 
developing safety guidelines and norms when conducting rDNA work, as an area of 
application o f genetic engineering that required immediate Community intervention, 
supported D G  Research’s strategic involvement in genetic engineering and enabled it to gain 
the necessary consensus in the Council.
Reflecting upon the increasing concerns of the various scientific unions in the field of 
rDNA worker health and safety,103 DG XII (Research) attempted to institute competence over
101 Article 235 reads as following: 'I f any action by the Community appears necessary to achieve, in the functioning o f  
the Common Market, one o f  the aims o f the Community in cases where this Treaty has not provided fo r  the requisite 
powers o f  action, the Council, acting by means o f  an unanimous vote on a proposal o f  the Commission and after the 
Assembly has been consulted, shall enact the appropriate provisions
102 The Council finally approved a more limited version of this programme in December 1981.
103 Among others, the Scientific and Technical Research Committee (CREST) and the European Science Foundation 
(ESF).
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genetic engineering issues. In doing so, it claimed a general intra-Commission primacy over 
modem biotechnology amidst the lack of any Commission initiative on this issue. In trying to 
avoid the mistakes o f the nuclear industry,104 D G ’s Research initiative came as a response to 
the requests for the need for the formulation o f minimum regulatory safety standards for 
laboratory procedures. However, there were two problems with the Commission’s, and 
specifically D G  Research’s involvement. Institutionally, in intra-Commission terms, it had not 
established any concrete competences over issues related to the safety control or 
administrative management of the various applications and uses o f genetic engineering. 
Proposing and initiating research programmes did not suffice to render it competent in 
intervening into the field of modem biotechnology in regulatory terms.105 Moreover, in 
practical terms, it lacked the necessary technical expertise to draft legislative proposals that 
would justify the need to formulate regulatory standards for applications o f genetic 
engineering at a Community level.
Consequently, D G  Research established contacts with expert committees and 
scientific unions so as to formulate scientifically sound proposals and technical justifications 
for its regulatory proposals. Its strategy o f containing discussions upon regulatory issues on 
genetic engineering within expert committees safeguarded its relatively narrow focus on the 
risks o f rDNA research and minimised the likelihood for any discussion about the broader 
socioeconomic effects of the various forms of application of this new technology. The 
European Molecular Biology Organisation (EMBO) —and more concretely its standing 
advisory committee on recombinant DNA- and the European Science Foundation (ESF)106 
dealt with the development of a harmonised European approach to the regulation of rDNA 
research via their recommendations, calling, inter alia, for hazard assessment,107 the 
establishment of national rDNA research safety advisory committees and the adoption of 
national legislation along the lines of the British safety code.108 These recommendations
104 As mentioned in J. Becker, ‘Bioengineering hazards-Europe doubts’ (May 1981) 291(21) Nature 181
105 DG Research had participated in the drafting of the first proposal for a Community research program in bimolecular 
engineering during 1975-6. For more on this, see H. Gottweis, Governing Molecules. The Discursive Politics o f  Genetic 
Engineering in Europe and in the United States (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass. 1998) 167
106 An ad hoc committee of the European Science Foundation had stressed the need for control of the laboratories and the 
advantages o f a legal requirement to safeguard the efficacy o f a central advisory committee, for more: 
‘Recommendations of the European Science Foundation’s Ad Hoc Committee on Recombinant DNA Research (Genetic 
Manipulation),’ in European Science Foundation Report 1976 (Strasbourg: European Science Foundation, 1976), 
appendix B and 8-12
107 Second meeting o f the EMBO Standing Advisory Committee on Recombinant DNA, Report and Recommendations, 
26.
108 For a more detailed discussion about the role o f these transnational scientific organizations, read A.M. Russell, The 
Biotechnology Revolution: An International Perspective, (St.Martins Press: New York, 1988); M. Cantley, ‘The 
Regulation o f Modem Biotechnology: A Historical and European Perspective. A Case Study on How Societies Cope 
with New Knowledge in the Last Quarter of the Twentieth Century’ in H.J. Rehm and G.Reed (eds.), Biotechnology
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provided D G  Research not only with the necessary scientific expertise for the formulation of 
an EC R&D policy on modem biotechnology,109 but also with the essential scientific 
reasoning that would justify the assumption of regulatory initiatives for enacting EU-wide 
harmonised rules on the safety control of rDNA laboratory work. The institutional self- 
interests o f D G  Research eventually prevailed over the aims and the functional value of its 
initial efforts to cooperate and establish partnerships with these scientific and research actors. 
Consequendy, the role o f the latter became gradually weaker due to D G ’s XII political need 
to liaise with the member states —in view of the requirement for the unanimous approval of 
its proposals and as a result of its fear o f losing ground in the control of the harmonization of 
safety regulation over the ESF. Thus, besides the significance o f the role o f the ESF and 
EMBO recommendations in highlighting the Community dimension o f the need for 
minimum safety rules, the rendering of a sub-committee o f the Commission’s Scientific and 
Technical Research Committee (CREST), the Committee on Medical and Public Health 
Research (CRM), as the principal forum for elaborating the issue o f rDNA research safety 
regulation facilitated the plans of D G  Research to establish contact with the competent 
national authorities that would enable it overcome national objections, safeguard the eventual 
approval o f its proposals for EC-wide safety regulatory measures and in effect expand its 
competences into the this new technological field.
In the early 1980’s, D G  Research officials aimed at establishing an EC biotechnology 
R&D policy, while at the same time advocating a Community-wide research and development 
programme in molecular biology. Assuming a regulatory initiative that would aim at 
establishing safety standards, D G  Research appeared as a policy entrepreneur in the field o f 
genetic engineering and at the same time attempted to meet the relevant scientific concerns 
and to downgrade the potential risks by rendering rDNA research activities socially 
acceptable, thus preparing the ground for the frarning of a new sector of Community policy 
that would be in need of financial support. The formulation o f rules that would provide a 
minimum set o f guidelines for controlling technological risks that might affect the safety of 
industrial researchers, the natural environment or even public health at the EU level was 
quickly prioritised in the Community’s regulatory agenda. The Commission was at that point 
seen as the sole authority that could speed up the harmonization o f the relevant measures and
Vol. 12, Legal, Economic, and Ethical Dimensions (Weinheim:VCH, 1995); L. Guzzeti, A Brief History o f  European 
Union Research Policy (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1995)
109 One can find a concise account about the first European efforts to discuss the possible hazards o f recombinant DNA 
research and the need for coordination o f their efforts to regulate experiments and minimize any relevant hazard in J. 
Tooze, ‘Genetic Engineering in Europe’ (10 March 1977) New Scientist 592-595.
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guidelines and provide the industrial private sector with a common framework for the 
exercise o f rDNA research at the Community level.
D G  Research gained further leverage in its batde for grounding its competences in 
the area o f genetic engineering through the establishment o f a consultation framework with 
the national rDNA research safety organisations and the initiation of a Community-wide 
research and development programme in molecular biology that would provide support for 
infrastructure development in biotechnology, with particular emphasis on research and 
training.110 In view of the potential increase o f rDNA research activities that would 
unavoidably augment the potential risks and in effect signify the formulation o f unilateral 
national safety measures across the EC, its officials stated the need for the addition of a 
regulatory dimension in the biotechnology section of the EC’s R&D policy that would 
minimise any inconsistencies with regard to the safety controls that were considered necessary 
on both public and private laboratories.
In other words, D G  Research sought to expand its competences within the 
Commission through its involvement in genetic engineering before the applications o f the 
latter raised commercial, industrial, environmental or public health issues. The prioritization 
o f its institutional self-interests became evident in its positions during the discussions for the 
formulation o f a Council Directive on establishing safety requirements for rDNA research 
activities.111 Apart from supporting its plans in the field of R&D policy, the elaboration and 
formulation o f proposals for rDNA research safety regulation was seen by D G  Research as 
an opportunity to establish a precedent in acquiring a prominent position in enacting safety 
norms and control standards for technological risks. The prioritisation o f its narrow 
organisational interests at the expense of the consideration o f the non-research dimensions of 
rDNA-related technological applications signified the institutional capture of the issue 
framing and legislative agenda-setting procedures in the area o f genetic engineering. As a 
result o f this organisational capture, the Commission, in its 1978 proposal, viewed the effects 
o f genetic engineering applications solely from a research perspective, as a problem of 
workplace safety.112
110 The Biomolecular Engineering Programme (BEP) was adopted by the Council on 7/12/1981 (15 million ECU, 1982- 
1986)
111 DG Research’s positions were drawn from informal notes of the relevant Commission’s discussions in the personal 
archive of a former DGXII official.
112 The final proposal for a directive in 1978 emphasizes the more general ‘exemplary’ value of this initiative referring to 
it, as a ‘choice material for establishing compatibilities between legislation and die development of modem technologies 
and for preparing a first basis to the dispositions which will undoubtedly have to be taken in the future to protect men
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The drafting of a Directive —effectively on the basis of the British Genetic 
Manipulation Advisory Group (GMAG) procedures- on ‘safety measures against the 
conjectural risks associated with rDNA’- became the main focus o f the debates within the 
Commission, mainly due to the insistence o f D G  Research on the need for the adoption o f 
legislative measures at a Community level that prevailed over the initial objections o f the 
French and German representatives,113 as well as over the pressures o f the US National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), the Committee on Genetic Engineering (COGENE) of the 
International Council of Scientific Unions and the EMBO, all of which had provided 
scientific justifications for deregulation.114 The formulation o f a proposal for a Council 
directive115 was perceived as a first step towards the establishment of the Commission’s 
material competence upon genetic engineering matters and its eventual further expansion 
through the enactment o f the relevant secondary legislation. The main interest of these 
transnational scientific organisations -such as the CREST and the ESF-, as the main 
consultants of the DGXII, had been the establishment of harmonised safety rules and 
guidelines as a means to render genetic engineering socially acceptable without however 
compromising scientific and technological competitiveness.116
The EC’s Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the Environment Committee 
of the European Parliament supported the Commission’s proposal which was finally 
submitted on the 4th of August 1980 requiring notification and prior authorization at the 
national level for all biotechnology research initiatives.117 Their support laid the groundwork 
for a horizontal inter-institutional cooperation at the Community level at the expense of 
national interests. In October 1981, the EESC published a report recommending that a 
directive was the most appropriate legal instrument that could deal with rDNA activities.118
against its own achievements’, for more see European Commission (1978), Proposal for a Council Directive Establishing 
Safety Measures against the Conjectural Risks Associated with Recombinant DNA Work, COM(78) 664 Final, 4 
December 1978, Brussels: European Commission at 6.
113 These two countries were in favor o f the introduction of voluntary regulatory approaches, rather than the legally 
binding ones supported by the ESF and the UK.
114 For more, read S. Wright, Molecular Politics. Developing American and British Regulatory Policy fo r  Genetic 
Engineering, 1972-1982 (University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London, 1994) 252,299 and B. Dixon, ‘Lessons for 
Whistle Blowers’ (6 April 1978) New Scientist 2-3
115 European Commission (1978), Proposal for a Council Directive Establishing Safety Measures against the Conjectural 
Risks Associated with Recombinant DNA Work, COM (78) 664 Final, 4 December 1978, Brussels: European 
Commission
1,6 See the Proposal fo r  a Council Directive establishing safety measures against the conjectural risks associated with 
recombinant DNA work, European Commission (1978), COM (78) 664 Final, 4 December 1978, Brussels
117 Report of the Economic and Social Committee on biotechnology OJ, No C 247,11.10.1979
118 In April 1979, the Council asked the Committee for an Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive establishing 
Safety Measures against Conjectural Risks associated with Recombinant DNA Work. This Opinion -delivered in July 
1979 (O.J No.C 247, 1 October 1979)- unanimously endorsed the issuing o f a Directive. One of the participants stated
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After 1981, the Commission’s initiative to launch the issue o f biotechnology as a new 
item in the EC’s regulatory agenda that was prima facie based on concerns expressed by 
various scientific bodies regarding the safety of rDNA researchers119 and the requirement of 
prior notification to, and authorization by, national authorities, o f all relevant research actions 
or other work involving recombinant DNA120 was set aside. The Commission’s proposal for a 
Directive on establishing safety standards when conducting rDNA research was soon 
abandoned and a new proposal for a less legally binding Community instrument, such as a 
Recommendation, was drafted and eventually adopted.121 Severe scientific objections,122 
political skepticism123 and the lack of flexibility of the then decision-making system to 
overcome specific national objections, in view of the need for unanimity in the Council and 
under an imminent veto threat,124 forced D G  Research to replace its proposal for a binding 
legal instrument125 with a non-binding recommendation that allocated the registration of 
rDNA work to national and local authorities.126 More specifically, the British veto -o r  at least 
its threat o f use- proved to be the sole, but also insurmountable, barrier for the adoption of 
the Commission’s proposal for a Directive, despite the support expressed by the majority of 
the member states within the Council o f Research Ministers.127
that ‘the issue is of such importance that it should not be left in the hands of the private industry. I would therefore like 
to ask the European Commission to push ahead with the adoption of a directive so as to provide better safeguards for 
society’. For more, see the Economic and Social Committee o f the European Communities, ‘Genetic Engineering-Safety 
Aspects o f Recombinant DNA work’, Economic and Social Committee o f the European Communities, Brussels October 
1981
119 The EMBO and the ESF recommendations for the development of a harmonized European approach to the regulatory 
control o f rDNA research were the most representative calls for the necessity of rendering genetic engineering safe via 
regulation.
120 The UK approach as expressed with the British Safety Code supported the Commission’s initiative from the 
beginning probably as a means to impose it own approach. For more see the House o f Lords LSCEC (1980) at 24-25 
about a meeting between DG Research officials with the directors of the national advisory bodies among them with the 
head of the British Genetic Manipulation Advisory Group (GMAG).
121 Council Recommendation of 30 June 1982, ‘Concerning the Registration of Work Involving Recombinant 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) (82/472/EEC), OJ, No L 213, 21.7.1982
122 EMBO had stated that there was ‘no scientific reason for attempting to achieve international uniformity’ with regard 
to the proposed safety rules, see note 114. For more, see K.Gibson, (1986) ‘European Aspects of the Recombinant DNA 
Debate’ in R.A.Zilinkskas and B.K.Zimmerman (eds.), The Gene-Splicing Wars, Issues in Science and Technology 
Series (American Association for the Advancement o f Science, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1996) 63.
123 This skepticism concerned the adequacy of the EC in supervising and managing this harmonization process and might 
be attributed to the lengthy and slow character o f the consultation and negotiation process for the elaboration of the 
Commission’s proposal that evidenced the Commission’s sluggish modus operandi.
124 Interview evidence with a UK’s representative to the relevant Council Working Group (7/9/2005)
125 According to the Minister o f Education and Science, ‘in a field where changes happen very quickly {...} a Directive 
is a very inflexible instrument’ in HCSCST, House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology (1979), 
Recombinant DANN Research-Interim Report, Session 1978-79, 2nd Report, London: HMSO at 169. For more about the 
reasons behind the rejection of the Commission’s initiative by the DES and the change in British biotechnology policy 
towards deregulation see this report along with the HLSCEC, House o f Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities (1980), Genetic Manipulation (DNA), Session 1979-80, 39th Report, London: HMSO.
126 82/472/EEC: Council Recommendation of 30 June 1982 concerning the registration of work involving recombinant 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) OJ 1213 ,  21/07/1982 P. 0015 - 0016
127 Interview evidence with members of the Danish and Dutch permanent delegations to the European Community. 
(March-May 2006)
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Russell justifies the ‘downgrading’ of the legal force o f the Community measure on
the Commission’s fears that a centralised hard-law instrument ‘could all too easily create
resentment amongst the researchers, now that perceptions o f the risks appeared to be
ameliorating’.128 Commissioner for Science, Research and Information Technology Narjes,
however, differs in his explanation about the withdrawal of the proposed Directive,
attributing it to what he foresaw to be ‘the subsequent stage in scientific and public
opinion.’129 This view is further supported by Candey that states,
‘as the debate progressed, scientific concerns were diminishing, experience was 
accumulating, with no adverse results, and greater confidence developed in the 
handling of the normally disabled strains of laboratory (and possible industrial) 
interest. With a time lag, this diminution of concern lowered the political 
temperature.130’
Although the rejection o f the draft directive was seen as a failure of the Commission’s driving 
organisational force for biotechnology issues (DG Research) to solidify its institutional 
interests and gain competences in drafting and forwarding proposals on EU-wide 
biotechnology rules, the adoption of the Recommendation, in June 1982, opened an 
institutional window for the Commission to render genetic engineering an issue o f 
Community interest and to expand its competences in the area o f rDNA research safety 
regulation. The Recommendation focused on the development of oversight structures for 
safety regulation and the introduction of biotechnology-specific regulation in the areas o f 
worker safety and environmental protection, calling for notification of rDNA research to 
national authorities, instead o f authorisation prior to all research and other work involving 
rDNA.131 Its recognition of the seriousness o f the conjectured hazards, the potential increase 
o f risks and their ‘transnational’ character led to the acknowledgment of the need for the 
establishment o f some minimum safety requirements of a regulatory character: ‘agreements 
and .. .guarantees can best be generated through legal dispositions, taken in each country, 
which are based upon a core o f principles adopted in common’.132
128 A.M. Russell, The Biotechnology Revolution: An International Perspective, (Wheatsheaf Books: Sussex, St.Martin’s 
Press: New York, 1988) 157
129 K.-H.Naijes, ‘The European Commission’s strategy for biotechnology’ in D.Davies, Industrial Biotechnology in 
Europe-Issues fo r  Public Policy (Frances Pinter: London and Dover, N.H. 1986) 128
130 M. Cantley, ‘Public perception, public policy, the public interest and public information’ in J. Durant (ed.)
Biotechnology in public-a review o f recent research (Science Museum for the European Federation o f Biotechnology:
London, 1992) 22
131 Council Recommendation o f 30 June 1982 Concerning the Registration of Work involving Recombinant
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) (82/472/EEC), OJ, No L 213,21.7.82
132 Council Recommendation of 30 June 1982 Concerning the Registration of Work involving Recombinant
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) (82/472/EEC), OJ, No L 213, 21.7.82
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At the same time, the adoption o f the Recommendation rendered D G  Research as the 
lead agency (chef-de-file) for the formulation of genetic engineering policy until the mid-80s 
and the establishment o f the Biotechnology Regulation Interservice Committee (BRIC) 
reflected its efforts to position itself as a central actor in the formulation o f the legislative 
provisions that would deal with questions of potential risk and offer its input to the 
transnational debate over the preferred uses and risks o f genetic engineering. During the 
process o f the elaboration of the 1982 Recommendation, the Council unanimously adopted 
the first Community Biomolecular Engineering Programme (BEP), which sought to develop 
enzyme chemistry and process plants so as to make industrial use of agricultural surpluses133 
whilst R&D efforts regarding recombinant DNA techniques were being undertaken in the 
frame of the first FAST programme under the title ‘Bio-Society’ (1978-1983). The first FAST 
reports on Community strategies for scientific research and development that were published 
in December 1982 and March 1983, further perpetuated D G  Research’s viewing of 
biotechnology as a knowledge-based means of innovation identified with the future o f 
Europe, as well as its aspiration of creating a European bio-society.134
3.1.2. DG III: Internal Market and Industrial Affairs
Despite the de-facto appointment of D G  Research as chef-de-file for the formulation 
o f policy recommendations and proposals on genetic engineering at a Community level and
its general prominence within the Commission on issues related to science, technology and
the associated potential risks of their applications, the drafting process of two Commission 
Communications in 1983 required the involvement of D G  Industry and, in particular, of its 
Food and Pharmaceuticals divisions.135 The drafting and adoption of these particular 
Commission announcements o f its legislative priorities signalled the institutional engagement 
o f D G  Industry with the intra-Commission discussion framework in the field of 
biotechnology regulation, whilst there were still explicit references to the need for supporting 
R&D biotechnology projects and a de facto acknowledgment o f the recommendations of the 
D G  Research’s Unit for Biotechnology, as expressed within the FAST framework.136
133 BEP: 15 MECU 1982-6, November 1981
134 Commission of the European Communities, Eurofutures: The Challenges o f  Innovation, The FAST Report, London: 
Butterworths, 1984
135 European Commission (1983), Biotechnology: The Community’s Role, COM(83) 328 final, 8 June 1983, Brussels: 
Commission of the European Communities
136 Since the focus of the paper is on the Commission’s Directorates and the intra-Commission organizational 
arrangements, it needs to be mentioned that the FAST group functioned as a scientific point of reference for the DGs for
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D G  Industry’s involvement, in its dual nature as responsible for both industrial affairs 
and internal market portfolios, was justified upon the fact that the Commission’s interest had 
started to shift towards competitiveness as a central axis for the undertaking o f the new EC 
biotechnology initiative. This swift increased concerns about the realisation o f the Internal 
Market, which would include biotechnology products as pharmaceuticals, chemicals and 
animal feedstuffs.137 The drafting o f ‘a Community Strategy for European Biotechnology’ in 
March 1983138 and the initiative o f the Commissioner for Research under his dual role as the 
ultimate policy-maker in the fields o f EC Research and Industrial Affairs to involve D G  
Industry in a direct manner signalled an abrupt change in the viewing of genetic engineering. 
It moved from being an issue o f research interest in technology development to a key field of 
industrial innovation and economic competitiveness.
The 83/328 Commission Communication139 emphasised the importance of 
establishing a common regulatory environment in the field o f modem biotechnology, whilst 
recognising the need to establish legally binding safety rules for rDNA research, and taking 
into account the lack o f coherence in R&D policies and the absence of structures on a 
Community scale. In it, the prospect for a ‘large internal market’ was emphasised. Specifically, 
it was stated that
‘it is above all necessary to take steps to prevent the appearance of specific national 
standards which would have the effect of confining the development of bioindustry 
within a narrow framework, thereby ruling out the possibilities of planning and 
expansion available only in a large single market”.140
The 83/328 Communication marked the recognition on behalf of the Commission o f the 
need to establish an encouraging industrial environment for the pharmaceutical and the agri­
food industries in view of the uneven national statutory control approaches towards 
biotechnology and its preferred uses141, the mushrooming of biotechnology companies in the
Economic, Industrial, Social and Regional Affairs, Transport, Energy, Agriculture, Development and Information 
Technology. For more see European Commission (1984), Eurofutures, publication No EUR 8936 of the Commission of 
the European Communities, London: Butterworth & Co.
137 The swift towards competitiveness is evident in the official Reports of the Bio-society Unit.
138 European Commission (1983), A Community Strategy for Biotechnology in Europe by F.A.S.T., FAST Occasional 
Papers No.62, 18 March 1983 Brussels; see on this D. Behrens, K. Buchholz, and H.J.Rehm, Biotechnology in Europe-A 
Community Strategy fo r  European Biotechnology, (European Federation o f Biotechnology, Frankfurt A.M.:Deutsche 
Gessellschaft fur chemisches Apparatewesen e.V., 1983)
139 COM(83)672, final, ‘Biotechnology in the Community’, Communication from the Commission to the Council, 
Brussels, 3rd October 1983
140 COM(83) 328, final, ‘Biotechnology: the Community’s role’ (Communication from the Commission to the Council), 
Brussels, 8 June 1983
141 An extensive reference to the various activities and R&D policies relating to modem biotechnology in the Member 
States of the Community can be found in the Background note attached to the COM(83) 328 (COM(83) 328 final/2, 
European Commission, ‘Biotechnology: the Community’s role, ‘Background note-national initiatives for the support of
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USA and the ‘lack o f coherence in R&D policies and the absence o f structures at the 
Community level’.
The Commission’s interest in developing ‘A European Approach to Regulations 
Affecting Biotechnology’ became, in fact, one o f the six action priorities o f the 83/672 
Communication, which was adopted 4 months later.142 This Communication referred to the 
findings o f international reports, which had indicated that ‘almost 40% of the products 
manufactured by the industrial countries are of biological origin’143 and identified the role of 
the Community in the field of biotechnology as one that should be linked with the creation o f 
prospects for a large internal market in biotechnology products through the strengthening o f 
the EC’s agricultural and industrial competitiveness, the removal o f trade barriers and the 
enactment of EC-wide harmonised rules in the field of genetic engineering. These 
biotechnology-related Communications identified three main objectives: the establishment o f 
a regulatory framework for the development of research and industrial activities on/with 
applications o f genetic engineering; the promotion of the free circulation o f goods produced 
by modem biotechnology; and the assessment o f the adequacy of the current Community 
regulations to meet the emerging regulatory needs in view of the divergent regulatory 
approaches towards biotechnology in the member states.
Further, the 83/672 Communication made reference to the need to create a common 
regulatory environment by putting forward ‘general or specific proposals appropriate to create 
a regulatory framework suitable for the development of the activities o f the bio-industries and 
for the free circulation o f goods produced by biotechnology, (...) in order to avoid new 
problems in the functioning o f the Community’s internal market.’ 144 The drafting of this 
policy document reflected the biosafety-driven approach o f OECD (Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development) discussions on rDNA technology145 and echoed 
Commission concerns about the divergent national licensing standards that ranged from 
Italy’s lack o f any official regulation to Denmark’s near-complete prohibition 146 and the
biotechnology’/A comparative assessment o f the United States, Japan, and the Member States of the European 
Community)
142 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, Biotechnology in the Community, 
COM(83)672 final/2, Brussels, 3rd October 1983
143 COM(83) 328, final, ‘Biotechnology: the Community’s role’ (Communication from the Commission to the Council), 
Brussels, 8 June 1983 at 2
144 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, Biotechnology in the Community, 
COM(83)672 final/2-ANNEX, Brussels, 3rd October 1983 Section 4.2.4.5 p p.73-4
145 OECD (1986), Recombinant DANN Safety Considerations, Paris:0 ECD and note 108 at 505-679.
146 The Commission became aware that Denmark and Germany were considering the formulation of strict safety 
measures on genetic engineering.
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eventual mushrooming of biosafety measures on the authorisation of GMO products in 
Europe. This Commission initiative also reflected the interests of D G  Industry and, more 
specifically, o f its political clientele, such as the pharmaceutical and agro-food industries, in 
establishing a single set of authorisation standards that could eventually reduce the cost of 
meeting diverse regulatory requirements for the performance of R&D activities across 
Europe and would strengthen the competitiveness of the European bioindustrial sector and 
the functioning o f the EC Internal Market.147 In other words, the establishment of a 
Community-wide market aurhorisation scheme was seen as a means that would resolve the 
confusion created by the existing diverse national standards.148 Regulatory uncertainty had 
been particularly devastating for biotechnology companies because many were not firmly 
established and had relatively small product portfolios.149
D G  Industry attempted to retain its competences over the assessment and testing 
procedures contained in the then product regulation, arguing in favour o f their adequacy 
when dealing with genetic engineering risks as seen not only in the frame of the 1983 
Communications, but also when its officers sided against the enactment of biotechnology- 
specific rules in the field o f pharmaceuticals.150 Its approach was reflected in the 83/672 
Communication, which argued in favour of the adequacy of the then sectoral Community 
legislation in various sectors (pharmaceuticals, veterinary medicines, chemical substances, 
food additives and bioprotein feedstuffs) to correspond to the safety challenges o f genetic 
engineering and did not call for the establishment of a horizontal regulatory policy. The 
resistance shown by D G  Industry towards the formulation of a new authorisation regime for 
modem biotechnology products —as reflected upon the wording of both the 1983 
Communications- constituted, in fact, a clear effort to safeguard its exclusive competence 
over issues related to the market authorisation of GMO-related pharmaceuticals and of other 
biotechnology products. This was justified with reference to the adequacy o f the existing 
testing requirements for drugs.151 At the same time, the establishment of Community 
regulatory standards on biosafety became a significant part of D G  Industry’s regulatory
147 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, Biotechnology in the Community, 
COM(83)672 final/2-ANNEX, Brussels, 3rd October 1983 Section 4.2.3.2
148 Directives Could Cripple Biotech Sector, Critics Warn, 1992-the External Impact of European Unification, Apr.6, 
1990, at 9.
149 Office o f Technology Assessment, US Congress, Biotechnology in a Global Economy 29 (1991)
150 European Commission, Note a Pattention de Monsieur Garvey, Directeur, DG III/A-3 (Pharmaceuticals, Foods and 
Chemicals), 14 September 1984, Brussels,
l5lFor more see Directives 64/54/EEC, 70/357/EEC, 74/329/EEC and 83/463/EEC on food additives, Directive 
70/524/EEC and its amendments on feed additives, Directives 65/65/EEC 1 75/318/EEC2; 75/319/EEC3 on 
pharmaceuticals among others.
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agenda, as a legitimate conceptual basis upon which a gradual expansion of its competences in 
areas o f modem biotechnology related to the research and environmental applications of 
biotechnology could be founded. Reflecting the two-fold character of its institutional 
interests, D G  Industry supported the shaping o f biotechnology-specific regulation solely 
when research or industrial activities involving genetic engineering were considered as 
potential sources o f risks for employees or the environment.
To sum up, D G  Industry’s basic position aimed at establishing a network of 
interrelated biotechnological regulations that would ensure oversight o f the risks involved, the 
creation o f a competitive environment for European biotechnology and the building o f public 
confidence. As a result o f the initiatives o f D G  Industry, the sector o f biotechnology was 
embraced not solely as a field of research and scientific inquiry, but also as an emerging 
industrial sector that could boost the EC’s international economic competitiveness as part o f 
an effort made at a Community level to respond to international economic challenges, 
enhance the EC’s socio-economic development and Europe’s industrial performance and to 
face the problems caused by the economic stagnation o f most European national 
economies.152 It should be noted that D G  Industry’s depiction o f genetic engineering ‘as the 
core technology of an upcoming industry, which was expected to boost European economies 
and benefit the society,’153 signified not only the translation o f the recombinant DNA 
question from a problem of workplace health and safety into a matter of economic 
competitiveness, industrial performance and commercial objectives, but also its gradual 
institutional empowerment within the Commission as a new organisational actor in the 
formulation o f biotechnology policy, as will be seen in the following section.
Following these Communications, D G  Industry was assigned a central role in the 
support and encouragement o f biotechnology and its commercial usage. It should be 
mentioned that D G  Industry, both on an ad hoc basis and within the frame of the eventually 
established coordination mechanism (BSC), pursued diverse interests, ranging from the 
safeguarding o f industrial interests and of the competitiveness o f European bio-industries to 
the promotion o f the Internal Market objectives, based on the twofold character o f its 
organisational portfolio, of handling Internal Market and Industrial Affairs. As a result o f its 
wide array o f interests, but also of its limited resources, after 1983, D G  Industry’s
152 This swift of the Commission’s approach (from complementing national efforts in research and development to the 
improvement of the competitiveness of the European industry and agriculture) is evident in the Bio-society Unit’s first 
official document.
153 Interview evidence with an officer from DG Industry (3/6/2005)
68
pharmaceuticals division took the lead in launching initiatives to raise the issue o f safety 
regulation in the framing o f the commercial applications o f modem biotechnology and 
approached European R&D initiatives as an instrument for the development of a 
comprehensive European industrial policy. This approach, which had become evident in the 
Bio-society Unit’s 1982 report ‘Challenge to Europe’, a document defined exclusively in terms 
o f competitiveness, was strengthened through the establishment of the European Strategic 
Programme for Research in Information Technology (ESPRIT). This programme was created 
to help European firms update their industrial knowledge and techniques and close the 
technology gap vis-a-vis US and Japan.154 The then President o f the European Commission 
Gaston Egmond Thom , stressed that an EC initiative on biotechnology would ‘follow the 
same approach as for ESPRIT’.155
Moreover, after the formulation and the Council’s eventual approval o f the COM(85) 
310,156 which formalised and upgraded the market element in the intra-EC debate about the 
need and the type o f a regulatory framework upon biotechnology issues-, 157 D G  Industry 
decided to focus on the gradual shaping of a cross-sectoral Internal Market. Along these lines, 
its operational capabilities and legislative interest in the formulation o f a safety rationale for 
rules for the planned release of GMOs were weakened. At the same time, the eventual focus 
o f D G  Industry on the regulatory harmonization o f all GMO-related activities and on the 
need for biotechnology-specific legislation, rather than on the promotion o f R&D and the 
safeguarding o f the regulatory value o f the existing product-sector legislation, marginalised 
D G  Research’s initiatives in the field of biotechnology research programmes —its position was 
in fact weakened due to the departure of Commissioner Etienne Davignon in 1985- and 
paved the way for the establishment and provision o f a new cross-sectoral political rationale 
for the elaboration of a biotechnology-specific EU regulatory framework that would be free 
o f competitiveness concerns and one-off scientific evaluations.
In view of the competence battles among the main actors involved in this particular 
negotiation context and their ever-changing regulatory focus, the following section discusses 
Commission’s efforts to bring together all actors involved in the shaping o f a European 
biotechnology policy and achieve a convergence of their approaches. It also examines the
154 See: J. Peterson and M. Sharp (1998) Technology Policy in the EU, London: Macmillan at 5-6
155 Quoted in Cantley, see note 108 at 529
156 European Commission (1985), Completing the Internal Market, COM(85) 310, 14 June 1985, Brussels
157 European Commission, (1985), Completing the Internal Market, COM(85)310, 14 June 1985, Brussels: European 
Commission
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operation o f this inter-service coordination mechanism against these contending 
organisational rationalities.
3.2. The (failed) coordination o f the EC’s regulatory initiatives (Part I, BSC- 
CUBE)
The widening of the Commission’s focus on genetic engineering —evidenced in its
explicit reference to the promotion o f industrial and agricultural competitiveness and to the
creation of a supportive context for biotechnology research at Community level made in the
Communication 83/672 and in effect to the need for the establishment o f a favourable
regulatory context for European bio-industries- did not only create space for the involvement
and, in effect, for the upgrading o f the role o f D G  Industry. The Commission’s interest in the
research aspect o f genetic engineering was retained, as can be noted in the reference to the
need to strengthen the Community’s R&D capabilities158 thus the dominant position of DG
Research, in terms o f its expertise and entrepreneur status in the Commission’s policy-making
framework on genetic engineering, was reinforced. As was documented:
‘There was a certain amount of inter-service tension around Feb.-March 83, but in 
effect it was DGXII which finally drafted the COM 83-28, the first Commission 
communication (on biotechnology)’.159
Apart from the gradual involvement of D G  III in the frame of the Commission’s negotiation 
domain on genetic engineering that D G  Research had shaped, the 1983 Communications 
marked the involvement also o f DGVI (Agriculture) in the field o f genetic engineering. Its 
participation to the elaboration of these Commission documents was seen as necessary in 
view of the gradual increase of biotechnology applications in the agricultural sector. This 
particular D G  viewed modern biotechnology as a potential solution for the low productivity 
and crop effectiveness problems noticed in Europe at that time. Its influential involvement 
into the process for the formulation o f the Communication 83/672 was evidenced in the 
reference of the latter to the need ‘to obtain the highest sustainable ‘added value’ from 
Europe’s natural resource system,’ through the relationship between the biotechnology, 
agricultural and food industries. It was also reflected in the inclusion o f two separate sections
158 See: European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, Biotechnology in the Community, 
COM(83)672 final/2-ANNEX, Brussels, 3rd October 1983, Sections 2.3 and 4.1
159 Interview evidence with an officer from DGXII (3/6/2005)
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entitled ‘Agro-food and the chemical industry’ and ^Provision o f raw materials of agricultural 
origin for industry.’160
As further DGs were ascertaining their affiliation with this growing field o f public 
policy and claiming competence upon the regulatory control of its various applications,161 the 
Commission, in its Communication of October 1983, acknowledged that the crosscutting and 
multi-sectoral character of genetic engineering would not be effectively dealt with within the 
Commission’s vertical administrative and organisational structure. The Communication 
recognised the multi-faceted character of biotechnology and the need for a coordinated and 
integrated approach via a provisional institutional restructuring of the Commission or, more 
specifically, by ‘linking horizontally across services within the Commission in terms of 
‘establishing, in cooperation with MS, an ad-hoc system of collaboration between groups and 
individuals with interest and capability in the life sciences and biotechnology.’162 As the 
Communication noted, Ho create a contextfavourable and encouragingfor the development of biotechnology 
in Europe demands some coherence,..across the services of the Community institutions'. The same 
Commission document made reference to a journal article that had highlighted the following: 
‘One of the central challenges of biotechnology is organisational: it is a boundary-crossing  ^ multidisciplinary, 
statistician's nightmare...It challenges the organisation of our universities, our government departments, our 
economic statistics and our minds ’163
In view of the proliferation of national biosafety rules o f diverse binding power and 
regulatory targeting, the up-coming non-research challenges of modem biotechnology and the 
dissatisfaction of several DGs with the framing of the biotechnology issue in research and 
scientific terms, which had in effect marginalised their role in the respective intra-Commission 
discussions, the need for both a new organisational coordination paradigm and for an 
integrated approach towards the control and management o f the challenges of modem 
biotechnology at the Community level, became imminent. Thus, an inter-service scheme 
appeared as an organisational necessity and as the most appropriate way for these actors to
160 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, Biotechnology in the Community, 
COM(83)672 final/2, Brussels, 3"1 October 1983
161 Sixteen Commission DGs expressed their concerns and interests in the field o f genetic engineering and indicated a 
relationship between their areas o f competence with the various applications of biotechnology. More on this, see Annex I 
o f European Commission ‘Biotechnology at Community level: Concertation’ DGXII-Joint Research Center- CUBE, 
Brussels, 7 October 1985, XII/85, MFC/cp/6
162 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, Biotechnology in the Community, 
COM(83)672 final/2, Brussels, 3rd October 1983 at 57
163 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, Biotechnology in the Community, 
COM(83)672 final/2, Brussels, 3* October 1983 at 52
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pursue their institutional interests in a structured way.164 The reference to concert as a 
procedural requirement for Community action in the field o f modem biotechnology implicitly 
acknowledged the inadequacy of the vertical division o f the Commission’s administrative 
structures to correspond to the multi-sectoral challenges o f genetic engineering and to the 
organisational need for the coordination o f the policies and activities of those Commission 
administrative units that had expressed an interest in genetic engineering.
As a response to these organisational problems, the Commission established the 
Biotechnology Steering Committee (BSC) along with a secretariat, the Concertation Unit 
Biotechnology Europe (CUBE). The foundation of this coordination structure that was to 
pull together the actions o f different Commission services was the outcome of an inter­
service meeting in December 1983 that involved officials from DGXII, DGVI and DGIII. 
This Commission initiative constituted the first substantive effort to establish a network 
structure around and inside the Commission that would help bridge the various conceptual 
divergences towards the preferred use of genetic engineering and the safe control o f its 
applications. The formation of the BSC aimed at coordinating the consultation process 
among the different Commission services and at providing a forum for discussions among 
the administrative units o f DGXII (Science, Research and Development) and D G III (the 
Unit in charge o f Industrial Affairs) for the elaboration o f GMO-specific rules. D G  Research 
was appointed as its chair165 and officials from DGs III (especially the section o f D G  III 
responsible for Internal Market affairs), DGVI (Agriculture), DG V (Employment, Industrial 
Relations and Social Affairs) (involved due to its interest on worker safety regulation), and 
DG XIII (Telecommunications, Information Industry and Innovation/Information Market 
and Exploitation o f Research) represented their services on a permanent basis.
According to the 83/672 Communication, the proposed coordination scheme 
(BSC/CUBE) was to provide ‘the staff and skills to monitor and anticipate developments 
{...} and concert necessary policy discussions and initiatives across the services, with 
Member States, and with other groups also with respect to regulatory issues’.166 The main 
mandate of the BSC was the establishment o f an integrated response to the wide-ranging but
164 In fact the October 1983 Communication ‘borrowed’ the ‘contextual’ model o f the FAST programme (CEC, FAST 
Programme: Results and Recommendations, Vols.I&II, December 1982) and connected the need for horizontal 
coordination o f Commission services with the need for the creation of a common regulatory environment (and hence 
more truly a common market) within the Community.
165 Dr Paolo Fasella, Director General for Science, Research and Development was appointed as chair o f the 
Biotechnology Steering Committee.
166 COM(83)672, final, ‘Biotechnology in the Community’, Communication from the Commission to the Council, 
Brussels, 3rd October 1983 at 52-4
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interconnected challenges of biotechnology and its efforts focused also on upgrading and 
coordinating the appearance o f the industrial sector in the frame of Community-level 
consultation proceedings.167 Its secretariat (CUBE) was established so as to serve as a point of 
collection for all relevant scientific information, as a coordinator and monitoring mechanism 
of all research efforts with regard to genetic engineering or, in other words, as an 
organisational unit that should ensure a technological monitor for the sector o f modem 
biotechnology.168
Although the BSC established a concertation network composed of representatives of 
Member States and societal actors, it did not succeed in formulating a working coordination 
relationship among the various competent Commission services on genetic engineering 
issues.1 This became evident in the poor attendance of its proceedings and its inability to 
establish a policy framework or to generate a specific course of action within the 
Commission. There were several reasons that led to this coordination failure. First o f all, this 
mechanism proved not to possess the necessary power for the resolution o f the organisational 
inter-DG tensions and as such proved inefficient in coordinating the drafting process and the 
corresponding regulatory efforts. Secondly, the radical developments in the field of 
biotechnology (the most important of which was the development of genetically modified 
micro-organisms and plants for commercial purposes) gradually rendered its institutional 
presence inadequate due to its narrow competences, thus undermining its ability to implement 
regulatory initiatives.
Thirdly, D G X II’s chairmanship proved inadequate for resolving inter-DG’s disputes 
and competence battles among the main Commission services over issues that were beyond 
its bounded competence, such as the gradual importance o f the need for harmonised 
Community-wide legislation when producing and authorising pharmaceutical and food 
products, the emergence of biotechnological agricultural innovations, the development of 
large-scale industrial production field releases of genetically modified micro-organisms and 
plants. Its noticeable institutional interests regarding the uses o f genetic engineering affected
167 The CUBE is usually referred as ‘the administrative partner of the genetic engineering industry in the European 
Commission’ rather than an independent forum of inter-service coordination. See B.Haerlin ‘Genetic Engineering in 
Europe’ in P.Wheale and R.McNally, The Bio-Revolution-Comucopia or Pandora's box (Pluto Press: London, 1990) 
259
168 As Cantley notes, ‘Our concertation unit (CUBE) works in two dimensions: one being coordination with Member 
States, the other coordination between services within the Commission’ in M. Cantley, ‘Biotechnology in Europe: The 
Role o f the Commission of the European Communities’ in E. Yoxen, and V. Di Martino, Biotechnology in Future 
Society-Scenarios and Options fo r  Europe, European Foundation for the Improvement o f Living and Working 
Conditions (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1989) 10
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its operation as the chair of the BSC and as an impartial coordinator of the CUBE. As a 
result, its procedural credibility and organisational trustworthiness to prevent ‘turf battles’ 
between different Commission DGs was gradually weakened. Making use of its institutional 
positioning to expand its own competencies in the field of genetic engineering, DGXII 
undermined the objective and unbiased character of its role as an organisational vehicle for 
coordination and diluted the purpose of the concertation scheme.
More concretely, BSC’s predominantly scientific reading of the genetic engineering 
issue surfaced, as its chairmanship was conferred to D G  Research and Science and the agenda 
was structured in research terms. The staffing of the central secretariat of this coordination 
mechanism (CUBE) with experts and officers belonging to only one o f the main DGs 
competing for the formulation of the Commission’s biotechnology objectives (DG Research) 
further qualified it as an actor that was meant to represent solely scientific interests and 
promote the establishment o f a European biotechnology research infrastructure that would 
enhance the Commission’s research capacity in the field o f biotechnology. Consequently, the 
various initiatives and reports o f this coordination mechanism resulted in the backing of the 
existing product-based, legislative framework. Thus, there was no need to consider the 
development of Community-level biotechnology regulation in the Commission’s regulatory 
agenda.
As a result of the organisational capture o f this intra-Commission coordination 
initiative by D G  Research, the lack of a specific policy mandate169 and the non-binding 
character of its decisions upon the competent DGs,170 its ability to act as a neutral arbiter for 
the resolution o f the competence battles mostly between D G  Research and D G  Industry as 
well as to achieve a harmonised and unified approach on the elaboration and further 
specification o f the stated Commission action priorities remained minimal.171 As one 
participant to the CUBE formation noted, The Biotechnology Steering Committee did not have the 
authority to resolve inter-DG conflicts.>172 It should be mentioned that this institutional initiative 
was also significantly weakened because o f the absence o f the industrial sector from its
169 In the frame of the relevant Commission documentation on the establishment of this Committee, a reference is made 
only to the need for coordination without any further qualification or specification of its contents or of its orientation and 
aims. See Proposal on the Commission’s internal coordination of policy for biotechnology, DGVI, DGXII and DGIII, 
December 1983 and the responses of the Commission (file archive of DGXII, Brussels)
170 Cantley refers to it as a debating club, ‘a forum for discussing biotechnology matters o f common interests’ that ‘ was 
not a decision-making body’. See note 108 at 534
171 As defined in the 1983 Communications and in the relevant Commission policy papers
172 Interview evidence with a member of the CUBE formation (18/7/2005)
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proceedings and the non-binding character o f its outcomes, especially upon the Commission 
Directorates which led to an organisational vacuum.
The role of the BSC/CUBE was eventually diminished173 and its operation ultimately 
became a source of inter-service fragmentation. As Simpson has stated, ‘CUBE probably 
generated more inter-service disputes that any other similar sized structure in the 
Commission!’174 As the Internal Market project shifted the Commission’s —including DG 
Industry’s- priorities away from pure industrial policy issues towards the formulation of 
regulatory proposals and structures that would also correspond to commercialisation 
pressures, the progressive development of harmonised Community-wide legislation in various 
industrial sectors, the special weight of this inter-service organisational scheme, became 
almost of symbolic character. This was exacerbated by D G  Research’s lack of significant 
regulatory experience -as the chair of this coordination mechanism- as well as of any powers 
upon the emerging areas o f application o f genetic engineering. It needs to be mentioned that 
the gradual emergence o f DGXI, as a new actor in the intra-Commission’s deliberations on 
biotechnology policies, also pushed towards the demise o f the BSC, as it expressed its 
preference for the establishment o f a new inter-service scheme that would be more effective 
and framed not only in scientific and industrial terms.
The eventual creation of a new coordination mechanism (BRIC) did not prevent BSC 
from attempting —unsuccessfully- to reset the agenda for a regulatory initiative recognising the 
threats arising from the emergence of divergent national regulations in two different 
instances. The first was in 1985 when it proposed a ‘science board’ to deal with regulatory 
harmonization and the second in 1988 outlining a new biotechnology initiative.175 Although, 
in theory, the BSC remained in charge of the proceedings of its organisational successor 
(BRIC), its consistent and one-dimensional focus on promoting research and scientific 
interests, including its efforts to prevent the ‘stigmatisation’ o f rDNA techniques that, as 
perceived, would occur through the adoption o f GMO-specific rules, alienated it from the 
other DGs and prevented it from articulating a collective regulatory discourse. Within 
months, BRIC would outpace and eclipse its parent, the BSC, as the institutional core of the 
biotechnology policy process. The demise of the BSC after its final meeting ‘...appeared to
173 As also can be seen by the number o f its annual meetings (1984, 1985: 3 times, 1986:2 times, 1987, 1988:1 time
174 K. Simpson, ‘No Biotechnology Policy in the European Commission?’ (1992) 9, 10 BFE 569 and K. Simpson, ‘Can 
the EC come to terms with its new statute’ (1991) 8, 4 BFE 163
175 An extensive account o f its initiatives can be found in Cantley, note 108
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carry with it as it sank the prospects of renewing and strengthening the coordinated view of 
biotechnology, which had been initiated in 1983’.176
The decaying presence o f the CUBE, -that served as a Secretariat of the BRIC- which 
in cooperation with the D G  Research remained as the main institutional form of 
representation o f the views and interests of the European researchers on molecular biology 
and biotechnology, and in general of the BSC, transferred the locus of rule formulation and 
coordination both outside o f and within the Commission from the BSC to the BRIC. The 
appointment o f a new Commissioner for Research and Technological Development (Vice- 
President Pandolfi), who had a non-biotechnology-orientated portfolio and the setting up of 
an operational unit responsible for implementing the research programmes in the field of 
biotechnology within DGXII corroborated the failure of BSC. As a result of its organisational 
marginalization within the Commission, its eventual dissolution occurred at the beginning of 
1993 after the structural reorganisation o f DGXII in July 1992, despite some objections.177
The failure o f the BSC (CUBE) to achieve inter-service coordination within the 
Commission and to operate as a forum of convergence o f the various approaches towards 
genetic engineering, the increase of the Commission DGs expressing an interest in 
participating to the formulation o f EC policies and rules on genetic engineering issues, the 
gradual transfer of genetic engineering applications into the natural environment and the 
equivalent large scale industrialisation of the latter and the enlarged need for a new legislative 
approach towards the safety control of modem biotechnology and its potential risks, created a 
conflicting political environment within the Commission. As a result, the political need for a 
new organisational arrangement for the resolution o f the correspondent novel institutional 
tensions emerged. Moreover, the inter-institutional debates on the need for the enactment of 
new regulations organised within various Member States,178 the US179 and in the OECD 
Group of National Experts on Safety in Biotechnology accelerated the decision for the 
assumption o f a new coordination initiative and prepared the ground for a new organisational 
restructuring o f the Commission.
176 See note 108 at 633
177 For more about the reasons behind the decision of the EC Commission to close down its Concertation Unit for 
Biotechnology in Europe, see ‘EC defends CUBE closure’ Biotechnology Business News, 26 February 1993/3, Simpson, 
K., No Biotechnology Policy in the European Commission, BFE Vol. 9, No. 10 October 1992 at 596 and ‘DGXII 
reorganized: adieu to CUBE’ European Biotechnology Newsletter, Number 140-26th August 1992 at 2
178 Mainly in Germany, the UK and in Denmark
179 The influence exerted by the US administrative model can be seen in the similarities of the mandate granted to the 
BRIC with the one provided to the US Coordinated Framework.
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3.3. Concluding Remarks
The chapter unpacked the Commission’s ‘black box’ and broke down its image as a 
monolithic unit by examining its fragmented institutional context in relation to the efforts for 
shaping a coherent legislative strategy in a multi-disciplinary policy field. It is clear from this 
analysis that the Commission DGs as competent actors in the biotechnology debate 
attempted to promote their institutional agenda and pursue their own policy objectives with 
regard to the use and application of genetic engineering in a rather uncoordinated manner. 
Biotechnology seemed to offer a unique opportunity for many DGs to expand their powers, 
and thus their sectoral interests, and the produced scientific reports were merely used as 
justifications for gaining ground in the biotechnology arena within the Commission, rather 
than for informing the coordination efforts for responding to the variety of challenges posed 
by genetic engineering.
The path towards the establishment of a framework for genetic engineering at the EU 
level was neither linear nor without contradictions. There was an absence o f a process o f 
delineation o f competences in the field of genetic engineering within the Commission and a 
lack of a coherent regulatory strategy on biotechnology with clearly set objectives. These 
shortcomings soon became evident in the various Community initiatives for the formulation 
of measures for the regulatory oversight of the potential effects of genetic engineering and 
allowed specific organisational actors within the Commission to capture the process of 
framing the nature and o f shaping the precise object of regulatory control, so as to attain their 
own institutional ends. Apart from the Commission’s structural shortcomings o f an 
institutional character, the multi-sectoral character of biotechnology, which offered ample 
space for new organisational inscriptions, further augmented the continuous modification of 
the Commission’s regulatory objectives and the lack o f consistent positions, even on whether 
there was a need for regulatory control over some aspects and risks o f modern biotechnology.
The ad hoc regulatory initiatives of DGs Research and Industry indicated an 
organisational adjustment of the process for the crafting o f the genetic engineering question 
towards their own institutional objectives. This eventually led to the destabilisation of any 
coordination effort, the transformation o f the created inter-service structure into a battlefield 
for regulatory task expansion and, in effect, to the reduction o f the issue o f the legislative 
oversight o f genetic engineering into a question o f the management of laboratory work
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control or of market integration at the Community level. The following chapter will show that 
apart from the fluctuating regulatory focus o f the EC’s competent authorities and the lack of 
a coherent biotechnology agenda, the institutional interests o f specific Commission DGs 
affected the wording and the structure of the drafted and eventually adopted Deliberate 
Release Directive.
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Chapter 4: D eveloping a regulatory framework on GMO releases
The drafting process for the formulation o f the Deliberate Release Directive lasted 
between 1986 and 1990 and engaged several institutional actors at the EU level, especially 
within the Commission. This chapter focuses on the process for the drafting o f the 1988 
Commission proposal,180 as the latter became, without major amendments, the final text o f 
the 1990/220 Deliberate Release Directive.181 The chapter discusses the positions and 
institutional interests o f those Commission DGs that became involved in the shaping of a 
safety regime on the planned releases o f GMOs —in principle D G  Environment and D G  
Industry- against the formulation o f the specific features o f the proposed Deliberate Release 
Directive. Within this frame, the chapter examines the gradual promotion o f DG XI from an 
institutionally weak actor within the Commission to its appointment as chef de file for the 
deliberate release directive, taking into account its peripheral role within the Commission and 
the significant institutional interests of DGs Industry and Research in the field of genetic 
engineering. Closely relevant to its empowerment, the role of D G  Industry is also assessed, 
especially with regard to its strategic alliance with D G  Environment, as this paved the way for 
the drafting o f biotechnology-specific and harmonised rules on genetic engineering, while also 
serving to set constraints on the actions o f DG  Environment in its role as the carrier of an 
ecological approach.
The chapter examines the effects of their respective substantive and institutional 
objectives upon the process o f the formulation o f regulatory proposals on agricultural 
biotechnology. Through this analysis, evidence is found that the draft Directive reflected D G  
Environment’s dual role, as a coordinator o f the negotiation process, which sought to achieve 
an inter-institutional and inter-service consensus, and as a chef de file that allowed it to 
become in control of the drafting process and to infuse its ‘ecological’ approach. Its two-fold 
approach became particularly evident in terms of the proposal’s ambiguous wording, case-by- 
case, ex-ante licensing approach and the choice of a science-based proceduralised risk analysis 
framework. Whereas D G X I’s ‘ecological’ rationale was evidenced in the proposed case-by- 
case ex-ante approach, the textual vagueness surrounding the central terms o f the prior 
authorisation scheme, as well as its substantive goals and its emphasis on the mediating role
180 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the deliberate release to the environment of genetically modified 
organisms, COM (88) 160 final-SYN 131, Brussels, 4 May 1988
181 Council Directive 90/220/EEC of 23 April 1990 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically 
modified organisms O JL 117, 8.5.1990, p. 15-27
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of science, seemed to indicate an intra-Commission compromise in view of the pluralistic and 
inter-dependent features o f the relevant coordination requirements.
The first section of this chapter discusses the gradual emergence o f DGXI as the 
main drafter o f the deliberate release framework that signified the Commission’s regulatory 
focus on the safety aspect o f genetic engineering releases. The second section examines the 
contentious character o f the intra-Commission negotiation procedure and the failure of the 
various institutional arrangements, such as the appointment of DGXI as chef de file and the 
establishment of an inter-service coordination structure (BRIC), to create a common ground 
for interaction, rather than asymmetries in the value given to the different viewpoints. The 
third section of the chapter highlights the main features of the authorisation framework of the 
1900/220 DRD and focuses on the textual ambiguity o f the Directive, its case-to-case 
approach and its proceduralised science-driven risk assessment structure. This is seen as the 
product o f D G X I’s efforts to moderate the various intra-Commission institutional 
antagonisms over the framing o f this particular control framework, but was also to set the 
grounds for an environmental ‘reading’ o f open-field genetic engineering releases.
4.1. The ‘safety* approach to regulating genetic engineering
This section focuses on the gradual empowerment of DGXI in the frame of the intra- 
Commission discussions on the need for a regulatory framework that would control the 
effects of modem biotechnology in its open-field applications. The Europeanisation of the 
various spheres of environmental protection, in combination with the gradual 
commercialisation o f agricultural biotechnology and the increase in the open-field releases of 
GMOs into the natural environment, provided D G  Environment with the opportunity to 
capture genetic engineering applications in environmental terms, by viewing plant 
biotechnology as a potential threat to environmental safety. Despite the apparent association 
between the environmental safety dimension of plant biotechnology and the constituent 
powers o f DGXI on all issues pertinent to the protection of the natural environment, its 
appointment as chef de file in the regulatory initiatives on GMOs was seen by D G ’s Industry 
and Research as an ‘organisational paradox’182, as they had been involved in the Commission’s 
initiatives long before the emergence of DGXI as a relevant actor in the biotechnology arena.
182 Interview evidence with officials of DG III and DGXII (March-May 2005)
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4.1.1. The rise of DGXI in the formulation of the Commission’s regulatory initiatives on 
GMOs
The Commission’s Directorate General for the Environment, Nuclear Safety and 
Civil Protection (DGXI) had been set up in 1971 as a minor service department and had not 
achieved directorate general status until 1981.183 In that year, a reorganisation o f the 
Commission resulted in environmental responsibilities being transferred from D G III 
(Industry) to a reformulated DGXI, which became responsible for all issues related to 
environmental protection, nuclear safety and civil protection. Up to the mid-1980s, the 
position of DGXI within the Commission was rather weak in structural terms184 and it was 
regarded as a minor league player.185 As Haigh and Lanigan note, until 1986 and the 
strengthening o f the legal basis for Community action on the environment, DGXI was 
considered ‘as weak, unimportant, peripheral {...} and under resourced’.186 Its weak intra- 
Commission position, in terms o f its limited material and human resources and the limited 
number o f issue-areas falling under its competence -in comparison to other Commission 
DGs- could not be attributed solely to its late arrival in the Commission’s scene, but also to 
the complementary character of its portfolio as compared with the main Commission 
priorities at that time.187 Until the institutional changes that the adoption o f the Single 
European Act (SEA) carried with it, such as the introduction of an Environmental Chapter in 
the Treaty (Title VII), the establishment of a separate legal basis for environmental measures 
(namely, Article 130r, s and t), the empowerment of the —traditionally responsive to 
environmental concerns- European Parliament in the frame of the EC decision-making 
structures,188 ‘environmental policy {in the EC} was considered an illegitimate child’.189 It was 
the Single European Act that formalised and made explicit the Community involvement in 
the environmental field and made the protection o f the environment o f equal or even 
superior status to all other Community objectives.
183 J.D. Liefferink, P. Lowe and A.P.J. Mol, ‘The environment and the European Community: the analysis o f political 
integration’ in J.D. Liefferink, P. Lowe and A.P.J. Mol, European Integration & Environmental Policy, (London ; New 
Y ork: Belhaven Press, 1993) 4
184 ‘As Peterson and Bomberg note, ‘DGXI is clearly a junior player in many o f {...} turf wars.’ In J.Peterson and
E.Bomberg, Decision making in the European Union (St. Martin's: New York, 1999) 192
185 M. Cini, ‘Administrative Culture in the Commission’ in N. Nugent, At the heart o f  the Union-Studies o f  the European 
Commission (Macmillan: London, 2000) 83
186 N. Haigh and C. Lanigan, ‘Impact of the European Union on UK Environmental Policy Making’ in T. S. Gray (Ed.), 
UK environmental policy in the 1990s (Macmillan: Basingstoke, UK, 1995) 22
187 Cini further notes that ‘its inability to win arguments or to have its priorities translated into EU priorities provides
ample evidence of its marginal character,’ see note 185 at 83
188 See: http://eurooa.eu/scadDlus/treaties/singleact en.htm
189 L. Kramer, E.C. Environmental Law, (Sweet and Maxwell: London, 2000) 27
81
First o f all, the array o f Communications, issued at the beginning o f the 1980s, such as 
the Communications 83/672 and 83/328, the establishment of discussion forums and 
coordination structures on biotechnology issues at the European level such as the BSC, the 
CUBE, the Task Force for Biotechnology Information and the European Biotechnology 
Coordination Group (ECGB) and the initiation of EC-wide R&D programmes on 
agricultural biotechnology, such as the European Collaborative Linkage of Agriculture and 
Industry through Research (ECLAIR) and the Food-Linked Agro-industrial Research 
(FLAIR) programmes, contributed to the shaping of a European biotechnology narrative and 
to the establishment o f the Commission, as a whole, as a major coordinating force in the 
formulation o f genetic engineering policies in Europe and in the elaboration o f biotechnology 
norms. Further, the various Commission research and policy initiatives on the development 
o f biotechnology conferred on this particular technological application an EC-wide dimension 
as an object o f policy analysis and research and industrial interest. The transfer of interest on 
the field o f modem biotechnology from the national to the supranational (European) level, in 
fact, paved the way for DGXI, as the Commission’s administrative unit responsible for 
shaping environmental policies, to establish its interest in elaborating a regulatory platform on 
the environmental aspect o f this novel technological sector. Its competence was based on it 
being an authority on issues related to risk-regulation, the regulatory control of hazardous 
activities and, in general, on the establishment of safety standards.
The interest o f Directorate General for Environment in biotechnology was initially 
expressed in the frame of the Third Environmental Action Programme (1982-1986).190 Its 
officials started participating in several informal meetings dealing with European Community 
programmes on biotechnology organised by the CUBE in the first months of 1984. In view 
of the Council’s adoption of the Biotechnology Research Action Programme (BRAP) on the 
19th December 1984 and the rapid developments in the biotechnology field that raised issues 
beyond research, an informal inter-service meeting was organised by CUBE on the 29th of 
April 1984 to initiate discussion of the regulatory aspects o f biotechnology. In this meeting, 
environmental concerns regarding bio-engineered organisms were expressed for the first time 
at Commission level. More concretely, as was noted, ‘since such organisms can be transferred 
to new habitats, are self-reproducing, and in many cases are intended to interact with natural 
systems and the environment, effective regulations can only be adopted at the European level
19°  3rd E n v ir o n m e n t a l  Action Programme, OJ, 1977, No.C 46/1
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and ultimately must be harmonised internationally.’191 The acknowledgment of the need to 
approach biotechnology through an environmental safety prism legitimised, in effect, D G X I’s 
de facto participation to these inter-service coordination meetings.
In the frame of the CUBE meeting on the 29th of November 1984, DGXI presented a 
report on the adequacy o f the existing environmental regulations to safeguard the control of 
risk from biotechnology applications. This report illustrated the insufficiency o f the then 
existing EC sectoral legislation to correspond to the novel, in character and origin, regulatory 
challenges o f genetic engineering.192 The report stated that there was a serious and urgent 
need to develop new EC regulations ‘if man and the environment are to be adequately 
protected and the European Industry is not to suffer from trade barriers’, thus T)GXI is 
considering an Ad-Hoc Directive intended to control risks from accidental and deliberate 
release o f new and exotic living organisms.’193 Following this meeting, DGXI expressed its 
desire to become involved in the relevant official meetings o f the BSC in order to infuse an 
environmental perspective in the Commission’s agenda for a regulatory framework on 
biotechnology applications. As a high-ranking officer of DGXI noted in a letter to DGXII, ‘I 
hope you would agree that in the future DGXI might be represented in the Biotechnology 
Steering Committee.’194
DG XI started participating to the proceedings o f the BSC and attending the intra- 
Commission meetings, on a formal basis, in July 1985, at a point when, after two years and 
the completion o f four official meetings since its establishment, the discussion had become 
focused on the formulation and adoption of a Biotechnology Action Plan (1985-1989).19s In 
late 1985, DGXI, at that time as an official member of the BSC, emphasised the need for a 
further re-structuring o f the intra-Commission organisational landscape so that the 
Commission could become more responsive to the eminent technological challenges and their 
multiple risks and be in a position to formulate technical norms and measures o f a safety 
orientation.196 In addition, DGXI made the case that, as biotechnological research moved into 
field release, closer attention and scrutiny was required alongside an emphasis on ‘technical
191 CUBE Minutes o f 29th April 1984
192 Informal Report of DGXI on the adequacy of the existing environmental regulations for the control of risk from 
biotechnology applications: Assessment of the environmental impact and risks from the use in the open environment of 
products derived from biotechnology, February 1984
193 CUBE Minutes of 29th November 1984
194 Regulation of Biotechnology in the European Community, Internal Note for the Attention of Mr. Fazelad: Director 
General DGXII from Mr. Andreopoulos DG Environment (found in the personal archives of an ex-Commission official)
195 BSC Minutes o f the Meeting of the 7th July 1985
196 BSC Minutes of the Meeting of 17/12/1985
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arguments about regulatory details’.197 With the growing salience of the environmental 
movement in Europe, D G X I’s arguments found favour amongst a number o f Directorates- 
General, such as D G  Agriculture and Industry, which thought that the establishment of 
common rules on the release o f biotechnology applications would meet both the safety 
concerns o f the local farmers and the commercial interests o f the European bioindustries.
The organizational ‘magnitude’ of DGXI in the framing o f the relevant intra- 
Commission discussions gradually increased as the large-scale industrialisation and systematic 
field release o f genetically modified organisms created the need for consideration o f the safety 
aspect o f modem biotechnology and the potential environmental risks of its releases. More 
concretely, the efforts to evaluate the consequences o f releasing large numbers of engineered 
organisms into the environment had started in 1983 and the first commercial release of a 
GMO into the environment took place in the US in 1986.198 Genetic engineering technology 
had reached a stage where environmental concerns could no longer be neglected as 
unimportant, as it was no longer the case that nearly all applications o f genetic engineering 
vtere confined to laboratories or to small and well-contained production units as in the early 
stages o f development. Thus, the need arose to address those environmental concerns arising 
from the deliberate or incidental release o f organisms, mostly due to their inherent self- 
propagating properties. The emergence of ‘deliberate release’ as a new application field of 
genetic engineering in combination with the potential of GMOs entering the natural 
environment, called for the upgrading of the role o f DGXI due to its formal tasks and 
competences.
As Gottweis stated, ‘(w)hereas in the 1970s the hazards o f genetic engineering had 
been conceptualised as a technological problem, in the second half o f the 1980s recombinant 
DN A’s risks came increasingly to be reconfigured as a socio-ecological issue that could not be 
dealt with entirely by technological means.’199 The discussion about the risks o f rDNA 
technology unveiled a political and social unease in Europe in relation to the effects of GMO 
deliberate releases, whereby the value of genetic engineering was being questioned on safety 
grounds. Consequently, the increase of the organisational mobilisation o f DGXI, in its role as
197 See: Background Note, ‘Regulation of Biotechnology in the EC’, Informal Interservice Meeting of 4/02/85 :DG 
Environment 1st February, 1985
198 See: S.J.Shackley, ‘Regulation of the release of genetically manipulated organisms into the environment’ 16(4) 
Science and Public Policy August 1989 at 213; S.Krimsky, ‘Gene splicing enters the environment: the socio-historical 
context of the debate over deliberate release’ in J.Fowle III, Application o f  Biotechnology -  Environmental and Policy 
Issues (Westview Press:Boulder, 1987)
199 See note 105 at 265
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the main institutional guarantor o f the sustainability and safety of the European environment 
on issues o f biotechnological character did not come as a surprise. The publication o f articles 
and studies referring to the potential risks o f genetic engineering,200 as well as of the 1986 
OECD  Report ‘Recombinant DNA Safety considerations,’201 the drafting of which included 
the participation o f DGXI officials,202 seemed to re-enforce the need for consideration o f the 
environmental safety dimension of genetic engineering releases.
More specifically, the OECD Report suggested a case-by-case review o f the potential 
risks o f genetic engineering releases and set the grounds for an internationally agreed 
framework for safety assessment.203 The Recommendation of the O ECD ’s Council 
concerning safety considerations for applications of recombinant DNA organisms in industry, 
agriculture and the environment that followed the 1986 Report suggested that Member States 
‘ensure that recombinant DNA organisms are evaluated for potential risk, prior to 
applications in agriculture and the environment by means of an independent review of 
potential risks on a case-by-case basis’ and ‘conduct the development o f recombinant DNA 
organisms for agricultural or environmental applications in a stepwise fashion, moving where 
appropriate, from the laboratory to the growth chamber and greenhouse, to limited field 
testing and, finally, to large-scale field testing.’204 Most importantly, the findings o f a study 
funded by DGXI, which identified ecological uncertainties in the behaviour of these novel 
recombinant DNA genetic combinations in the natural environment, provided a plausible 
technical platform for DGXI in its efforts to territorialize the area o f genetic engineering 
regulation.
200 See for example, W.J. Brill, ‘Safety concerns and genetic engineering in agriculture’ (1985) 219 Science 381; R.K. 
Colwell, E.A. Norse, D. Pimentel, F.E. Sharpies and D. Simberloff, Genetic engineering in agriculture (1985) 229 
Science 115; M. Alexander, Ecological consequences: reducing the uncertainties (1985) 1 Issues in Science and  
Technology. 57; P.J. Regal, ‘The Ecology of Evolution: Implications of the Individualistic Paradigm’ in O. Halverson, D. 
Pramer, and M. Roggul (eds.), Engineered Organisms in the Environment: Scientific Issues (American Society for 
Microbiology, Washington., D.C. 1985) 11-19; J. D. Watson and J. Tooze, The DNA Story: A Documentary History o f  
DNA Cloning (Freeman: San Francisco, 1981); F.E. Sharpies, Spread o f  Organisms with Novel Genotypes: Thoughts 
from an Ecological Perspective (ORNL/TM-8473, Oak Ridge National Laboratory Environmental Sciences Division 
Publication No. 2040, 1982) (Reprinted in Recombinant DNA Technology Bulletin, 6,43-56.)
201 OECD (1986) ‘Recombinant DNA Safety considerations’, OECD, Paris; See also, A. Bull, G. Holt, and M. Lilley 
(eds.), Biotechnology, International Trends, and Perspectives (OECD: Paris, 1982)
202 Those DGXI officers that participated to the OECD meetings on modem biotechnology were C. Whitehead 
Consultant to the Environment, Consumer Protection & Nuclear Safety Directorate (DGXI), Dr. G. Del Bino 
Environment, Consumer Protection & Nuclear Safety Directorate (DGXI) and C.Mantegazzini Consultant to the 
Environment, Consumer Protection & Nuclear Safety (DGXI). It needs to be mentioned that DGXII and DGIII also 
attended these meetings.
203 Available at http://dbtbiosafctv.nic.in/guideline/OECD/Recombinant DNA safety considerations.pdf: see also 
Dickson, ‘OECD Urges Case-by-Case Review for Releasing Engineered Organisms, 234 Science (1986) 280-1
204 Clause 3b and 3c of the Recommendation of the Council concerning Safety Considerations for Applications of 
Recombinant DNA, Organisms in Industry, Agriculture and the Environment, OECD, Scientific and Technological 
Policy, 16 July 1986 - C(86)82/Final
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DGXI made use of the ambiguous and vague wording o f the relevant scientific 
reports, such as the Mantegazzini study and the 1986 OECD Report, and projected a 
technically documented ecological viewing of genetic engineering effects to legitimise its 
safety claims and justify its institutional involvement. The calls on behalf o f environmental 
non-govemmental groups for a cautious approach towards the development of modem 
biotechnology205 and the development of inter-institutional discussions in Denmark, the UK 
and Germany about the possibilities for the drafting of regulatory safety measures focused 
exclusively on genetic engineering at the national level, further accentuated the need for an 
EC-wide regulatory initiative in the field o f GMOs. More specifically, Denmark formulated a 
stringent biosafety regulatory framework, the Environment and Gene Technology Act (‘Lov 
om Mil jog Gensplejsning’) designed to protect health and the environment. This came into 
force in June 1986, implementing a licensing system for the development of biotechnology- 
derived products that would be based on a prior case-by-case assessment o f the potential 
harmful effects o f deliberate releases of GMOs on the environment.206 In turn, the 
Netherlands was working ‘on regulations concerning work with ‘harmful’ organisms’207 and in 
Germany, the Bundestag established, on 29 June 1984, a ‘Commission o f Enquiry on 
Prospects and Risks o f Genetic Engineering’ that was allocated the responsibility o f preparing 
a Report on the risks o f gene technology, which was released a few years later.208 In the UK, 
the Advisory Committee on Genetic Manipulation —established in 1984 under the aegis o f the 
Health and Safety Commission— recognized that the issues raised by the planned release of 
genetically modified organisms into the environment should be considered a priority. It set 
up a Planned Release Sub-Committee in 1986 so as to review in advance all proposals for the 
introduction o f GMOs into the environment that had been submitted in the UK. This 
Committee published guidelines for the planned release of GMOs for agricultural and 
environmental purposes in April 1986.209 The emergence o f these national biosafety acts led
205 The Grunen and the Oko-Institutes in Germany, the Les Amis de la Terre, Confederation Paysanne, So/agral and 
Genetique et Liberte in France and the UK Genetics Forum, the Green Alliance, Friends o f  the Earth, Greenpeace UK 
and the Soil Association in the UK were the most prolific political mobilisers against genetic engineering. The emerging 
Green parties at the local, national (Germany, France) and European levels (Green Party in the EP) gradually became the 
main institutional sites of critique against the applications of this technology.
206 Denmark. 1986. Environment and Gene Technology Act 1986. Soborg, Denmark: Denmark, Ministry of 
Environment, National Food Agency. See also E.Baark and A.Jamision, ‘Biotechnology and Culture: The Impact of 
Public Debates on Government Regulation in the United States and Denmark’ (1990) 12 Technology in Society 27-44
207 R.Walgate, ‘Europe: A Few Cooks Too Many’ (December 1985) 13 Bio/Technology 1071
208 See note 105 at 273-280
209 See for more, D. Barling, ‘Regulating GM foods in the 1980s and 1990s’ in D.F. Smith and J. Phillips, Food, Science, 
Policy and Regulation in the Twentieth Century-International and comparative perspectives. For more about these 
national initiatives, see J.Toft, ‘Denmark seeking a broad based consensus on gene technology’ in L.Levidow and S.Carr 
(eds.), ‘Special issue on biotechnology risk regulation in Europe’ (1996) 23 Science and Public Policy 171-4; 
ACGM/HSE/Note 3 (1986) Advisory Committee on Genetic Manipulation
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Walgate to state, that ‘it would seem that in Europe {...} (regulatory) anarchy still reigns 
oblivious (on all factors beyond laboratory experiments).’210
As a response to the various safety concerns and distress over the potential 
environmental effects o f genetic engineering throughout Europe, the European Parliament’s 
own-initiative report on biotechnology, conveyed the plea for a very cautious approach 
towards genetic engineering that would respond to the emergent environmental risks and 
meet the plurality o f socio-economic interests. The report o f the EP called on the 
Commission to give priority to studying the problems posed by the potential release into the 
environment of genetically modified micro-organisms and demanded that such releases be 
banned until binding Community safety directives had been drawn up.211 Further, the 
Resolution of the EP ‘on biotechnology in Europe and the need for an integrated policy’ 
called for the harmonization o f Member States’ provisions with regard to safety and the 
environment and for the formulation o f common procedures for risk assessment, as well as 
for a step-by-step approach to regulating the various phases o f biotechnology processes.212 
These institutional initiatives intensified the need for an organisational empowerment o f 
DGXI, within the framework of the Commission’s discussions on the need for a 
biotechnology-related regulatory framework.
The political momentum in Europe at the time, which favoured the emergence o f a 
pro-regulatory agenda for environmental and safety reasons, upgraded the need for the 
formulation o f a regulatory framework for the control of those risks associated with genetic 
engineering. To this end, the Commission’s 1986 Communication under the title ‘A 
Community Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology’213 made the first explicit 
reference to the intention o f the Commission ‘to introduce proposals for Community 
regulation o f biotechnology’ by the summer of 1987 addressing, among other things, the
210 See note 207
211 For more, see P. Viehoff, (1985), Biotechnology Hearing. Outline, PE 98.227/rev., Committee on Energy, Research 
and Technology, European Parliament, 30.10.1985, P. Viehoff, (1986), On Biotechnology in Europe and the Need for an 
Integrated Policy, Committee on Energy, Research and Technology, European Parliament, Doc.A 2-134/86, European 
Parliament (1985), Genetic Technology: Some Ethical and Legal Problems, Doc/104/85/JE, Group o f the European 
People’s Party, Secretariat, 23 May 1985, Luxembourg: European Parliament, European Parliament (1985), Notice to 
Members. Subject: Preparations for Hearings, No.51/85, Annex, Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights, 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection, 13 September 1985, European Parliament and 
European Parliament, Committee on Social Affairs and Employment. Draft Opinion for the Committee on Energy, 
Research and Technology on matters relating to biotechnology. Draftsman B.Haerlin, 14 May, 1986, PE 105.015, 
Brussels, 4
212 See: paragraph 15 of the, Resolution on biotechnology in Europe and the need for an integrated policy, European 
Parliament Doc.A2-134/86, C 76/25, Monday, 16 February 1987
213 Communication from the Commission to the Council, (86) 573 final, A Community Framework fo r  the Regulation o f  
Biotechnology, 4 November 1986, Brussels
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authorization o f the planned release of genetically engineered organisms into the environment 
and stressing the need for harmonizing or establishing biotechnology regulations for the 
protection o f the population, of works and of the environment with a view to providing a 
high and common level o f human and environmental protection throughout the Community’. 
This Communication addressed for the first time the need to prevent or to predict the 
potential risks of an environmental character associated with the open-field release o f GMOs 
and, in fact, raised the need for a biotechnology-specific regulation at the EU level. It 
emphasised the need to safeguard public health and the environment as a basic regulatory 
requirement for the development of modem biotechnology, and the need to enact safety 
control standards that would target genetic engineering as a source of novel uncertainties and 
complex risks o f an irreversible and complex character.
The Communication formalised the intentions o f DG XI to formulate and propose 
biotechnology-specific legislation with an evident safety scope and a strong environmental 
character214 and became indicative of its objective to frame an authorisation framework for 
genetic engineering releases in environmental terms. This Commission declaration of its 
legislative aims signalled the framing o f genetic engineering as a sui generis environmental 
problem in the EU needing special attention and a case-by-case approach because o f its high 
scientific uncertainty and complexity, as well as the absence of any general guidelines on 
biotechnology safety. At the same time, it became the first Community document that made 
an explicit reference to the need to address the authorization of the planned release of 
genetically engineered organisms into the environment as a distinct aspect of the use of 
genetic engineering.
The reasons for this Commission initiative Svere threefold and may be conceptualised 
in terms o f harmonisation, risk reduction and dealing with uncertainty.215 The Communication 
portrayed the Commission’s rationale for a biotechnology-specific legislative regime as 
follows: ‘the Commission is convinced that the development o f a Community regulatory
2,4 As the Communication states, ‘In the light of the examination which has been undertaken by the services, the 
Commission believes the rapid elaboration of a Community framework of biotechnology regulation to be of crucial 
importance...citizens, industrial workers, and the environment, need to be provided with adequate protection throughout 
the Community from any potential hazards arising from the applications o f these technologies.’ Commission of the 
European Communities, , Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(86) 573 final, A Community 
Framework fo r  the Regulation o f  Biotechnology, 4 November 1986, Brussels
215 See note 108 at 550ff and H. Torgersen, J. Hampel, M.L. von Bergmann-Winberg, E. Bridgman, J. Durant, J. & E. 
Einsiedel, ‘Promise, problems and proxies: Twenty-five years o f debate and regulation in Europe’ in M. Bauer & G. 
Gaskell (eds.), Biotechnology: The making of a global controversy. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 
2002) 48
framework, which will both provide a clear, rational and evolving basis for the development 
o f biotechnology and also ensure adequate protection of human health and the environment 
is an urgent necessity.’216 This brief Communication to the Council favoured a strict 
regulatory approach to biotechnology, and Svent beyond the views and recommendations o f 
the ECRAB paper,’217 the Member-State approaches as expressed in the Council 
Recommendations 82/472, and the OECD report.218 It should be further noted that the 
Commission Communication 86/221 had further linked biotechnology with the protection of 
the environment in the European Community and referred to the encouragement o f 
innovations aiming at ‘profitable and self-supporting longer-term developments, compatible 
with the protection o f the environment’219 thus strengthening, in reality, the institutional 
position o f DGXI within the Commission in the context of the adoption o f EU rules on 
genetic engineering.
The announcement on behalf o f the Commission of its determination to prepare 
proposals for the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment and in gieneral to draft 
GMO-specific rules —in the frame of the 86/573 Communication- not only signified the 
strengthening o f the need for regulatory intervention in the area of genetic engineering, but 
also reflected the Commission’s environmental approach towards genetic engineering as 
DGXI was appointed as the lead D G  for the drafting of a Deliberate Release framework. The 
incorporation of the Commission’s Communication of November 1986 into the fourth 
Environmental Action Programme (1987-1991)220 further strengthened the need for an EC 
legislative intervention in the field o f agricultural biotechnology and signalled D G X I’s 
intention to frame genetic engineering regulation in environmental terms.221 The following 
section examines the paradoxical character o f this institutional arrangement and identifies 
some further reasons that led to this particular organizational choice within the Commission.
216 Communication from the Commission to the Council: A Community framework for the regulation o f Biotechnology, 
COM(86) 573 final, Brussels, 4 November 1986
217 ECRAB, European Committee on Regulatoiy Aspects of Biotechnology (1986), Safety and Regulation in 
Biotechnology, April 1986, Brussels: ECRAB
218 OECD Report (1986) ‘Recombinant DNA Safety Considerations’. This report had clearly recognized that the area of 
greatest concern and at the same time the area of greatest ignorance and uncertainty was the release o f genetically 
modified organisms to the environment but had explicitly recognized that ‘there is no scientific basis for specific 
legislation to regulate the use o f recombinant organisms’.
2 Biotechnology in the Community-Stimulating Agro-Industrial Development, Discussion Paper o f the Commission, 
COM (86) 221 final, Brussels, 18 April 1986 at 3
220 4th Environmental Action Programme, OJ, 1987, No. C 328/1
221 As Koppen states referring to the fourth Environmental Action Programme, ‘The Community intends to continue and 
expand scientific research on biotechnology {...}The health and environmental risks of genetic engineering will be 
assessed carefiilly’ in I.J. Koppen, ‘The European Community’s Environmental Policy-From the Summit in Paris, 1972 
to the Single European Act, 1987’ EUI Working Paper No.88/328 22 and 4th Environmental Action Programme 1987- 
1992(OJC 328, 7.12.87)
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4 .1.2. The appointment of DGXI as chef de file
The appointment of DGXI as a co-chair of the inter-service committee (BRIC) and as 
the main intra-Commission coordinator in shaping a regulatory framework seemed 
disproportionate to it being a political and institutional ‘lightweight’ within the Commission 
and to its lack of experience or competence on issues of modem biotechnology. Also, 
because o f the relatively late conferral o f the status o f an autonomous Directorate General to 
its administrative structure, its weak enforcement capacity and the fact that its policies seemed 
mostly removed from mainstream Commission priorities, the appointment o f DGXI as chef 
de file for the drafting o f the Deliberate Release presented a challenge. This is especially the 
case when set against the backdrop of industrial and competitiveness concerns on the one 
hand and the science-driven development of genetic engineering as an object of regulatory 
attention on the other.
There was nothing in the institutional set-up o f the Commission, which would have 
privileged DGXI over D G s XII or III in terms o f deciding who should be the main drafter of 
the Deliberate Release framework. In relation to this contextual background, it needs to be 
mentioned that D G  Industry did not object to D G X I’s appointment as chef de file. As one 
participant noted, TDGXI became chef-de-file in part because no other service was much 
disposed to argue against that decision’.222 The non-contentious character of its appointment 
is somewhat surprising for two reasons. Firstly, there was no specific institutional, procedural 
or substantive justification for the choice o f D G  Environment over DGs XII and III. 
Secondly, considering D G  Industry’s dual competences and interests in the biotechnology 
arena, namely, its internal market and industrial competitiveness objectives and its traditional 
and consistent primacy within the Commission from the early years o f the development of 
biotechnology, it seems odd that it would concede drafting powers on the development o f a 
horizontal regulatory framework solely to DGXI.
An examination o f the FAST documents and the correspondent Commission 
organisational and general policy initiatives (the establishment o f the BSC (CUBE) among 
others) had in fact signalled the Commission’s reading of genetic engineering in technological 
and competitive terms. The launching of the BEP, which supported research in the period 
1982-1986, the translation o f the Commission’s biotechnology strategy into a part o f the
222 Interview evidence with an officer from DG Industry (13/9/2006)
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emerging R&D and industrial policies of the EC, as seen in the relevant Bio-Society Working 
Group’s policy papers, and the establishment of the European Biotechnology Coordination 
Group (ECGB),223 had strengthened the role of DGs Research and Industry and had further 
legitimised their intra-Commission predominance. In fact, the ECGB was formed in June 
1985 at the request of DGXII and consisted o f seven national associations o f manufacturers, 
industries and producers concerned with the application of biotechnologies. These 
organisational initiatives indicated the Commission’s interest in the research and development 
aspects o f biotechnology and its focus on the strengthening of EC research structures, rather 
than on the prioritisation o f the need for enactment o f common safety rules on genetic 
engineering.
Further, DGXI did not possess any scientific expertise or regulatory experience 
regarding genetic engineering applications, mainly due to its lack of permanent scientific and 
technical staff specialised on modem biotechnology.224 The absence o f any reported 
environmental harm or documented safety risk that could be linked with the agricultural or 
industrial applications of modem biotechnology indicated the absence o f any justification for 
D G X I’s involvement in this field o f public policy. These structural limitations that augmented 
or simply justified D G X I’s unremarkable participation to the correspondent intra- 
Commission consultation and deliberation proceedings over the regulation of modem 
biotechnology before the establishment o f the BRIC,225 seemed in fact to constitute 
significant obstacles to its appointment as chef de file for the DRD. In light o f these factors, 
D G X I’s appointment as chef de file was seen as an organisational paradox, given the 
centrality o f the reference to the need for the establishment o f a specifically European 
biotechnology research base and industry in the Commission’s strategy on genetic engineering 
as presented in the COM(83)672.226 This leads to the question o f what the reasons were that 
led to this institutional choice.
223 See more in J. Greenwood, and K. Ronit, ‘Established and Emergent Sectors: Organised Interests at the European 
Level in the Pharmaceutical Industry and the New Biotechnologies’ in J. Greenwood, J.R. Grote, and K. Ronit, 
Organised Interests and the European Community (SAGE:London, 1992) at 90
224 A Lake mentions, 'One modestly-sized division is responsible fo r  all chemical and biological regulation, ranging 
from  the Seveso Directive, via the Marketing and Use o f  Dangerous Substances to the directives under discussion here. 
It is almost a case o f  one person, one dossier.' in G.Lake, ‘Scientific uncertainty and political regulation: European 
legislation on the contained use and deliberate release of genetically modified (micro) organisms’ (March 1991) 6 
Project Appraisal 8
225 As Flynn notes, ‘DGXI is invariably weakly positioned to resist being forced to sacrifice its own projects’ in B. 
Flynn, ‘Does Subsidiarity Make a Difference to the EU Environmental Institutions?’ in M. Wissenburg, G. Orhan, and 
U. Collier, European Discourses on Environmental Policy (Ashgate: Aldershot, 1999) 116
226 Communication from the Commission to the Council. COM (83) 672 final/2,4 October 1983
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First o f all, this particular organisational designation can be attributed to the gradual 
prioritisation of environmental considerations and safety concerns in Europe at that time. 
The gradual emergence o f a public environmental paradigm at the Community level had been 
evidenced in the gradually increasing involvement of environmental NG Os in local and 
national governing schemes —such as the Grunen’s election to the Bundestag in 1984227- as 
well as into EC decision-making structures and in the election of ‘Green’ politicians in the 
1984 election of the European Parliament.228 DGXI officials captured this political 
momentum and as one Commission official stated: ‘They (DGXI) tapped cleverly into a 
combination o f forces, traditionally strong in Europe: anti-Americanism, anti-multinationals, 
agricultural protectionism, the rising Green movements.’229 Further, in view of the potential 
risks that became associated with the launching o f the first GMO-related field trials,230 the 
commencement o f a scientific debate on the environmental risks and the high scientific 
uncertainty o f genetic engineering applications in the US,231 and the scheduled large-scale 
releases o f GMOs in the EU as part of a broader strategy for the commercialisation and 
industrialisation o f the applications of genetic engineering,232 those safety concerns and 
initiatives that had initially been expressed in relation to the safety of rDNA research work 
expanded into other applications of modem biotechnology.
The combination o f a wider political momentum that encouraged the adoption of 
environmental protection initiatives at the EU level with the inability o f CUBE to respond to 
the multi-sectoral regulatory challenges of genetic engineering due to its lack o f expertise, its 
narrow policy-focus (of a principally R&D character), as well as to resolve the intra- 
Commission competence battles and to shape the rule-making process in a legally binding 
manner further paved the way for D G X I’s stronger involvement in the Commission’s 
biotechnology discussions. Due to the gradual commercialisation and industrialisation of 
genetic engineering applications in the international arena (mainly in the US and Japan) that
227 See: H.Kitschelt, The Logics o f  Party Formation: Ecological Politics in Belgium and West Germany (Cornwell 
University Press: Ithaca, NY and London, 1989)
228 Eleven Green MEPs of member parties were elected to the European Parliament in 1984 forming the Green 
Alternative European Link (GRAEL), 7 of which were elected for the German Greens, 1 for the Dutch Political Party of 
Radicals, 1 for the Dutch Pacifist Socialist Party, 1 for Ecolo (Belgium) and 1 for Agalev (the Netherlands)
229 Interview evidence with an officer from DGXII, (12/6/2006)
230 As Newmark notes, ‘some very cautious tests designed precisely {during the summer of 1986} to assess the possible 
risks of deliberate bacterial release, performed under a European Community risk-assessment program, provoked howls 
o f protest in two of the three countries in which they took place {Germany and France} in P. Newmark, ‘Discord and 
Harmony in Europe’ (December 1987) 5 Biotechnology 281
231 An account of the relevant scientific debate can be found in Gottweis, see note 105 at 235-236
232 As Cantley notes, ‘the situation was changing, as biotechnology moved towards applications in large-scale industrial 
production facilities, and field release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) -microorganisms or plants.’ See note 
108 at 546
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had created the need for improving the competitiveness o f the'•European bio-industries, 
D G X I’s gradual promotion within the Commission seemed to fill the organisational space 
that had been created due to the Commission’s need, on the one hand to assume legislative 
initiatives of an environmental character and on the other hand, due to the gradual weakening 
o f CUBE, as well as o f its organisational chairman, D G  Research, both in political and 
institutional terms. In fact, DGXI officials moved strategically to fill this gap within the 
Commission and in the words o f a DGXI official: TDGXI, recognising the potential for 
biotechnology as a vital issue, demonstrated an early interest in gaining control over a 
significant policy process and that it provided environmental actors access to rule 
formulation.’
Moreover, D G  Environment had gained experience in regulating dangerous 
substances and potentially hazardous industrial activities233 and in fact, its competence over 
the formulation, enforcement and monitoring of the application o f EC chemicals legislation, a 
sector that shared many technical similarities with that of agricultural biotechnology, became a 
crucial factor in its appointment. It was these competences that soon placed it as leader o f 
the regulatory efforts and constituted a crucial factor in its appointment. As Cantley noted, 
‘The experience of DGXI with chemicals legislation was o f strong relevance as an influence 
on their thinking, and subsequently on their drafting, as a paradigm for regulating the 
products o f biotechnology’.234 It seems that, as in the case o f chemicals legislation -where the 
US Toxic Substances Control had affected the formulation and the design of the 1967 
Council Directive on chemicals-,235 the appointment o f DG XI as chef de file in the field of 
chemicals also followed the US administrative paradigm, where the Environmental Protection 
Agency had been placed in charge of the US Co-ordinated Framework on Biotechnology.236
233 Legislation on chemicals had been in place since 1967 (Council Directive 67/548/EEC (for dangerous substances) 
and Council Directive 76/769/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States relating to restrictions on the marketing and use of certain dangerous substances and 
preparations (Limitations Directive) but the element o f environmental protection from the dangerous effects of 
substances was only introduced with the 6th amendment o f the Directive, adopted in 1979 (Council Directive 
79/831/EEC of 18 September 1979 amending for the sixth time Directive 67/548/EEC on the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions relating to the classification, packaging and labeling of dangerous substances, 
OJ o f the European Communities L 259, 15.10.1979, p. 10). The 6th amendment also introduced the notification system 
for “new” substances (as from 1981) and, consequently, required the establishment of the list of “existing” substances. 
For more information see European Commission Working Document-Report on the Operation of Directive 67/548/EEC, 
Directive 88/379/EEC, Regulation (EEC) 79/393 Directive 76/769/EEC, SEC (1998) 1986 final, Brussels 18.11.1998
234 See note 108 at 547
235 Council Directive 67/548/EEC of 27 June 1967 on the approximation o f the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous substances, OJ 196, 16.8.1967, p. 1. 
Directive as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 807/2003 (OJ L 122, 16.5.2003, p. 36).
236 As products moved from basic research and development to field-testing and eventual commercial release, the United 
States government published the “Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology” in 1986 to explain how the 
federal agencies would regulate research as well as commercialization. In the Coordinated Framework, USDA, EPA, and 
FDA are identified as the primary regulatory agencies responsible for products of agricultural biotechnology. Under this
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The influential role o f the US regulatory model, in terms o f the gradual substitution of the 
research authorities as the sole actors in charge o f biotechnology policy issues by the 
correspondent environmental ones (the limitation of the powers of the National Institutes of 
Health in favour o f the EPA),237 became evident in, for instance, the replacement of the 
GMAG by the Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment (ACRE) operating 
under the Department o f Health, Social Services and Public Safety (DHSS).
In sum, a conjecture emerged whereby the political momentum, D G X I’s competence 
on issues o f risk regulation and the creation of an institutional vacuum led to it being 
appointed as chef de file for the drafting of the terms o f the authorisation o f GMOs in the 
European environment. Though an apparently paradoxical institutional choice that could not 
have been predicted given the Commission’s predominantly research- and industry-orientated 
approach towards genetic engineering, an ex-post examination o f the broader political and 
institutional context within which this arrangement took place evidences the realistic character 
o f the Commission’s choice. The next section examines the various intra-Commission 
competence battles and the failure o f particular institutional arrangements, such as the 
appointment o f DG XI as chef de file and the establishment o f a new inter-service mechanism 
for the coordination among different organisational actors (i.e. Directorates General), which 
all pursue distinct institutional interests, to resolve the anticipated conflicts.
4.2. Intra-Commission disputes and the (failed) coordination efforts (Part II, 
BRIC)
The appointment of DGXI as chef de file for the formulation o f a draft Directive on 
deliberate releases provided it with the opportunity to command a field o f multifaceted 
applications upon which its formal competence was initially limited and to expand its powers 
in an area o f multi-disciplinary technological applications. Its assignment as the sole drafting
framework, some products may be regulated by all three agencies and some may be regulated by one or two agencies. 
More specifically, EPA assesses genetically modified plant-pesticides and microbial pesticides for adverse effects to 
humans, nontarget organisms, and the environment. Safe residue tolerance levels are established before the pesticide is 
registered for sale and distribution. EPA also requires resistance management for Bt toxins as plant-pesticides. Under 
FIFRA/FFDCA, EPA has responsibility for GM plants and microorganisms with pesticidal characteristics. Companies 
must register these with EPA. Under TSCA, EPA regulates intergeneric microorganisms for commercial purposes, 
including R&D for commercial purposes. TSCA jurisdiction does not cover substances that fall under the jurisdiction of 
FIFRA and FFDCA.
237 Shapiro offers a detailed account of how the then US government responded to the potential risks of the new 
biotechnology and the coordination efforts of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), 
S.Shapiro, ‘Biotechnology and the Design of Regulation’ (1990) 17(1) Ecology Law Quarterly 13-14
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actor signified both a potential increase of its competence in the field o f modem 
biotechnology and its intra-Commission prevalence, that would allow it to shape this issue in 
environmental terms, but also the compromises that needed to be made in view of the multi­
sectoral character o f genetic engineering issues, the multiplicity o f DGs involved in its 
drafting and the collegiate character of the Commission’s decisions. In view of the 
Commission’s institutionally fragmented environment, the procedural requirement for 
collective decision making and responsibility in the frame of the College of Commissioners 
created the need for coordination among the main DGs involved. This in turn set limits on its 
efforts to frame the authorisation framework in environmental terms. As one Commission 
official has noted,
‘The practical effect {of the appointment of a Commission Directorate as chef de 
file} is that the appointed DG is responsible for preparing a proposal and for 
consulting the other Commission services before adoption by the College can take 
place.’238
Despite its experience in formulating and supervising the regulation o f the release of 
dangerous substances as well as of other hazardous activities, and the upgrading o f the 
administrative Unit for Environment into a Directorate-General that had strengthened 
D G XI’s internal standing within the Commission, DGXI soon realised that its appointment 
as chef de file would not suffice in terms of achieving an intra-Commission coordination and 
to meet its institutional interests. This was due to its structurally weak position within the 
Commission and the inter-sectoral dimensions of genetic engineering that exceeded its 
organisational portfolio. As a result, the establishment of links with other DGs involved in 
the biotechnology debates and the creation o f an operational platform of common 
denominator proposals became a basic organisational target o f the Environment Directorate. 
DGXI followed —at least in the first period o f the operation of BRIC- a middle-of-the road 
approach in an effort to integrate the different conceptualisations expressed by the different 
actors proposed. Among others, its reference to the needs o f the then under preparation 
Internal Market as a means to attain the agreement o f D G  Industry on the need for a 
Community-wide regulation o f biotechnology seemed to prevail over environmental concerns 
that had not been —until that time- clearly phrased.
238 Interview evidence with a member of the Legal Service o f the Commission (13/5/2006)
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Considering that the appointment o f DGXI was the outcome of a combination of
technical and political conditions of a non-institutional nature, rather than the reflection o f its
actual structural positioning within the Commission, its distinct organisational powers, its
material relationship with the sector of genetic engineering and with its various applications or
o f its competencies and scientific expertise upon issues o f modem biotechnology, its power to
control and coordinate the process for the formulation o f a Commission proposal on the
deliberate release o f GMOs seemed questionable. As a result, whereas, in theory, DG XI as
chef de file could obstruct or conceal the contributions o f other DGs, the requirement for
each draft proposal to gain the unanimous consensus o f all Commissioners created the need
for DGXI to shape inter-institutional alliances and to produce a legislative output that would
meet the various industrial, trade and safety interests, so as to minimise the risk of the
proposal becoming blocked. The strategic use o f the Internal Market harmonization
requirements and the reference to the need for preventing a potential market fragmentation,
in view of the under adoption divergent national safety regulatory frameworks,239set the
grounds for an inclusive approach towards trade and industrial interests. The Commission’s
reference to the under preparation Community regulatory framework as the main axis for the
commercial development o f modem biotechnology, which indicated D G X I’s compromise
approach, was reflected in the 1986 Commission Communication that referred to the Internal
Market objectives and the competitiveness of European bio-industries and noted that:
“The Commission believes the rapid elaboration of a Community framework for 
biotechnology regulation to be of crucial importance to the industrialization of this 
new technology in the Community. Equally, citizens, industrial workers, and the 
environment need to be provided with adequate protection throughout the 
Community from any potential hazards arising from the applications of these 
technologies.”240
As the drafting process for the proposals on the adoption o f the Deliberate Release 
Directive was advancing, the number of Commission DGs that gradually expressed an 
interest in participating in the process o f formulating Community policies and positions on 
genetic engineering increased. Apart from D G  III (Industry) and DGXI (Environment),
239 The main national developments that took place in 1986 were the adoption by Denmark o f the Gene Technology Act 
-the first biotechnology-specific piece of legislation- and the establishment by German’s Bundestag o f the ‘Commission 
o f Enquiry on Prospects and Risks of Genetic Engineering’. For more see C. Conzelmann and D. Claveloux, ‘Europe 
fails to agree on biotech rules’ (10 July 1986) New Scientist 19. As has been mentioned, ‘The regulation of the release of 
genetically-engineered organisms in individual European countries falls into three categories {...}. The UK, France and 
the Netherlands are said generally to support such experiments, provided that each project is thoroughly assessed before 
being authorized. West Germany and Denmark tend to operate a much more restrictive system, with approval only being 
granted in specific cases {...}. The remaining member states have not yet introduced regulations covering this area.’ In 
‘EC seeks consensus over biotech regulations’ (October 16th, 1987) 49 AGROW 6
240 Commission o f the European Communities, COM(86) 573 final, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council. A Community Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 4 November 1986, Brussels at 4
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D G V  (Employment and Social Affairs (traditionally related to the safety o f rDNA 
researchers)) and DG XII (Research (for its developed expertise over issues o f a 
biotechnological character), DGVI (due to its experience with dealing with the applications of 
new technologies upon agricultural farming and its responsibilities over the main field of 
release o f GMOs into the agricultural environment) and DG XIII (Innovation) also became 
involved due to the potential effects that the commercialisation o f genetic engineering 
applications might have upon the formation of European agricultural policies, the trade 
interests and the competitiveness o f European bioindustries and the sustainability o f this new 
commercial sector carrying with them their own regulatory experiences and 
conceptualisations o f the genetic engineering issue and its potential uses/risks. As a result of 
the functional separation o f tasks within the Commission, each D G ’s proposals and positions 
corresponded to their institutional interests and reflected their pre-existing portfolio of 
competences.
The establishment o f the BRIC in July 1985 was in fact the Commission’s institutional 
response to the need for technical elaboration o f the draft regulatory proposals, but most 
importantly a consequence o f the greater prominence o f the issue o f genetic engineering 
within the Commission as the number of interested ‘constituencies’ increased. The BSC 
agreed to the establishment of this new coordination mechanism and in theory remained the 
overarching administrative scheme on modem biotechnology issues in the Commission. D G  
III and DG XI were assigned as chairs of this new Committee, rotating every six months, 
whereas CUBE (XII) became its secretariat. The establishment o f BRIC upgraded the 
organisational structure for the coordination o f the intra-Commission drafting procedure and 
due to its high-level membership, it became a centre o f inter-service discussions after 1985.
More specifically, the BRIC was created in order to identify, review and assess the 
adequacy o f the then licensing Community regulations and administrative structures to 
govern commercial applications of biotechnology in view o f the potential safety risks but also 
so as to examine the possibility o f proposing and elaborating additional rules. It was further 
empowered to review guidelines for rDNA research, to initiate specific actions where 
regulatory measures are deemed necessary and to ensure the coherence o f scientific findings 
that might be used for risk assessment reasons.241 This committee, which would serve as a 
technical agent for the BSC in the drafting of biotechnology legislation, ensured that it would
241 C. Whitehead, ‘Controlling the risks to health and environment from biotechnology-what is the European Community 
doing?’ (May 1987) 5(40) Trends in Biotechnology 124
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be ‘the active centre within which the inter-service discussions on regulation o f biotechnology 
were developed within the Commission, from 1985 to 1990.’242
DGs Research, Employment and Social Affairs, Agriculture, Environment and 
Industry were the main participants in this institutional formation, but it was the last two that 
presided over this committee and exerted an influential role on its working.243 This particular 
composition o f BRIC, with representatives of rival DGs, was promoted as a means of gaining 
a wider understanding o f a variety of concerns regarding the establishment and operation of 
the Community market on modem biotechnology products, the competitiveness o f European 
bio-industries and the environmental safety of these industrial products. It needs to be 
mentioned that the actions o f the BRIC can be divided into two distinct stages of unequal 
duration. The first one was dedicated to the review of the scope and applicability of existing 
EC legislation on biotechnology processes and products and to the identification o f the areas 
o f higher risk that should be o f special regulatory concern,244 whereas the second was initiated 
through the formulation of the 1986 Commission’s Communication and focused on the 
drafting o f a Directive on the deliberate release o f GMOS into the environment and the 
market.
DGXI and D G III were those Directorates General that made extensive use of the 
BRIC institutional formation in order to promote their regulatory agendas and to establish a 
platform for addressing the emergent challenges o f a safety and commercial character, 
through the selective use o f technical reports created by external scientific committees and the 
OECD- in fact taking advantage o f their ambiguities- and surpassing the oppositions 
expressed by CUBE and D G  Research, as well as the requests o f the latter for the 
preservation o f the existing regulatory measures. Both Directorates, taking advantage of 
different institutional and political factors such as the incoherent positions o f most member 
states and the uncoordinated presence of the industrial sector, but in essence aiming at 
increasing their sphere of influence, argued in favour o f a biotechnology-specific framework 
that would address safety concerns and at the same time harmonise the various national 
biosafety regulations in view of the then under-elaboration Internal Market objectives. The 
continued struggles between DGs Industry and Environment, specifically in their aspirations
242 See note 108 at 544
243 More on this, see Annex II of European Commission ‘Biotechnology at Community level: Concertation’ DGXII-Joint 
Research Center- CUBE, Brussels, 7 October 1985, XII/85, MFC/cp/6
244 European Commission (1985), Biotechnology Steering Committee, First Annual Review and Outlook, XII/601/85, 
Draft, March 1985, Brussels: Commission of the European Communities
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for regulatory task-expansion and competence extension, dominated the regulatory debate at 
the expense o f the interests and views expressed by scientific unions and communities, 
environmental groups, industrial groups, member states and other Commission DGs. Their 
disagreements over the scope of the DRD and the allocation o f competences over the 
process of market authorisation o f GMOs and GMO products constituted the main points of 
conflict during the negotiation process in general.
In relation to the rationale o f D G  Industry, its officials viewed the prospective 
establishment o f national regulatory approaches towards the various applications of 
biotechnology that might be framed for safety purposes —especially those ones that would set 
excessive safety requirements- as a potential barrier against the harmonious development o f 
biotechnology in Europe, which would hamper access to the Community-wide market 
envisaged for 1992.245 To this end, D G  Industry argued for the need for a Directive in 
recognition o f the emergent challenges to competitiveness and in view of the on-going efforts 
made for the establishment of an Internal Community Market, but also in order to meet 
potential consumer concerns regarding the safety o f genetic engineering products.246 Its 
influence upon the process o f the shaping o f genetic engineering policies and rules at the 
Community level —initially evidenced in its participation in the drafting of the 1983 
Commission Communication- was eventually reinforced in the framework of the BRIC, 
within which D G  III was appointed as chair alongside DGXI. After the presentation of the 
Community’s Framework on Biotechnology, D G  Industry maintained its position for a 
biotechnology-specific framework on experimental releases, justifying its views on the pre­
eminent Internal Market requirements.
On the other hand, DGXI made strategic use o f the requests expressed by D G  
Industry for a common regulatory framework as a prerequisite for the ‘biotechnology 
revolution’ and the establishment of Internal Market rules, as well as o f the concerns 
expressed by DGVI about the gradual hostility and scepticism of consumer associations and 
farmer’s unions towards modem biotechnology and its potential risks that might require a
245 D.J.Bennett & B.H.Kirsop (eds.), The Impact o f  New and Impending Regulations on UK Biotechnology (Cambridge, 
Cambridge Biomedical Consultants, 1990) 18
246 As Newmark notes, ‘The inhomogeneity of European regulations is clearly frustrating to the biotechnology industry 
in Europe. {...}Looking ahead, the question is what happens when testing gives way to commercialization. As Jan 
Leemans, director o f the plant engineering group of Plant Genetic Systems, points out, no company can relish the 
prospect o f going through separate, slow regulatory processes in each country of Europe. Whether such companies can 
hope to thrive in a Europe that does not have unified approval procedures is a question that is being asked with 
increasing frequency anywhere that European biotechnologists gather.’ In P. Newmark, ‘Discord and harmony in 
Europe’ (December 1987) 5 Bio/Technology 1283
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Community-wide regulatory response.247 Officials at DG XI even employed ‘Internal Market’ 
narratives so as to achieve a minimum level o f consensus over the need for a common 
regulatory approach with regard to the applications of genetic engineering: ‘a range of 
divergent regulatory regimes was not going to help the harmonious development of 
biotechnology in Europe and would hamper access, in fact, to the entire Community market 
o f 1992’.248 Despite criticisms raised against the limited perspective assumed by DG XI,249 this 
administrative unit attempted (as evidenced in the formulated draft Directive) and in fact 
managed to integrate and accommodate the various intra-Commission approaches towards 
genetic engineering (as can be seen in the finally adopted legislative measures), whilst also 
portraying itself as an intermediary between ‘luddite’ positions expressed by anti-GM groups, 
the Environment Committee o f the EP and pro-technology ones, as expressed by various 
scientific associations and bio-industrial groups.
More concretely, the balanced approach of DGXI as the intra-Commission 
institutional coordinator was evidenced in the rejection o f the proposal contained in the 1987 
EP Report for a five-year moratorium on GMOs and for the introduction o f the concept o f a 
‘fourth hurdle’ for regulatory approval of veterinary medicines and pharmaceuticals.250 The 
Viehoff Resolution of February 1987 referring to the ‘special risks associated with genetic 
engineering methods’ had asked for a complete ban on field releases ‘until binding 
Community safety directives have been drawn up’.251 In other words, the influence of DGXI 
in terms o f adjusting the framing and wording o f the draft Directive towards its ecological 
paradigm was constrained due to its relative weakness, which put it at a disadvantage when 
seeking to push its proposals through interservice negotiations and the subsequent need to 
find institutional and political allies that would support its position after its forwarding to the 
EP and to the Council. As was noted,
‘it is more appropriate when looking at DGXI to consider the constraints to which it
is subject. These constraints are not simply legal.. .rather, the constraints facing
DGXI are primarily ideological, in the sense that its officials often have been
247 For more on the positions o f DGVI, see the minutes of the BRIC meetings.
248 Cambridge Biomedical Consultants (CBC), The Impact o f  New and Impeding Regulations on UK Biotechnology, 
(Cambridge, UK, 1990) 18
249 As Peterson notes, 'These DGXI people are like the Trappist monks who make Chimay Bleu {a strong Belgian beer]. 
They don't consult with anyone besides their religious patrons and they cook up very strong stuff, which will always 
appeal to a certain segment o f  the 'beer-drinking public '. They don’t ever think about what a ferocious hangover is 
induced by the stu ff they cook up ’ in J. Peterson, ‘Playing the transparency game: consultation and policy-making in the 
European Commission’ (1995) 73(3) Public Administration 482
250 Anon, ‘Why industry should take the ‘Fourth hurdle in its stride’ (December 1989) Animal Pharm’s Eurobriefing 6-9
251 See: European Parliament, Report drawn on behalf of the Committee on Energy, Research and Technology on 
biotechnology in Europe and the need for an integrated policy, Rapporteur: Mrs P.Viehoff, 18 November 1986, PE 
105.423/fin, Working Documents 1986-87.
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promoting a vision of ecologism which neighbouring DGs have tended to consider 
unattainable.’252
The role o f DGXI, as the main drafter of the DRD and intra-Commission 
coordinator empowered to search for compromise solutions, was facilitated by the fact that 
its appointment was not accompanied with a specific reference or detailed description o f the 
duties and special powers that such an arrangement would entail. The absence of an 
influential bio-industrial lobby at the European level2*3 and the lack of any institutional 
constraint, or o f an institutional mechanism that would design and supervise the exercise of 
its duties,2*4 and the allocation of tasks within the BRIC, allowed D G  Environment to 
articulate a regulatory narrative that mostly echoed its ecological rationale in terms of 
initiating and defining environmental legislation and finally compelled its normative 
preferences. The noted ecological rationale was bi-dimensional: scientifically, DGXI 
borrowed arguments from environmental sciences and most specifically from ecological 
science and, ideologically, its positions on genetic engineering reflected a familiarity with 
features o f shallow ecology such as the emphasis on the complexity of ecosystems, on how 
the inadequacy o f ecological science makes GMO risks difficult to assess and on ‘genetic 
pollution’ as a threat to human health. This allowed DGXI to shape the relevant regulatory 
requirements in environmental terms. As a Commission officer stated:
The need to transmit our perspective and not design biotechnology policy in Internal 
Market terms emerged as a possibility when BRIC was established. The appointment 
of our DG as chef de file became a means for reflecting our safety concerns over 
genetic engineering, despite our role as coordinator and mediator.’255
As a result, despite the fact that the various initiatives and positions o f DGXI were 
not shaped in a vacuum, but within a specific organizational structure that required a 
consideration o f other viewpoints and inter-service pressures,256 BRIC became an institutional 
carrier o f D G  Environment’s ecological rationale. The market-harmonization driven stance of 
D G III alongside D G  Research’s peripheral interest in the regulation o f modem
252 Sec note 185 at 83.
253 As Dunlop notes, ‘The very existence o f directive 90/220 undoubtedly reflects the absence, for most o f the 1980s, of 
any powerful biotech lobby organization in Europe. The first operation - the Senior Advisory Group on Biotechnology 
(SAGB) - was not set up until 1989 - too late to have any meaningful impact upon the pending legislative proposals.’ See 
note 288 at 152
254 As Nugent notes, ‘Precisely how, and to what extent, consultation occurs depends very much on the circumstances 
applying’. In N. Nugent, The European Commission (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2001) 243
Interview evidence with an officer of DGXI (14/7/2006)
256As was seen in the previous chapter, BRIC became the main negotiation arena and coordination framework for the 
elaboration of a proposal for a Directive for a Deliberate Release Directive
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biotechnology applications made the primacy of D G  Environment all but inevitable. As a 
result o f the organisational prevalence of DGXI in its role as chef de file, in combination with 
the inefficacy of this coordination mechanism to establish a commonly agreed regulatory 
terminology and an operational framework for genetic engineering, there was an alienation of 
those interested parties that had no pro-environmental affiliation. Their marginalisation 
became evident both in the small number of meetings with external actors organized within 
the BRIC framework257 and in the organisation o f forty-three meetings with environmental 
actors between July 1985 and 1990.258 Consequendy, instead of rendering BRIC a deliberative 
negotiation framework that would enhance inter-service coordination and facilitate 
organisational interaction, DGXI formulated its legislative positions pursuant to its 
institutional self-interest.
Further, although BRIC did not aim at the substitution, or the gradual replacement of 
the various competent Commission DGs, but solely at their coordination and organisational 
synchronisation, it proved weak in resolving inter-DG conflicts and widely divergent views 
over the potential risks o f the agri-food applications o f genetic engineering within the 
Commission. In other words, despite the fact that the operation o f BRIC became associated 
with the formulation of a regulatory proposal that was only minimally modified in terms of its 
structure and orientation by the Council and the European Parliament, it did not manage to 
achieve a functional consensus among the main approaches expressed by the participant DGs 
and to establish a common regulatory narrative that would allow the creation of a well- 
defined and operational regulatory framework. After ten official meetings between 1986 and 
1988, the operation o f the BRIC was in effect completed with the publication o f the 1988 
Commission Proposal, since after the official adoption of the Deliberate Release Directive on 
the 23rd o f April 1990, there was no further need for such inter-service consultation.
The discussion that follows analyses the main features o f the 1990 Deliberate Release 
Directive in combination with the underlying rationalities of the main DGs involved in its 
formulation. The latter were informed by differences in: the degrees o f trust in science; 
opinions about the human ability to assess, manage and mitigate environmental risks; 
constructions o f environmental protection and risk; and notions o f nature’s sensitivity to 
human interference. Acknowledging the intricacies that relate to the embedding o f values
257 Documented from the minutes o f 10 official meetings of the BRIC formation in the personal archive of a former 
DGXII official.
258 Documented through informal notes from the personal archive of a former DGXII official.
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within institutions, the major contending rationalities are highlighted as informed by 
conflicting views over the plausibility o f different knowledge paradigms, through which the 
main actors involved intuitively fashioned their strategic goals and defined their long-term 
interests. More specifically, the competence battles between D G  Environment and Industry 
dominated the intra-Community debate and outmanoeuvred the influence of other interested 
Commission DGs, such as the Agriculture and Research. The interests and the way in which 
DG s Research and Environment interacted constituted the most important influence upon 
the draft directive. In the end, despite DG XI’s lack o f competence or experience in 
agricultural biotechnology issues and the general institutional flux and procedural intricacies 
among the different DGs, it managed to articulate a regulatory context that seemed to 
integrate the positions o f the main Commission services, but also to frame the need for 
uniform biotechnology rules at the Community level in environmental terms, which reflected 
its ecological rationale.
4.3. Key features o f the DRD: Proceduralism as the minimum common  
denominator
In order to understand the dynamics that resulted from the participants’ contending 
rationalities, firstly we must examine D G X I’s influence, as chef de file, on the formulation of 
the wording o f the proposed Directive. The formulation o f a case-by-case prior authorization 
mechanism that carried the conceptual footprint of DGXI is approached as a reflection o f an 
ecological rationale that had also become evident in the early 1980s, when environmental 
policy at the EC level started being developed. Following a ‘pollution imagery’ and the 
regulatory paradigm of controlling dangerous substances at the EC level, DGXI approached 
genetic engineering as a source of potential risks and irreversible effects, emphasizing genetic 
novelty as a foundation of scientific uncertainty and taking for granted the hypothetical 
hazards before their translation into scientific terms, incorporation into safety measures and 
empirical testing. The prominence of DGXI in the intra-Commission process for the drafting 
o f a Deliberate Release Directive impacted the wording and the structure o f the relevant 
Commission proposal.
The following section illustrates the basic elements o f the adopted Directive and 
examines the main ‘compromise features’ of the Commission’s proposal, which mirrored the
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conflicting nature of the intra-Commission coordination and the noted divergent approaches, 
turf battles and competing agendas. The final Commission proposal was characterised by 
conceptual vagueness regarding the central terms o f the risk assessment procedure and an 
emphasis on a proceduralised science based, prior authorisation framework.
4.3.1. An Overview of the Deliberate Release Directive
The adopted Directive established a framework that aimed at securing the 
environmental safety o f deliberate releases o f GMOs into the environment and addressing the 
placement in the market o f products that consist o f or contain GMOs. More specifically, the 
Directive required Member States to regulate the deliberate release of GMOs into the 
environment in order to minimize their potential negative effects on human health and the 
environment. A distinction was made between releases for research and development (Part B) 
and release for placing on the market (intended for subsequent deliberate release into the 
environment) (Part C). In relation to part B, safety would be assessed via a ‘step-by-step’, 
progression using data from earlier experiments to inform decisions about the safety of future 
field trials. Part C o f the Directive provided a one-stop notification and application procedure 
for applicants and a harmonized approach to the EU-wide market authorization o f genetic 
engineering products.
The prior authorization procedure established a detailed consent process between the 
authorizing body of a Member State and those persons wishing to market or release a GMO 
product into the environment, whereas Articles 11 to 18 of the Directive set out certain 
environmental risk assessment requirements for the placement o f GMOs into the Community 
market. More specifically, under the Directive, any person wishing to undertake a deliberate 
release o f a genetically modified organism (according to Article 11, the notifier is either the 
manufacturer or the importer of the product containing or consisting o f GMOs) should 
submit a notification to the competent authority of the Member State within whose territory 
and market the release is to take place for the first time. This notification should include a 
technical dossier of information referred to in Annex II of the Directive.
The authorities were to examine the notification for compliance with the Directive, 
’giving particular attention to the environmental risk assessment and the recommended
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precautions related to the safe use o f the product.’259 The Member State should send the 
Commission a summary of each notification received and the Commission must forward 
these summaries to the other Member States for information. The other Member States could 
present reasoned objections. I f  no objections were presented, the competent authority of the 
Member State where the authorization procedure was initiated ‘shall give its consent’, within 
90 days, enabling the product to be placed on the market. If objections were presented, the 
competent authorities o f the Member States were to try to reach an agreement. If  they did not 
succeed within 60 days, the Commission was to submit a draft o f the proposed measures to a 
Committee composed of the representatives of the Member States. The Commission could 
suggest that the GMO should or should not be authorized. Where the Comitology 
(Regulatory) Committee did not agree with the Commission’s draft measure or did not give 
its opinion, the proposed measures would be submitted to the Council. Council decisions 
could be taken with a qualified majority, but if the Council did not reach consensus within 
three months, it was up to the Commission to take the final decision. Once the Commission 
had made a decision, and if there were no objections to the authorization, the Member State 
that received the initial application was supposed to give its final written consent.260
4.3.2. The Case-by-case ex-ante risk assessment approach
The emphasis on the genetic novelty of GMOs as a source o f an inherent ecological
uncertainty, the potential ‘ecological imbalances’ and on the ‘possibility of displacement of
natural populations, alteration o f ecological cycles and interactions, and undesired
transference o f novel genetic traits to other species (i.e., pesticide-resistance of a crop-plant
passed on to weeds), which mostly reflected upon the findings o f a commissioned scientific
report,261 provided the conceptual basis for the proposed case-by-case approach that was
explicitly manifested in the Explanatory Memorandum of the 1988 Commission Proposal.
‘Because international experience in deliberate release is still limited, it is not possible 
to propose any general guidelines or testing requirements for the time being. The 
Commission is therefore proposing a case-by-case notification and endorsement 
procedure which will be mandatory for industry and research institutions.’262
259 Article 12 of the 1990/220 Directive
260 Article 13 of the 1990/220 Directive
261 M.Chiara Mantegazzini, The Environmental Risks from Biotechnology. (Pinter: London, 1986)
262 See Proposal for a Council Directive on the deliberate release to the environment of genetically modified organisms, 
COM (88) 160 final-SYN 131, Brussels, 4 May 1988
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The viewing o f the effects of deliberate releases into the environment as ‘irreversible’ 
and, in effect, the proposed prior authorisation structure (including the notification, prior 
assessment and consent stages), in fact, reflected the approach o f DGXI towards the control 
of new technologies. That was accompanied by a step-by-step evaluation procedure that 
implied that biotechnology product development takes place in distinct steps, the safety and 
integrity of which should be evaluated before moving to the next step following the approach 
o f ecologists that argued that, ‘generalisations over different species are very difficult.’263
More specifically, DGXI proposed a specific regulatory system that leaned towards an 
ecological representation of transgenic techniques which drew from specific ecological studies 
that emphasised nature’s complexity and interdependence, regarded conventional agriculture 
and the open environment in general as particularly vulnerable to disturbance by GMO 
products and left open the prospect o f GMOs causing unpredicted disturbances.264 It viewed 
and shaped genetic engineering as an environmental problem characterized by high 
complexity and the irreversibility o f potential risks.
In particular, the field o f Community regulation on harmful activities provided DGXI 
with a ‘pollution imagery’ and various regulatory tools such as the notification scheme, the 
prior authorisation procedure and the risk assessment mechanism for predicting changes in 
ecological systems, which indicated significant changes in the topography of the regulatory 
control o f genetic engineering and contributed to the process of an intra-Commission 
boundary drawing. As Newmark noted, ‘the approach o f the environment DG, which is 
drafting the directive, is based more on dealing with disasters than building on risk 
assessment, which is what some other DGs favour.’265 Its proposals were informed by analogy 
by the Council Directive 84/360/EEC ,266 Council Directive 76/464/EEC 267 and Council 
Directive 79/831/E E C  amending for the sixth time Directive 67/568/EEC  on the 
classification, packing and labeling o f dangerous substances (the so-called Sixth Amendment), 
prior to being placed on the market according to which substances would be notified to the
263. See F.E. Sharpies, ‘Regulation of Products from Biotechnology’ (1987) 235 Science 1329-1335
264 DGXI’s positions in the frame of the 1987 BRIC meetings (located in the personal archives of a former DGXII 
official, 1-3/7/2006)
265 P. Newmark, ‘Discord and Harmony in Europe’ (December 1987) 5 Biotechnology 282
266 Council Directive 84/360/EEC of 28 June 1984 on the combating of air pollution from industrial plants OJ L 188, 
16.7. J984, p. 20-25
267 Council Directive 76/464/EEC of 4 May 1976 on pollution caused by certain dangerous substances discharged into 
the aquatic environment of the Community OJ L 129, 18.5.1976, p. 23-29
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competent authority of the Member State in which the substance would be imported.268 
Following the arguments raised by ecologists and population biologists in ecological studies,269 
DGXI became sensitised to the possibility o f unplanned risks at a systemic level and 
portrayed GMOs as virtually self-reproducing pollutants: its scientific view of nature was 
centered on its complexity, interconnectedness, and lack of predictability of its behaviour. In 
this account, DGXI approached GMOs as potentially weakening crops and as potential 
threats to an inherently fragile environment and natural balance and biological and ecological 
processes as complex and of a non-linear character.
More concretely, ecologists had questioned the epistemological authority o f the then 
existing ecological knowledge to make general predictions about the effects o f deliberate 
releases o f GMOs, especially in relation to gene transfer. Such effects could only be 
investigated on a systematic case-by-case basis. They rejected the notion that all the adverse 
effects can be predicted from the DNA sequence and demanded a broad approach to risk 
assessment, which should take into account the effect o f GMOs on ecosystems in the real 
conditions o f agricultural production rather than through in vitro experiments.270 Further, 
environmental scientists associated genetic novelty with greater unpredictability and 
conceptualised ‘ecological niches’ as dependent upon genetic variation, not simply upon the 
environment.271 In order to detect potential harm, they proposed extensive field tests, and 
more basic ecological research, before any GMO could be regarded as innocuous.272
Ecologists had conjectured that the truly important problems with GMOs might only 
arise slowly, subdy and through long chains of events. These effects included the formation 
o f new agricultural pests; harm to non-target species and whole communities and ultimately 
extinction and reduction in biodiversity. With a novel GMO, there was no direct evidence of 
the environmental impact o f a particular modification in an organism before a GMO release,
268 Council Directive 79/831/EEC of 18 September 1979 amending for the sixth time Directive 67/548/EEC on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the classification, packaging and 
labelling o f dangerous substances OJ L 259, 15/10/1979 P. 0010 - 0028
269 See on this issue, R.E.N. Colwell, D. Pimentel, F. Sharpies and D. SimberlofF ‘Genetic Engineering in Agriculture’ 
29 Science 111-2; M. Alexander, ‘Ecological consequences: reducing the uncertainties’ (March 1985) 1,3 Issues in 
Science and Technology 57-68
270 See: S. Pendorf, Comment: Regulating The Environmental Release O f Genetically Engineered Organisms: 
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 12 (1985) FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 905-907 and Levin, S.A. and Harwell, M.A. 
‘Environmental risks and genetically engineered organisms’ in S. Panem, (Ed.) Biotechnology: Implications fo r  Public 
Policy ('Brookings Institution: Washington, DC, 1986) pp. 56-72.
271 See J.W.Gillett, ‘Risk assessment methodologies for biotechnology impact assessment’ 10 Environmental 
Management (1986) 515-532
272 See, among others, P. Regal, ‘The ecology of evolution: implications for the individualistic paradigm’ in H.O. 
Halvorson, D. Pramer and M. Rogul (eds.), Engineered Organisms in the Environment: Scientific Issues (American 
Society for Microbiology, Washington, DC, 1985) 11-19
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and little was known in general about phenomena such as gene flow and its ecological impact. 
It needs to be mentioned that those trained in ecology and field studies believed that 
predicting the fate o f GMOs on the basis o f genetic information and in vitro experiments was 
based on false confidence, perhaps even a myth about the predictive power o f genetic 
knowledge and implicidy suggested a case-by-case approach.273
DGXI officials embraced these scientific concerns and genetic novelty was presented 
as a generator o f ecological instability and viewed the then scientific findings inadequate to 
assess the ecological risks of GMOs. Its positions were drawn selectively from scientists’ 
warnings that some cases of genetic novelty might cause ecological instability. For DGXI, 
genetic novelty presented an inherent ecological uncertainty, even a risk of ‘ecological 
imbalances’ (exemplifying the ‘irreversible effects’ cited in the Directive274) and it was genetic 
modification technology that created the real novelty, so a case-by-case approach was thought 
necessary to respond also to public concerns considering that ‘in the second half of the 1980s 
an important set o f actors entered the field of genetic engineering politics such as ‘green’ 
parties and a variety of new social movements, social groups, and environmental 
organisations.’275
The case-by-case consideration was seen as particularly important in assessing the
effects o f the applications of biotechnology, due to their wide variety and the nascent stage of
biosafety research. The proposed approach also came as a response to the relevant scientific
challenges considering th a t1 there is more in common among herbicide-resistance genes in different plants;
we are looking for specific aspects resulting from the genetic novelty. *76 DGXI regarded public unease277
as partly justified by ecologists’ concerns about GMO releases and according to its officials,
science was deemed insufficiendy developed to provide a sound basis for such definitions. Its
officials emphasised the uncertainty o f potential hazards, particularly the possible disruption
of ecosystems, ecological processes and cycles that could justify the need for bigger ecological
expertise pursuant to a commissioned study.278 Further, DGXI emphasised the idiosyncratic
features of each proposed planned release and its site-specific particularities and as it noted,
‘The idea of risk related to geographical area {...} is a matter of scientific evidence. 
Organisms are not like chemicals their effect may depend on the environment on
273 F.E.Sharples, ‘Regulation of Products from Biotechnology’ (13 March 1987) 235 Science 1329-1332
274 See: the Preamble of the 90/220/EEC Directive
275 See note 105 at 176
276 Interview evidence with DGXI official. (7/9/2005)
277 As expressed in Germany, France and the UK during the ‘80s. See note 105 at 241-5
278 See note 261
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which they are introduced. And ecosystems are not like human beings, their 
characteristics are very different from one another. The different effects of a given 
organism on different natural environments is not a philosophical idea but a very well 
documented fact.*279
As a result, contrary to D G X II’s positions in favour of derogating the development o f
risk assessment standards to the European Committee for Standardization (CEN), DGXI
proposed a case-by-case scrutiny o f the individual characteristics, intended uses and situation
of each GMO product, and the development of an interdisciplinary expertise for assessing the
hypothetical hazards cited in public debate. DGXI officials were in favour o f an anticipative
risk assessment structure that would be based upon a dialogue between the notifier and the
competent authority. As was stated,
“A lack of candour on the part of some companies about the potential environmental 
risks from their products coupled with a bland attitude of ‘we know best’ on the part 
of scientists and industrialists could pull the mg out from under these industries.”"80
The promotion o f a case-by-case approach —according to which the scale of release is 
increased gradually, only if the evaluation of the earlier steps.. .indicates that the next step can 
be taken safely’-281, as a reflection and a significant component of the ecological rationale 
promoted by DGXI, marked its regulatory strategy towards the deliberate release o f GMOs. 
Considering that culturally and normatively, DGXI had been located within a network o f 
ecologists and environmental groups,282 its ecological rationale —realised in the field of GMO 
regulation as a case-by-case approach- was based upon the assumption that gene behaviour 
was poorly understood. As mentioned in the Explanatory Memorandum following the 1988 
Commission Communication; ‘In a largely unexplored field like this, the exchange of 
information is likely to play an essential role in gaining experience.’283 This reference was the 
result o f the emphasis on genetic novelty and its inherent ecological uncertainty, as an area of 
high potential concern that would require ex-ante regulatory measures. Thus, there was a need 
to employ instruments and institutional structures that would be based on the pollution
279 Internal Note from Godofredo Delpino, Head of Service DG ENV to Mr. Grey (Head of Division DG III), 15/12/87
280 CEC (1986), Draft o f the A Community Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, Rev.l, 23/5/1986 at 2
281 See on this the relevant 1986 OECD Report
282 For more, see ‘Patterson, L.A. ‘Biotechnology Policy’ In Wallace, H. & Wallace, W. (eds.), Policy-Making in the
European Union (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005) 329-352. It needs to be specified that although the Green
Alliance of the European Parliament and the European Environmental Bureau constituted the most influential
environmental actors, DXI did not consult directly with environmental non-governmental groups prior to the Directive’s 
publication drawing criticisms from a variety of NGOs. For more see COFACE-Contacts (1990), ‘EC Seminar on 
Biotechnology’, March-April 1990:4-6 and interview evidence with former advisors for the Greens in the EP, former 
MEPs and with former Directors of Greenpeace-Europe.
283 Explanatory Memorandum o f the Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the deliberate release to the 
environment o f genetically modified organisms, COM (88) 160 fmal-SYN 131, Brussels, 4 May 1988
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imagery that had been established in prior regulatory initiatives such as the ones adopted in 
the field of air pollution and control of dangerous substances.2*4 However, as Commissioner 
Davis specified, ‘this should not be taken to imply that GMOs should automatically be 
regarded as ‘pollution’.285
For DGXI, regulation of GMOs was perceived as one of the first opportunities to 
apply an ex-ante approach -in terms of assuming protective measures before damage would 
occur and acting against risks which had yet to be documented- to product regulation, 
entailing new kinds o f environmental assessment and a cautious interpretation o f scientific 
uncertainties. The ex-ante approach implied that a certain human activity was assumed to be 
dangerous until proven safe and brought alone a shift of the burden o f proof by obliging the 
promoter of the activity to prove the activities’ safety. Emphasis on the uncertainty regarding 
the behaviour o f GMOs, the possibility of environmental or human health risk and on the 
growing public concern about genetic engineering in view of the technological disasters that 
had occurred in Europe since the late ‘70s -such as the Seveso disaster and the Chernobyl 
accident- exhibited D G X I’s ecological narrative and was translated into proposals for a case- 
by-case authorisation procedure and for a regulatory focus on the techniques o f genetic 
engineering per se.
Clinton Davies, the Environment Commissioner at that time, justified the proposed 
case-by-case approach upon the basis that *We must avoid repeating the mistakes o f the past 
{and not rush} into the technological future without considering its effects on our whole 
society and on our planet.’286 Its reference to the uncertain potential for ‘possible hazards’ and 
‘serious risk{s}’, that ‘make it urgently necessary to provide protection to people and the 
environment from the possible risks related to these new techniques’ justified the proposed a 
priori regulation of entire categories o f products for which there was no prior evidence of 
harm. In the frame of the proposed risk assessment procedure, the genetically modified 
organism would be evaluated as an organism with potential to cause harm, rather than as a 
product with potential utility. In other words, the competent authority would be solely
284 See: Council Directive 85/203/EEC of 7 March 1985 on air quality standards for nitrogen dioxide OJ L 87, 
27.3.1985, p. 1-7; Council Directive 79/831/EEC of 18 September 1979 amending for the sixth time Directive 
67/548/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the classification, 
packaging and labelling of dangerous substances OJ L 259, 15.10.1979, p. 10-28
B.D.Davis, ‘Bacterial domestication: underlying assumptions’ (1987) 235 Science 1329-1335.
286 ‘EC environmental regulation vital for the growth of biotech industry, Commissioner Clinton Davis tells 
industrialists’ European environment review, Vol.2 No.l, March 1988 at 43
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empowered to assess those aspects of a GMO which might cause environmental risk such as 
its capacity for survival, reproduction and dispersal.
It should be mentioned that the proposed structure did not leave space for 
considerations o f product utility and efficacy to override considerations o f environmental 
protection, contrary to the risk-benefit rationale o f the sectoral legislation.287 There was 
concern that genetic engineering brought with it ‘special risks,’288 as well as anxiety about the 
possible environmental impacts as expressed by scientists.289 The Head o f the Specialised 
Service for Biotechnology in DGXI identified three reasons for the need for a case-by-case 
approach to regulation and for ensuring a high level of environmental and public health 
protection. These were the general lack of documented safety evidence, the quantitatively 
great risks (real or conjectural) associated with the deliberate release of transgenic organisms 
into open environments and the extremely varied regulatory situation in the Member States 
regarding the authorisation o f GMO products.290 The Commission’s proposal implicidy 
acknowledged that the high complexity of ecosystems might be such so as to preclude the 
unambiguous identification of cause-effect relationships with regard to the release of 
genetically modified organisms into the environment. In addition to the parameter of 
ecological complexity, the proposal reflected the recognition of high scientific uncertainties in 
biosafety evaluations that rendered genetic engineering structurally different to traditional 
agronomic techniques in terms o f ‘tampering with nature’, thus associating it with inherent 
risks that might be unpredictable and irreversible.
4.3.3. The Conceptual and Textual Ambiguity of the DRD
As a result o f the need to accommodate the different conceptual approaches and 
battles over the definition of what constitutes ‘risk’ or ‘adverse effect’ in the field o f genetic 
engineering within the Commission, major conceptual vagueness surrounded the exact 
conditions for approval, the width of the scope of risk assessment and the role o f new
287 See for example, Council Directive 75/319/EEC on the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action relating to proprietary medicinal products (OJ L 147, 9.6.1975),
288 Dunlop, C., (2000), ‘GMOs and regulatory styles’, Environmental Politics, Vol.9, No.2 at 152
289 See more in Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Thirteenth Report: The Release of Genetically 
Engineered Organisms to the Environment (London HMSO, Cmd 720, 1989); J.M.Tiedje, R.K.Colwell, Y.L.Grossman, 
R.E.Hodson, R.E.Lenski, R.N.Mack and P.J.Regal, ‘The planned introduction of genetically engineered organisms; 
ecological considerations and recommendations’ (1989) 70(2) Ecology 298-315
290 For more see, G. Del Bino, ‘European Commission Proposals for Biotech Safety Regulation’ (July 1988) 
2(2)European Environment Review 44
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scientific evidence —in relation to the noted uncertainty- in the framework o f the proposed 
prior authorization structure. Further, there was a lack o f precise definitions o f terms such as 
‘risk’,291 ‘harm’, ‘human and environmental safety’, ‘environment’292 or ‘reasonable practicable 
measures to control any risk of harm to people and the environment’.
Moreover, there was no regulatory guidance as to what type of risk posed by the 
release o f GMOs and their products into the environment and the market should be relevant 
and crucial for the safety assessment of genetic engineering. The absence of risk assessment 
criteria standards for the release of GMOs into the environment,293 the lack o f clarity 
regarding the range of the potential effects that should be evaluated in the proposed risk 
assessments, the non-specification of what effects would be deemed harmful or what counts 
as an acceptable risk, the extent to which causal chains were to be included in the risk 
assessment or even whether secondary effects of an indirect and cumulative character could 
be considered under the definition of the term ‘harm’ indicated a regulatory framework that 
imposed no concrete substantive obligations upon the Member States.
The conceptual ambiguity regarding the role o f new scientific findings in downplaying 
scientific uncertainty (including the burden and type of scientific evidence relevant for the 
predictability of effects) and, in general, in relation to the wider interpretative scope of the 
Directive evidenced its open-ended nature. Further, with regard to the step-by-step principle 
that had been proposed as the main methodological mechanism of risk assessment for GMO 
releases, no indication had been provided as to what might constitute a step in the framework 
of the proposed step-by-step approach towards the gradual decrease o f physical containment. 
The Commission’s proposal was equally ambiguous with regard to the reasons behind and the 
value o f the distinction o f risks between those that relate to releases that have a research and 
development purpose and those ones that aim at placing products containing, or consisting 
of, GMOs on the market.
291 References to the concept o f ‘risk’ can be found in the Preamble, ‘Whereas the protection of human health and the 
environment requires that due attention be given to controlling risks from the deliberate release o f genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) into the environment;’ ‘Whereas it is necessary to establish harmonized procedures and criteria for 
the case-by-case evaluation of the potential risks arising from the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment;’ and 
whereas a safeguard procedure should be provided in case o f risk to human health or the environment; as well as in other 
parts of the proposed Directive.
92 The lack of any definition of the term ‘environment’ seemed to minimize the scope or undermine the effectiveness of 
the proposed regulatory measures, since it was not clear whether the proposed Directive would embrace the ecosystem to 
which the GMO would be released (e.g. the agricultural ecosystem) apart from the natural ecosystem.
293 Such as ‘conditions of human and environmental safety which are as high as reasonable practicable’, ‘shall take all 
measures reasonably practicable to control any risk of harm to people and the environment’
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The noted conceptual vagueness could be attributed to the small room for the 
accommodation o f structurally divergent approaches and for the reconciliation o f different 
policy goals, or for covering up the structural contradictions o f the underlying premises o f the 
proposed authorisation procedure. These factors led to the formulation o f a regulatory 
framework that seemed drained in its approach in relation to the main terms o f its operation 
and in its substantive targeting. Given the divergent approaches towards the scope and the 
main terms of the Directive, genetic engineering in general, its effects and uses, and the 
different definitions of what could count as acceptable or unacceptable harm/risk, the 
framework’s textual ambiguity seemed to accommodate the diversity of views by simply 
incorporating them into the proposed Directive without however specifying which needed to 
be taken into account or to be prioritised in a risk assessment or in the final authorisation 
decision. The noted textual ambiguity and the lack o f normative points of reference seemed at 
the same time to reflect the failure o f the various institutional arrangements to articulate a 
coherent view of the collective EU interest on the preferred uses and acceptable risks of 
genetic engineering.
At the same time, the noted vagueness in the articulation o f the main terms o f the 
proposed risk assessment structure seemed in fact to facilitate the maintenance of the formal 
division o f competences amongn the main DGs and the accommodation o f their different 
conceptualizations of the main regulatory terms, reconciling in that way their sharp 
disagreements over the safety of agricultural biotechnology applications. As one Commission 
official stated,
The institutional weight of DGXI was such that, it did not leave many options, but 
delegating the specification of the basic terms and the interpretation of the scope to 
the member states and the process itself. Even as chef de file, we were far too weak 
to withdraw the directive from the Internal Market context and to shape it without 
any institutional support, but also too determined not to abandon a unique 
opportunity of giving voice to environmental concerns and to frame biotechnology in 
environmental terms.’294
The ambiguity surrounding the phrasing o f the principal terms of the proposed legal 
framework seems to have been utilised to enable the establishment o f a supranational sphere 
of prior approval o f genetic engineered products that would operate upon the fulfilment of a 
series o f procedural obligations and at the same time would allow scope for national 
discretion in appropriating and imbuing the main terms with interpretations that served their
294 Interview evidence with DGXI officer (19/5/2006)
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institutional, task-expansion needs and in emphasizing the potential consequences of a 
perceived ‘uncertainty’ that would be tailored to their own conceptualization of risk leading to 
various strains o f process-style housed under one roo f.295. Another reason for the noted 
ambiguity might have been the need for leaving room for flexible interpretation pursuant to 
the Cassis de Dijon model o f harmonisation via a mutual acknowledgment of standards 
among countries, rather than through the establishment o f Europe-wide safety standards.296
The textual ambiguity of the proposed Deliberate release framework in combination 
with the absence or risk assessment standards might be also attributed to the late entrance of 
the Environment Directorate into this particular negotiation procedure, as well as to its 
limited resources297 and time pressures that curtailed its ability to shape a more specifically 
targeted prior authorisation framework. Furthermore, considering that 'the complexity of the 
Community legislative process makes it unwise to tty to decide on everything at the legislative stage... it may 
also be more expedient politically to defer contentious items to a subsequent stage of the polity process,£9S and 
an attempt to define terms such as ‘risk’, ‘harm’ and ‘safe use’ would have probably 
undermined the all-encompassing and responsive character of the proposed risk assessment 
framework.
4.3.4. Scientific considerations
Considering the technical complexity of the genetic engineering area, the relevant 
scientific uncertainty and the increased public concerns about the safety o f the open-field 
applications o f genetic engineering,299 science was seen as the sole objective means and source 
of a-political argumentation that could overcome potential national hindrances or 
protectionist approaches. Notwithstanding, as in the case of the main terms and regulatory 
standards which became subject to various intra-Commission institutional battles, the extent 
to which science should inform regulation became an additional source o f acrimonious 
disagreements among the main DGs involved and in effect a controversial negotiation item. 
Despite the fact that the exact role of scientific opinions and findings in the frame of risk
295 See note 288 at 152
296 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung flir Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649.
297 See: A.Weale, ‘Environmental Rules and Rule-making in the European Union’ (1996) 3 Journal o f  European Public 
Policy at 598 where it is stated that up to 1987, DGXI had only 50 staff.
298 R. Dehousse (2003) ‘Comitology: Who watches the watchmen’ 10(5) Journal o f  European Public Policy 749
299 See: G. Gaskell, M.W.Bauer and J.Durant ‘The Representation of Biotechnology: policy, Media, Public Perception’ 
in J.Durant, M.W.Bauer and G.Gaskell (eds.), Biotechnology in the Public Sphere (Science Museum: London, 1998) 31- 
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analysis never became a distinct item of negotiation, the discussion over the role o f science 
within the emerging regulatory frame emerged in the discussion o f all main issues, such as the 
width of the regulatory scope o f the proposed Directive, the formulation o f its risk 
assessment structure and the overall approach towards genetic engineering techniques and 
their products.
DGXI and DGXII invoked incompatible accounts of the relevant scientific 
uncertainty and environmental threats as a means to locate the authority, regulatory value and 
limitations of science in facilitating the regulatory control of GMO releases. The two sides of 
the debate represented two contrasting scientific views o f nature —  one concerned about 
complexity, interconnectedness, and lack of predictability, the other concerned with 
controlling the attributes o f specific organisms for human benefit. In disciplinary terms, these 
competing views mapped onto two distinctive intellectual schools in life science —  ecology 
and molecular genetics. Contrary to the Tiypothetical risks ex ante’ approach of DGXI, DG 
Industry argued in favour o f its science-driven character. D G X I’s invocation o f specific 
scientific accounts that mostly fall within the ecological studies realm was examined in the 
previous section. What requires special reference in this section is how DGXII and DG III 
approached and interpreted scientific findings in the field o f genetic engineering.
D G  Industry viewed GMOs as the latest in a long line o f technical accomplishments 
in biology and breeding and expressed a strong faith in the ability o f scientists to assess and 
manage any risks the new biotechnologies presented as well as to contain or mitigate adverse 
effects. This account accepted and reinforced a prevalent view of laboratory scientists that 
was the portrayal of GMOs as modest, precise extensions o f familiar domesticated organisms, 
which were undergoing the recombinant DNA process. According to the scientific accounts 
of DGXII, genetic engineering techniques made the behaviour o f GMOs even more 
predictable and presumed a precise genetic-level control over product characteristics, as well 
as over environmental effects pursuant to the findings of specific studies.300 Its approach was 
based on the absence o f negative biosafety data at that time, as well as on the positive 
experience of the traditional uses o f organisms. As a DGXII official noted, Sve have several 
thousand years of pragmatic experience of management and intervention in living 
materials.’301 The ability to identify and assess the risks of GMOs was not considered more 
problematic than it was for other organisms. This implied either that no novel risks would
300 See B.D. Davis, ‘Bacterial domestication: underlying assumptions’ (1987) 235 Science 1329-1335
301 Interview evidence with an official of DGXII (13/7/2005)
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emerge or, that any novel risks could be identified and assessed by existing criteria and
methods. Occasionally, its officials argued that the greater precision o f genetic modification
techniques, relative to classical methods, reduces the chance of untoward phenotypic effects.
DGXII officials were given the following reassurances about the risks o f GMOs,
'The risks (are) not a new kind, as far as we can tell; there seems to be growing 
consensus that there is no evidence o f  additional risks from rDNA processes beyond 
those already inherent in the organisms or genetic material combined.’
DGXII advocated a trial and error strategy, the justification for which was derived 
from Popper’s account o f science, according to which error should be embraced as the motor 
o f scientific advance.302 From this perspective, the errors arising from field trials were 
considered as a positive learning opportunity and according to a DGXII official; *We can 
learn faster from making mistakes, where we don’t have the foresight to prevent them’.303 
Advocating learning by trial and error assumed that any resulting damage was minor and 
reversible, that the effects o f trials were sufficiendy rapid and clear to allow learning to take 
place, which was important in achieving, inter alia, industrial competitiveness. DG XII viewed 
GMOs as highly unlikely to pose catastrophic or irreversible hazards; such an approach 
implied a construction o f nature as robust and /or adaptable in the face o f human 
interference, at least with respect to GMOs.
In relation to the role of science in the proposed authorization framework, the 
placement of the risk analysis process into the realm of an EU-wide expert networks indicated 
a predominandy technical orientation towards genetic engineering. The choice o f ‘scientific 
uncertainty’ as the main conceptual basis o f the proposed prior authorisation framework, the 
formulation of a special science-based notification mechanism for the accumulation of the 
necessary scientific experience304 for regulatory purposes (Annex II), the significance of Part B 
as an important aspect o f the risk assessment process, the reference to ‘substantive, reasoned 
scientific grounds’305 and the use of scientific evidence as the main motor o f the proposed
302 M. Cantley, ‘Biotechnology developments in Europe, and the evolution of EEC policies’ Paper presented at the 
USDA 'Biotechnology Challenge Forum ’, Washington, 5-6 February 1987
303 Interview evidence on 12/10/2006
304 In relation to the planed release process and the framing of a risk assessment mechanism, Poole, Mahler, and Heusler 
note that ‘For planned release, considerable relevant inexperience exists. This is from the deliberate release of non- 
indigenous organisms, or new strains produced by selection/breeding, and from genetic engineering in the laboratory. 
This experience provides the foundation upon which to build a risk assessment methodology.’ In N.J. Poole, J.L. Mahler 
and K. Heusler, ‘The involvement of European industry in developing regulations’ TREE vol.3, no.4; TIBTECH vol.6, 
no.4, April 1998 at 534. For more, see Heusler, K. (1986) Proceedings o f  the British Crop Protection Conference 
(Vol.2), pp.677-682, BCPC Publications and Introduction of Recombinant DAN-engineered Organisms into the 
Environment: Key issues (Council of the National Academy Press: Washington, 1987)
305 Article 11 of the 90/220 Directive
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licensing procedure evidenced the intense scientific character of the proposed regulatory 
structure. Moreover, the proposed foundation and dependence o f the safeguard clause upon 
‘scientific’ evidence306 and the use o f scientific evidence as the sole basis upon which a 
competent authority could consider ‘that the placing on the market of the {genetically 
modified} product may pose risks to people or the environment’307 further indicated the 
dominant positioning o f science in the under formulation regulatory regime. The standard of 
scientific evidence was selected as the main basis not only for the necessary risk assessment, 
via which a member state could evaluate any hazard to human health and the environment, 
but also for transforming ecological uncertainties into testable features and technical evidence 
for safety.
The construction o f science-based precautions and the suggested positioning of
‘science,’ in the form of scientific expertise and advice, in the epicenter of the prior
authorization mechanism, reflected an institutional compromise among the main Commission
Directorates.308 As the concept of environmental impact assessment is conceptually founded
upon the assumption that reliable knowledge exists,.DGXI’s suggestions on the introduction
of a requirement for impact assessment indicated its unwillingness to focus on uncertainty, as
well as on an ecological viewing o f the precautionary principle that would have required the
accumulation o f a sufficient amount o f knowledge and experience on all possible effects of
genetic engineering prior to the initiation of any process for the release of GMOs into the
environment. DG XI gradually abandoned its negative approach towards field trials and
adopted a model of learning approximating to trials but without error, as follows:
“...it is necessary to ensure the development o f industrial products utilising 
genetically modified organisms which do not cause harm to human health or the 
environment (revision 8, release directive, 1987).”
DGXI did not embrace the scientific rationality o f DGXII and D G III pursuant to 
which the structured assessment should focus solely on significant and real risks and on the 
findings o f molecular biology, nor did it follow its own hesitations about the limited value of 
a science-based risk-assessment and the need for field trials as part of the process of assessing 
potential risks. DGXI approached scientific work as a means o f disseminating information 
about the risks o f GMOs and assessing their environmental safety on the basis of an
306 Article 14 of the 90/220 Directive
307 Article 11(4) of the 90/220 Directive
308 According to articles 11, 12 and 13, Annexes II and III of the proposed Directive, a set of harmonized provisions in 
terms of the required scientific information about the notified product would constitute the basis of the risk assessment.
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ecological rationale and as a carrier for learning opportunities in a rather unexplored, in
scientific terms, field where various scientific disciplines (such as molecular biology, genetics,
evolutionary biology and ecology) would be required to identify possible hazards that might
result from the release o f GMOs. After 1987, DGXI became less concerned with objectivity
and scientific rationality, and more with promoting the role of science-based risk assessment
and of science (in its various organizational formations) as an obligatory point of reference
and as a means o f resolving regulatory disputes over the safety of GMOs releases so as to
reach an intra-Commission consensus. As one official put it:
‘while an objective approach to risk assessment should be a goal for the future, I do 
not think that we should get bogged down at this stage in attempting to find 
quantitative definitions o f minimal and significant {risk}.”309
The proposed Directive seemed to accommodate the institutional concerns of all 
science-related actors and to establish the conditions for the development of a 
comphrehsenive knowledge base that might justify the gradual relaxation of regulatory 
controls. Moreover, the Commission drafted the safeguard procedure via which a Member 
State can oppose the import and release of a GMO product in a way that its provisions could 
be activated solely upon the basis of the provision of scientific data and findings.310 However, 
due to the general intra-Commission compromise character o f the negotiation process, 
ambiguity surrounded the type and volume of data required for the activation o f the relevant 
procedure.
The addition o f scientific competency as a central feature o f the prior authorisation 
process seemed to meet the interests o f most of the main Directorates involved. Scientific 
uncertainty was promoted as a common conceptual basis for the operation of the prior 
authorisation structure and in effect as a balanced compromise solution that would provide 
procedural chances for various institutional actors to emphasize different accounts o f the 
unknown and for the Commission to accumulate the necessary scientific expertise and 
experience. The proposed central placement of science indicated a predominantly technical 
viewing of the potential genetic engineering risks that could eventually render the relevant 
uncertainties technically acceptable and calculable. The proposed framework, reflecting an
309 Interview evidence with an official from DGXI (17/6/2006)
310 According to the Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal for a Council Directive on the deliberate release to the 
environment of genetically modified organisms, COM (88) 160 final-SYN 131, Brussels, 4 May 1988, ''The reasons fo r  
a national ban should in any case be scientific ones ’ at 9
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intra-Commission compromise, acknowledged the potential of risks to human health and the 
environment arising from the release of GMOs, whilst also translating them into technical 
evidence o f safety.
In other words, DGXI, realizing the implications and complexities that its cautious 
approach may develop, situated scientific evidence as a cornerstone o f the authorization 
process so as to meet the demands of those administrative units in favour of science-based 
regulatory solutions. This translated ‘perceived risks’ into testable characteristics of GMOs on 
a case-by-case basis, but also, by not-acknowledging the scientific limitations o f this process, 
left the role and legal authority of scientific evidence open for interpretation and paved the 
way for DGXI to propose and formulate ex-ante ecological measures and step-by-step 
methodologies until more experience was gained. Thus, a commercial release would be 
approved only if the assessment of earlier steps of increased containment or decreased scale 
would indicate that the next step should be taken.
The use o f science as the main element o f the intra-Commission compromise was 
further evidenced in the discussions about the potential introduction of the consideration o f 
the socio-economic aspects o f the potential effects of modem biotechnology, including the 
examination o f the relevant societal dimensions and ethical implications (the so-called fourth 
hurdle), into the Deliberate Release risk assessment framework that emerged in the 
negotiations for the adoption of the 90/220 Directive. Whereas DGXI argued in favour o f 
the inclusion of socioeconomic considerations in the scope of the proposed risk assessment 
procedure, thus responding to the findings o f the 1984 FAST report,311 DGXII opposed the 
incorporation of non-technical elements on the basis of a technical viewing o f the aimed for 
safety that would ensure legal certainty and regulatory predictability for the benefit of 
industrial notifiers.
Further, o f central importance for the positioning o f science within the framework of 
the DRD were the formation o f Technical Annexes312 and the design o f the process for their 
adaptation to technological developments. More concretely, the status o f technical Annexes 
and the process that should be followed for their eventual amendment and adjustment to
311 See: Commission of the European Communities, Eurofutures: The Challenges o f  Innovation, The FAST Report 
(Butterworths: London, 1984)
312 Annex I of the proposed Contained Use Directive determined the scope of both Directives through the definition of 
the genetic modifications that would be covered under their provisions. Annexes 2-4 would regulate the criteria for risk- 
assessment, classification and information requirements. Council Directive 90/219/EEC of 23 April 1990 on the 
contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms OJ L 117, 8.5.1990, p. 1-14
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technological developments became a field of conflict among the main DGs. D G  Industry, 
along with other Commission Directorates, opposed granting Directive-level legal status to 
the Annexes and, in effect, the delegation of the elaboration and specification o f their 
technical details to a comitology committee. Instead, they argued in favour of the involvement 
o f the standardization bodies in this process as a way of handling ‘uncertainty’.
The type o f comitology committee that would assist the Commission in its efforts to 
adapt the Directive to the relevant scientific and technical progress became in fact one o f the 
most contentious intra-Community negotiation issues. The 1988 Commission Proposal 
suggested the establishment of an advisory committee of Member State experts to adapt the 
annexes to technical progress, but the Commission was merely obliged to ‘take the utmost 
account o f the opinion delivered by the Committee’.313 The selection of a procedure upon 
which the Commission would have a crucial influence314 reflected another intra-Commission 
compromise and, in effect, the interests o f D G III and o f the scientific and industrial 
groupings that aimed at grounding control o f the process o f the adaptation o f the proposed 
DRD to technical progress.
4.4. Concluding Remarks
The examination o f the negotiation process for the formulation of a draft Directive 
on the Deliberate Release o f GMOs, of the competing, claims of those framing both 
environmental and industrial interests in the field of genetic engineering and o f the 
competence batdes among the main Directorates involved, revealed the institutional 
significance o f organizational configurations such as the appointment of DGXI as chef de file 
for the particular drafting procedure and the establishment o f BRIC. The drafting process was 
ultimately characterised by the predominance of the Environment Directorate in its twofold 
clothing: that o f an organisational unit established for promoting environmental protection 
and for safeguarding safety conditions for GMO releases and at the same time one o f a 
mediator among opposing views as chef de file, appointed precisely to accommodate all 
relevant approaches and deliver a well-balanced proposal that would gain the consensus of 
the College o f Commissioners. The final proposal by the Commission, which in essence
313 Article 15 reads as follows: ‘The Commission shall be assisted by a committee o f an advisory nature composed o f the 
representatives o f the Member States and chaired by the representatives of the Commission.’
3 For more about the advisory committee, see G. Edwards, and D. Spence, The European Commission, 2nd edn, 
(Harlow: Longman, 1987) 125
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became the official text of the DRD, reflected both an ecological approach to genetic 
engineering evidenced in case-by-case ex-ante line of action and an intra-Commission 
organisational compromise that placed a web of procedural obligations and scientific evidence 
at the epicentre of the risk analysis framework leaving its main terms unqualified.
The Environment Directorate attempted to replace the plurality o f institutional 
perspectives, interests and regulatory needs with an environmental ‘reading’ o f the genetic 
engineering risks and uses. However, despite the founding of the proposed licensing regime 
upon the genetic novelty of GMOs, the vagueness in the wording of basic regulatory terms 
created the conditions for the development o f a procedural form of regulation that would be 
based on the findings of genetic engineering sciences. It seems that the proposed delegation 
o f the specification o f the regulatory terms o f the notification and endorsement framework to 
the competent national authorities and expert committees reflected D G X I’s conciliatory 
approach in terms o f promoting a technical viewing of the genetic engineering risks and 
smoothing down its ecological viewing o f GMO risks. In the end, scientific uncertainty 
became the main underlying rationale o f this institutional compromise as a means o f merging 
two apparently contrasting approaches to risk evaluation. The intra-Commission battles over 
issue-definition and the Commission’s failure to accommodate the plurality o f interests led to 
the adoption o f a regulatory framework that lacked clear legislative orientation. Thus, it did 
not actually reconcile different policy goals such as market integration, environmental 
protection and the development of biotechnology applications. The following chapter 
discusses the authorization practice, as it was shaped after the entry into force of the 
Deliberate Release framework, in relation to those features of the negotiated framework that 
indicated both the lack of a clearly-defined legislative strategy on the control o f genetic 
engineering releases and an emphasis on the fulfilment o f procedural science-based 
obligations.
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Chapter 5: The 1990/220 Deliberate Release Directive:
Early Im plem entation and Revision
This chapter discusses the problems that emerged in the frame of the operation of the 
90/220 Deliberate Release Directive. Divergent views on the safety requirements and on the 
appropriate risk assessment standards in relation to the notified or authorized GMO releases, 
alongside the various discrepancies in the interpretation o f the wider scope o f the Directive’ 
and the contending ‘readings’ o f the data requirements for safety assessments contained in 
Annex II of the Directive, led to severe difficulties in the effective implementation o f the 
established framework and in the commercialisation of agricultural biotechnology.315
It is argued, that in view of the absence of common risk assessment criteria and the 
Commission’s exclusive reliance on the opinions provided by its scientific committees, the 
establishment of a responsive and flexible prior authorisation approach that would enhance 
the acceptability of GMO products became an almost nearly unattainable target. As a result, 
this multi-state assessment framework failed to accommodate the various national safety 
concerns and conceptualisations of ‘adverse effect’ and/or genetic engineering ‘risk.’
As seen in its revision initiatives, the Commission viewed the initial implementation 
problems as resulting from the organisational structure o f the provision of scientific advice 
rather than from its exclusive reliance on expert technical assessments. As a result o f the 
Commission’s particular explanatory approach, the scientific consultation structure was 
eventually revised. This organizational restructuring, in turn, intensified the Commission’s 
resort to the opinions of its scientific committees for the shaping of the breadth o f the risk 
assessment mechanism, the interpretation o f the main terms of the prior authorisation 
framework and, in effect, for the formulation o f the required acceptability standards. The 
Commission’s exclusive dependence on the opinions of its scientific committees in
315 Referring to the ‘sharp divisions across Commission services on the perceived risks of the technology, the 
role of scientific expertise in its regulation, and the appropriate balance between market integration goals, on 
the one hand, and consumer concerns and environmental protection, on the other’ Skogstad notes, ‘As many 
as one third of Commission services have an interest and stake in GMO regulation, and even after DGXI 
became chef de file on GMO approvals at the Community level, bureaucratic infighting continued.’ As it 
was noted, ‘By the late 1990s there were ample signs that EU-level GMO regulatory framework had lost 
public credibility and was suffering from a loss of legitimacy’ and ‘Directive 90/220 was faulted by 
proponents and opponents of GMOs alike for failing to deliver desirable policy outcomes.’ For more see, G. 
Skogstad, “Legitimacy and/or Policy Effectiveness?: Network Governance and GMO Regulation in the 
European Union,” (2003) 10(3) Journal o f  European Public Policy 321 -338.
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combination with the complex Regulatory Committee (Type Ilia and Illb) rules316 led to 
unanticipated delays in the operation of the risk assessment and management procedure.
The chapter further examines the various efforts for the revision o f the Deliberate 
Release framework, which were initiated so as to restore those implementation problems that 
emerged during the second half of the 1990s and eventually resulted in the adoption of a new 
deliberate release framework. The latter was expected to redress earlier deficiencies and to 
provide a more inclusive risk analysis platform that would approximate the various national 
views and respond to the safety concerns, thus strengthening its legitimacy and effectiveness. 
What follows is an analysis o f the various problems arising out o f the divergences in the 
interpretation o f the main prior authorization terms and notification data, as well as out of the 
Commission’s exclusive reliance on the evaluations provided by its scientific committees.
The first section discusses the implementation problems evidenced in the early years 
o f the operation of the Deliberate Release framework. To this end, the authorisation of Bt- 
maize 176 is a case where the absence of any minimum risk assessment standards paved the 
way for the Commission’s scientific committees to define the terms o f commercial release for 
GMO products. The examination of this controversial case shows that the co-existence of 
discretion, as it was provided to this decentralised network o f national risk assessment experts 
for interpreting the main terms of the Directive in accordance with their own risk assessment 
yardsticks, with the de facto shaping o f particular evaluation standards at the Community 
level following the opinions of the relevant scientific committees, appeared not to offer all- 
encompassing solutions. As a result, the various safety concerns and conceptualisations over 
genetic engineering were not reconciled in the operation o f the Deliberate Release framework.
The second section further elaborates on the tensions in the implementation o f the 
established authorisation framework and the divergent accounts of ‘adverse effects’, 
‘environment’ and ‘risk’ in relation to those GMO products notified after 1997. The analysis 
focuses on the efforts for the revision o f the structure for the provision o f scientific advice at 
the Community level, as well as on the inherent organisational limitations of the Scientific 
Committee on Plants in informing the Commission’s authorisation decisions on GMO 
releases. The section examines the Commission’s use of the opinions o f its scientific 
Committees as the sole means for defining the breadth o f the prior authorisation procedure’s
316 See: Decision 87/373/EEC of 13 July 1987 OJ L 197, 18.07.1987, p. 33
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scope, interpreting the main terms o f the prior authorisation framework and shaping the 
required acceptability standards for the evaluation of the potential effects of GMO releases. 
To this end, it examines the process of the prior authorisation o f the commercial release of 
the MS8xRF3 oilseed rape. In view of the inherent shortcomings evidenced in the operation 
of this advisory scientific committee and the variety of risk assessment standards used by the 
competent national authorities, it is argued that the Commission’s resort to these committees 
as a source o f objective evidence for safety seemed to undermine, rather than to promote, a 
unified evaluation paradigm. The open-ended, proceduralised character of the Directive 
ultimately undermined the effective implementation and uniform application of the prior 
authorisation decisions.
The final section focuses on the various efforts for the revision of the Deliberate 
Release framework, which resulted in a new Directive that was expected to address the noted 
deficiencies and to provide a more inclusive deliberation platform that would approximate the 
various national views and concerns, thus strengthening its legitimacy and effectiveness.
5.1. Old committees and new challenges: the problems of a fragmented system  
of scientific consultation
This section examines the problems that arose out of the divergence in the 
interpretation o f the notified scientific data, as well as of the main terms of the Directive. To 
this end, it analyses the first case of commercial authorisation in Europe and highlights the 
main features o f these controversial releases that eventually led to a restructuring o f the 
Commission’s scientific advisory committee scheme.
5.1.1. Early implementation problems and interpretation disagreements
Despite the fact that only one plant release for growing and marketing was authorized 
between the entry into force of the Directive (23 October 1991, 18 months after its adoption 
on 23 April 1990) and the end o f 1996,317 when the first Commission Report on the Review
317 That was the Ciba-G eigy maize. Prior to this com m ercial release, four recom binant crops had been 
previously approved but only for limited applications: P lant Genetic Systems (Gent, Belgium ) oilseed rape 
and Bejo Saden’s (W arm enhuizen, the N etherlands) chicory were approved for breeding purposes; tobacco
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of the Directive was published,318 various problems emerged in relation to the operation of 
the Deliberate Release framework. The 1994 Communication had in fact set the grounds for a 
future revision of this particular licensing framework acknowledging that ‘there were aspects 
o f this Directive that might be improved in the future.’319
First o f all, the limited interest shown in making applications for commercial releases 
o f GMOs was viewed as a problem attributed to the bureaucratic complexities of the multi­
stage structure and the considerable vagueness o f the relevant risk assessment framework. 
More specifically, no more than seven releases of a commercial character had been authorized 
by the end o f 1996. Some of these did not even involve releases into the natural environment 
or for food or feed uses, but were limited to applications o f the new biotechnology to 
microbes such as the Vaccine against Aujeszky's disease and the Vaccine against rabies. The 
severe delays noted in the transposition of the DRD into national legal structures320 further 
evidenced the controversial character o f the commercialization of genetic engineering in its 
agri-food dimension. It should be pointed out that the administrative procedure, which the 
Directive foresaw as the general rule (that marketing would be possible after the 90-day 
period during which competent authorities may comment) had not been followed at all due to 
the fact that the assessment carried out by the notified competent authority, had not, even on 
one occasion, met the concerns set by the other national authorities.
The case of the Bt maize-176 below illustrates the lack of common risk assessment 
standards and the Commission’s exclusive resort to the opinions of the Scientific Committee 
on Plants and their effects upon the effective operation o f the prior authorization structure.
5.1.1.1. Insect-protected B t maize-176, France
The first test case for commercial cultivation in the frame of the Deliberate Release 
framework came up in 1994 when pursuant to Directive 90/220/EC , Article 13, Ciba-Geigy
from Seita (Domain de la Tour, France) for growing; and Monsanto’s (St Luis, MO) soy beans for import 
and processing only.
318 European Commission, Report on the Review of Directive 90/220/EEC in the Context of the 
Commission’s Communication on Biotechnology and the White Paper, Brussels, 10.12.1996
319 European Commission (1994) Biotechnology and the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and 
Employment: Preparing the Next Stage, COM (94) 219 final, 1 June 1994 at 6
320 It needs to be mentioned that by the end of the obligatory 18 months time frame work in 1992, only 4 
countries had managed to implement the Directive (UK, NL, DK and D). Greece, Luxembourg, Belgium 
and France were actually brought before the Court for failing to transpose the 90/220 Directive. (C- 
170/1994, C- 339/1997, C-343/1997 and C-296/2001 accordingly)
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Limited submitted a notification to the competent authorities o f France (C/F/94/11-03) for 
the placing on the market of a maize plant containing genes for both insecticide and 
herbicide-tolerance (Bt-maize 176), thus rendering France the rapporteur for the EU-wide 
authorisation procedure.321 In its dossier, the notifier evaluated the potential that the crop 
could generate selection pressure for resistant insects as a ‘low risk...at least during the first 
four years o f commercialisation.’322 After gaining the initial acceptance of the French 
authorities, the dossier was forwarded to the European Commission in March 1995. On the 
basis of the comments submitted by the national authorities, the Commission circulated in 
March 1996 (as required in Article 21 o f the DRD) a proposal to accept Ciba’s application. 
The ambiguities surrounding what constituted ‘adverse effect’ in the frame of the Directive 
and the breadth of its scope became the main points o f disagreement between the 
Commission and most o f the member states.
The discussion about the approval of Ciba's application eventually reached the 
Council o f Environmental Ministers. This was the first time that environment ministers were 
asked to approve the marketing of a genetically engineered plant. In one o f the Council 
meetings, ‘Spain abstained and 13 ministers said they would oppose the application, leaving 
only France - where Ciba originally made its application - in favour.’323 Finally, on April 25, 
1996, several Member States either voted against the application or abstained on the basis that 
the bacterial gene inserted into the plant as a marker would make it resistant to the antibiotic 
ampicillin, thus being potentially harmful to animal and human health. There was also 
disagreement over the relevant secondary adverse effects o f the release and whether 
conventional agricultural practices should be used as a risk assessment point of 
reference.324Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Italy and Spain raised objections regarding 
‘the effects on human health of the non-expressed b-lactamase gene, the environmental 
impact o f using herbicides on plants and the possible development o f resistance to the Bt-
321 See about the background of this authorisation case, FoEE (1997), ‘France Authorises Cultivation of GM 
Maize’ (15 December 1997) 3(8) Fiends o f  the Earth Europe B iotechnology Program m e M ailout 2-3 and C. 
Marris, Swings and  Roundabouts: French Public Policy on Agricultural GM Os 1996-1999, Universite de 
Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, Centre d’economie et d’ethique pour l’environnement et le 
developpement (Cahier no.00-02, February 2000) 8
322 Ciba-Geigy (1994) Application for placing on the market a genetically modified plant (maize protecting 
itself against com borers), according to Part C of Directive 90/220/EC and Commission Decision 92/146, 
notification C/F/94/11-03, typescript; placed on DoE public register, March 1995.
323 A. Coghlan, ‘Engineered maize sticks in Europe's throat’ (6th of July 1996) N ew  Scientist 88
324 UBA, ‘Technical Aspects of Potential Health and Environmental Risks Caused by Ciba-Geigy’s 
Genetically Modified Maize’ Typescript, 17 January 1997, Umweltbundesamt, Vienna; E. Johnson, ‘CIBA 
faces a maize of committees in Europe’ (1996) 14 N ature Biotechnology  1088-89; see also FoEE, (1996) 
M ailout 2(8), Brussels: Friends of the Earth Europe Biotechnology Programme and FoEE, (1997) M ailout 
3(1) Brussels: Friends of the Earth Europe Biotechnology Programme
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toxin.’325 The Commission eventually authorised the product, stating that the possible 
development o f insect resistance ‘(could) not be considered an adverse environmental effect, 
as existing agricultural means of controlling such resistant species o f insects (would) still be 
available’.326 It approached insect resistance as an ‘agronomic problem’ and not as an ‘adverse 
effect’, thus as an issue not falling under the scope o f the deliberate release framework 
following the respective positive evaluation of the French competent authority and the 
opinion o f the Scientific Committee on Pesticides, 327 which had focused on the so-called 
product safety features and on the direct effects of the GMO or of its inserted genes.
After gaining EU-wide approval and in view of the Directive’s vague reference to the 
need ‘to avoid adverse effects on human health and the environment,’ various Member States 
interpreted the scope o f the required environmental risk assessment and terms such as ‘high 
level o f environmental protection’ or ‘adverse effects’ in different ways. The authorisation of 
Ciba- Bt-maize became a contentious issue for Ireland and its national Environmental 
Protection Agency ‘expressed reservations about the development o f Bt resistance among 
pests, recommending a resistance-management programme’328 whilst the Department of 
Environment and Local Government ‘had their own concerns about the use o f an antibiotic- 
resistant marker gene.’329 The UK objected to the commercial release o f this particular maize 
because it contained a gene that made it resistant to the antibiotic ampicillin. As it was noted, 
“‘Ampicillin is widely used to treat infections in both people and livestock, and Britain is 
worried that cattle fed on the com might become resistant to treatment, or even that the gene 
will find its way into bacteria in people. We thought that the risk was real enough to be 
concerned,’ says Derek Burke, chairman of the Advisory Committee on Novel Foods and 
Processes, which advised the British government.”330
325 Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the placing on the market of genetically modified maize (Zea 
mays L.) with the combined modification for insecticidal properties conferred by the Bt-endotoxin gene and 
increased tolerance to the herbicide glufosinate ammonium pursuant to Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 
Explanatory Memorandum, Brussels, 20.05.1996 COM (96) 206 final
326 EC (1997) Commission Decision 97/98/EC of 23 January 1997 concerning the placing on the market of 
genetically modified maize. OJ of the European Communities, L 31, 1 February: 69-70 {Ciba-Geigy dossier 
C/F/94/11-3}
327 See. SCP (1996) Opinion of the Scientific Committee on Pesticides on the genetically modified maize 
lines notified by Ciba-Geigy (C/F/94/11 -3), DGVI, 13 December
328 B.Motherway, ‘Ireland: Contested precaution as policy evolves’ in Safety Regulation o f  Transgenic  
Crops: C om pleting the Internal M arket? A Study on the Im plem entation o f  D irective 90/220, Centre for 
Technology Strategy, Faculty of Technology, The Open University, Milton Keynes at 7
329 B.Motherway, ‘Ireland: contested precaution and challenged institutions’ (2000) 3(3) Journal o f  R isk  
Research  258
330 A. Coghlan, ‘Europe halts march of supermaize’ (4 May 1996) N ew  Scientist at 77. Further, it was stated 
that "The Advisory Committee on Novel Foods and Processes (ACNFP) was concerned that there was a low, 
but finite, possibility of the ampicillin resistance gene in the maize transferring to bacteria in animals fed the
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Ecological uncertainties were the main item of opposition from Sweden, Austria and 
Denmark, which were concerned ‘that com borers might develop resistance to the Bt toxin, 
and that the gene for herbicide resistance might spread into weeds.’331 Austria’s Health 
minister stated that ‘the effect o f inserting a marker gene resistant to the antibiotic ampicillin 
has not been properly evaluated’332 whereas Luxembourg’s Health and Environment Minister, 
also emphasised the unknown implications for human health and questioned the motive 
behind the Commission’s decision, saying there was ‘reason to wonder why, in so highly 
sensitive an area o f public opinion, the said decision was taken without awaiting the results of 
other studies, notably regarding the long-term implications o f these products.’333 Pursuant to 
article 16 of the DRD, Austria, Luxembourg and Germany, where GM crops were seen as 
symbolising an environmental and commercial threat to organic agriculture, adopted 
temporary and provisional measures prohibiting the sale o f the notified maize product on 
their territory. Their decision was based on the authorisation decision’s lack o f consideration 
o f the issue o f antibiotic resistance that might constitute a risk on its own and o f the fact that 
the Bt toxin could harm beneficial insects in combination with a correspondent scientific 
uncertainty in predicting such effects.334
Given the opposition in the various Member States,335 the Commission decided, in 
1996, to consult its Scientific Committees on Food, Animal Nutrition and Pesticides.336 These 
committees rejected the submitted Austrian study as not being ‘new scientific evidence’ that 
would provide ‘justifiable reasons’ according to Article 16337 and confirmed that the submitted 
information did not prove any risk arising from the release of the genetically modified
unprocessed grain. If such a transfer were to occur, the gene would become functional in the bacteria. 
Indeed, the control sequences associated with the gene would result in the generation of over 600 copies of 
the gene in a bacterium. This would result in the bacterium being able to completely overwhelm important 
antibiotics used in the treatment of human diseases." In T. Dalyell, ‘Thistle diary: Poisoned land and playing 
safe’ (November 2, 1996) N ew  Scientist 5252
331 See Coghlan (1996) note 330 at 77
332 E.Masood, ‘Austria bans gene-modified maize’ (2 January 1997) 385 N ature  3
333 ‘Biotech business face fall-out from rows over modified soya, maize’ (March 1977) 266 E N D S Report 46
334 It needs to be noted that evidence of potential harm came from a Swiss-funded tri-trophic study. For 
more, see Hilbeck, A. et al. (1998) ‘Effects of transgenic B t corn-fed prey on mortality and development 
time of immature Chrysoperla ca m ea ', Environm ental Entom ology  27(2): 480-87.
335 At the Environment Council on 25 June 1996, 13 Member States expressed their disapproval with the 
Commission’s proposal to allow the marketing of this product in the EU although the Council did not 
finalise a decision. See more in ‘Commission awaits scientific opinion for giving view on allowing 
genetically modified maize’ E U RO PE  No 6852, 14 November 1996 at 9
36 See for more, M.Mann, ‘Call for more research into modified seed’ (25/7/1996) 2(35) European Voice 7
337 For more about this issue, see T.K. Hervey, “Regulation of Genetically Modified Products in a Multi- 
Level System of Governance: Science or Citizens?” (2001) Review  o f  European Community an d  
International E nvironm ental Law  321-326.
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maize338 noting that ‘the potential development of insects that are resistant to the Bt toxin 
cannot be considered as an effect that is harmful to the environment as there are agricultural 
methods allowing for the control of this kind of insect.’339 Once the committees delivered 
their positive opinions, the Commission went ahead with the authorisation rendering this 
particular crop the first genetically engineered plant to be allowed to be grown and marketed 
in Europe.340
This authorisation decision caused new national concerns.341 Austrian officials said 
that Vienna’s evaluation o f the facts was different from the conclusions drawn by the three 
scientific committees consulted by the Commission and stated that; *We fear the ecological 
consequences o f the product’s herbicide resistance and are unhappy that it could lead to 
antibiotic resistance in humans.’342 France’s eventual approval and registration of this 
particular product in the National List procedure as a new crop variety was provided only for 
an initial period of 3 years asking the notifier to monitor various environmental effects (e.g. 
insecticidal efficacy, unintended harm to insects, insect resistance to Bt, effects on other 
organisms, spread of the ampicillin-resistance gene). Its emphasis on ‘unknowns about 
socioeconomic consequences (such as the prospect of generating herbicide-tolerant weeds), 
the time limitations imposed upon the authorisation and the establishment of an obligation 
for the mandatory monitoring of commercial usage almost amounted to a moratorium on the 
marketing of GM crops ‘until scientific studies show that there is no risk to the environment 
and a public debate has been conducted.’343 Spain followed France and assumed measures of a
338 Opinions on 21 March 1997, 10 April 1997 and 12 May 1997 SCF, 1997. Opinion of the Scientific 
Committee on Food on the additional information from the Austrian Authorities concerning the marketing of 
Ciba Geigy Maize;SCAN, 1997. Opinion of the Scientific Committee for Animal Nutrition on the 
supplementary question 88 concerning new data submitted by Austrian authorities on the safety for animals 
of certain genetically modified maize lines notified by Ciba Geigy in accordance with Directive 90/220/EEC 
for feedingstuff use;_SCP, 1997. Further Report of The Scientific Committee for Pesticides On The Use Of 
Genetically Modified Maize Lines.
339 ‘Commission decides, on the basis of the opinion from the relevant scientific committees, to approve the 
marketing of genetically modified maize, without special labelling’ (19 December 1996) 6878 E U RO PE  11
340 EC (1997a) Commission Decision 97/98/EC of 23 January 1997 concerning the placing on the market of 
genetically modified maize, O J o f  the European Communities, L 31, 1 February: 69-70. [Ciba- 
Geigy/Novartis dossier C/F/94/11-3]
341 ‘European Parliament: For ‘Greens’ Decision to approve commercialization of transgenic maize is insult 
to consumers’ EUROEP-No 6889, 21 December 1996 at 9; Further, it was noted, ‘The decision was 
condemned by environmental and consumer groups, which argued that it would result in agricultural pests 
developing resistance to pesticides, and farmers using more pesticides, increasing water pollution.’ 
C.Southey, ‘Brussels gives go-ahead to genetically modified maize’ Financial Times 19.12.1996 at 10
342 M.Mann, ‘Austria prepares for battle with Commission over genetically-modified foods’ (11/09/1997) 
E uropean Voice 2
343 The relevant French government’s statement can be found in 8(3) F oE E  Biotech Mailout, Information 
provided by the Biotechnology Programme of Friends of the Earth Europe, 15th December 1997 at 3
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precautionary character beyond the realm of 1990/220.344 In December 1998, the French 
Supreme Administrative Court declared that the product approval of the Ciba/Novartis 
maize was invalid because the risk assessment procedure had failed to assess the ampicillin- 
resistance gene345 whilst the panel of French citizens, charged with questioning 25 national 
experts on the safety and application of GMOs, reported ‘that there was a risk of pollen and 
grains spreading modified genes and {...} there were health risks arising from the presence of 
antibiotic resistant marker genes.’346
This authorisation case evidenced the failure o f the scientific evaluations offered by 
the Commission’s scientific committees to provide an authoritative point o f reference that 
would set the grounds for a uniform implementation of the approval decisions and for a 
harmonious interpretation o f the framework’s provisions. The narrow interpretation o f the 
scope o f the prescribed risk assessment framework, in combination with the rejection o f all 
national arguments regarding the need for consideration o f local environmental conditions 
and of the indirect and long-term potential effects o f the commercial GMO releases, caused 
severe tensions between the Commission and various member states during the subsequent 
implementation period.
The problems in reaching a commonly acceptable decision on the release of Bt maize- 
176 at the EU level signified the failure of the established prior authorization procedure to 
facilitate the creation o f a unified, all-encompassing interpretative approach towards the scope 
o f the risk assessment procedure and its terms o f operation and to formulate general 
acceptability standards for release into the market and the environment.
5.1.2. Institutionalizing scientific mediation and organizational reforms
The Commission acknowledged these particular problems in its 1996 Review report, 
which reflected upon the accumulated implementation practice. The report attributed the 
difficulties in reaching consensus among member states to the absence of a forum for the 
discussion o f the relevant technical disagreements at the Community level, as well as to the 
lack o f guidance as to which risks should be covered, of a common methodological approach
344 For more see O. Todt and J. Lujan 'Spain: commercialisation drives public debate and precaution' (2000) 
3(3) Journal o f  Risk Research 237-245.
345 ‘France suspends GM maize authorization, (October 2, 1998) Agra Europe 7
346 ‘Cautious support for GMOs in French debate’ (June 26, 1998) Agra Europe 7
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and of common environmental risk assessment principles and objectives.347 The association 
o f the controversies in the estimation of the relevant genetic engineering risks with the 
absence o f an institutional structure for scientific consultation, which could function as an 
impartial reconciliation mechanism outside the realm of the Commission’s administrative 
structure and immediate organisational control. As announced in Communication 
183/1997,'348 a number of institutional reforms, including the establishment of a Scientific 
Steering Committee (Commission Decision 97/404/EC )349 and of 8 new scientific 
committees (Commission Decision 97/579/EC) were agreed upon.350 Following these 
proposals, the Commission’s scientific committees (Food, Veterinary, Animal Nutrition, 
Cosmetology, Pesticides and Toxicity and Ecotoxicology), which had been dispersed among 
DGs III, V, VI and XXTV, were placed under the authority of DGXXIV, which was renamed 
the Directorate-General on Consumer Policy and Health Protection (eventually DG  
SANCO).
This particular restructuring o f the system of scientific consultation for the regaining 
o f the momentum on authorisation reflected the Commission’s focus on the need to separate, 
in organisational and institutional terms, the services responsible for drafting legislation from 
those in charge of scientific consultation as a response to the decreasing public trust in the 
capacities of expert advice to provide all-encompassing opinions largely due to the BSE 
(Bovine spongiform encephalopathy) crisis.331 Therefore, the modification o f the terms of use 
o f the given scientific opinions for informing and/or grounding authorisation decisions on 
GMOs did not constitute the driving force behind this organizational restructuring depite the 
fact that this particular regulatory use o f these technical evaluations seemed to constitute a 
constant source o f implementation problems and interpretation divergences. In fact, the issue 
o f authorization o f open-field releases o f biotechnology products was scarcely mentioned in 
these organizational initiatives. The Commission Communication 183/1997 simply noted that
347 See more in Commission of the European Communities (1996), Report on the Review of Directive 
90/220/EEC in the Content of the Commission’s Communication on Biotechnology and the White Paper 
COM(96) 630 final
348 COM (97) 183 final of 30 April 1997
349 97/404/EC: Commission Decision of 10 June 1997 setting up a Scientific Steering Committee OJ L 169, 
27.6.1997,
350 Commission Decision 97/579/EC of 23 July 1997 setting up Scientific Committees in the field of 
consumer health and food safety, OJ (1997) L 237/18
351 As it was noted, ‘The European Commission {...} announced a major re-organisation of its food safety 
services in a bid to head off European Parliament critcism of the Commission’s handling of the BSE 
crisis.{...} The move, an initiative by Commission President Jacques Santer, comes ahead of next’s vote in 
the European Parliament on the report tabled by the special BSE inquiry committee.’ In ‘Bonino takes 
charge in EU food safety shake-up’ (February 14, 1991) Agra Europe 1
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‘the Commission feels the need to have available at Community level highly specialized 
expertise on biotechnology,’352 whilst the establishment o f a specific working group on GMO 
releases was postponed.
The following section examines whether these particular institutional changes 
improved the terms o f operation of the Deliberate Release framework in terms of converging 
the various ways the Commission and the member states interpreted the Directive’s risk 
assessment requirements and the submitted technical data.
5.2. New committees, same problems: the post-1997 authorization practice
More specifically, this section analyses the line of interpretation o f the Scientific 
Committee on Plants and its effects on the Commission’s efforts to establish a harmonized 
risk assessment approach that would provide space for alternative scientific readings by 
Member States over what environmental protection might entail or how adverse effects and 
risks could be defined in the frame of a national or regional context and respond to the 
various safety concerns. It focuses on the interpretation practice o f the 1997 institutional 
structure for scientific consultation in its role as a major source o f disagreement between the 
Commission and the various Member States. Despite the fact that the wording of the DRD 
had left wide room for interpretation, in the clear expectation that a common European 
understanding would develop over time, and in view of the absence of common risk 
assessment principles, the Scientific Committee on Plants did not accept any views that 
departed from its particular conceptualisation of the potential effects of GMO releases. As a 
result of the inherent shortcomings of the established structure for the provision o f scientific 
advice and the absence of common scientific methodological standards, the focus o f risk 
assessment on direct technical effects accentuated rather than resolved the disagreements, 
raising questions about the aptitude of the Commission’s exclusive resort to scientific 
opinions to offer broadly acceptable solutions.
352Section 2.3 of COM (97) 183 fin. of 30 April 1997 Communication of the European 
Commission,’Consumer Health and Food Safety’
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5.2.1. The scope for national autonomy and narrow scientific readings in view of the
lack of common risk assessment principles
The launching o f the revised structure for the provision o f scientific advice in 1997 in 
fact coincided with an increase in applications for the commercial release o f GM crops. As a 
result, the Scientific Committee on Plants became the main risk assessor of the notification 
data submitted for the commercial authorisation o f releases of GMO products by delivering 
thirty opinions on correspondent GMO releases. Before examining the various conflicts that 
arose throughout the process of scientific evaluation of GMO files, this section will, first of 
all, highlight the unqualified character of the central concepts of the DRD such as ‘risk’, 
‘harm’, ‘potential effects’ ‘high level of protection’ ‘human safety’ and ‘environmental 
protection.’ This textual vagueness conferred on the member states a wide scope for 
interpretation and broad room for imbuing the main regulatory terms with their own risk 
assessment and environmental conceptualisations.353
The required environmental risk assessment had merely been defined as an ‘evaluation 
o f the risk to human health and the environment’354 and contained no specific minimum 
common standards for the evaluation of the acceptability of potential GMO risks and the 
conditions for approval. The level of specification in Annex II o f the Directive that contained 
a list o f the information needed to be provided upon application for the notification o f and 
authorization for the release o f GMOs into the environment had taken the form o f vague 
phrases such as ‘information in survival...’, ‘predicted habitat o f the G M O s...’ and 
‘likelihood of post-release selection....’ These generic references in combination with the 
absence o f any specific detail for toxicity and allergenicity safety requirements and lack of 
information on the effects upon non-target species, on competitive advantages that may be 
transferred to other plants and on the wider impact on ecosystems, including the food supply 
for birds and other animals did not seem to constitute sufficient guidance for the evaluation 
o f risks that might arise from such complex biological processes and novel techniques. In 
fact, ‘the ‘information requirements’ as specified by Annex II {...} leave open too much 
freedom to the applicant for interpretation o f the notification requirements, which is not in
353 As it has been noted, ‘Despite intensive negotiations over the years, binding rules on crucial rules such as 
risk assessment criteria for products could not be achieved. Divergence and convergence did not produce 
equilibrium.’ M. W. Bauer and G.Gaskell, Tromise, Problems and Proxies: 25 years of European debate and 
regulation’ in M. W .Bauer an d  G. G askell (eds.), B iotechnology - the m aking o f  a g lobal controversy  
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2002) 21-94
354 As Spanggaard notes, ‘As for the risk assessment as such, the GMO Directive provides no specific 
standards’ Th.Spanggaard, ‘The marketing of GMOs: a supra-national battle over science and precaution’ 
(2003) 3 Yearbook o f  European environm ental law  11
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the interest o f a scientific biosafety assessment.’355 In a discussion on the EC regulatory 
regime on GMOs, the House of Lords identified the absence of a clear, coherent set of 
principles for environmental impact analysis as a major problem in the operation of the 
Directive and as stated, ‘if approvals are to remain Community-wide, there must be a 
recognised standard as to what constitutes an unacceptable effect of a release.’336 As was 
noted; *1116 differences in risk assessment between dossiers, especially between those 
pertaining to the same plant species and/or aiming at similar applications are to a lack of 
details in guidance documents at the EU level or even to the absence of guidance at all.’357 In 
addition, the Directive was particularly ambiguous about whether new scientific findings 
would decrease or increase the noted scientific uncertainty including the volume and type of 
scientific evidence necessary for the evaluation of the potential effects o f the release.
In view of the absence of a detailed list of principles and elements that needed to be 
taken into account for the performance and evaluation of the required environmental risk 
assessment, the lack o f a comprehensive knowledge base and o f significant regulatory 
experience on the effects of genetic engineering in combination with the indeterminate 
wording o f the Directive, the various competent authorities seemed to be fairly autonomous 
in shaping the breadth of the scope of the required risk assessment. The breadth o f the scope 
o f the required risk assessment, The diverse remit of effects taken into account in several 
Member States reflected the variety o f approaches found in the national statutes on genetic 
engineering,358 the significant differences in their scientific infrastructure339 in terms o f the 
nature, expertise and composition of their competent national authorities.360 As Karl Doehler,
355‘ A. van Dommelen, H azard  Identification o f  A gricultural B iotechnology: F inding Relevant Questions 
(International Books: Utrecht, the Netherlands, 1999) 150.
356 House of Lords, ‘EC Regulation of Genetic Modification in Agriculture’, Select Committee on the 
European Communities, Session 1998-99 2nd Report, 15 December 1998 at 28
357A. Spok, H. Hofer, R. Valenta, K. Kienzl-Plochberger, P. Lehner & H. Gaugitsch, Toxikologieund 
allergologie von GVO-produkten: Empfehlungen zur Standardisierung der Sicherheitsbewwerung von 
gentechnisch veranderten Pflanzen auf Basis der Richtlinie 90/220/EWG (2001/18/EG) (Federal 
Environment Agency Monographien Band 109: Wien, Austria, 2002)
358 On the content of the various national genetic engineering laws, see Journal o f  R isk Research  3(3), 1 July 
2000, Special Issue: Precautionary Regulation - GM Crops in the European Union
359 Related to this issue and constituting a significant reason for the divergent interpretation of the main 
terms of the Directive from the various national competent authorities was the choice of Ministry as the 
Competent Authority for the implementation of the prior authorization requirements. On this issue, see S. 
Carr and L. Levidow, 'Negotiated science: the case of agricultural biotechnology regulation in Europe' in 
U.Collier, G.Orhan, M.Wissenburg (eds), European D iscourses on Environm ental Policy  (Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publ.1999) 159-72,
360 As was noted, ‘while France, Belgium, UK, West Germany and the Netherlands have panels of manly 
scientific experts, the Danes will retain their Parliamentary Committee on the Environment. The southern 
member states -SPAIN, Portugal and Italy- with little regulatory experience so far, will have to gain their
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a biotechnology specialist in DGXI notes, *we have 15 member states with 15 scientific 
cultures; therefore risk assessment is done in different ways.’361 The use of different scientific 
assumptions for assessing the risks o f gene technology also mirrored the relevant scientific 
debate,362 which, among others things, included the discussion about whether and to what 
extent the acceptability standards should be based and defined entirely through the means of 
scientific evidence363 and the extent to which regulation should be informed by the existing 
scientific expertise 364
Within this risk assessment framework, most of the member states shaped 
autonomous baseline standards for the acceptability of the notified release o f a GMO product 
either as a familiar organism similar to the existing plant varieties or as a fundamentally novel 
one that could potentially or inherently cause environmental and/or human health harm. In 
general, state o f the art in science and technology, conventional agricultural practices, 
agronomic effects, sustainable development, biodiversity, acquired familiarity during releases 
and available ecological data, effects on pesticides use, familiarity with the genetic construct 
and known biological risks were some of the main baselines used in the various member 
states for the evaluation of the potential genetic engineering risks in accordance with the 
particularities of the local agricultural and environmental contexts.365 For example, Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland and Austria viewed sustainable agriculture, agronomic effects and socio­
economic issues as an indispensable part of the relevant risk assessment considerations, whilst
competence rapidly.’ In J.Hodgson, ‘When ethics and biotechnology collide’ (April 1990) Scientific 
European 26
361 E. Johnson, ‘CIBA faces a maize of committees in Europe’ (September 1996) 14 N ature B iotechnology  
1069
362 With regard to the latter, it needs to be mentioned that ecologists were making use of the exotic/non- 
indigenous species as the basic point of reference, whilst the molecular biologists referred by analogy to the 
practice of conventional plant breeding and viewed the existing scientific evidence as not sufficient to rule 
out possible risks arising from the use of genetic techniques and it would be difficult to predict any specific 
impact of GMOs on natural ecosystems.
363 Various Member States as well as other actors requested the incorporation of socio-economic 
considerations, agricultural practices and ethical principles in the prior authorization line of permitted 
argumentation. The UK, the European Parliament, the Bioethics Committee...
364 As it was stated, ‘’{The non-target harm issue] is a scientific issue...We are asked only scientific 
questions’ (interview, Chairman, Scientific Committee on Plants Environmental Sub-Committee, June 
1988} Not surprisingly critics targeted those assumptions.’ In J. Murphy, L. Levidow, and S. Carr 
’Regulatory Standards for Environmental Risks: Understanding the US-European Union Conflict over 
Genetically Modified Crops’ (February 1, 2006) 36(1) Social Studies o f  Science  146.
365 On the variety of risk assessment standards used in the various Member States, see L.Levidow, S.Carr, 
R.von Schomberg, D.Wield, ‘Regulating agricultural biotechnology in Europe: harmonization difficulties, 
opportunities, dilemmas’ (June 1996) 23(3) Science and  Public P olicy  135-157, R. von Schomberg, A n  
appraisal o f  the working in practice o f  directive 90/220/EEC  on the deliberate release o f  genetically  
m odified  organism s (Brussels: STOA, 1998); L.Levidow, S.Carr and D.Wield, EU -level Report-Safety  
Regulation o f  Transgenic Crops: Completing the In ternal M arket? ‘ A  study o f  the im plem entation o f  E C  
D irective 90/220, (Open University, November 1999)
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the UK and the Netherlands considered the direct ecological effects of the GMO releases as 
falling within the scope o f the required evaluation control process.366 Austria made use of 
‘safety, considering synergistic effects, reversibility and the ecological context o f effects’ as the 
main criteria for decisions about GMO releases.367
On the other hand, examining the opinions provided by the SCP, one could conclude 
that its members viewed the European environment as a homogeneous context. In all its 
opinions on GMO releases, this particular expert committee approached the risk assessment 
questions as focused exclusively on the potential direct effects of the proposed releases and 
on the physical characteristics o f the GMOs without recognizing the inherent uncertainties. 
Their approach as to what constitutes ‘adverse effect,’ ‘risk’ or ‘environment’ was shaped by 
using the traditional model o f (industrially intensive) conventional agriculture as the main 
point o f reference and comparison. As a result o f this framing, any consideration of the long­
term or cumulative effects of the release and/or the particularities o f the various ecological 
and agricultural contexts across Europe was left out of its evaluation prism, thus restricting 
the room for common problem solving at the level of risk management.
The examination of the relevant interpretation practice, as it was developed after 
1997, highlights these observations. Firstly, in the frame of the case o f Pioneer’s Insect- 
Resistant Transgenic Maize Expressing the Gene for Btk Toxin maize, the Scientific 
Committee on Plants made use o f the then effects of chemical-intensive agricultural methods 
and the present agricultural practices as the risk assessment baseline for the evaluation of the 
potential effects o f GM crops. In relation to the effects of the release on the safety o f non­
target organisms, the Committee stated that ‘the expectation is that the genetically modified 
maize will be at least as safe as, and perhaps safer than, traditional methods o f insect control 
involving pesticides’.368 Austria departed from this approach stating:
‘Possible secondary metabolic changes in the plant as a result of a foreign gene
insertion should be studied. {...} The developing monitoring protocol should be
366 See about these disparities, P.Schenkelaars, ‘Uncertainty and reluctance: Europe and GM foods’ 
(September 2001) 47 Biotechnology and  D evelopm ent M onitor  17 and P. Commandeur, P. Joly, L. Levidow, 
B. Tappeser, and F. Terragni, ‘Public Debate and Regulation of Biotechnology in Europe’ (March 1996) 26 
Biotechnology and  D evelopm ent M onitor 4
367 See more in H.Torgersen and M.Mikl, H ow to H andle a Virtual Reality, country report on Austria for the 
project "GMO Releases: Managing Uncertainties About Biosafety" (funded by EU/DGXII) (ITA: Wien, 
1996)9
368 SCP (1998) Opinion of the Scientific Committee on Plants Regarding Pioneer’s MON9 Bt, glyphosate- 
tolerant maize, 19 May and Opinion regarding the submission for placing on the market of genetically 
modified, insect-resistant maize lines notified by the pioneer genetique S.A.R.L.Company (notification No 
C/F/95/12-01/B) (Submitted by the Scientific Committee on Plants, 19 May 1998)
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amended in order to analyse any indirect effects of Bt-maize, for example on the 
food chain. In recent scientific Bt publications possible effects have been detected in 
laboratory experiments, the ecological relevance of which have to clarified before a 
decision on placing on the market of this product.’369
The Scientific Committee on Plants followed the same approach also in the case o f the 
authorization o f the Monsanto’s Bt maize, where it considered the insect resistance 
management plan as ‘adequate to delay resistance’, viewing the issue o f resistance as one of an 
agricultural rather than an environmental character.370
The case o f Aventis ‘Chardon LL’ T25 and the banning of its cultivation and import 
into Austria is equally indicative of the narrow approach assumed by the SCP towards the 
scope o f the scientific risk assessment required in the frame of the 90/220 Directive. In this 
case, the Scientific Committee on Plants examined the information submitted by the UK 
authorities and concluded that it did not provide new scientific information which required 
any changes to the original risk assessment and considered the issue raised in the question to 
be related to management and not to risk assessment, and thus o f a non-scientific character.371 
Austria justified the ban o f imports of Aventis’s GM maize on the grounds that there were no 
available studies on the long-term impact the crop could have on the environment and that 
‘neither the notification seeking approval nor the Commission foresaw a monitoring 
programme’372 especially for protected areas. As the Austrian Minister o f Food Safety and 
Inspection stated, ‘Austria is no laboratory and it is of utmost concern that we maintain 
Austria as a provider o f produce o f the highest quality for the whole European market.’373 
Furthermore, the scientific opinions of the SCP on herbicide tolerant oil seed rape and Bt 
maize considered the effect of insect-resistant (Bt) maize in intensifying the selection pressure 
for resistant insects,374 the potential effect of the Bt toxin on beneficial insects (on non-target
369 Republic Osterreich Bundeskanzleramt, Genehmigungsverfahren gem ab Teil C  der RL 90/220/EW G; 
Ubermittlung von Kopien der osterreichischen Stellungnahmen, GZ 32.299/5-W9/b/00, 31/1/2000
370 See more in SCP (1998) Opinion of the Scientific Committee on Plants regarding Monsanto’s MON 10 Bt 
maize (C/F/95/12-02), 10 February
371 Scientific Committee on Plants (2001) Opinion on the invocation by the United Kingdom of Article 16 of 
Council Directive 90/220/EEC regarding genetically modified maize line T25 notified by Agrevo (now 
Aventis Cropscience, ref. C/F/95/12-07) 08 November
372 ‘EU Committee slams Austrian man’ (January 24, 2001) 47 A graF oodB io tech  8
373 ‘Austria bans Aventis’gene-modified maize’ REUTERS, April 14, 2000
374 EC (1997) Commission Decision 97/98/EC of 23 January 1997 concerning the placing on the market of 
genetically modified maize, OJ of the European Communities, L31, 1 February, 69-70 {Ciba-Geigy/Novartis 
dossier C/F/94/11-3} and Opinion of the Scientific Committee on Plants (1998) regarding the submission for 
placing on the market of genetically modified, insect-resistant maize lines notified by the pioneer genetique 
S.A.R.L. Company (notification No C/F/95/12-01/B), 19 May
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species)375 and the effects of antibiotic-resistance marker genes as non-relevant to the scope 
o f the Directive’s risk assessment.
Various member states raised concerns about the possible environmental effects of 
introducing crops that might change farming practices. As was noted, ‘In Europe, farming 
and wildlife are intimately interlinked with 80% of UK land cultivated. So the impact of 
genetically modified crops, and the new management plans for the use o f pesticides for 
herbicide-resistant crops, may have a devastating impact on wildlife species, many of which 
have already been highly damaged by intensification.’376 In the cases o f Monsanto soya seeds, 
Ciba-Geigy maize and Beja Zanden chicory, ‘the Danish government recognized that the long 
term risks of the use of such organisms cannot be ignored and the Environment Minister 
announced that there will be an investigation into the effects o f the use of herbicide tolerant 
crops as ‘the general Danish standpoint has always been that the ‘secondary effects’ of 
herbicide usage would be caused by the crop and therefore lie within Directive 90 /220’.377 In 
fact, this approach reflected the viewpoint o f the Danish environmental policy framework, 
according to which agriculture was mainly regarded as part o f the environment. The 1991 
Danish Act on Environment and Genetic Engineering stated as its basic purpose 
‘safeguarding nature and the environment in Denmark, thus ensuring a sustainable social 
development.’378 Denmark’s focus had been centered on the secondary effects of an 
agricultural character and the long-term environmental ones such as farmland biodiversity and 
groundwater protection.379 It was noted that ‘Northern European countries, such as 
Denmark, take a broader view of the risks and include effects {of genetic engineering} on 
agricultural land and practices in evaluating GMOs.’380
Moreover, the Austrian authorities made use o f the sustainable agriculture model and 
the reduction of adverse environmental effects by organic farming as a benchmark for
375 SCP (1998) Opinion of the Scientific Committee on Plants regarding Pioneer’s MON9 Bt, glyphosate- 
tolerant maize (notification C/F/95/12-01/B), 19 May
376 See more, in N.Williams, ‘Agricultural Biotech Faces Backlash in Europe’ (7 August 1998) 281 Science  
770
377 J.Toft, ‘Denmark: potential polarization or consensus?’ (2000) 3 (3) Journal o f  Risk Research 229
378 MoE, Ministry of the Environment (1991), Act no.356 on Environment and Genetic Engineering 
(Ministry of the Environment, Danish Environmental Protection Agency, official translation, 6 June), Article 
1
379 See: Levidow, L, Carr, S, and Wield, D., EU Regulation of Agri-biotechnology: Precautionary Links 
between Science and Policy Project No QLRT-2001-00034 (The Open University, June 2005) 71
380 See S.Mayer, Let’s keep the genie in its bottle’ New Scientist, 30 November 1996 at 51 and ‘Greenpeace 
urges the EU not to authorize the release on the market of three genetically modified products (produced by 
Monsanto, Ciba Geigy and Beja Zanden)’ (21 February 1996) 6671 EUROPE 14
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assessing GM-related risks and considered agronomic practice as environmentally relevant as 
gene transfer and out crossing. As was noted, ‘Austria, with its small-scale agriculture and 
special ecological conditions {...} views the new GM products as part of the ‘further 
industrialisation’ of agriculture and the public has become hostile to their introduction.’381 
Austria’s risk assessment criteria had been shaped beyond those of the 90/220 Directive by 
taking indirect effects, such as socioeconomic effects, effects upon organic agriculture, 
ecological irreversibility and the ecological context o f the proposed release into consideration. 
As the head of biotechnology in the Ministry of Agriculture pointed out ‘not all products are 
good for all places’, and there must be risk assessment o f the ‘secondary effects’ from 
releasing GMOs into the environment.’382 In relation to the approval o f the import o f Ciba- 
Geigy’s GM maize, Austria and Luxembourg unilaterally banned imports o f the maize 
‘unconvinced that sufficient research has been carried out into the long-term effects on health 
o f an antibiotic ‘marker’ gene in the product.’383 After 1997, France also adopted a broader 
definition o f ‘adverse effects’ of GM crops ‘accepting the expert advice of those who 
emphasize environmental uncertainties’ {...} ‘moving towards a wider assessment, involving 
post-market follow up of adverse effects through biovigilance.’384 Spain became worried about 
the potential effects on indigenous species, whilst the ‘narrow5 character of the scope o f the 
90/220 Directive as it had been framed via the opinions o f the Scientific Committee on 
Plants also became a source of concern for the UK authorities. As the UK Environment 
Minister stated, ‘the UK will {...} be seeking to make sure that the scope o f EU Directive 
90/220 is broad enough to cover the indirect ecological effects o f GMOs, as well as their 
direct impact’385so that the risk assessment includes effects from ‘changes in use or 
management’ of the product.’386
The various national risk assessment evaluations approached ‘environment’ as a 
particular context that included ecological particularities, agricultural practices and socio­
economic parameters and departed from the conventional or ‘static’ approach of the SCP,
381 Commentary ‘GMOs in Europe: a question of confidence’ (May 1, 1998) 1796 A gra Europe 3
382 Commentary ‘Call for regionalized policy on GMOs’ (November 28, 1997) A gra Europe  8
383 S.Coss, ‘Consumers wary of genetic changes’ (27 February-5 March 1997) 3(8) European Voice
384 A.Roy and P.B. Joly, ‘France: broadening precautionary expertise?’ (2000) 3(3) Journal o f  R isk Research  
253
385 Commentary ‘UK imposes restrictions on GM crop releases’ (October 23 1998) A gra  E urope 9
386 DETR (1998) ‘Government announces fuller evaluations of growing genetically modified crops’, news 
release, 21 October, London: Dept of the Environment, Transport and the Regions and HL (1998); EC 
Regulation of Genetic Modification in Agriculture, 2nd Report of the Select Committee of the House of 
Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, session 1998-99, HL paper 11-I, December, 
London: The Stationery Office
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interpreting it in different ways: either as natural environment with a focus on biodiversity 
(UK and Ireland) or as an integrated combination o f natural and agricultural elements 
(Denmark and Austria). In the case of the authorization of the Aventis T25 maize, the UK 
authorities stated that ‘A broad interpretation o f Article 16 allows ‘protection o f the 
environment’ under the Directive to include protection o f an environment where organically 
pure crops can be grown.’387 It was also noted that; “We have very great concerns regarding 
the decline o f wildlife on farmland. It is really these concerns that have led us to be worried 
about crops containing GMOs’.388 In the case o f Austria, the standard used ‘widens the 
product assessment beyond a narrow, technical understanding o f risk. It explicitly includes 
secondary effects, especially those of agricultural practice. {...} Austria referred explicitly to 
the impact on pesticide use as well as to possible secondary and long-term effects —not only 
on the ‘natural’ environment, but also on the agricultural one-as an integral part o f risk 
assessment.’389
The conceptualisation o f what constitutes ‘risk’ also varied among the competent 
national authorities that attempted to frame their own knowledge base on issues o f genetic 
engineering safety, emphasizing the familiarity, inherent safety, predictability or the novelty of 
genetic engineering, with dissimilar levels of emphasis on the risk of genetic imprecision, the 
focus on the threats to human health, the presence o f organisms capable o f causing harm to 
living organisms supported by the environment, the effects of the use o f a GM O product and 
o f agricultural practices in cultivating GM crops, herbicide implications and the socio­
economic impacts o f GM crops. For instance, the UK’s competent authorities incorporated 
ecological uncertainty about long-term environmental effects into their risk assessment 
conclusions.390 The case o f the authorization of the PGS oilseed rape is indicative o f the 
severe intra-Community interpretative tensions and disagreements about the Directive’s 
breadth o f scope.
387 See on this issue the justifications used by the UK competent authority in the case of Aventis T25 maize. 
‘Aventis T25 maize’ FOEE Biotech Mailout, Vol.7, Issue 6 at 7
388 ‘Governments come under mounting pressure to act over GMO crops’, European Voice, 1-7 October 
1998 at 5
389 H.Torgersen and F.Seifert, ‘Austria: precautionary blockage of agricultural biotechnology’ (2000) 3(3) 
Journal o f  Risk Research 210
390 See: Levidow, L., Carr, S. von Schomberg, R. and Wield, D. 'European biotechnology regulation: 
framing the risk assessment of a herbicide-tolerant crop' (1997) 22(4) Science, Technology and Human 
Values 472-505.
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5.1.1.1. H erbicide tolerant o il seed rape-MS8xRF3, PGS, U K
Pursuant to Directive 90/220, article 13, Plant Genetic Systems N . V. submitted a 
notification to the competent authorities o f the United Kingdom for the placing on the 
market, for growing and obtaining seeds of a GM oilseed rape (MS8xRFf3, Notification 
C /B /9 6 /0 1 1 proposed use: growing and multiplication of parental line seeds for breeding 
material and for placing hybrid seed on the market).391 This product had been genetically 
modified for tolerance to the herbicide glufosinate. Several potential environmental risks were 
considered as primary effects of the use of herbicide resistant GM crops such as crossbreeding, 
gene transfer and/or undesirable effects on non-target organisms, such as on beneficial 
insects. In relation to the so-called secondary effects, these were defined as those that could not 
directly be caused by the GM crops themselves, but were associated with the use o f the 
complementary herbicide (development of resistance to the herbicide in target weeds, 
negative impact on biodiversity).
A positive assessment report recommending an EU-wide approval under Part C, 
prepared by the UK authorities (ACRE),392 was forwarded to the Commission in May 1994, 
which was in turn forwarded it to the competent national authorities. The UK authorities had 
acknowledged some uncertainty about the potential spread o f the herbicide-tolerance gene to 
other oilseed rape and its weedy relatives,393 but had noted that the hybridisation of the PGS 
crop would not harm ‘the agricultural environment’ because other effective herbicides were 
available.394 In other words, the potential effects upon agricultural practices in using the 
particular GMO were evaluated as ‘secondary’ or ‘indirect’ and in effect as not 
‘environmentally harmful’.
391 For more about the background of this case, see Levidow, L., Carr, S. and Wield, D.M., 'Market-stage 
precautions: managing regulatory disharmonies for transgenic crops in Europe' (1999) 1 AgBiotechNet 1-8, 
Levidow, L., and D. Wield. "European Regulation: Harmony - or Cacophony?" (1998) 4 BINAS News and 
Levidow, L., Carr, S. von Schomberg, R. and Wield, D. 'European biotechnology regulation: framing the 
risk assessment of a herbicide-tolerant crop' (1997) 22(4) Science, Technology and Human Values 472-505.
392 The Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment (ACRE) is a statutory advisory committee 
appointed under section 124 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (the EPA) to provide advice to the 
UK government regarding the release and marketing of genetically modified organisms.
393 The Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment (ACRE) is a statutory advisory committee 
appointed under section 124 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (the EPA) to provide advice to the 
UK government regarding the release and marketing of genetically modified organisms. See on this issue, 
‘L.Levidow, S.Carr and D.Wield, ‘Regulating biotechnological risk, straining Britain’s consultative style’ 
(1999) 2(4) Journal of Risk Research 307-324
394 ACRE, (1995) ACRE: Annual Report no.2: 1994/95, p.7. Department of the Environment, London at:7
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On the other hand, several competent national authorities thought o f the herbicide 
implications of herbicide tolerant crops as falling under the scope of the risk assessment 
process. In Austria, for example, GM crops were widely regarded as a threat to organic 
agriculture and the Austrian Federal Environmental Agency commented that; ‘In the course 
o f several scientific discussions.. .it became obvious, that due to the possible general 
ecological problems associated with herbicide use in agricultural practice, the marketing of 
herbicide resistance plants is regarded as a very sensitive topic in Austria.’395 Scandinavian 
states objected because of the implications for the use o f herbicides,396 whilst the INRA397 
abandoned its innovation research on herbicide-tolerant oilseed rape.398 As was noted, ‘in this 
particular case, the EU is really playing with fire, given that Mediterranean Europe is the 
centre o f origin o f oilseed rape, as it is for the whole o f the Brassica family.’399
In this particular risk assessment procedure, several countries argued in favour of a 
wider interpretation o f what constitutes an ‘adverse effect’ for the environment and human 
health in relation to GMO releases, considering ‘agricultural practices’ as part of the natural 
environment. Denmark requested that the risk assessment should encompass the implications 
for overall herbicide usage and future weed-control options, especially given that oilseed rape 
could hybridize with weedy relatives and ‘objected on grounds of the weed-control 
implications.’400 Its scientific officials claimed that the herbicide-tolerant gene could generate 
herbicide-tolerant weeds, thus potentially restricting future options for weed-control methods 
and for sustainable agriculture and considered it as an environmental impact, which should be 
addressed under Part IV of Annex II to Directive 90/220. In the frame of the relevant 
regulatory comitology committee discussion, Denmark cited its own ecological study showing 
‘significant hybridisation between oilseed rape and a widespread agricultural weed*01 and as 
was noted, ‘scientific field experiments in Denmark already provided strong evidence that this 
is exactly what occurs’.402 Sweden warned that broad-spectrum herbicides would damage 
wildlife habitats and demanded that the 90/220 procedures should evaluate such effects for
395 Stellungnahme des umweltbundesamtes zu Z1.106-II/C/5. Umwelbundesamt, 26.Juli 1994, Zl.: 04- 
772/94)
396 See: M.Williamson, ‘Can the risks from transgenic crop plants be estimated?’ (December 1996) 14 
TIBTECH 449
397 Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (French National Institute for Agricultural Research)
398 See: L.Levidow, ‘Precautionary Uncertainty: Regulating GM Crops in Europe’ (December 2001) 31(6) 
Social Studies of Science.852-9
399 Commentary ‘Novel foods, old tricks’ (March 1996) Seedling 12
400 See Toft (1996) note 209 at 173
401 Ibid. at 174
402 GRAIN, ‘Novel foods, old tricks’ (March 1996) Seedling 13
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every crop tolerant to broad-spectrum herbicides, whilst France and Italy raised the issue of 
multiplying resistant weeds, which may result from the commercial use o f various herbicide- 
tolerant crops (especially oilseed rape). In the Netherlands, the advisory committee signaled 
the herbicide issue to the Dutch government, whilst the German competent authority voted 
in favour, but acknowledged that the herbicide implications remain a concern in response to 
the German Environment Ministry, whose officials criticized the PGS marketing 
application.403
After the Environment Council viewed the general herbicide issue as a matter falling 
under the pesticides Directive (91/414), thus outside the scope of the D R D ^ a n d  despite the 
concerns about the resistant properties of the PGS product (which could as a result become 
weeds) expressed in the frame of the Article 21 Committee,405 the Commission eventually 
granted market approval to the herbicide-tolerant oilseed rape. It did so asserting that the 
Directive kept herbicide implications out of its scope and noting ‘that any spread o f transfer 
o f the herbicide-tolerance gene could be controlled by using existing management 
strategies.’406 Following the Commission’s approval, the UK issued a final consent for the 
placing on the market o f the product.407 The authorisation o f the release of herbicide-tolerant 
rape created tension in several Member States that viewed it as a threat to weed-control 
methods and to organic agriculture and resulted in France’s commercial blockage of all 
products that contained an antibiotic-resistance gene due to the fear of its spreading to wild 
relatives. France announced its refusal to sign in November 1997, on grounds that herbicide- 
tolerant oilseed rape warranted further safety evaluation: ‘N o authorization for commercial 
use o f plant species other than maize will be given until scientific studies show there is no risk 
to the environment and until a public debate has been conducted.’408
403 See on this issue, L. Levidow, S. Carr, R. von Schomberg, and D. Wield, 'European biotechnology 
regulation: framing the risk assessment of a herbicide-tolerant crop', (1997) 22(4) Science, Technology and  
H um an Values 472-505.
404 See: Environmental Data Services (ENDS) (1994) Genetically modified rape blazes trail for industry 
and regulators ENDS Report 239:15-18
405 Commentary ‘EU gene-altered crop approval imminent?’ EU RO PE Biotechnology Business News, 31 
January 1996/2
406 97/392/EC: Commission Decision of 6 June 1997 concerning the placing on the market of genetically 
modified swede- rape (Brassica napus L. oleifera Metzg. MSI, RE1), pursuant to Council Directive 
90/220/EEC (Text with EEA relevance) O J L  164, 21.6.1997,
407 The consent only covered ‘the notified use of the product for growing for obtaining seed’ but did not 
extend to the use for human food or animal feed...’ thus precluding seed certification on the UK National 
List. Later the same product was submitted for all commercial uses to France, which recommended EU 
approval (C/F/95/05-01).
4 8 ‘’France authorizes Novartis modified maize’ ENDS Europe Daily, Issue 198-Friday 28 November 1997
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As a result of the noted intra-Community tensions, the Commission resorted to the 
Scientific Committee on Plants for an objective evaluation o f the risk assessment data, which 
in turn followed the same approach by considering the aforementioned effects as being out of 
the Directive’s risk assessment scope. It did not acknowledge those ecological uncertainties 
that had been associated with the herbicide implications o f the notified release singled out by 
various member states and argued that the DRD covered solely the safety o f the crop as such 
(‘product safety’), namely the direct ecological effects of its biological characteristics. 
Although in its opinion, the Scientific Committee on Plants acknowledged that gene transfer 
to wild Brassica ‘is a new issue in Europe,’ it noted that it ‘could be controlled in subsequent 
crops by conventional agricultural methods.’409 Eventually, pursuant to Directive 90/220/EC , 
Article 16, France announced in July 1998 a two-year moratorium on the commercial 
cultivation o f GM crops with wild relatives, such as rape, ‘until scientific studies show that 
there is no risk to the environment and a public debate has been conducted.’410
5.2.2. Shortcomings of the 1997 scientific consultation structure
After 1997, the main responsibility for the provision of scientific advice on GMO 
releases, when Member States would object to proposals for product authorizations411 or when 
individual states would decide to ban or restrict particular product authorizations in their 
territory, fell mostly on the shoulders of the SCP. This body was requested to consider 
whether the placing on the market o f specific GM O products would be likely to cause any 
adverse effects on human health and the environment in at least thirty occasions. However, it 
needs to be noted that this committee had not been created in order to handle the 
technological challenges and the safety concerns related to the agri-food application of genetic 
engineering as such. As was noted, its creation came as a response to the BSE crisis and to 
the need for the provision of high quality scientific advice for the drafting and amendment of 
Community rules regarding consumer protection in general and consumer health in particular.
409 SCP (1998) Opinion regarding the Glufosinate tolerant, hybrid rape derived from genetically modified 
parental lines (MS8 x RF3) notified by plant genetic systems (notification C/B/96/01) 19 May
410 For more about the French GMO policy at that time, see Marris, C (2000) “Swings and Roundabouts: 
French Public Policy on Agricultural GMOs 1996 -  1999” Cahiers du C3ED, Cahier no. 00-02, Fevrier 
2000 .
411 The resort to these Committees took place in all cases of applications for GM crop authorizations except 
in the case of carnations modified for colour.
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More specifically, the main task assigned to this expert advisory committee had been 
the emission o f scientific opinions on plant protection products in general (more than 100 
opinions were produced in this field) and the examination o f scientific and technical questions 
relating to the production or processing o f non-food products in relation to characteristics 
liable to affect human or animal health or the environment, including the use o f pesticides. In 
fact, the Commission Decision that established the SCP did not include the commercial 
releases o f GMO products in its field o f competence,412 despite the calls of the then 
Commissioner responsible for Consumer affairs for the creation o f an EU scientific 
committee responsible for evaluating the risks from GMOs, which had in fact been 
characterized as an ‘absolute necessity.*413 The absence o f a scientific committee that would be 
focused exclusively on safety issues related to GMO releases and the de facto delegation of 
the risk assessment duties in this technological field to the SCP might be attributed to the fact 
that ‘there was no political interest to foster transgenic plants’414
Leaving aside the history o f the Scientific Committee on Plants (as a body that had 
been established following the merging and renaming of the pre-1997 pesticides and 
toxicology and ecotoxicology committees), the under-representation o f ecologists and o f plant 
scientists in the Committee’s composition415 and its lack o f experience in relation to genetic 
engineering issues416 became a source of criticism against the particular operation o f the 
deliberate release framework. As Toke notes, . .the large majority of the SCP are not actually 
experts on plants themselves, but on various types of human and animal toxicology. {...} It 
does strike me as a body that is ideally set up for consideration of pesticides rather than 
GMOs. Four out o f the 18 members o f the SCP are specialists in biochemistry and 
biotechnology, four specialists in plant ecotoxicology and ecology, seven in human toxicology
412 See Annex of Commission Decision N° 97/579/EC of 23 July 1997; Commission Decision setting up 
Scientific Committees in the field of consumer health and food safety (OJ L 237 of 28.08.97) that noted that: 
‘Scientific and technical questions relating to plants intended for human or animal consumption, production 
or processing of non-food products as regards characteristics liable to affect human or animal health or the 
environment, including the use of pesticides.’
413 See more in ‘Bonino calls for EU committee on GMO risksVtgra Europe, April 1997 at 27
414 Interview evidence with a member of the Scientific Committee on Plants, 7/3/2006
415 Further information can be found in http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/scp/index cn.htm 1. ’In Toke, D. ‘The 
Politics of GM Food-A comparative study of the UK, USA, and EU’ Routledge (2004) at 169
416 This might also be attributed to the membership of the SCP since the large majority of its members were 
not actually experts on plants themselves, but on various types of human and animal toxicology. As Toke 
notes, ‘This membership betrays the SCP’s history as a body that has been formed following the merging 
and renaming of the pesticides and toxicology-ecotoxicology committees. It does strike me as a body that is 
ideally set up for consideration o fpestic ides rather than GMOs. F our ou t o f  the 18 members o f  the SC P  are  
specialists in biochem istry a n d  biotechnology, fo u r  specialize in p la n t ecotoxicology and  ecology, seven in 
hum an toxicology and  three in veterinary-related anim al toxicology. ' D ave Toke, (2004) The Politics o f  G M  
Food, London: Routledge, a t 169
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and three in veterinary-related animal toxicology.’417 As was noted, the SCP Svas requested to 
gain, from the analysis o f these first four dossiers, the experience necessary for establishing 
standardized analysis criteria, evaluation methods and risk assessment approaches’.418 It needs 
to be mentioned that in the frame of the process for the evaluation o f the notification data, 
severe time constraints were imposed upon the SCP. This became evident in the case o f the 
authorization o f the T25 maize, where the SCP had to look at 3 other GM crops and 
delivered its official opinion on all four GMOs 7 weeks later.419
The administrative structure of the Scientific Committee on Plants as such became a 
factor that soon undermined its efficient operation and indirectly affected the quality o f its 
judgments. The SCP consisted o f three groups of experts and as one member o f the Scientific 
Committee on Plants noted; ‘The areas of expertise of these three groups did not overlap 
enough, so the plenaries were truly frustrating. Although occasionally we had good general 
discussions, usually it did not work well, was counterproductive and expensive.’420 Further, the 
positioning of the SCP under the direct control and administrative supervision o f an 
expanded DGXXIV-SANCO (a marginal body that had been created in 1989 as Community 
Policy Service (CPS)) soon became a further impediment in its operation, as its dependence 
on the limited financial resources of this particular Directorate-General ‘led to its under­
resourcing and the delegation of its work to outside experts’421 as ‘there was not sufficient 
scientifically literate administrative support at Community level.’422 As a member o f the 
Scientific Committee on Plants noted, ‘there were shortages o f resources in the Commission 
(DG SANCO) and Commission services. The compensation o f experts was ridiculous, so
417 In D. Toke, ‘The Politics of GM Food-A comparative study of the UK, USA, and EU’ (Routledge, 2004) 
169
418 Scientific Steering Comm ittee (former M DSC) Summary Minutes of the meeting of 21.11.1997
4,9 To this end, it is interesting to read the minutes of the public hearing regarding whether Chardon LL 
should be put on the UK's National Seed Listing. In August 1998 the biotech company Aventis/Bayer 
received approval from the EU to import and market GM maize known as T25. Two years later the UK 
Government proposed that a variety of T25 maize known as Chardon LL be licensed for the National Seed 
List in the UK, thus for commercial growing. Friends of the Earth objected and forced a public enquiry to be 
held. In the course of Friends of the Earth's investigations into the approval of T25, serious failings in the 
regulatory process and flaws in the scientific research were discovered. Among them that 'The SC P  gave its 
approval within weeks, despite the Committee being new  and  inexperienced, raising doubts about the 
scrutiny it gave to the data. ’ More in Biotech  Mw/oi/Mnformation from the Biotechnology Programme of 
Friends of the Earth Europe, Volume 6, Issue 8, 15 December 2000 and the relevant FoEE Briefing.
420 Interview with a member of the Scientific Committee ((9/12/2006)
421 Interview evidence with a member of the Scientific Committee (19/1/2007)
422 House of Lords, ‘EC Regulation of Genetic Modification in Agriculture’, Select Committee on the 
European Communities, Session 1998-99 2nd Report, 15 December 1998 at 28
146
experts' work for the Commission was charity, nobody was getting any financial
*423compensation.
As the Scientific Steering Committee noted, ‘a serious drawback is the totally 
insufficient support due to lack of resources, leading to a backlog, which erodes the 
confidence o f community and scientists, as well in the Commission’s position regarding 
scientific advice.’424 The Commission eventually acknowledged these limitations stating that 
‘the existing system is handicapped by a lack of capacity and has struggled to cope with the 
increase in the demands placed upon it.’425 Professor James, a senior member o f the Scientific 
Steering Committee noted in 1998 that ‘the pressure of the last year has been too intense to 
get really very well balanced, beautiful judgments that are explicit and clear in all aspects.5426 
The absence of an open debate on the findings and the limitations o f the risk assessment 
process further isolated the Scientific Committee on Plants, raising questions such as ‘Why 
have we not had an open discussion of the Commission’s own scientific findings?’427
Further, the opinions o f the Scientific Committee on Plants lacked any reference to 
the scientific methodologies employed for the evaluation of the notified risk assessment 
conclusions, to the modes and sources of generating advice (basic material, draft opinion, 
peer review) and the linkages between scientific advice and scientific research, in particular the 
potential for synergies between national scientific advice systems and the Community one. 
Considering the lack o f scientific infrastructure, this particular expert committee was 
inherendy constrained as a source o f scientific authority that could initiate its own 
independent reviews o f the effects o f the applications o f modem agricultural biotechnology. 
The absence o f such initiatives and the generation of more than 30 scientific opinions —on 
corresponding Commission requests- in a limited time frame (3 years) indicated the 
adjustment of its operation to specific regulatory needs, as the latter were shaped via the 
narrow risk assessment questions that the Commission was putting forward. As one member 
of the Committee noted, ‘the questions handed to the SCP were rarely open ended, and often
423 Interview evidence (6/9/2006)
424 Scientific Steering Committee (SSC), ‘Integrated comment and remarks of the Scientific Steering 
Committee on the White Paper on Food Safety’ 14 April 2000 at 7
425 European Commission, ‘White Paper on Food Safety’, Brussels, 12 January 2000, COM (1999) 719 final 
at 13
426 House of Lords, ‘EC Regulation of Genetic Modification in Agriculture’, Select Committee on the 
European Communities, Session 1998-99 2nd Report, 15 December 1998 at 45
427 ‘If it’s safe, then prove it’ Editorial, (4 January 1997) New Scientist 3
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allowed a relatively direct answer.’ {...} our work would have been much harder were it not 
for the relatively narrow focus of the questions.’428
The reasoning provided for the eventual dissolution of the 1997 Committees as it was 
reflected upon in the various reports produced for the evaluation of their operation offer a 
significant account of the shortcomings evidenced in the operation of this scientific 
committee structure. As James, Kemper and Pascal mentioned in their report submitted to 
the Commission for the reform of the institutional structure for the provision o f scientific 
advice, the 1997 system was suffering from a lack o f transparency, accountability and 
stakeholder involvement. In accordance with the Medina report,429 they concluded that the 
regulatory structure had actually advantaged industrial interests at the expense of consumer 
safety.430Along these lines, the President o f the Commission raised the following question: 
‘Can official information be trusted these days, or is it all manipulated for economic and 
political purposes?*431
In fact, the eventual establishment of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 
reflected the need for the founding of a discrete organisational structure for the provision of 
objective scientific advice detached from the Commission and policy or other external 
considerations that would function under fewer constraints and closer to the consumers and 
the expert national authorities. The Commission envisaged EFSA as being ‘guided by the best 
science’; ‘independent of industrial and political interests’; ‘open to rigorous public scrutiny’; 
‘scientifically authoritative’ and intertwined ‘closely with national scientific bodies’.432
5.2.3. The Commission’s risk management practice and its effects
Examining the tensions that arose in the operation of the 90/220 framework, 
one should examine the role o f the Commission, since due to the inability o f the Council and 
o f the Regulatory Committee to reach a qualified majority and the constant disagreements
428 Interview evidence with a member of the Scientific Committee on Plants, 12/8/2006
429 European Parliament. 1997. Report on a lleged contraventions or maladm inistration in the 
implem entation o f  Comm unity law in relation to BSE, without prejudice to the jurisdiction  o f  the Comm unity  
and  national courts. Rapporteur, Manuel Medina Ortega,
hltp://www.europarl.eu, int/con ferences/bse/a4002097_en.him
430 James, P., Kemper, F. and Pascal, G., A European F ood a n d  Public H ealth Authority. European 
Commission DG-XXIV, DOC/99/17 (13 December 1999, Brussels)
431 B. James, ‘Prodi Proposes Creation of EU Food Safety Agency’ (6/10/1999) H erald  Tribune 6
432 European Commission, White P aper on F ood  Safety COM(1999) 719 final. 38
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among various member states,433 it found itself in a position where it had to take the final 
decision on whether the notified releases should be authori2ed or not. Therefore, its position 
as an issuer of commercial release permits became crucial for the establishment o f a unified 
regulatory narrative at the EU level and the effective operation o f the established framework. 
This section illustrates the Commission’s risk management practice to resort to the opinions 
o f its Scientific Committees despite the fact that the wording o f the Directive, the lack of 
commonly agreed methodological and scientific risk assessment principles and the various 
shortcomings in the operation of the structure for scientific advice made evident the need for 
its departure from the provided scientific opinions so as to frame a more inclusive and 
accommodative risk analysis authorization platform.
More concretely, although science in its role as the main source of ‘objective’, testable 
information for the purposes of the authorisation framework had become a common 
denominator in all proposals submitted to the various inter-service coordination mechanisms 
for the drafting of a deliberate release framework, the final wording of the 1990 Directive 
neither contained any substantive standards regarding the exact position o f the scientific 
evidence in informing prior authorisation decisions, nor did it establish a clear obligation to 
consult scientific committees on safety issues. Further, the Directive did not make reference 
to an explicit scientific basis for the provision of release permits, or to the need to establish an 
institutional structure for the provision of scientific advice on GMOs at the risk assessment 
stage. In turn, the inserted safeguard clause could be invoked generally upon ‘justifiable 
grounds’ and various member states approached this phrase as referring not only to new 
scientific evidence, but also to ‘situations brought to the attention of Member States which 
had been considered during the Part C consent procedure.’434 In other words, the emphasis 
on science as a m otor of the established prior authorisation structure had only remained 
implicit in the Directive’s regulatory structure.
Furthermore, the shortcomings in the operation o f the scientific committees o f D G  
SANCO in combination with the lack of technical protocols for the evaluation of the risk
433 See: Decision 87/373/EEC of 13 July 1987 OJ L 197, 18.07.1987, p. 33 and Article 21 of the 90/220 
Directive
434 See on this issue the justifications used by the UK competent authority in the case of Aventis T25 maize. 
‘Aventis T25 maize’ FOEE Biotech Mailout, Vol.7, Issue 6 at 6
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assessment data,435 the underdeveloped character of the relevant environmental risk 
assessment requirements436and the absence o f minimum standards for the required risk 
assessment data, questioned the authoritative or ‘objective’ character of their risk assessment 
evaluations. The lack of scientific consensus upon the potential effects of the introduction of 
GMOs into the environment437 and the absence o f a comprehensive base of knowledge for 
the understanding o f the ecological impacts o f the introduction o f GMOs into the European 
environment constituted some additional factors that cast doubt on the value o f the generated 
scientific opinions in informing and shaping authorisation decisions. In view of the imminent 
need to formulate risk assessment practices that would be accepted at the Community level 
and to create an open-ended authorization narrative, one might have expected that the 
Commission as the main coordinator of the operation o f the deliberate release framework 
would depart from the opinions of the SCP. However, the absence, in the prior authorization 
framework, o f an obligation to consult scientific committees did not prevent the Commission 
from resorting to the Scientific Committee on Plants ‘to inform and eventually base its 
authorization decisions upon objective grounds’438 without however at the same time 
reflecting sufficiently on the trans-scientific character o f the genetic engineering issue.439
In other words, the Commission founded the operation of the DRD upon the 
assumption that an authoritative appeal to a standard of scientific evidence for the evaluation
435 As it was noted, ‘Annex II does not specify the proper scientific way to ‘vary’ this ‘level of detail 
required’. A van Dommelen, H azard Identification o f  Agricultural Biotechnology: F inding Relevant 
Questions (International Books: Utrecht, the Netherlands, 1999) 150
436 For more about the inconsistency in the use of applied statistical analysis, the limited amount of 
information presented in the notification dossiers, the lack of details in the description of tests, the 
questionable value of the methods used, the marginalisation of the exposure assessment in the frame o f the 
risk assessment approach, see A. Spok, H. Hofer, P. Lehner, R. Valenta, S. Stim & H. Gaugitsch, R isk  
assessm ent o f  GM O products in the European Union (Umweltbundesamt Wien, Berichte, Band 253, July 
2004). Also it needs to be mentioned that the narrow and problematic character of the risk assessment 
became evident also in the disregard of the unintended effects of genetic modification and the diluted 
segregation between exposure and hazard assessment.
437 As von Schomberg has concluded, ‘the general scientific debate on the ecological effects of releasing 
GMOs is inconclusive: in fact, ecologists and biotechnologists base their prospective statements on 
assumptions and models which are all plausible to some extent but are unreconcilable at the same time.’ In 
R. Von Schomberg, “Democratising the Policy Process for the Environmental Release of Genetically 
Engineered Organisms,” in P. Glasner et al. The Social M anagem ent o f  Genetic Engineering  (Brookfield, 
Ashgate, 1999) 244-5. For more see Schomberg, R., ’The erosion of value spheres: the ways in which 
society copes with scientific, moral and ethical uncertainty’, in R.Von Schomberg (ed.), C ontested  
Technology: Ethics, R isk  a n d  Public D ebate  (International Centre for Human and Public Affairs, Tilburg, 
1995) 13-28. Von Schomberg has characterized the GMO-related scientific debate as an open conflict over 
the ‘epistemic plausibility of knowledge claims’. In R.von Schomberg, ‘Political decision-making and 
scientific controversies’ in R von Schomberg (ed.), Science, Politics and  Morality: D ecision-M aking and  
Scientific Uncertainty  (Kluwer Academic: Dordrecht, 1995)
438 Interview evidence with Commission officer (DG Environment) at 16/7/2006
439 See von Schomberg (1998) note 365
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o f environmental protection could facilitate the process o f consensus formation on the 
possible effects o f the use of genetically modified organisms. Although the Commission never 
specified the exact terms under which the requested scientific reports informed its 
authorization decisions, its resort to the opinions o f the SCP became in fact an institutional 
practice that rendered the entire authorization procedure the preserve of scientists. The 
Commission requested a scientific evaluation of the notification data every time a Member 
State invoked the safeguard clause of Article 16, but also where there were points o f concern 
raised by the rapporteur competent authority or other member states in relation to the 
notification file. The Commission viewed the opinions of the Scientific Committee on Plants 
as the sole credible source of objective evidence that could inform political decisions for the 
open-field authorisation o f novel technological products.
Considering that none o f the relevant public concerns were taken into account440 and 
despite the ‘widespread lack of trust in the ability of governments and other public authorities 
to deal effectively with people’s concern about biotechnology applications,’441 the 
Commission’s standardized resort to D G  SANCO’s scientific committees framed a particular 
line of interpretation o f the scientific data contained in the notification files that did not seem 
to be particularly effective in responding to the need for consensual authorization decisions. 
In fact, the Commission’s recurring resort to the opinions o f the SCP made the latter the sole 
acceptable point of reference in the context of the prior authorization o f GMO releases, 
adjusting, in effect, the established licensing regime to its ‘narrow’ conception o f risks (in 
terms o f non-consideration of a broader range of adverse effects).442 As a result, the scientific 
information -submitted either at the notification stage or at the risk management one (or the 
absence of it)- became a divisive rather than a unifying factor, as the different actors involved
440 See: Julich, R. (1998) ‘Offentllichkeitsbeteiligung im Geltungsbereich der EG-Richtlinien 90/219 und 
90/220 im intemationalen Vergleich. Die Ausgestaltung von Informations- und Partizipationsrechten in den 
EU-Mitgliedstaaten, der Schweuz und Norwegen’, Oko-Institut, Freiburg, Darmstadt, Berlin. It should be 
mentioned that in April 1997, one and a quarter million Austrians signed a petition opposing genetic 
engineering in food and agriculture.’ See more in ‘Commission to rule against Austria’s GMO ban’ Agra 
Europe, 6 June 1997 at 7. See on this issue, the negative stance of the European public towards GM food as 
it was expressed in the 1999 Eurobarometer, Directorate General for Education and Culture, ‘The Europeans 
and Biotechnology’ Eurobarometer 52.1-Report 1999, Public Opinion Analysis Unit.
441 See: Biotechnology and the European Public Concerted Action group, ‘Europe ambivalent on 
biotechnology’ Nature, Vol.387, 26 June 1997, pp.845-847
442 The Novartis Bt-176 case is indicative of the narrow approach assumed by the SCP with regard to what 
constitutes ‘scientific information’ for the DRD and, particularly, ‘how the relevant institutions constructed 
the key notion of ‘novel’ scientific information.’ See more on this, T. Hervey, ‘Regulation of Genetically 
Modified Products in a Multi-Level System of Governance: Science or Citizens?’ (2001) 10(3) RECIEL 330
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employed different scientific readings o f the submitted data, as evidenced in the case of the 
commercial release of the Novartis maize.443
The Commission’s exclusive reliance on the opinions o f the competent scientific 
authorities eventually led to disagreements between the officials o f DGXI and the competent 
national authorities —among others- on the interpretation o f the relevant risk assessment data 
requirements and on the relevance of the various stated safety concerns to the scope of the 
Deliberate Release framework. This particular technical framing accentuated the unease of 
those member states that considered the scope of the risk assessment framework as narrow 
and the scientific opinions provided as formalistic and short-ranged. Consequently, the 
scientific opinions, in fact, perpetuated the disagreements among the member states, and the 
correspondent safety concerns and in effect led to several regulatory delays and to the 
invocation o f Article 16 on nine different occasions as a means o f signifying national 
distrust.444
Instead of facilitating the accommodation o f the various views over the conflicting 
interpretations o f the same body of scientific evidence and the establishment of a common 
evaluation platform, the upgrading of the Opinions of the SCP into the sole point of 
reference of the Commission’s perception of risks in effect hindered a uniform interpretation 
o f the scope o f the DRD and prevented a consensual ‘reading’ o f the authorisation data. The 
formulated prior authorisation practice created a general political distrust in the delivered 
scientific judgments and disharmony in the implementation of the approval decisions. These 
tensions led to a situation where, according the Commission, “no single product has so far 
been given consent to without an objection [from one or more Member States] being 
raised.”443 In fact, it should be noted that since 1997 when Luxembourg implemented the 
Directive as the last EU Member State,446 until its eventual substitution eleven years later,447
443 See SCP (2000) Opinion on the submission for placing on the market of genetically modified insect 
resistant and glufosinate ammonium tolerant (Bt-11) maize for cultivation. Notified by Novartis Seeds SA 
Company (notification C/F/96/05-10) 30 November and SCP (2000) Opinion on the invocation by Germany 
of Article 16 of Council 90/220/EEC regarding the genetically modified BT-MAIZE LINE CG 00256-176 
notified by CIBA-GEIGY (now NOVARTIS), notification C/F/94/11-03 (SCP/GMO/276Final - 9 
November 2000) 22 September
444 Austria invoked this provision on three separate occasions, France made use of it twice whilst 
Luxembourg, Greece, Germany and the UK once.
445 See: FoEE Mailout 1995 at 3
446 It should be mentioned that by the expiry of the 18-month implementation framework - by1992- only four 
countries -UK, NL, DK and D- had managed to transpose the DRD into their own national legal order.
447 Directive 2001/18/EC of 12 March 2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically 
Modified Organisms, {2001} OJ LI 06/1, repealing Council Directive 90/200//EEC
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only 3 GM O releases were authorised without objections raised from the Member States. The 
overwhelming majority o f the commercial releases were authorized via a Commission 
decision following the failure o f reaching a qualified majority vote in the frame of the Article 
21 regulatory committee.448
The perpetuation of the relevant intra-Community disagreements caused a 
stalemate and as o f October 1998, no further authorizations were granted under the 1990 
DRD for a number o f reasons. The most important o f these was the imposition of an ad-hoc 
moratorium on the authorisation o f GMO releases.449 The moratorium ‘came as a response to 
the Commission’s approval o f imported genetically modified soya and com in 1996 and 
1997’450 and sought to give the EC an opportunity to develop a ‘tighter, more transparent 
framework’ for GM product approvals ‘in particular for risk assessment, having regard to the 
specifics o f European ecosystems’ so as to positively demonstrate that GM products have ‘no 
adverse effect on the environment and human health’ and ‘to restore public and market 
confidence.’451 This EC-wide moratorium that was justified upon the need to respond to 
public concerns’ as well as to the ‘need for more research into the indirect and ‘cumulative 
effects’ o f GM crops on the environment’452 accelerated the institutional need for 
modification and eventually for the replacement o f specific parts of the 1990 framework.453 
The next section examines the various initiatives aimed at addressing the aforementioned 
distortions and in effect for the revision o f the Deliberate Release framework.
448 According to Article 21 of the 1990/220 Directive, ‘The Commission shall be assisted by a committee 
composed of the representatives of the Member States and chaired by the representative of the Commission. 
{...}The Commission shall adopt the measures envisaged if they are in accordance with the opinion of the 
committee. If the measures envisaged are not in accordance with the opinion of the committee, or if no 
opinion is delivered, the Commission shall, without delay, submit to the Council a proposal relating to the 
measures to be taken. The Council shall act by a qualified majority. If, on the expiry of a period of three 
months from the date of referral to the Council, the Council has not acted, the proposed measures shall be 
adopted by the Commission. ‘
449 See Declaration by the Danish, Greek, French, Italian and Luxembourg delegations concerning the 
suspension of new GMO authorizations and Declaration by the Austrian, Belgian, Finnish, German, 
Netherlands, Spanish and Swedish delegations, Minutes of the 2194th Council of Environment Ministers 
Meeting
450 T. Bemauer, Genes, Trade and Regulation (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 2003)
451 In October 1998, a block of six states, Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Greece 
announced that they would not sanction any new product approvals until new rules on traceability and 
labeling were brought into force. Later Belgium and Germany joined this unofficial moratorium on the 
commercial release of GMOs. See Declaration by the Danish, Greek, French, Italian and Luxembourg 
delegations concerning the suspension of new GMO authorizations and Declaration by the Austrian, 
Belgian, Finnish, German, Netherlands, Spanish and Swedish delegations, Minutes of the 2194th Council of 
Ministers of Environment Meeting
452 ‘UK considering 3 year GMO moratorium’ Agra Europe, October 16, 1998 at 9
453 See more on this, in J.Hodgson, ‘National politicians block GM progress’ (September 2000) 18 Nature 
Biotechnology 918-99
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5.2.4. Attempts for revision of the prior authorisation structure and the new DRD
(2001/18)
Although initiatives for the revision of specific parts of the authorisation framework 
had already been assumed in the early years of its operation, a systemic effort for the 
replacement o f the regime in place began in 1998. The Commission’s decision to launch the 
revision process came principally as a response to the aforesaid implementation problems. As 
was noted, ‘mounting negative pressure from member state governments in the EU is 
beginning to fuel suggestions that the Commission may be forced into reconsidering, or at the 
very least engaging in some ‘creative thinking’ over its eight-year old Directive (90/220) which 
covers the release of GMOs into the environment.’454 The divergence in the evaluation of the 
notified scientific data and the failure o f both the opinions of the Scientific Committee and of 
the Commission’s strict reliance on them to shape a harmonised risk assessment practice led 
the Commission to suggest a widening of the scope o f the authorisation regime and the 
insertion of an obligation to consult the Ethical Committee and the public in the frame of 
both the experimental and commercial releases.455
The constant resort to the safeguard clause o f Directive 90/220456, the declaration of 
the de facto moratorium on commercial licencing of GMO products and in general the severe 
delays and disagreements evidenced in the operation o f this particular licensing framework 
had brought to the surface concerns about the need to strengthen the safety aspects of the 
deliberate release framework. Within this frame, the Commissioner for the Environment 
stated; W e need to re-establish confidence in our approval systems’437whilst other 
Commission officials noted; ‘If  the Commission finds itself in a position where the 
Parliament and Member States do not want to comply with legislation, then we should have 
to seriously re-evaluate the situation.’458 Various proposals centered on the need to extend the
454 ‘UK considering 3 year GMO moratorium’ (October 16, 1998) A gra Europe  10
455 See: the Commission’s Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive amending Directive 
90/220/EEC on the deliberate release into the. environment of genetically modified organisms COM(1998) 
85 f in a l —  98/0072 (COD) and  COM (1998) 85 fin a l —  98/0072 (COD)
456 According to article 16 of the 1990/220 Directive, Where a Member State has justifiable reasons to 
consider that a product which has been properly notified and has received written consent under this 
Directive constitutes a risk to human health or the environment, it may provisionally restrict or prohibit the 
use and/or sale of that product on its territory. It shall immediately inform the Commission and the other 
Member States of such action and give reasons for its decision.
457 ‘Fresh row over GMOs could delay deal’ (3 August-6 September 2000) European Voice 2
458 S.Coss, ‘Commission hints at GMO rethink amid calls for a ban’ (15/10/1998) European Voice 1
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scope o f the risk assessment framework, so as to include direct, indirect as well as delayed, 
immediate and cumulative long-term adverse effects on human health and the environment.
It was noted that; ‘While the majority of member states only wants the effects on 
human health and the environment directly resulting from the use of a GMO to be assessed, 
Scandinavian countries and Austria want the wider effects to be considered.’459 There was also 
reference to the need to introduce mandatory long-term monitoring o f those GMOs released 
for commercial or any other purpose, granting a marketing consent for a limited period (for 
10 years, after which authorizations could be renewed), modifying the comitology procedure 
and establishing public registers concerning the locations where GMOs were grown for 
commercial or experimental purposes. For instance, the European Consumer Organization 
called for the development of protocols for ecological risk assessment (quantitative and 
qualitative), the formulation o f protocols for the evaluation o f the significance of the release 
o f GMOs for sustainable development, as well as for plant pesticide resistance management 
and the provision o f means for the segregation of seeds.460
The range of criticisms against the structure and the operation o f the Deliberate 
Release authorization framework was reflected in a much more concrete form in the intra- 
Community consultations over the profile of the new Directive.461 For instance, it was noted 
that ‘the UK will also be seeking to make sure that the scope of EU Directive 90/220 is broad 
enough to cover the indirect ecological effects of GMOs, as well as their direct impact.’462 
After publishing a review of the application of the Directive that included the need to 
harmonise the risk assessment standards and improve the relevance of experimental data 
collected,463 the Commission presented its proposal in February 1998.464 The proposal and the 
final text o f the 2001 /1 8 Directive required direct and indirect, delayed and immediate effects 
to be taken into account at the risk assessment stage, enhancing the mechanism for 
environmental risk assessment by laying down extensive requirements for information on the 
effects on non-target species, information on competitive advantages that may be transferred
459 ‘Plan to streamline GMO approvals procedure’ (August 22, 1997) Agra Europe 7
460 Letter from BEUC to Ms Ritt Bjerregaard, Commissioner, 9 July 1997
461 As it was noted in relation to the negotiations for the adoption of the 2001/18 Directive, ‘Member States 
ended up split into three camps.’ ENDS Report 293, pp.41-43
462 ‘Scope of 90/220 should be expanded’ (October 23, 1998) Agra Europe 9
463 See Commission of the European Communities (1996) Report on the Review of Directive 90/220/EEC in 
the Context of the Commission’s Communication n Biotechnology and the White Paper COM(96) 630 final
464 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending Directive 90/220 on the 
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms, COM (1998) 85 DEF., O.J.. 1998, 
c 139/1
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to other plants and information on the wider impact on ecosystems, including the food 
supply for birds and other animals. As EU Environment Commissioner Bjerregaard noted; 
‘This represents a significant improvement in Community legislation in a very sensitive area 
and will hopefully answer a strong call from European consumers.’465
The introduced amendments further included the establishment o f mandatory 
extensive consultation with the Scientific Committee(s) and with the public (Article 9 and 24), 
the requirement to take ‘ethical considerations’ into account (Preamble point 9) in response to 
a Swedish and Danish request,466 and to a report submitted to the D G  Environment which 
noted; W e cannot get away from the fact that the ethical considerations also have to be taken 
up within the Directive.’467 Further, approvals can be given for a maximum of ten years 
during which post-release monitoring of environmental impacts would take place (time- 
bound consents)468 so as to detect unanticipated effects and consider whether assumptions 
made at the risk assessment stage were correct. As the Director General in charge of 
consumer policy and health protection in DGXXTV noted, ‘In view of the fact that the 
scientific knowledge is evolving, approvals could be time-limited.’469
It is worth noting that whilst the first initiatives for the revision of the Directive aimed 
at the simplification of the prior authorization procedure, the proposal for a simplified ‘fast- 
track’ approvals procedure —submitted in the post-1998 revision procedure- was finally 
rejected. The differentiation between ‘high’ and ‘low risk’ products was rejected on the 
grounds that ‘the different regional impacts that a seed could have between varying climates 
across the Community will also have to be taken into account in the approvals procedure.’470 
Moreover, the revised Directive incorporated the precautionary principle in an explicit 
manner, made the requirements for the use of the safeguard clause even more stringent, 
retained the existing simplified authorization procedure for plants, introduced an option to
465 ‘Changes to EU’s GMO approvals procedure’ (28 November 1997) Agra E urope  3
466 ‘EU calls halt to new GMO approvals’ (25 June 1999) A gra E urope 4
467 ‘Risk-Based GMO Procedure Should Include Liability, Says Bowe’ (1997) 9(9) AgBiotech N ew s and  
Inform ation  194
46 As Article 17 paragraph 6 of the Directive 2001/18 notes, ‘The validity of the consent should not, as a 
general rule, exceed ten years and may be limited or extended as appropriate for specific reasons.’
69 ‘EU may give only temporary GMO approval’ (November 14, 1997) A gra Europe  6
470 ‘EU calls halt to new GMO approvals’ (25 June 1999) Agra Europe 4
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propose new simplified ‘differentiated procedures’ for GMO releases and required a 
centralized authorization procedure to be examined in 2003.
5.3. Concluding Remarks
Although in the early 1990s, the DRD represented a genuine paradigm shift, from 
both the scientific and legal points o f view,471 severe implementation and interpretation 
problems arose due to the lack of a common framework o f risk assessment criteria or 
evaluation standards, but most importantly due to the overriding resort to science as the sole 
objective, thus acceptable, form of reasoning. The inherent shortcomings of the particular 
institutional structure for the provision o f scientific advice at the Community level and the 
lack o f a binding obligation for consulting the Community’s expert committees did not 
prevent the Commission from founding its proposals and consequent authorisation decisions 
upon their judgments. In effect, the opinions o f the Scientific Committee on Plants were used 
as a means for elucidating the scope o f the deliberate release framework, spelling out the main 
terms o f the prior authorisation framework and shaping the required acceptability standards.
An examination of two prior authorisation decisions o f GMOs reveals that the 
Commission’s institutionalised resort to the Scientific Committees of D G  SANCO, in 
combination with the ‘static’ interpretation practice of the latter, became a constant source of 
conflicts between the Commission and various Member States. Instead of setting the ground 
for a harmonious authorisation practice and for a unified application o f the relevant licensing 
decisions, the Commission’s dependence on these particular scientific opinions, in effect, 
undermined any effort for reaching a consensus on how the terms of evaluation o f the safety 
o f the authorised releases should be articulated and on the inclusive and objective character of 
the correspondent authorisation decisions. Although the DRD left broad room for the 
interpretation of terms such as ‘risk’, ‘adverse effect’ and ‘environment’ among those to 
whom it would be addressed and for accommodating the various ‘readings’ of science and 
local particularities, the Commission seemed unprepared to confer some substantive
471 N. de Sandeleer, “Two Approaches of Precaution: a Comparative Review of EU and US Theory and 
Practice of the Precautionary Principle” (Transatlantic Environm ent D ialogue, 2000) and N. Haigh, "The 
Introduction of the Precautionary Principle into the UK", in T. O’Riordan and J. Cameron (eds.), 
Interpreting the Precautionary Principle  (Earthscan: London, 1994) 237
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discretion to the member states and to create more accommodative dispute-resolution 
mechanisms.
Thus, the Commission viewed the intended harmonisation o f the risk assessment 
criteria as a purely technical exercise based on the opinions o f the Scientific Committee on 
Plants, rather than as an on-going process for the clarification of the legislative scope and for 
the accommodation o f the various national risk assessment approaches. As this licensing 
structure lacked a substantial —and probably guiding— definition o f the issue, the prior 
authorisation regime remained ambiguous in its very character, making a plurality of 
interpretations probable. The exclusive adherence to the opinions of the Commission’s 
Scientific Committees narrowed the deliberation framework and accelerated the need for 
amendments and improvements. Although the revised Directive indicated the Commission’s 
intention to resolve most of the tensions evidenced during the period o f implementation of 
the 90/220 Directive, the incorporation of requests for the simplification and standardization 
o f the notification requirements, as well as for the enhancement of the precautionary 
character and the widening o f the scope of the authorisation framework, resulted in a prior 
authorisation framework that remained elusive on its underlying assumptions and substantive 
legislative orientation.
The lessons drawn from the examination o f the implementation o f the 1990/220 
framework refer to the limitations of the science-based authorisation practice in 
accommodating the various conceptualisations of genetic engineering and in responding to 
the plurality o f concerns expressed in the various Member States. As will be seen in the 
following chapters, following the revision of the DR framework and the restructuring of the 
institutional set-up for the provision of scientific advice at the Community level, the 
perpetuation o f these particular practices led to the failure o f the initiated legislative revisions 
and institutional arrangements in achieving all-embracing solutions and in reinforcing the 
acceptance o f the authorisation decisions. More significandy, the restructuring o f the 90/220 
framework failed to modify the established interpretation paradigm. The next chapter focuses 
on the effects o f the persistence of the noted divergences on the operation o f the revised 
authorisation framework and their eventual transformation into inherent weaknesses in this 
prior authorisation framework.
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Chapter 6: Authorising GMOs and the resort to EFSA’s opinions: Space for
other legitimate factors?
This chapter examines the operation of the revised Deliberate Release framework, as 
it relies exclusively on the notified technical data, as well as on the EFSA risk assessment 
conclusions. Information that meets the established science-based risk assessment 
requirements has become the sole source of authoritative evidence in this particular licensing 
framework, as can be seen in the central positioning given to the requirement for scientific 
consultation in the revised DRD, the gradual empowerment of the institutional structure for 
the provision o f scientific advice at the EU level and the exclusively scientific basis o f the 
Commission’s authorization decisions. The chapter illustrates that despite the establishment 
o f formal means for public participation and lay involvement and the reference to the need to 
consult ethical committees and evaluate the potential socio-economic effects o f genetic 
engineering, the resort o f the proceduralised licencing framework to a ‘sound-science’ 
interpretation paradigm has transformed the prescribed information-exchange procedure into 
a routine set o f expert-based administrative actions and steps, where non-scientific 
considerations play no influential role.
It is argued that the Commission’s emphasis on science, in the form of the relevant 
EFSA GMO Panel Opinions, for its decisions on the licensing of GMO releases reflects a 
gradual centralization o f the risk analysis framework based on purely technical grounds, as 
opposed to an open-ended, multi-stage and decentralised risk assessment narrative. The 
predominance o f an expert-based model of controlling genetic 'engineering risks has diffused 
the inclusive features of the DRD excluding actors that frame non-scientific arguments. Also, 
its unwillingness to depart from a hard-fact technical ‘reading’ o f genetic engineering safety 
that created the need for the revision of the authorization framework remains. The 
Commission’s declared objective to enhance public involvement in the wider risk analysis 
procedure and to achieve a separation between a technical science-based risk assessment and 
a policy-oriented risk management have remained unfulfilled, raising questions about the 
Commission’s determination to act as a responsive risk manager at the EU level.
The first section examines the structure of the revised Directive as the outcome of the 
efforts o f the Commission to strengthen both the scientific and procedural dimensions o f the 
deliberate release framework. Special attention is given to the establishment o f the European
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Food Safety Authority (EFSA) as a reflection of the Commission’s determination to separate 
the risk assessment from the risk management process and to delegate the former to technical 
experts. It is argued that the delegation of the risk assessment competencies over the entirety 
o f GM O issues to a food safety agency indicated the Commission’s intention to distance itself 
from the complications and inherent difficulties of the process of risk evaluation for the 
totality o f applications of modem agricultural biotechnology and to delegate this contentious 
task to an institutional actor that would though be deprived o f any regulatory power or 
financial autonomy.
The second section focuses on the role o f non-scientific factors in the field o f the 
Deliberate Release risk analysis framework and examines both EFSA’s handling of those 
public comments submitted in the SNIF (Summary Notification Information Format) 
database and the Commission’s consideration of the relevant ethical and socio-economic 
concerns at the level of risk management. It is found that despite the references in the frame 
of the Deliberate Release framework to the non-technical aspects o f agricultural 
biotechnology, these concerns have not been evaluated or considered prior to the assumption 
of the correspondent prior authorization decisions. The institutionalization o f the technical 
character o f the risk assessment process has led to the marginalisation of non-technical views 
and concerns and in effect to the conclusion that there is no non-technical risk that needs to 
be controlled at the level of risk management. As a result, the Commission as the main risk 
manager resorts exclusively to the opinions offered by the GMO Panel of EFSA as the basis 
of its authorization judgments. It is argued that this particular institutional practice has diluted 
the institutional boundaries between risk assessment and management and has imposed an 
expert-based ‘reading’ o f the potential effects and risks associated with the open-field genetic 
engineering releases that undermines the all-encompassing character o f the established 
proceduralised prior authorization framework.
6.1. Institutionalisation o f the risk assessment process: the establishment of the 
EFSA GMO Panel
This section sheds light on the creation of a separate institutional structure for the 
provision o f scientific advice on all aspects related to the risk assessment o f GMO releases as 
a Commission initiative for the institutionalization o f the requirement for scientific
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consultation in the deliberate release framework for the removal of non-technical objections 
and concerns from the realm of the risk assessment framework and the organizational 
separation of the stage of risk assessment from that of risk management and the delegation of 
the responsibilities for the performance of the former to an expert-based institutional actor. 
The establishment and organisational development of the EFSA as a new institutional actor in 
the field o f the deliberate release of GMOs is examined in relation to its focus on non-food 
GMO releases. It is argued that the granting to EFSA of risk assessment competences on all 
releases o f plant biotechnology products was rather incidental, indicating the Commission’s 
preference to delegate the entire GMO issue to an organizational actor that would be 
exclusively technical in its composition and approach, without at the same time taking into 
consideration the idiosyncratic features of agricultural biotechnology, at least in terms of its 
non-scientific risk assessment particularities.
From its outset, the GMO Panel of EFSA has in effect become the sole point of 
scientific consultation at the EC level and the exclusive arbiter in relation to any technical or 
scientific dispute that might arise regarding the soundness and integrity of the GMO 
notification files. As EFSA has become the main risk assessor o f GM notification data, the 
Community’s institutional interest and political attention had been given to the specification 
of the procedural terms of its operation and the development o f common risk assessment 
principles and methodologies, as well as of unified technical approaches, upon which the 
GMO Panel would evaluate the submitted notification dossiers, have dominated. Namely, the 
institutionalisation o f the risk assessment procedure through the establishment of EFSA, in 
combination with the formulation o f EU-wide expert-based networks for the dissemination 
of the relevant biosafety data, have rendered this particular stage o f risk analysis the preserve 
of scientists.
More specifically, the restructuring of the Community’s system of scientific advice in 
1997 became associated with the need to address the problem of consumer distrust towards 
official scientific accounts. In the aftermath of the BSE crisis and due to the general 
questioning o f the credibility of scientific expertise when provided for regulatory purposes, 
‘resort to agencies could cultivate credibility, clarity, and public confidence and thus enhance 
EU legitimacy’.472 The development o f an independent scientific structure that would function 
out of the immediate realm of the Commission’s administrative supervision had in fact been
472 E. Vos, ‘EU Food Safety Regulation in the Aftermath of the BSE Crisis’ (2000) 23 Journal o f  Consumer Policy 247
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an idea elaborated at the EU level much before the publication of the James/Kemper/Pascal 
Report and the preparation of a White Paper where, among other things, the establishment of 
a European Food Safety Authority was proposed.473
The idea for a European Food Safety Authority with regulatory powers came up in a
Conference in 1993, where it was proposed that such ‘an Agency would have to be a
politically independent, publicly accountable body {...} that would provide a practical
•
solution to the political problems involved in formulating food law and the regulation of 
foodstuffs.’474 In a speech to the European Parliament on 18 February 1997, Jacques Santer, 
President o f the European Commission, proposed the creation o f an independent agency that 
would ‘meet the specific needs of the Community.’475 In the Green Paper on the General 
Principles o f Food Law in the European Union, concern was expressed about the 
‘independence and objectivity, equivalence and effectiveness’ o f the national food control 
systems as well as about “the most appropriate place for scientific advice, {...} in particular 
with reference to the necessary degree of independence and to the relationship with the 
Community institutions.’476 In early October 1999, Romano Prodi advocated the creation o f a 
European food agency477 and the Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection David 
Byrne confirmed the Commission’s interest in the establishment of an independent structure 
in the area o f food safety in his first official appearance in the EP.478 Watson notes that; 
‘Within weeks o f being voted into office, Romano Prodi has begun canvassing the idea of 
establishing an independent food agency for the European Union {...} The new European 
Commission has placed food safety at the top of its political agenda.’479
In December 1999, the James, Kemper and Pascal Report480 drew conclusions on the 
future of the scientific advice in the EC and suggested the establishment of a European Food
473 European Commission (2000) White Paper on Food Safety in the European Union. COM (99) 719,12 January 2000. 
According to this particular White Paper, ‘The establishment of an independent European Food Safety Authority is 
considered by the Commission to be the most appropriate response to the need to guarantee a high level o f food safety. 
{...} The European Food Safety Authority will provide the Commission with the necessary analysis. It will be the 
responsibility of the Commission to decide on the appropriate response to that analysis.’
474 A. Cleary, ‘The objectives and functions of food law’ in F. Snyder, A Regulatory Framework fo r  Foodstuffs in the 
Internal Market (EUI Working Paper Law, No.94/4 European University Institute, Florence) 26-27
475 Speech by Jacques Santer, President o f the European Commission at the Debate in the European Parliament on the 
report into BSE by the Committee of Enquiry of the European Parliament. February 18, 1997-Speech 97/39
Consumer Health and Food Safety. COM (97) 183 final, 30 April 1997
477 Address delivered to Parliament by Romano Prodi, President-designate of the Commission, on 5 October 1999), 
available at htto://www.europarl.eurona.eu/nress/sdp/ioum/en/1999/n9910051 .htm
478 European Commission, (2000) Remarks by David Byrne, European Commissioner for Health and Consumer 
Protection to the Group of the European People Party and European Democrats in the European Parliament (EPP/ED), 
Brussels, September 27
479 R. Watson, ‘Prodi proposes food agency for the EU’ (1999) 319 British Medical Journal 1025
480 See note 430
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and Public Health Authority. In terms o f the new organizational set-up o f scientific advice, 
the Report recommended that any new organization relating to scientific advice should be 
able “to play a major part in crisis management when these actions are traditionally seen as 
the responsibility of the Commission as well as Member States.’481 The Report, in accordance 
with the references o f Commission President Prodi and Commissioner Byrne, suggested the 
establishment of an independent institutional structure that would have genuine management 
powers analogous to the US FDA482 and would be independent of political and industrial 
interests.483 Notwithstanding, the Commission’s White Paper on Food Safety, which was 
published only a few weeks after the expert report, departed from the proposed integrated 
approach and suggested the restriction o f the role of the would-be food agency to risk 
assessment and risk communication tasks on food safety issues.484
The Commission specified that the inclusion of risk management duties in the 
mandate of the Authority would raise problems of democratic accountability, would 
undermine the designated responsibilities of the Commission and would require a 
modification o f existing EC Treaty provisions.483 This approach was supported by 
Commissioner Byme, who noted that the FDA model (risk assessment and risk management 
responsibilities) ‘while attractive in itself and clearly working for the US, would not be 
appropriate for the European scene.’486 Despite the large number of amendments introduced 
by the European Parliament,487 both the Commission proposals488 and the final regulation that 
founded the European Food Safety Authority489 followed the suggestions o f the White Paper 
and limited the proposed far-reaching competences o f this under elaboration central authority
481 Ibid. at 19
482 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is an agency of the US Department o f Health and Human Services that is 
responsible for the safety regulation of most types of foods and drugs.
483 See: Liberation, 13 January 2000; Financial Times, 12 January 2000; D. G. McNeil, ‘At Birth, EU’s Food Watchdog 
is on Defensive’ International Herald Tribune, 13 January 2000
484 European Commission, (2000), White Paper on Food Safety. COM (1999) 719 final, Brussels, January 12 at 14
485 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the general principles and 
requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Authority, and laying down procedures in matters o f food /* 
COM/2000/0716 final - COD 2000/0286 * Article 2 para.2 at 15
486 European Commission (2000), ‘Remarks by David Byme, European Commissioner for Health and Consumer 
Protection to the Group o f the European People Party and European Democrats in the European Parliament’ (EPP/ED). 
Brussels, September 27,
487The Parliament approved, on June 12th, the Environment Committee Report prepared by Phillip Whitehead, which 
involved over 200 amendments to the original Commission proposal.
488 See: Commission Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and o f the Council laying down the general 
principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Authority, and laying down procedures in 
matters o f food, Brussels, 8.11.2000, COM (2000) 716 final 2000/0286 (COD) and Commission Amended Proposal for 
a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the general principles and requirements of food 
law, establishing the European Food Authority, and laying down procedures in matters of food safety pursuant to Article 
250 (2) o f the EC Treaty) Brussels, 7.8.2001 COM(2001) 475 fmal2000/0286 (COD)
489 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council o f 28 January 2002 laying down the 
general principles and requirements o f food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down 
procedures in matters of food safety, OJ L 031,01/02/2002
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in line with the administrative model o f the European Medicines Agency.490 The areas o f risk 
analysis eventually delegated to this Agency cover risk assessment, the provision of scientific 
advice, the gathering and analysis o f technical information, monitoring and risk 
communication, while the Commission retains the responsibility for risk management and 
policy formulation. The resultant institutional structure has been a less supranational 
Community body with its own legal personality. It is funded from the Community budget, 
but operates independently of the Community institutions that did not in fact modify the 
terms o f the Commission’s association with scientific committees of advisory character in a 
radical manner. More importantly, the Commission structured this new organisational entity 
in expert control terms, despite various calls for either the establishment of a multidisciplinary 
body separate from EFSA that would cover all disciplines,491 or for the organisational 
involvement o f social scientists in EFSA’s scientific risk assessment.492
In relation to the scope of its operation, the regulation establishing EFSA expresses a 
dual aim: to secure safe food and to ensure the operation o f the internal market. This can be 
seen in its Preamble that states that; ‘The free movement o f food and feed within the 
Community can be achieved only if food and feed safety requirements do not differ 
significandy from Member States to Member States.’493 The restoration of European 
consumer trust in the Union’s risk assessment capacities in offering sound and credible 
scientific guidance on food safety issues constituted the primary concern of the Commission, 
as the multiple use of the phrase ‘consumer confidence’ in its 2000 proposal for the 
formulation o f EFSA indicated.494 The establishment o f a separate scientific committee that 
would only assess the risks of GMO releases became, almost from the beginning, part of the 
process for the reformulation of the institutional structure for the provision of scientific 
advice at the Union level. In all its proposals, the Commission suggested that the committee, 
under the tide ’GMO Panel’, should have all-encompassing responsibilities for all GMO 
releases, independent of their relationship with food safety. At the same time, it should be 
mentioned that the divergences and various tensions noted in the process for the assessment
490 See: E. Vos, ‘Agencies and the European Union’ in Verhey, Luc/Zwart, Tom (ed.), Agencies in European and 
comparative law (Intersentia: Antwerpen, 2003) 113-147
491 See: ‘Call for multidisciplinary body separate from EFSA’ (April 2003) EU Food Law
492 See: ‘Social scientists ‘should be involved in food risk assessment’ says SSC’ (May 2003) EU Food Law 12-13 and 
European Commission, Opinion of the Scientific Steering Committee on Setting the Scientific Frame for the Inclusion of 
New Quality of Life Concerns in the Risk Assessment process, adopted on 10-11 April 2003 as part of its exercise on 
Harmonisation of Risk Assessment Procedures, pp. 1-6
493 Paragraph 3 of the Preamble of Regulation (EC) 178/2002
494 European Commission Proposal for a Regulation o f the European Parliament and o f the Council laying down the 
general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Authority, and laying down procedures 
in matters o f food Brussels, 8.11.2000 COM (2000) 716 final 2000/0286 (COD)
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of the effects o f the notified GMO releases during the operation of the Scientific Committee 
on Plants remained an ancillary object of attention throughout the intra-Community 
negotiations for the establishment of EFSA.
More specifically, neither the proposals nor the Regulation that set up the foundations 
of EFSA made any special reference to environmental protection or to the special features of 
agricultural biotechnology and no scientific, or other technical, reasoning was provided to 
justify the expansion o f the remit of the GMO Panel upon non-food releases. Further, as the 
examination o f the remit o f competences o f the French, UK, German and Swedish food 
safety authorities indicates, none o f the food standards agencies or food safety risk 
assessment structures at the national and supranational levels had at that time been related to 
the assessment of GMO open-field releases or been involved in issues of environmental 
protection or plant health. Thus, there was no other institutional structure that could have 
served as a model for the Commission’s expansionary approach. The competence of the 
GMO Panel became in fact a significant point o f intra-EC controversy as ‘most Member 
States (had) reserved positions over the additional tasks that might be assigned to the 
Authority.’495
The Report o f the European Parliament on the Commission’s proposal for the 
establishment of a Food Safety Authority rejected the suggested transformation of EFSA into 
a provider o f scientific opinions in relation to genetically modified organisms in general on 
the grounds that ‘it is essential that food safety shall be paramount concern o f the new 
Authority. Issues such as {...} GMOs come within the rubric o f the Authority in direct 
proportion to the way in which the issue concerns food safety.5496 In relation to this issue, 
Philip Whitehead, the Rapporteur o f the EP, stated that the Commission’s insistence that it 
take on this role ‘may have loaded it so that it takes up a great deal of the authority’s time, and 
will be a disadvantage to it. {...} The authorization of GM products is not necessarily a job of 
food safety.{...} To give it such a role may well be to jeopardise its work.5497 The European 
Economic and Social Committee, in its opinion on the White Paper on Food Safety, stated 
that ‘the EFSA should be confined to questions of food safety and should not extend to
495 ‘FSA Letter’ (12 April 2001) EU Food Law News (01-61)-EU-2001
496 See Draft Report on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council regulation laying down the general 
principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Authority, and laying down procedures in 
matters o f food (COM (2000) 716-C5-0655/2000-2000/0286(COD)) Part 1: draft legislative resolution Committee on the 
Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy Rapporteur: Phillip Whitehead Provisional, 2000/0286(COD), 
26/3/2001
497 ‘GM role may hamper EFSA’ (February 1, 2002) Agra Europe 11
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environmental issues, if food safety is not involved.’498 Some members o f the Scientific 
Steering Committee proposed the creation of a Scientific Committee on Sustainability and 
noted that all environmental matters should be delegated to this body.499 Caroline Jackson, 
chairwoman of the European Parliament’s Committee on environment, public health and 
consumer affairs, expressed ‘great reservations’ over perceptions that the body might be 
overburdened by an excessively wide remit.500
In the end though, despite the objections in relation to the breadth of its proposed 
competence on GMO issues and sidestepping the sui generis safety concerns that had been 
associated with the releases o f GMOs into the environment, the relevant Regulation 
established the Authority’s competence on the provision o f ‘scientific opinions on products 
other than food and feed relating to genetically modified organisms as defined by Directive 
2001/ l  8 /E C ’ that would exclusively deal with the evaluation of the submitted notification 
data on all (food and non-food) commercial GMO releases, national assessment reports as 
well as those objections raised at the stage of risk assessment in the frame of the 2001/18 
procedure.501 More specifically, questions could be related to GMO authorisation dossiers 
introduced under Community legislation (e.g. directives 90/220/EEC  and 2001/ l  8/EC) or 
could be of a more general nature. Dossiers submitted under Directive 2001/ l  8 /E C  (Part C) 
would only come to EFSA, when the EU member states at Community level cannot agree on 
the initial risk assessment performed by the lead member state and maintain their objections. 
In practice, with all GMO dossiers so far, one or more member state has had unresolved 
objections, so that EFSA’s consultation at the EU level has been constantly requested 
pursuant to Article 28 (1) of Directive 2001/ l  8/EC. The mandate of the GMO Panel was set 
out as follows:502
‘the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms will deliver opinions on 
scientific questions relating to genetically modified organisms as defined in Directive 
2001/l8 /E C , such as micro-organisms, plants and animals, relating to deliberate 
release into the environment and genetically modified food and feed including their 
derived products’.503
498 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘White Paper on Food Safety’, (2000/C 204/06), 
18.7.2000 at 26
499 See: Integrated comment and remarks of the Scientific Steering Committee (SSC) on the White Paper o Food Safety, 
14/4/2000
500 ‘European Food Authority behind schedule’ (16 March, 2001) Agra Europe 6
501 Regulation (EC) 178/2002, Article 22, paragraph 5 ‘The mission of the Authority shall also include the provision of: 
( ...)  (c) scientific opinions on products other than food and feed relating to genetically modified organisms as defined 
by Directive 2001/18/EC and without prejudice to the procedures established therein.
502 Article 18 o f the Decision concerning the establishment and operations of the Scientific Committee and Panels, 
adopted by the Authority’s Management Board on 17.10.2002
503 EFSA-Decision concerning the establishment and operations of the scientific committee and panels, Scientific 
Committee and Panels Internal Rules MB 17.10.2002 -  3 adopted
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The Commission insisted on its proposal for the incorporation of the sector of plant 
biotechnology into EFSA’s spectrum of scientific supervision upon the basis of 
administrative efficiency and scientific coherence, or as the Preamble of Regulation 178/2202 
notes, ‘in order to avoid duplicated scientific assessments and related scientific opinions on 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs)’504 as well as ‘to avoid confusion in relation to 
responsibilities for environmental matters in the Community.’505 Further, the Commission 
justified the inclusion o f non-food GMO-related issues under the realm of the GMO Panel as 
a necessary measure for the general improvement of the procedural and material conditions 
under which the notified risk assessment data would be assessed for their compliance with the 
authorisation requirements. In relation to this issue, the then Consumer Commissioner David 
Byme stated; ‘A wider remit is necessary {...} to avoid the failures o f the past such as early 
identification of animal health problems that can pose a risk to human health, as in the case of 
BSE.’506 However, in view of the noted scope o f EFSA’s founding Regulation and the main 
issues discussed in the relevant intra-Community negotiation process, the transfer o f risk 
assessment competences on the entirety of GMO releases, including non-food releases that 
pose questions o f a predominantly environmental character, from the Scientific Committee 
on Plants to the EFSA GMO Panel seemed paradoxical. As one member o f the Management 
Board o f EFSA stated, ‘EFSA is a novel structure with funny competences’507 whereas the 
Chief Executive o f EFSA characterized this Agency as ‘a rather curious institutional
,508compromise.
The Commission’s particular conceptualization o f the range of competences of the 
GMO Panel seemed in fact to perpetuate its piece-meal approach in relation to the structure 
of an EU-wide regulatory approach towards public health problems. Considering that ‘food 
may be a priority for the Commission at this moment, but the next crisis could well be a drug, 
an industrial chemical, an environmental organism, etc.’509 In other words, the incorporation
504 Regulation (EC) 178/2002 Preamble (38) ‘In order to avoid duplicated scientific assessments and related scientific 
opinions on genetically modified organisms (GMOs), the Authority should also provide scientific opinions on products 
other than food and feed relating to GMOs as defined by Directive 2001/18/EC(7) and without prejudice to the 
procedures established therein.’
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the general principles and 
requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Authority, and laying down procedures in matters of food /* 
COM/2000/0716 final - COD 2000/0286 * Article 2 para.2
506 ‘MEPs and Commission clash on EFA’ (June 26, 2001) 58 AgraFood Biotech 11
507 Interview evidence with a member of the Management Board (13/9/2006)
508 European Policy Centre, The role o f  the European Food Safety Authority, EPC-KBF Policy Briefing, Communication 
to Members S59/03, 9 October 2003 at 1
509 Integrated Comments and Remarks of the Scientific Steering Committee on the White Paper on Food Safety, 14 April 
2000 at 2
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of non-food safety issues under its realm seemed to comply neither with the food safety focus 
o f the Authority, nor with the need to bring together a variety o f public health matters such as 
worker’s health or issues of a purely environmental character which are still dispersed among 
various Commission DGs. The wide character, o f the competences of the GMO Panel could 
be interpreted as the Commission’s viewing the process for the establishment o f EFSA as a 
unique opportunity to delegate the organizational responsibility for the assessment o f the 
potential risks o f genetic engineering to a new institutional structure that would be fairly 
autonomous in its operation and that would in effect restore those loopholes in the system of 
scientific advice noted under the 90/220 framework. At the same time, the association of 
EFSA’s risk assessment responsibilities with issues o f agricultural biotechnology indicated the 
Commission’s unwillingness to acknowledge the differences between food- and non-food 
GMO releases in terms o f the risk assessment focus, the expertise required and the special 
parameters involved in the evaluation of the indirect, long term and cumulative impacts o f the 
open-field releases o f GMOs.
In sum, the allocation of risk assessment competences upon all notified genetic 
engineering releases to the EFSA GMO Panel has perpetuated the Commission’s viewing of 
the entire GMO risk assessment process as a strictly technical procedure that should not take 
into consideration non-technical parameters, as well as its preference for science-based 
readings o f the effects of genetic engineering. The following section will examine the 
predominance o f science in the authorisation arena via the examination o f the Commission’s 
and EFSA’s handling o f non-scientific concerns and objections that have emerged in the 
frame of the operation o f the deliberate release framework.
6.2. Risk assessment and the prior authorisation practice: space for non- 
scientific factors?
The consideration o f non-scientific factors or o f those factors that do not derive from 
non-expert sources in the risk assessment procedure of the 2001/18 licensing framework will 
now be examined. This section demonstrates that major aspects of the genetic engineering 
issue go unnoticed, are neglected, under communicated or instrumentalised, because 
problems are only addressed from the point o f view of the established notification 
requirements o f a technical character. The section highlights how the deployment of a 
particular expert-oriented risk assessment and management practice has prevented the
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pertinent regulatory debate from considering a range o f other non-scientific contextual issues 
and has in fact trivialised their legislative weight.
More concretely, the examination of the risk assessment practice evidences that the 
GMO Panel has been particularly unresponsive to those public comments that have been 
submitted to the SNIF database.510 Although this risk assessment practice might seem 
compatible with the technical character o f the established notification and risk-assessment 
requirements of the deliberate release framework, the realm of EFSA’s competences, the 
composition of its GMO Panel and the rationale behind the institutionalisation of the stage of 
risk assessment as such indicate EFSA’s unresponsiveness to those concerns and challenges 
that have become associated with the commercialisation of plant biotechnology and, in effect, 
its failure to meet the all-encompassing and inclusive requirements of this proceduralised 
framework. As it is further shown, the Commission has chosen to found its authorisation 
proposals and decisions exclusively upon EFSA’s opinions and not to take into account the — 
as noted in the Directive- ethical and socioeconomic aspects o f agricultural biotechnology, 
narrowing, in this way, not only the frame of its risk management duties, but also the scope o f 
the established risk analysis framework.
The examination of the relevant risk assessment practice indicates a major 
contradiction in the Commission’s regulatory approach towards the risks and the effects of 
genetic engineering. On the one hand, the Commission has initiated the creation o f an 
authorisation framework that should operate via the fulfillment o f a series o f procedural 
obligations that offer various opportunities for the participation o f actors with multiple 
interests. On the other, it emphasises the elaboration o f the scientific dimension o f the risk 
assessment framework and shapes its risk assessment practice in accordance with the 
opinions o f the EFSA GMO Panel. The contradiction found between its intentions and the 
actual implementation is indicative of its preference for measurable and quantifiable forms o f 
argumentation in the field of risk regulation.
The prevalence o f ‘scientific argumentation’ as a source of ‘objective’ and ‘reliable’ 
biosafety data in the release framework can be seen in the absence o f any consideration o f 
non-scientific factors (lay views, public comments, socio-economic considerations) and the
510 After the notification o f a Part C release, The Commission shall immediately make available to the public a 
"summary notification information format" (SNIF) along with the respective national assessment reports upon which the 
public may make comments to the Commission within 30 days.
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operationalisation on behalf o f EFSA, as well as o f the Commission, o f only those provisions 
o f the DRD that relate to the production and assessment o f hard scientific facts. This 
particular institutional expert-based capture of the risk assessment framework has, in effect, 
restricted the space for meaningful public participation and for non-scientific inputs in the 
operation of the licensing framework. The combination o f the predominance of a science- 
based risk analysis paradigm with the marginalization o f any non-expert view or argument has 
watered down the open-ended and pluralistic character o f this proceduralised authorization 
framework.
6.2.1. EFSA’s risk assessment practice as a technical exercise: the (non)
consideration of public comments
The analysis that follows is focused on the role o f public consultation and lay views in 
informing risk assessments and in shaping the content o f the risk assessment conclusions in 
the field of genetic engineering. The possibilities provided in the institutional and regulatory 
structures for the authorization of GMOs for public participation to the risk assessment 
process, are examined first. The section will then shed light on those public comments that 
have been submitted in the SNIF database and discusses EFSA’s approach towards this form 
of public involvement in the case-based risk assessment mechanism. Finally, the effects of 
EFSA’s interpretation practice upon the inclusive character of the prior authorization 
framework are illustrated.
The Commission has repeatedly emphasized the need for major stakeholder 
involvement during the process for reaching a scientific opinion and has stated that public 
consultation schemes illustrate ‘the extent to which ordinary members o f the public, once 
they have all the information in their possession, can conduct a high-quality dialogue with 
experts, put judicious questions to these experts, deliver balanced judgments, and reach 
reasonable consensus.’511 As far as the relevant legislative framework is concerned, it should 
be noted that the adoption o f the 2001/18 DRD was associated with a commitment to 
stronger public involvement in regulatory decision-making —in comparison to the lack o f any
511 See on this the Commission’s positions in the intra-Community discussion about the role of scientific expertise in 
Europe in a roundtable organized by the European Parliament in 2002. Available in the thematic archive o f the European 
Parliament in Brussels. See also EC-JRC (European Commission, Joint Research Center). Science and Governance in a 
Knowledge Society: The Challenge for Europe. International Conference on European Commission [online]. (16th- 17th 
October, 2000, Brussels, Belgium). Summary, 2000 [cited 20 December 2002], p. 19. Available from Internet: 
httn://www.irc.es/sci-gov/sutncon.html
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public consultation requirements in the 1990/220 Directive- and seemed to signify a bold 
policy shift that would strengthen the social legitimacy o f the authorization framework via the 
involvement o f a broad range o f stakeholders. As the recommendation in the Preamble of the 
DRD states “comments by the public should be taken into consideration in the drafts of 
measures submitted to the Regulatory Committee.’512
More specifically, anyone wishing to introduce a GMO into the environment of the 
EU must submit a notification to the competent authority of any member state where such a 
GMO is to be placed on the market for the first time. The competent national authority is 
required to forward the summary o f the dossier to the competent authorities of the other 
member states and the European Commission.513 Then, the European Commission is 
required to make the summary of the dossier of the notification and the public assessment 
reports in the case referred to in Article 14(3)(a) available to the public.514 On the basis o f the 
information, the public may make comments on the summary dossier of the notifications for 
Part C marketing applications (SNIFs & assessment reports) directly to the Commission 
within 30 days, in line with Article 24 of the EC Directive 2001/18 and these are placed on 
the relevant Commission website.515 According to a Commission officer, ‘the SNIF database 
constitutes the most advanced system of transnational public consultation that guarantees the 
participation of European citizens from the first steps o f the authorization process.’516
As scientists tend to minimize the risks ‘while lay observers express deep concerns 
about the political, moral, and ethical dimensions o f genetic innovation,’517 the role o f the 
GMO Panel o f EFSA as the principal risk assessor for GMO releases is crucial in establishing 
an institutional model o f deliberation that would accommodate the various viewpoints that 
either stem from diverse epistemic backgrounds or merely transmit lay knowledge or are 
simply deprived o f technical authority and a scientific aura. It should be noted that the 
prevalence o f EFSA in assessing the potential risks o f agricultural biotechnology in the EU 
has been the outcome of its role as a final arbiter of those disagreements that arise among 
various national scientific committees on issues of agricultural biotechnology/18 its task to 
provide guidance for decision makers and the ‘best possible scientific opinions in all cases
512 Paragraph 46 of the Preamble o f Directive 2001/18/EC
513 Article 13.1 Directive 2001/18/EC.
514 Article 24 (1), Directive 2001/18/EC
515 www.amoinfo.irc.it
516 Interview evidence with Commission officer in DG Research, 18/2/2007
517 C. Wales and G. Mythen, “Risky Discourses: The Politics of GM Foods” (2002) 11 Environmental Politics 121-44.
518 Article 30(3) o f Regulation 178/2002/EC
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provided for by Community legislation and on any question within its mission,519 as well as o f 
its scientific authority that stems from its composition and organizational autonomy.520 As 
EFSA’s former Director stated, ‘some decisions end up with us because we are the final court 
o f scientific opinion.’321 The establishment o f the EFSA GMO Panel, that occurred a little 
after the adoption o f the White Paper on Governance,522 came in fact as a response to the 
need ‘to develop and make the science o f risk assessment open and transparent and to 
provide greater opportunity for stakeholder participation in the risk assessment process and 
the delivery o f a final opinion.’523 According to Article 42 o f its founding Regulation 
178/2202, ‘the Authority is required to develop effective contacts with consumer 
representatives, producer representatives, processors and other interested parties to enable 
prior consultation with these groups,’524 whereas article 9 o f the same legislative measure 
states that; ‘There shall be open and transparent public consultation, directly or through 
representative bodies, during the preparation, evaluation and revision of food law, except 
where the urgency o f the matter does not allow it.”323
Notwithstanding the assurances that the Deliberate Release Directive and EFSA’s 
founding Regulation (178/2002) provide, in terms of safeguarding public participation and 
consultation as a necessary procedural requirement, these provisions seem weak in 
operational terms, thus they leave a wide margin for discretion to EFSA on how to take into 
account comments from the public, or, in other words, they impose no concrete substantive 
obligations. Further, there has been no indication regarding whether, and in which way, EFSA 
should take public comments or views submitted in the SNIF database into account in the 
frame of the Deliberate Release framework. In fact, there is no mechanism or method that 
could evaluate or guarantee whether and how public comments enter the authorisation arena, 
and there has not been any organised effort to establish public hearings. The lack of 
enforceable provisions on participatory rights, the absence of any requirement to take into 
account either the submitted public comments or the outcome o f public participation and the 
nonexistnce o f any definition o f the potential scale o f the public consultation in the frame of
519 See: Article 23 (a) o f Regulation 178/2002 EC
520 Article 28 and 37 of Regulation 178/2002/EC
521 G.Podger, (2004) ‘European Food Safety Authority Will Focus on Science’ European Affairs, Winter
522 Commission White Paper on European governance (COM(2001) 428) .C5-0454/2001), OJ C 287, 12.10.2001, p. 1.
523 EFSA, Minutes of the 1st plenary meeting of the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO Panel) 
held on 26 May 2003 at 1-2
524 Article 42 of Regulation (EC) 178/2202
525 Article 9 of Regulation (EC) 178/2002
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the EU legislative framework on GMOs was considered ‘as being problematic’ in the frame 
of the 3rd Meeting of the Parties to the Aarhus Convention.526
Further, the technical framing of the risk assessment questions and data requirements 
(found in Annex II and III of the DRD) and of the relevant implementation measures for the 
specification of the risk assessment requirements constitutes a further obstacle for any 
influential involvement o f the majority of interest groups, local communities, stakeholders 
and the general public in the prior authorisation framework and has, in effect, marginalised 
their legitimate concerns. The level of technical specificity that characterizes the Deliberate 
Release framework prevents, in essence, those public interest groups or members of the 
general public that lack the necessary infrastructure or the expertise that is required for the 
questioning o f the scientific and technical integrity o f the notification dossier from 
participating in the risk assessment framework. According to Bauman, ‘risk information 
aimed at the lay people and passed over to the public in the form of T)IY survival kits’ has an 
overall effect o f a counterfactual privatisation of risks.’527 The technical character of the risk 
assessment requirements and the science-based composition of the EFSA GMO Panel reflect 
in fact the Commission’s viewing of the process for the assessment o f the potential risks and 
effects o f GMOs as one that should be founded upon objective scientific evidence, thus 
distinct from the political considerations that characterize the stage o f risk management. At 
the same time, however, this particular framing o f the risk assessment structure seems 
unresponsive to the need for widening the composition of the GMO Panel so as to include 
social scientists,528 as well as for approaching the terms ‘risk’ and ‘adverse effect’ in the field of 
agricultural biotechnology also from a socio-economic and ethical perspective that would 
allow this institutional risk assessor to take into account and estimate the potential non­
technical effects and social risks of genetic engineering technological applications. These non­
technical risks include, among others, concerns over the long-term or indirect socio-economic 
effects o f deliberate releases, the effects o f the industrialisation o f modem agriculture upon 
traditional farming practices, as well as upon the sustainability o f the local rural communities.
526 Economic Commission for Europe Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters Working Group on Genetically 
Modified Organisms MP.PP/AC.2/2004/2, 30 April 2004 at 8
527 Bauman, Z., (1996), Postmodern Ethics (Blackwell, Oxford) at 202
528 ‘Social scientists ‘should be involved in food risk assessment’ says SSC’ EU Food Law: May 2003 pp.12-3; see also,
J.Wallis et al. ‘The meta-govemance of risk and new technologies: GM crops and mobile telephones’ 8 Journal o f  Risk 
Research (2005) 635-661; L.Sjoberg, ‘Limits of knowledge and the limited importance of trust’ 21 Risk Analysis (2001) 
189-198; W.Poortinga ‘The use o f multi-level modelling in risk research: a secondary analysis of a study o f public
perception of genetically modified food’ 8 Journal o f  Risk Research (2005) 583-597
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The examination of those public comments that have been submitted to the SNIF 
database in the frame of 20 Part C notification procedures529 indicates a plurality of non- 
scientific concerns o f an ethical or socio-economic character. Among other things, the public 
comments that have so far been submitted to this centralized biosafety database have 
included concerns about the potential economic risks that might be created through the 
monopolisation of both the field of biosafety research and biotechnology patenting by a few 
multinational companies and the correspondent increase in the dependence o f local farmers 
on the expertise and patented seeds o f these economic actors,530 the absence of any need for 
an increase in the agricultural and food production in Europe, which has been one o f the 
main arguments of biotechnology companies in favour o f the commercial development of 
this new technology,531 the potential socio-economic risks that the unanticipated expression of 
toxic proteins might pose upon local bee populations and in effect upon their pollination of 
commercial crops,532 the effects o f the commercial application of agricultural biotechnology 
upon organic dairying which constitutes an important sector in the agricultural economy of 
many member states533 and ethical concerns in relation to the potential contamination of non- 
GM crop varieties and o f the correspondent agricultural plots.534
The GMO Panel has so far not responded to any of the expressed public comments 
submitted in the SNIF database. The lack of procedural guarantees that would facilitate the 
integration of public comments submitted to the database, the technical character of the 
established risk assessment and notification requirements and the institutionalization o f the 
risk assessment process via the establishment of an expert organizational structure that is 
deprived of experts on socio-economic or ethical issues, have in fact ‘allowed’ EFSA to 
remain silent with regard to the submitted public comments. It should be mentioned, though, 
that EFSA’s ‘silence’ towards these comments should not be considered as self-explanatory
329 The examined comments have been submitted in relation to various authorisation cases such as the Insect resistant 
B tll maize, the Lepidopteran resistant and glufosinate tolerant 1507 Maize, the Potato variety EH92-527-1 with 
modified starch content, Amylogene HB, Oilseed rape Ms8xRf3, Roundup Ready fodder beet derived from line A5/15, 
Glufosinate tolerant Oilseed Rape Liberator pHoe6/Ac, Roundup Ready Sugar Beet (Beta Vulgaris) derived from Event 
H7-1, Glufosinate tolerant Oilseed Rape Falcon, GS40/90pHoe6/Ac, Insect-Protected cotton line derived from Event 
531, Roundup Ready cotton line derived from Event 1445 Glufosinate tolerant soybeans A2704-12 and A5547-127, 
Genetically modified maize NK603xMON 810, Roundup Ready (glyphosate tolerant) maize, event NK603, Oilseed rape 
Ms8xRf3, Insect-protected maize line MON 863 and maize hybrid MON 863XMON 810 and Roundup Ready 
(glyphosate tolerant) oilseed rape, event GT73
iKiblic comment for Part C Notification C/NL/00/10-Lepidopteran resistant and glufosinate tolerant 1507 Maize and 
public comments submitted by SEED Europe on Maize 1507xNK603
Public comment for Part C Notification C/NL/00/10-Lepidopteran resistant and glufosinate tolerant 1507 Maize
532 Comments to the European Commission and Member States in relation to the assessment report for notification 
C/BE/96/01 for the commercial release of MS8, RF3 and MS8XRF3 oilseed rape
533 Public comment for Part C Assessment Report to notification C/BE/96/01 Oilseed Rape Ms8xRf3
534 Public comment submitted by Universita Politecnica Marche on Maize 1507xNK603
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and inescapable due to the generally technical structure and orientation of the broader risk 
assessment framework.
As the case of the Spanish Biosafety Commission indicates, despite the fact that its 
formal risk assessment protocol is stricdy technical in its structure and orientation, this 
national risk assessor ‘uses input from public debate to assess certain public concerns’535 and 
has ‘applied, in a few isolated cases, an implicit technology assessment.’536 In other words, the 
examination of the risk assessment practice of the GMO Panel indicates that this risk assessor 
carries its own distinct organisational responsibility for the trivialization o f those public 
comments referring to those notification files and national assessment reports submitted at 
the level o f risk assessment. In fact, the Panel does not take into consideration any comment 
or objection that does not comply with the technical requirements o f the Deliberate Release 
framework and as one member o f this scientific committee has noted; ‘Examining ethical and 
socio-economic concerns is beyond our competencies and capacities. This is a policy task for 
the Member States and for the Commission at the level o f risk management.’537
EFSA’s viewing o f social and ethical concerns as non-compatible with its own 
competencies and with its organisational expertise has become more clearly evidenced in the 
risk assessment framework for the authorization o f GM food and feed products. More 
concretely, in the safety assessment of the notified commercial release of Maize DAS-59122- 
7,538 the submitted comments referred to the respective notification dossier as lacking 
information on possible contributions to sustainable development, benefits to society and 
other ethical considerations regarding the use of maize line 59122.539 Further, it should be 
noted that the submitted comments identified a lack of discussion o f the potential effects of 
these changes on the environment, as well as the socioeconomic effects of the changes in the 
cultivation and management o f the GM maize compared to conventional maize that both the 
insect resistance and the herbicide tolerance have been expected to cause. The GMO Panel, in
535 O. Todt, ‘Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology under Uncertainty’ (2004) 42 Safety Science 150
536 M. DeBlonde & P. Du Jardin, ’Deepening a Precautionary European Policy’ (2005) 18 Journal o f  Agricultural and 
Environmental Ethics 330
537 Interview evidence with a member of the GMO Panel on the 23rd of February 2006
538 Application EFSA-GMO-NL-2005-12 for the placing on the market of insect-resistant genetically modified maize 
59122 from Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. and Mycogen Seeds, c/o Dow Agrosciences LLC
539See more in http://gmoinfo.irc.it/publiccomments/C-NL-00-10%20on0/o20AR.pdf
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its response to these concerns, viewed the issue of costs-benefits, ethical questions and the 
assessment o f potential socioeconomic effects as falling outside its rem it.540
Further, looking at the terms of operation of the GMO Panel —that in fact reflects the 
modus operandi o f the risk assessment framework-, it could be further stated that there has been 
no sign o f any form of public participation to the expert meetings for the assessment of 
individual GM notification files and national assessment reports. EFSA has not shown an 
interest in encouraging or facilitating the submission o f lay views in the case-by-case risk 
assessment process. In fact, the enhancement of public participation and stakeholder 
involvement within the structures of EFSA has been limited considering that although Art. 25 
o f EFSA’s founding Regulation clearly states that four members should have backgrounds in 
organisations that represent consumers or other interests in the food chain, EFSA’s first 
Management Board541 included only one consumer representative. On this issue, Sheila 
McKechnie, president o f the European Consumer Organization (BEUC), commented that 
‘the purpose o f setting up the EFSA was to restore the badly damaged confidence of 
European consumers in the European food industry, but with only one member representing 
consumer interests, consumers cannot hope to see change or improvements in food safety 
and standards.’542 The current composition of the Management Board reflects the same 
representation analogies with only one person representing the body of European consumers.
As a result of this particular institutionalised handling o f those public comments 
submitted in the SNIF database, the resulting expert-based character of the risk assessment 
process has in fact hindered the meaningful integration of public views into the policy-making 
process and has questioned the ‘inclusive’ character of the risk assessment process in relation 
to non-expert views. The lack of public enforcement o f the relevant public participation 
clauses in combination with the absence of a detailed specification on behalf o f EFSA of the 
terms o f consideration o f the submitted public comments and views, or even how the latter 
have informed its judgments and conclusions, have contributed to the de facto downgrading
540_  ,
See more in:
http://www.efsa.euroDa.eu/etc/medialib/efsa/science/gmo/gm ff applications/more info/809,Par.0012.Filc.dat/gmo ov 
opl2 annexe en.pdf
5 1 The EFSA Management Board ensures that the Authority functions effectively and efficiently. Its key tasks include 
the establishment o f the budget and work programmes and the monitoring of their implementation; the appointment of 
the Executive Director and members of the Scientific Committee and the nine Scientific Panels; ensuring that EFSA’s 
priorities are in line with its mandate and key missions and that adequate time is given by EFSA to so-called “self- 
tasking”. ‘Self-tasking’ occurs when EFSA, during the course of its regular work, identifies a particular issue which it 
believes requires further analysis and research.
542 S. R. Melchor, ‘European Food Safety Authority criticized by consumer advocates’ (September 23, 2002) Food 
Chemical News 14
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o f this form of public participation and have undermined an enforceable materialisation of 
the public consultation process. The silence of the GMO Panel, as the ultimate risk assessor 
in the EU GMO framework, towards these non-technical concerns and its implicit viewing of 
non-scientifically founded public comments as value-laden, thus as incompatible with the 
purpose and the objective character of the shaped expert-based risk assessment framework 
has accentuated the public mistrust towards EFSA’s working methods and has called into 
doubt its stated intention to establish an ‘open and transparent public consultation.’543
This institutionalized unresponsiveness perpetuates the traditional shortcomings of 
the process o f risk assessment that mostly conceals ‘the power relations and underlying values 
inherent in {...} decision procedures, offering the rituals of public participation without any 
real influence being exerted by the —in the eyes of the decision-making elites- uninformed 
public.’544 It is further concluded that the expected enhancement of the role o f the public in 
the risk assessment process that has been associated with the establishment o f EFSA has been 
questioned, thus the exclusively technical character of this evaluation process does not seem 
open to non-expert inputs and the procedural opportunities offered to the lay people and to 
non-expert stakeholders cannot be activated towards a direction where public contribution 
will acquire an influential normative force at either the risk assessment or the risk 
management stage.
In sum, the limited operational force of the public participation provisions, the 
technical framing o f the risk assessment and notification requirements and most importantly 
EFSA’s silence towards those non-scientific comments and views submitted in the SNIF 
database have in fact contributed to the weakening o f the role of the public in the frame of 
the risk assessment procedure and to the perpetuation of the technical and quantifiable 
character of the latter.
543 Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002
544 J. Conrad, ‘Introduction’ in J. Conrad, J. 'Society, technology and Risk Assessment’ (Academic Press: London, 1980) 
6
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6.2.2. The 2001/18 directive and the Commission as a risk manager: ethical and
socio-economic concerns and the role of the European Group on Ethics in
Science and N ew Technologies
Risk assessment constitutes a basic, but not the sole pillar o f the required risk analysis 
for the prior authorisation of GMOs in view of the tri-part character of the latter (risk 
assessment, risk communication and risk management). The results reached through the 
established process o f assessing risks on the basis o f a prescribed list o f scientific 
requirements and technical factors can neither constitute the sole basis of the decision as to 
whether a particular GM crop should be released into the environment, in view of the 
plurality of non-scientific considerations, nor can it be claimed that they reflect the 
consideration o f wider societal concerns. As the Commission has stated, ‘scientific risk 
assessment alone cannot, in some cases, provide all the information on which a risk- 
management decision should be based.’545 As indicated through EFSA’s institutionalized 
interpretative practice, from the point of view of not taking into account non-scientific 
factors when shaping its risk assessment conclusions, the consideration o f parameters that do 
not strictly relate to the assessment o f the technical safety o f a notified release o f a GMO 
product into the European environment and market should take place in another stage o f the 
risk analysis process, that is at the level o f risk management. In view of the fact that the 
consideration o f ‘environmental, ethical, religious and socio-economic factors has been 
viewed as part o f risk management,’546 it is the task o f the risk manager to assess them in the 
frame o f its role in defining what constitutes an acceptable risk, whilst reflecting non-scientific 
concerns and wider societal considerations that relate to the applications o f agricultural 
biotechnology. In the case o f the Deliberate Release framework, due to the inability o f the 
Council to achieve a qualified majority, the risk management duties and the final authorization 
decisions have been conferred on the Commission in accordance with Article 5 of the 1999 
comitology Decision.547
On multiple occasions, the Commission has emphasized the particular role o f risk 
management when shaping a decision that would authorize an activity that might pose risks. 
In the Commission’s Strategy for Europe on Life Sciences and Biotechnology, it has been 
stated that ‘risk management measures may also take into account other legitimate factors, 
such as societal, economic, traditional, ethical and other environmental concerns, as well as
545 European Commission, (2001), Science and Society. Action Plan, COM (2001) 714 final. Brussels at 28
546 See more on this, D.Banati, ‘Agricultural Ethics’ Editorial, (2006), Vol.35 (2), Acta Alimentaria 149
547 See: Council Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred 
on the Commission OJ L 184,17.7.1999, p. 23
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the feasibility of controls and law enforcement required to achieve the chosen level of
protection.’548 The Director General for Health and Consumer Protection o f the European
Commission has noted, ‘in simple terms, the job o f the scientific committees is to describe
the risk. It is the task of the risk manager to determine how to handle the risk after taking
account of the economic, social and other legitimate factors in addition to scientific advice.’549
Along the same lines, the European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection has
stated that; ‘Risk managers {...} have to take into consideration not only science, but also
many other matters for example economic, societal, traditional, ethical or environmental
factors, as well as the feasibility of controls.’550 It should be mentioned that in the frame o f the
Explanatory memorandum of the proposal for EFSA’s founding Regulation, the Commission
pointed out that risk management is
‘the process o f weighing policy alternatives in the light o f the results o f a risk 
assessment and, if required, selecting the appropriate actions necessary to 
prevent, reduce or eliminate the risk to ensure the high level o f health 
protection determined as appropriate in the European Community.’551
The Commission’s Scientific Steering Committee has stated that the risk management 
decision should be ‘determined primarily by human health and environmental quality 
considerations, while being sensitive to social, cultural, legal and political considerations.’552 
The establishment of a separate institutional structure such as EFSA was, in fact, part o f the 
Commission’s plan to emphasise the need for separation of the risk assessment from the risk 
management process. In the case o f the Deliberate Release framework, the non-scientific and 
political orientation o f risk management has been, in fact, associated with the provision of 
space and o f a qualified basis for deliberation on the acceptability o f commercial releases of 
GMO products to the main stakeholders, such as the members of the 2001/18 Regulatory 
Committee and the Council of Ministers of Environment to frame their non-scientific 
concerns and views over the potential effects and risks o f GMO releases. The non-binding
548 Life sciences and biotechnology —A strategy for Europe Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee o f the Regions COM (2002) 27 
European Commission at 5, 17
549 R. Madelin, ‘The importance of scientific advice in the Community decision making process’, Opening address, 
Inaugural joint meeting o f the members of the non-food scientific committees, (2003) Brussels 7 September at 8
550 D.Byme, European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection, ‘EFSA: Excellence, Integrity and Openness’, 
speech delivered to the inaugural meeting of the Management Board of the European Food Safety Authority, Brussels, 
18 September 2002
551 Proposal for a Regulation o f the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the general principles and 
requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Authority, and laying down procedures in matters of food /* 
COM/2000/0716 final - COD 2000/0286 * Article 2 para.2 at 9
552 First Report on the Harmonization of Risk Assessment Procedures, Working Group on Harmonization o f Risk 
Assessment Procedures in the Scientific Committees advising the European Commission in the area o f human and 
environmental health, 26-27 October 2000, 201.12.2000 at 32
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power o f EFSA’s scientific opinions, the absence of any form of participation for the 
members of the EFSA GMO Panel in any process that follows the statement of its opinion 
and the Commission’s definition o f risk management as the arena where the precautionary 
principle should apply553 have further emphasised the significance of the Commission’s role as 
the main actor responsible for responding to the various implementation challenges that 
relate to non-scientific concerns, as well as the non-scientific character of the stage of risk 
analysis that follows risk assessment.
Moreover, in its White Paper on Food Safety, the Commission states that risk 
management decisions are o f a political character and involve ‘judgments not only based on 
science, but on a wider application o f the wishes and needs o f society’554 and refers to the 
need for consideration of other legitimate factors relevant to the health protection of 
consumers such as environmental considerations, animal welfare and sustainable 
agriculture.555 The European Parliament has, in fact, called ‘the Commission to look into the 
economic, social and environmental implications of applied biotechnology.’556 As a member 
o f the Management Body of EFSA has pointed out; ‘The EC could in their risk management 
decisions of course rely more on such legitimate factors as the precautionary principle, socio 
economic considerations or maybe even ethical questions.’557 Further, the Scientific Steering 
Committee has proposed the inclusion o f the values expected to be placed at risk (e.g. 
economic concerns), consumer perception o f risks and the distribution of risks and benefits 
as some of the main factors that should be taken into consideration at the level o f risk 
management.558 These references, apart from highlighting the political character o f the risk 
management responsibilities of the Commission, indicate that the Commission’s 
consideration o f these parameters would in fact be compatible with its legislative initiatives to 
separate risk assessment from risk management as well as with how other institutional actors 
at the EU level have viewed its role in the wider authorisation framework.
The Deliberate Release framework has acknowledged the existence o f non-scientific 
concerns in the field o f agricultural biotechnology both in the frame of the negotiation and
553 Communication from the Commission on the precautionary principle, COM/2000/0001 final
554 Commission of the European Communities (2000), White Paper on Food Safety. COM (1999) 719, 12 January, 
Brussels
555 White Paper on food Safety DOC/OO/1 (COM( 1999)719) Brussels, 12 January 2000 at 9
556 Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, Opinion on Biotechnology: prospects and challenges for agriculture in 
Europe Draftswoman: Maria del Pilar Ayuso Gonzalez European Parliament, 14.9.2006
557 Interview evidence with 2/10/2006
558 Final Report on Setting the scientific frame for the inclusion of new quality of life concerns in the risk assessment 
process’ Adopted by the Scientific Steering Committee at its meeting of 10-11 April 2003 at 29
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the operation of its provisions. More specifically, Sweden, Denmark559 and the European 
Parliament had requested that the Commission would insert a proposal for assessing the 
social desirability (costs and benefits) of GM crops, as was published before the adoption of 
the 90/220 framework560 whilst D G  Environment remarked that; W e cannot get away from 
the fact that the ethical considerations also have to be taken up within the Directive.’561 
Consequently, the revised Deliberate Release Directive included, in its Preamble, a specific 
reference to the need for the evaluation and taking into account of ethical and socio­
economic considerations in relation to deliberate releases of GMOs562 and for the 
Commission to consult the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 
‘with a view to obtaining advice on ethical issues of a general nature regarding the deliberate 
release or placing on the market of GMOs.’563 According to article 29 of the Directive, the 
Commission, the Parliament, the Council or a member state may seek advice from one o f the 
EU committees on the ethical implications of biotechnology, whereas the Directive makes 
explicit reference to the importance o f respecting ‘ethical principles recognized in a Member 
State.’564 The Directive also acknowledges the relevance tof the socio-economic 
considerations o f the licensing o f open-field releases o f GMOs and o f GMO products via its 
reference to the need for an assessment of the ‘socioeconomic implications o f deliberate 
releases and placing on the market of GMOs in the frame of required Commission’s three- 
year report on the implementation of the Directive.’565
6.2.2.I. Ethical considerations in the E U  context
Ethical concerns, in their broadest meaning, have become a central driving force in 
the debate on the effects o f agricultural biotechnology, due to the fact that the main 
expression o f the benefits and risks of genetic engineering acquires socioeconomic forms.566 
In this analysis, ethics is approached in its broadest context as a term that includes all 
considerations that can be classified as non-scientific, such as the moral and socio-economic
559 ‘EU calls halt to new GMO approvals’ (25 June 1999) Agra Europe 4
560 EP Document A2-142/89, p. 13
561 ‘Risk-Based GMO Procedure Should Include Liability, Says Bowe’ (1997) 9(9) AgBiotech News and Information 
194
562 Paragraph 9 of the Preamble o f the Directive 2001/18/EC
563 Paragraph 57 o f the Preamble of the Directive 2001/18/EC
564 Article 29 of Directive 2001/18/EC
565 Article 31, paragraphs 6 and 7 o f Directive 2001/18/EC
566 Se for more C. Juma, “Biotechnology in a Globalizing World: The Coevolution of Technology and Social 
Institutions" (March 2005) 55.3 BioScience 268 and R.E. Evenson, V. Santaniello, D. Zilberman (eds.), Economic and 
Social Issues in Agricultural Biotechnology (CABI: Wallingford, UK, 2002)
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concerns surrounding the commercialisation of agricultural biotechnology. Focus is on the 
non-scientific considerations that have moved beyond the traditional and structural objections 
against agricultural biotechnology, such as issues relating to concerns about man ‘playing 
G od’567 or ‘tampering with nature’568 or the ‘unnatural’ character of biotechnology products.569 
In particular, in the context o f the GMO-related deliberate release framework, focus is given 
to those concerns that have been expressed in relation to the association of genetic 
engineering with intensive farming methods, the commercial dominance of the bio-industrial 
sector and the marginalisation of traditional European farming methods and structures, rather 
than with the intrinsically positive or negative perceptions relating to the manipulation of 
genes.
First, among the key concerns expressed in various member states are the potential 
effects o f the commercialisation and cultivation o f GM-varieties on the European agricultural 
structure and in effect on farmers in various parts o f Europe.570 Ethical considerations have 
been expressed in relation to the sustainable character o f the deliberate release of GMOs into 
the environment, due to: the particular position o f farm agriculture in the European political 
economy and its contribution to social cohesion, the variety and multiplicity of small farmers, 
the family-structured agricultural production, and the high diversity o f agricultural practices, 
agronomic methods and farming techniques.571 These concerns relate to the sustainability of 
rural economies, the preservation of traditional agronomic practices, the safeguarding o f the 
existence of small farm units in terms o f their integrity and competitiveness and the 
protection of local communities especially in less-favoured areas in view of the farmers’ 
potential reliance ‘on a limited range of crop varieties {produced via the application of genetic 
engineering techniques} that are dependent on packages o f agrochemical accessories
567 See J. Lassen, K.H. Madsen and P. Sandoe, ‘Ethics and genetic engineering-lessons to be learned from GM foods’ 
(2002) 24 Bioprocess and Biosystems Engineering 263-271, especially at 268-269
568 BBC News (6/6 - 2000). "GM: The Royal debate". BBC News Online,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/cnglish/uk/newsid 779000/779425.stm
569 See on this issue, A. Dobson, “ Biocentrism and Genetic Engineering”  (1995) 4 Environmental Values 227-239; A. 
Dobson, “ Genetic Engineering and Environmental Ethics”  (1997) 6 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 205- 
221; B. E. Rollin, “ On telos and genetic engineering,”  in A. Holland and A. Johnson (eds.), Animal Biotechnology and 
Ethics (Chapman and Hall, London, 1998) 156-171; M.J. Reiss and R. Straughan, Improving Nature? The Science and 
Ethics o f  Genetic Engineering (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996) and A. Melin, ‘Genetic engineering and 
the moral status o f non-human species’ (2004) 17 Journal o f  Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 479-495,
570Interview evidence with officers in the competent authorities of Sweden and Finland, 16/6/2006
571 See on this issue, J. Durant, M.W. Bauer, and G. Gaskell, Biotechnology in the public sphere: A European 
sourcebook. (Science Museum: London, 1998); B. Fischoff, P. Slovic, S. Lichtenstein, S. Read and B. Combs, How safe 
is safe enough? A Psychometric study of attitudes towards technological risks and benefits (1978) 9 Policy Sciences 127- 
152; G. Gaskell, N. Allum, M. Bauer, J. Durant, A. Allansdottir, H. Bonfadelli et al. ‘Biotechnology and the European 
public’(2000) 18(9) Nature Biotechnology 935-938; G. Gaskell, J. Durant, W. Wagner, H. Torgersen, E. Einsiedel, E. 
Jelsoe, et al. ‘Europe ambivalent on biotechnology’ (1997) 387(6636) Nature 845-847; P. Slovic, S. Lichtenstein, and B. 
Fischoff, ‘Facts and fears: Understanding perceived risk’ in R. C. Schwing & W. A. Albers (eds.), Societal risk 
assessment: How Safe is safe enough? (Plenum: New York, 1980)
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purchased with the seed’ as ‘experience has shown that this trend {in the use o f high 
technologies, industrial techniques and laboratory methodologies in the fields of agriculture, 
crop production and farm management} favours larger, well-capitalized farms, at the expense 
o f smaller farmers and so has profound social implications in rural areas.’572 The Austrian 
Ministry o f Health has repeatedly referred to the need for inserting a clause in the Deliberate 
Release Directive that would refer to the ‘right on maintaining an ecologically intact and 
unadulterated agronomical culture.’573
The potential impacts o f the commercialisation o f agricultural biotechnology on small 
farms have become a major source o f widespread concern, as it is thought that 
biotechnological productivity-enhancing products might induce market concentration and 
threaten the survival o f small farms in the European continent. It has been noted that ‘the 
introduction into the market of a revolutionary agricultural technique has {...} an 
economically harmful potential to small farmers. {...} Agricultural applications appear to 
present {...} widespread risk potential.’57*The preservation of the existing farming structure 
in Europe —mostly based upon the concept of family-owned small farms- has in fact become 
a special issue o f EU-wide attention and various Mediterranean and Eastern European 
countries have designed special policies for its preservation in view of the gradual 
commercialization o f plant biotechnology. For example, Malta’s consistently cautious position 
towards the open-field releases o f genetic engineering products has been based upon the 
following rationale
‘Malta has a very particular agricultural system with multi-ownership small farming 
plots, one next to the other, often in a terraced manner due to the Maltese 
topography, involving valleys and associated hills. Thus GM crop production is not 
sustainable in such small land parcels. These plots of land are all surrounded by 
rubble walls, which make it difficult to mow in order to reduce adventitious presence.
The multiple-owners issue makes it difficult for agreements to be made.’ 573
Concerns have also been expressed in relation to the potential implications of the 
commercial licensing o f releases o f GMOs and GMO products upon local farming
572 P.J.Gates, ‘Bioethical issues in crop production: herbicide resistance’ in T.B.Mepham, G.A.Tucker and J.Wiseman 
(eds), Issues in Agricultural Bioethics (Nottingham University Press: Nottingham, 1995) 157
573 Precautionary Expertise for GM Crops National Report -  Austria Political Consensus Despite Divergent Concepts of 
Precaution Quality o f Life and Management of Living Resources Key Action 111-13: socio-economic studies of life 
sciences Project n° QLRT-2001-00034 H. Torgersen and A. Bogner, Institute of Technology Assessment, Austrian 
Academy o f Sciences, Austria, February 2004 at 42
574 V. Szczepanik, ‘Regulation o f Biotechnology in the European Community’ (1993) 24 Law & Policy in International 
Business 635
575 Interview evidence with the Competent Authority of Malta, 9/9/2006 (Joseph Abela Medici, Nature Protection Unit, 
Environment Protection Directorate Malta Environment & Planning Authority)
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practices,576 rural types o f life,577 upon the sustainable development of agricultural 
communities or the need for preservation o f the ecological diversity, the agronomic 
particularities o f European regions and the interests o f European consumers.578 Moral579and 
religious580 concerns have been also expressed as genetic engineering has been seen as 
‘threatening both the integrity o f species and putting at risk the delicate relationships that 
sustain the ecosystems into which genetically engineered organisms might be released.’581 The 
need for sustainable farming strategies and for the protection o f organic agriculture have been 
o f particular importance in Austria, Slovenia, Denmark and Latvia where this type of farming 
constitutes a significant part o f the national agricultural economy.582 The position of Danish 
Union o f Organic Farmers has been that ‘in view of the incompatibility o f GM technology 
with the basic principles and values o f organic agriculture, the risks associated with GM crops 
should not be taken.’583 Further, ‘the release of GMOs into the environment is a potential 
threat to local varieties and organic products. From experience in other countries, it is 
reasonable to fear that GMOs might contribute to the decline of local breeds and plant 
varieties.’584 It is worth mentioning that the Economic and Social Committee o f the European 
Union has acknowledged the potentially negative impacts of the introduction of GMOs on
576 See: P.B. Thompson, “ Unnatural Farming and the Debate over Genetic Manipulation,”  in V. V. Gehring (ed.), 
Genetic Prospects. Essays on Biotechnology, Ethics, and Public Policy (Rowman & Littlefield: Oxford, 2003) 27-40.
577 C. Heller, ‘From scientific risk to paysan savoir-faire: peasant expertise in the French and global debate over GM 
crops’ (2002) 11 Science as Culture 5-37.
578 For more about this issue, see A.F. Deshayes, ‘Environmental and social impacts of GMOs: What have we learned 
from the past few years’, The Biosafety Results o f  Field Tests o f  Genetically Modified Plants and Microorganisms 
(Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium, Monterey, California, November 13-16, 1994. D.D. Jones, ed. Oakland, 
CA: Division of Agriculture and Natural Resources, University o f California, 1994), 5-19
579 See on this K. Nielsen, “ Transgenic Organisms -  Time for Conceptual Diversification”  (2003) 21(3) Nature. 227- 
228 and H. Rolston, (2002), “ What Do We Mean by Intrinsic Value and Integrity of Plants and Animals?” in D. Heaf, 
and J. Wirz (eds.), Genetic Engineering and the Integrity o f  Animals and Plants. Proceedings of a Workshop at the 
Royal Botanic Garden, (Ifgene: Edinburgh, UK, Hafan, UK, 2002) 5-10.
580 See: C. Deane-Drummond, R. Grove-White, and B. Szerszynski, “ Genetically Modified Theology: The Religious 
Dimensions of Public Concerns about Agricultural Biotechnology”  in C. Deane-Drummond and B. Szerszynski (eds.), 
Re-ordering Nature Theology, Society and the New Genetics. (T&T Clark: London, 2003) 17-38; D. Cooley, and G. 
Goreham, “ Are Transgenic Organisms Unnatural?” (2004) 9 Ethics and the Environment 46-55; Church of Scotland, 
The Society, Religion and Technology Project Report on Genetically Modified Food, Reports to the General Assembly 
and Deliverances of the General Assembly 1999, 20/93-20/103 and Board of National Mission Deliverances 42-45, p. 
20/4; D. Bruce, ‘Contamination, crop trials, and compatibility’ (2003) 16 Journal o f  Agricultural and Environmental 
Ethics 595-604; see also, J.Petre, ‘Church Bans GM Crops Trials on Its Land’ (December 5, 1999) Sunday Telegraph,
581 A. Dobson, “ Genetic Engineering and Environmental Ethics,”  (1997) 6 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 
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582 T. Trewavas, Can Agricultural Biotechnology Live with Organic Farming -  Public Debate at the Royal Agricultural 
College, Cirencester on 2 June 2000; B. Sheridan, EU Biotechnology Law and Practice: Regulating Genetically 
Modified and Novel Food Products (Palladian Law Publishing: Bembridge, 2001).
583 See: J. Toft, Co-existence Bypassing Risk Issues Quality o f  Life and Management o f Living Resources, Precautionary 
Expertise for GM Crops-National Report -  Denmark Key Action 111-13: socio-economic studies of life sciences Project 
n° QLRT-2001-00034, University Library Roskilde, Denmark, June 2004
584 C. Le-Grice Mack (Member of the South-West Regional Assembly), Market opportunities fo r  non-GM agriculture in 
South-West England: The promotion o ffood  from traditional and organic agriculture, Proceedings of a Conference on 
Safeguarding Sustainable European Agriculture: Coexistence, GMO-Free Zones and the Promotion o f Quality Food 
Produce in Europe, Assembly of the European Regions and European Parliament, Brussels, 17 May 2005 at 18
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the actual production costs and image of organic products in those European regions that are 
specialised in small-scale cultivation and the processing o f regional speciality products.585
Further, due to the technical and commercial control exerted by a small number of 
industries over genetic engineering in its development and seed production,586 several local 
farmers and authorities have expressed concerns in relation to the potentially wider effects 
that the commercial expansion o f agricultural biotechnology might pose to traditional 
agricultural practices and rural economies, such as the loss of local control. More specifically, 
the industry-driven development of genetic engineering and the subsequent development of 
high-technology large farms have also caused several concerns due to the potential 
dependencies o f the farming communities upon commercial-scale farming methods, the 
consequent changes of agricultural management practices and o f land use patterns587 and the 
gradual strengthening of the economic power of particular biotechnology seed companies to 
the detriment of small farmers in disadvantaged regions and countries. Harvested seeds could 
potentially be rendered infertile, making farmers entirely dependent on seeds manufactured 
and marketed by biotech companies causing additional distress for European farmers.588
Moreover, the protection of indigenous knowledge on genetic resources and the 
preservation o f non-GM  plant genetic resources seem to clash with the gradual privatisation , 
o f the genetic commons through outright ownership of living forms, thus it constitutes an
585 European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Co­
existence between genetically modified crops, and conventional and organic crops NAT/244 Brussels, 16 December 
2004 at 20
586 See on this issue in general, F.B. Rudolph and L. V. Mclntire (eds.) Biotechnology: Science, Engineering, and Ethical 
Challenges fo r  the Twenty-first Century (Joseph Henry Press: Washington, D.C, 1996)
587 See for example, ‘The spiraling agenda of agricultural biotechnology’, (1998) 283 ENDS Report 18-30. See: D. 
Pimentel, R. Zuniga, D. Morrison, ‘Update on the environmental and economic costs associated with alien invasive 
species in the United States’ (2005) 52 Ecological Economics 273-288 and S. Warwick, Small, E., 1999. Invasive plant 
species: evolutionary risk from transgenic crops. In: van Raamsdonk, L.W.D., den Nijs, J.C.M. (Eds.), Plant Evolution in 
Man-made Habitats. Hugo de Vries Laboratory, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, pp. 235-256; see also, Firbank, 
L.G., Perry, J.N., Squire, G.R., Bohan, D.A., Brooks, D.R., Champion, G.T., Clark, S.J., Daniels, R.E., Dewar, A.M., 
Haughton, A.J., Hawes, C., Heard, M.S., Hill, M.O., May, M.J., Osborne, J.L., Rothery, P., Roy, D.B., Scott, R.J., 
Woiwod, I.P., 2003. The Implications o f  Spring-Sown Genetically ModiWed Herbicide-Tolerant Crops fo r  Farmland 
Biodiversity: A Commentary on the Farm Scale Evaluations o f  Spring Sown Crops. Department for Environment Food 
and Rural Affairs, London. Clark, E. Ann, ‘Ten Reasons Why Farmers should Think Twice Before Growing GM 
Crops,” (1999) (http -Jfwww.plant.uoeueloh.ca/faeultv/eclark/1 Qreasons.htm). As Toke notes, ‘Greens criticize the green 
revolution for its dependence on chemicals and its tendency to favour rich owners o f large farms who could afford to buy 
the annual seed requirement. These criticisms are also thrown at GM crops by greens and development groups. Farmers 
are dependent on seed suppliers for ‘hybrid’ ‘green revolution’ crops because such seeds are, like most species hybrids, 
infertile. Farmers are dependent on commercial seed suppliers for GM seeds because of patent rights law.’ In Toke, D., 
'The Politics o f  GM Food- A comparative study o f  the UK, USA, and EU' (2004) Routledge at 8; See also on this, 
Marris, C., Wynne, B., Simmons, P., Weldon, S., (2001) Public perceptions of agricultural biotechnologies in Europe. 
Final report of the PABE Research project., httn://www. lancs.ac.uk/dcpts/iennp/nabe/docs.htrnl.
588 Lehman, V., “Patents on Seed Sterility Threatens Seed Saving," Biotechnology and Development Monitor 35 (1998), 
6-8.See on this issue, Priest, S.H., ‘A Grain of truth: the media, the public, and biotechnology, Rowman 7 Littlefield 
Publishers, Maryland especially Chapter 8, ‘The Terminator Gene’, pp.l 11-123; see also, Soil Association (2002), Seeds 
of Doubt: North American farmers’ experiences of GM crops (Soil Association, Bristol)
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additional field o f ethical concern that has been raised in relation to the potential introduction 
of GMOs into the European natural and agricultural environment.589 Additionally, ‘from an 
environmental perspective, farmers are crucial in many areas to preserve biodiversity, if GM- 
crops result in loss of competition for such farmers, this could have dramatically negative 
effects on biodiversity.’590 Applications of modem agricultural biotechnology in Europe have 
also brought forward worries about the availability and development o f alternative agricultural 
solutions and the added value and benefits of agricultural biotechnology in comparison to 
other forms o f agricultural techniques.591 Some European national authorities have raised the 
issue of usefulness and the need for GM crops in Europe. The Dutch Committee on Genetic 
Modification (Cogem) has suggested the formal introduction into the authorisation procedure 
o f a ‘usefulness-risk’ form592 whilst Swedish authorities have repeatedly argued ‘for a broader 
assessment including zero options and comparisons with alternatives such as different crops 
or cropping patterns.
Also, various public interest groups and research institutes have made the case for the 
EU ’s Deliberate Release framework to integrate socioeconomic considerations into its prior 
authorization framework. More concretely, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
Scotland and the Scottish Wildlife Trust have suggested that the economic impact of GMOs 
and risk mitigation measures be included in the assessment study for the deliberate release of 
GM crops.594 Within this frame, the Estonian Fund for Nature has called for a socio­
economic cost-benefit analysis to have the ‘need for GMOs in Europe to be taken into 
account and balanced against possible risks.’ 595 Some other proposals seem to be rather too 
broad in their targeting considering the inherent difficulties in quantifying or measuring ‘the
589 As it has been noted, ‘Genetic engineering provides, more poignantly than almost any other technology, a means of 
transferring power from the poor to the rich. Corporations are now winning patents for engineered crop plants. They 
obtain an unassailable advantage over the farmers whose ancestors developed the original crop. Their ownership o f what 
previously had no owner -  the germ line of living creatures -  represents a significant loss to the common weal.’ George 
Monbiot, ‘Blind Faith and Science’ The Guardian 5th December 1995; see also H. Warwick and G. Meziani, 2002. 
Seeds of Doubt. North American Farmers' Experiences o f GM Crops. UK Soil Association, Bristol; J.R. Axt, M.L.Com, 
D. M. Ackerman and M. Lee, Biotechnology, Indigenous Peoples, and Intellectual Property Rights. (Congressional 
Research Service: Washington, D.C., 1993); M.Lappe, ‘A Perspective on Anti-Biotechnology Convictions’ in B.Bailey 
and M.Lappe (eds.), Engineering the farm: Ethical and Social Aspects o f  Agricultural Biotechnology (Island Press: 
Washington, D.C., 2002) 155
590Interview evidence with competent authorities in Sweden and Finland, 16-7/6/2006
591 More about this issue can be found in http://www.gmnation.org.uk/
592 Precautionary Expertise for GM Crops National Report -  The Netherlands Precaution as Societal-Ethical Evaluation 
Quality o f Life and Management of Living Resources Key Action 111-13: socio-economic studies o f life sciences 
Project n° QLRT-2001-00034 Schenkelaars Biotechnology Consultancy March 2004
593 Interview evidence with Swedish competent authority, 22/2/2007
594 Summary o f Scottish responses to First Consultation on implementation of European Directive 2001/18/EC 
Regulating the Deliberate Release of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) A consultation on draft regulations to 
implement Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release into the environment o f genetically modified organisms July 
2002 Paper 2002/22, Annex 3 at76- 77
595 Interview with the Estonian Fund o f Nature, 2/3/2-2007
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ethical desirability o f particular types of genetic modification and their cumulative impact on 
the environment and society at large,596 or in formulating ‘a ‘total sustainability approach’ 
meaning economic, social and environmental impacts that ‘should include long-term 
(eventually also life cycle) testing for safety of human and animals, long term testing taking 
into account complex relations in the natural as well as agricultural ecosystems.’597 These 
proposals indicate that it is in the Commission’s interest to support the initiatives for the 
formulation o f management tools for the social control o f genetic engineering risks so as to 
also keep the risk management procedure away from the controversial business of politics.
Firsdy, public opinion polls have, on multiple occasions, reflected the general unease 
towards the Commission’s means of evaluating those risks that have been associated with the 
commercial application of agricultural biotechnology in Europe.598 Member states have 
actively sought for public opinion to be taken into account by the Commission before 
drafting its authorisation decisions, by voting against the proposed commercial permit upon 
the basis of the results o f official and/or de facto referenda. It should be mentioned that 
ethical concerns which relate to the use and the effects o f genetic engineering are ‘statistically 
among the bigger cause for the public to reject the growing and the commercialization of 
GM.’599 That has been the case with the public opinion on agricultural biotechnology in Italy, 
Austria, Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus and the countries of the Baltic region.600 For 
instance, Latvia, in the frame of the Regulatory Committee of the Deliberate Release 
Directive, highlighted that ‘there were negative opinions from the public’601 whilst the 
competent Austrian officials justified their opposition by stating that ‘the approval of GMOs
596 Genetically modified crops: the ethical and social issues, Report of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, May 1999, 
Published by Nuffield Council on Bioethics
597 Interview with the Slovenian Institute for Sustainable Development-UMANOTERA-The Slovenian Foundation for 
Sustainable Development, 3/2/2007
598 See: EUROBAROMETER. Europeans and biotechnology. Eurobarometer 52.1 [online], Luxemburg, Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities. Brussels, European Commission, Research DG, 2000 [cited 20 
December 2002], 84 p. Available from Internet: h ttp ://eu ro p a .eu .in t/c o m m /re se a rch /D d fre u ro b a ro m e te r-e n .p d f. 
EUROBAROMETER. Europeans, science and technology. Eurobarometer 55.2 [online]. Brussels, European 
Commission, Public Opinion Analysis, 2001 [cited 20 December 2002], 62 p. Available from Internet: 
h ttp ://cu ro D a .eu .in t/c o m m /p u b lic  o p in io n /a rc h iv e s /sp e c ia l .h tm
599 See about this issue, di Michela Angeli Public participation and information under regulation no. 1829/2003 and No. 
1830/2003. Diritto & Diritti - il Portale Giuridico italiano September 2004 and GM Crops Briefing Paper written by 
Malcolm Carroll. June 2003. www.christian-ecology.org.uk/GM-Crops.rtf.
600 See: J.Durant, M.W.Bauer and G.Gaskell (1998) Biotechnology in the Public Sphere-A European Sourcebook, 
London: Science Museum; M.W.Bauer and G.Gaskell Biotechnology: The Making o f  a Global Controversy (Science 
Museum-Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2002); G.Gaskell and M.Bauer (eds) Biotechnology 1996-2000: The 
Years o f  Controversy (Science Museum: London, 2001) see also
http://www.cc.europa.eu/rescarch/Drcss/2006/Ddf/Drl906 cb 64 3 final reDort-mav2006 cn.odf and R. Pardo, C. 
Midden and J. D. Miller ‘Attitudes toward biotechnology in the European Union’ Journal o f  Biotechnology Volume 98, 
Issue 1,11 September 2002, Pages 9-24
601 Interview evidence with Latvian competent authority (Sanita KalnaSa, Ministry of Agriculture, Senior officer- 
Division of Biotechnology and Novel food, 17/3/2006
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also has a strong political background, as 90 percent of Austrians do not want GMOs in food 
and agriculture.602
The multiplicity of ethical concerns that has been developed in the case o f the 
commercial applications of agricultural biotechnology in Europe became evident in the 2002 
GM Nation public debate,603 where it was noted that ‘GM marks a radical departure in our 
•use of living things for commercial purposes, and a fundamentally different way of breeding 
plants and animals.’604 Following the revision of the Deliberate Release framework which 
conferred those ethical concerns related to genetic engineering applications a pan-European 
dimension, the Network’s Florence Declaration605 broadened the debate on genetic 
engineering effects by making reference to the fact that ‘the impact o f GMOs on the 
environment and on the social and economic circumstances o f the community depends to a 
large extent on the characteristics of the territory concerned and may conflict with the 
principle of eco-compatible development.’606 In turn, the Berlin Manifesto for GMO-free 
Regions and Biodiversity in Europe under the title ‘Our Land, our Future, our Europe’ stated 
that; ‘Socio-economic and cultural impacts must be taken into account when introducing 
agro-technologies such as GMOs.’607 At the conclusion of the Berlin Conference on GMO 
free Regions, the need for the incorporation o f socio-economic impacts in the approval 
process, including agricultural and regional considerations and the impact on the 
Community’s general goals for sustainable agricultural development was emphasized.608 
Further, the Declaration of Rennes pointed out the ‘undeniable impact {of genetic 
engineering} on landscapes and socio-economic realities, genuine, sound agricultural practices 
are not only considered part of Europe’s cultural heritage and diversity but likewise as the 
core o f any regional action concerned with defending the welfare of its consumers.609
602 Interview evidence with the Austrian competent authority, 5/7/2006
603See:
http://www.gmnation.ore.uk/ and http://www2.aebc.gov.uk/aebc/renorts/gm nation report final.pdf: see also T. 
Horlick-Jones; J. Walls; G. Rowe ;N, Pidgeon; W. Poortinga; T. O'riordan On evaluating the GM Nation? Public debate 
about the commercialisation of transgenic crops in Britain New Genetics and Society, Volume 25, Issue 3 December 
2006 , pages 265 - 288
604 See on these issues, N. Stehr, (ed.) Biotechnology: between commerce and civil society, New Brunswick (N.J. 
Transaction Publishers, 2004) and A.Dyson and J. Harris (eds.), Ethics and biotechnology, (Routledge: London; New 
York, 1993); see also httn.7/www.gmnation.org.uk/
605 Charter of the regions and local authorities of Europe on the subject of coexistence of genetically modified crops with 
traditional and organic farming signed in Florence on the 4th of February, 2005; Available at http://www.gmofree- 
euregions.net:8080/docs/aiax/oem/Chartcr en.ndf
606See for more, http://www.gmofree-europe.org/
607 Berlin Manifesto for GMO-free Regions and Biodiversity in Europe:. Berlin, 23rd January 2005, available at
httD://w ww.gm o-frce-regions.org/Downloads/m anifcsto eng.pdf
608 Conclusions of the European Conference on GMO-free Regions, biodiversity & rural development, Berlin 23rd 
January 2005
609 Archives of the Greens- European Free Alliance in the European Parliament (visited on 19/7/2006)
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It needs to be mentioned that European biotechnology industries have also 
recognised the need to consider the ethical aspects o f agricultural biotechnology ‘since they 
are very aware o f ethical issues and consider them as important/610 although on a different 
rationale than the one o f the public interest groups. An ‘ethics code’ has been viewed more 
as a social management tool that could contribute to market acceptance, rather than as an 
acknowledgement o f the inherent ethical and socio-economic complexities o f genetic 
engineering. The bio-industrial sector, at the European level, has acknowledged the existence 
o f possible socioeconomic impacts in relation to the introduction of transgenic crops since ‘at 
the economic level transgenic plants will certainly have effects on the existing conditions in 
the agricultural sector. This competition between the industry multinationals could compound 
current trends towards market concentration.’611 The significance o f the ethical initiatives of 
the industrial sector lies not so much in its motives and underlying interests but in the 
acknowledgment o f the need to address and promote the ethical dimension o f the 
commercial applications of crop biotechnology.
Special reference should also be made to the ethical principles that have been 
integrated into the authorization frameworks o f various member states, such as that of 
Denmark that refers to economic and qualitative benefits, autonomy, dignity, integrity and 
vulnerability, just distribution o f benefits and burdens and codetermination and openness.’612 
Spanish regulators have also been sensitive to social demands for wider criteria for precaution 
and ‘they have tried to influence the design of GMOs or have adapted the regulatory process 
in response to public concerns’.613 The integration of ethical principles into national biosafety 
frameworks indicates the gradual prominence that the evaluation o f the ethical aspect of 
deliberate releases has gained, despite the fact that some ‘European member states that are 
willing to integrate social and ethical issues are still trying out suitable procedures (e.g., the
610 See von Schomberg (1999) at 18
6,1 Italy precaution for environmental diversity? February 1999 Fabio Terragni and Elena Recchia CERISS Safety 
Regulation o f  Transgenic Crops: Completing the Internal Market? A study o f the implementation o f EC Directive 
90/220 Main contractor: The Open University, contract no. BI04-CT97-2215,1997-1999 (March 1999) 13
612 Danish Ministry of Trade and Industry. 2000. The Danish Government Statement On Ethics And GeneticEngineering. 
Copenhagen: Ministry of Trade and Industry
613 Spain commercialization drives public debate and precaution O. Todt and J. L. Lujin Safety Regulation o f  Transgenic 
Crops: Completing the Internal Market? A study of the implementation o f EC Directive 90/220, January 1999 Main 
contractor: The Open University contract no. BI04-CT97-2215,1997-1999 at 7
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Netherlands), partly because most of them doubt the sincerity o f this statement, since 
concrete substantial and/or procedural recommendations are lacking.’614
Further, it should be mentioned that the assessment of the socio-economic 
implications of GM crops has already become an indispensable component o f the regulatory 
framework on agricultural biotechnology in many jurisdictions outside the EU such as, for 
example, in South Africa, Indonesia, Philippines, Argentina, New Zealand and Norway.615 
With regard to the latter, the Norwegian Gene Technology Act allows a departure from the 
obligation to apply and enforce the relevant commercial authorization decision where there 
are over-riding ethical or social considerations. According to this national biosafety 
framework, ‘the approval o f manufacture and commercialization o f GMOs must be 
contingent on their social utility and ethical acceptability’616 and the planned release of 
genetically engineered organisms should represent a ‘benefit to the community’ and ‘enable 
sustainable development.’617 Citing this ‘security clause,’ ‘the Minister o f Environment 
Thorbom  Bemtsen banned the marketing in Norway of six modified products on the 
grounds that they all contain genes coded for antibiotic resistance.’618 The Norwegian 
Biotechnology Board refused to approve the genetically modified maize C /D E /02/9-line  
MON863 from Monsanto, which has been made insect-resistant, until documentation has 
been provided to show that its use will have a socially beneficial effect and /or contribute to 
socially useful development.619
At the international level, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety makes an explicit 
reference to the need for taking socio-economic issues into consideration when assessing the 
risks o f agricultural biotechnology by stating that ‘the Parties, in reaching a decision on import 
{...}, may take into account, consistent with their international obligations, socio-economic 
considerations arising from the impact of living modified organisms on the conservation and 
sustainable use o f biological diversity, especially with regard to the value o f biological diversity
614 M. O’Brien, “ Science in the Service of Good: The Precautionary Principle and Positive Goals,”  in J. A. Tickner 
(ed.), Precaution, Environmental Science and Preventive Public Policy (Island Press: Washington/Covelo/London, 
2003) at 329
615 For more about this issue, see L. Fransen, A. La Vina, F. Dayrit, L. Gatlabayan, D.A. Santosa and S. Adiwibowo, 
Integrating Socio-Economic Considerations into Biosafety Decisions: The Role o f  Public Participation. World 
Resources Institute (Washington, DC. USA, 2005) 28
616 See more on this in E.Kallerud, ‘Science, Technology and Governance in Norway- Case study no 1: Biotechnology in 
Norway STAGE (Science, Technology and Governance in Europe) Discussion Paper 15 June 2004
617 See Sections 1 and 10 of the Norwegian Gene Technology Act, available at www.lovdata.no
618 Norway bans six genetically modified products (Friday 12 September 1997) 143 ENDS Europe Daily
619 Interview evidence with members of the Norwegian Biotechnology Advisory Board (18/6/2007)
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to indigenous and local communities.’620 The Council of Europe’s initiatives in the field of 
agricultural biotechnology have provided a first step at the European level in this direction, by 
calling to ‘draw up a European Convention covering bioethical aspects of biotechnology 
applied to the agricultural and food sector.’621 In view of the gradual importance that the 
socio-economic parameters of the planned release o f GMOs into the natural and agricultural 
environment have gained in national and supranational legislative frameworks, the European 
Commission, not only as the main coordinator of the 2001/18 licensing process, but also as a 
global actor that reflects upon those legal developments in the field of the governance control 
o f technological applications that occur outside its jurisdiction, would have to acknowledge 
the significance o f addressing these non-technical aspects of the open-field releases of GMOs.
In conclusion, the potential expansion of the commercial applications o f agricultural 
biotechnology has been viewed in Europe not only as a technological application that will not 
only modify current traditional agricultural practices, but also as a commercially-driven 
introduction o f a rather unnecessary high technology that will more likely bring forward 
sweeping changes in the structures of European farming and the social sustainability o f rural 
economies, especially in disadvantaged regions and countries.
6.2.2.2. The Commission’s response
How has the Commission, in its role as risk manager, responded to these non­
technical concerns? This section demonstrates that it has not so far addressed those socio­
economic views and concerns that have been expressed both at the notification and risk 
assessment levels, contrary to the relevant, if broadly phrased, legal requirements.
620 Article 26 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
621 In J. Kinderlerer, “Is a European Convention on the Ethical Use of Modem Biotechnology Needed?” (2000) 18 
Trends in Biotechnology 87-90. The author refers to the international conference of the Council of Europe on Ethical 
Issues Arising from the Application o f  Biotechnology was held in Oviedo, Spain, 16-19 May 1999 in the frame of which 
‘playing God’ was seen as important to the debate. Many believed that we ought to limit our creativity in moving genes 
between organisms. Although we have been modifying crops since the beginning of human civilization, it was generally 
recognized that not everything that can be done should be done. The rights of consumers and farmers to choose whether 
or not to use the new technology were recognized.’ at 87-88. See also Recommendation 1213 (1993) on developments in 
biotechnology and the consequences fo r  agriculture Assembly debate on 12 May 1993 (34th sitting) (see Doc. 6780, 
report o f the Committee on Agriculture, Rapporteur: Mr Gonzalez Laxe). Text adopted by the Assembly on 13 May 
1993 (36th Sitting). In the frame of this recommendation, the need for taking action ‘to protect biodiversity and 
ecosystems from all possible negative influences that biotechnological inventions might cause and to use biotechnology 
in preserving biodiversity;’ and ‘to accept the concept of "farmers' rights" as resulting from the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organisation's (FAO) resolution, adopted in November 1989, as well as to encourage the implementation of 
the project on an "International Code o f Conduct for Planned Biotechnology" drawn up by the FAO;’ was highlighted 
and called the Committee o f Ministers to ‘draw up a European convention covering bioethical aspects of biotechnology 
applied to the agricultural and food sector.
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Before examining Commission’s risk management practice, special emphasis will be 
placed upon the structure of the revised Deliberate Release Directive as such, since it 
constitutes the main frame of reference and guidance for the operation o f the authorization 
framework at all its stages. More concretely, the Directive’s references to non-scientific 
parameters have not been included into its operating parts, whereas it remains unclear which 
ethical principles or concerns can be taken into account or what the process for the 
recognition o f a concern as ethical or of an ethical principle in each member state is. The 
Directive seems, in fact, to employ a narrow perspective o f the role o f ethical principles in the 
formulation of each prior authorization decision and appears to treat them separately from 
the evaluation o f the risks, o f the adverse effects as well as o f the usefulness of GMO 
releases. Considering that the established licensing framework seems focused on the scientific 
evaluation of potential genetic engineering risks at the level o f risk assessment, the Directive’s 
rather broad references to these non-technical aspects o f the authorization framework 
implicitly highlight the importance o f risk management as a distinct step in the process o f risk 
analysis, in addressing these non-scientific factors. At the same time, these references signify, 
in effect, the special responsibilities of the Commission as the coordinator of the 2001/18 
licensing regime to operationalise the Directive’s vaguely worded references to the potential 
non-scientific effects of agricultural biotechnology so as to respond to the relevant concerns.
Moreover, despite the explicit acknowledgment of the relevance o f the ethical and 
socio-economic dimension of agricultural biotechnology in the prior authorization 
framework, there is no clear mechanism for introducing these concerns into the central 
control mechanism of risk assessment. Ethical issues have not been embodied in a 
standardized manner in this particular licensing framework, either as part o f its substantive 
content or o f its procedural set o f rules. Ethical considerations are not qualified in order to 
balance other lawful interests in the context o f the established licensing framework.622 
Further, there is no reference or example as to which sort o f ethical principle can be taken 
into account, or as to what it takes for an ethical principle to be ‘acknowledged’ in a member 
state. Thus, there is considerable uncertainty as to which elements could constitute an ethical 
consideration and how the ethical concerns- of one member state should be weighed against 
the concerns o f another country in the EU. The examination of ethical concerns does not 
constitute a procedural requirement when reviewing an application and no particular ethical
622 ‘Member States may take into consideration ethical aspects when genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are 
deliberately released or placed on the market as or in products’, Recital 9 of Directive 2001/18/EC
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consideration forms part o f any overall assessment o f the release o f a GMO product. In the 
Deliberate Release framework, ethical principles seem marginalized at the Community level, 
as is shown in the weak link between the prior authorisation procedure and the Commission’s 
ethical advisers, the obscure role and status o f the latter, the non-binding character of their 
opinions and the unidentified character of these ethical values.623
Thus far, the Commission, as the institution in charge of the elaboration of the 
Directive’s provisions, but also as the main coordinator for the implementation of the 
Deliberate Release framework and principal risk manager of the authorisation process has 
neither specified the Directive’s generic references to ‘ethical considerations’ nor has it set up 
the terms o f the involvement of non-experts via an open consultation process. In fact, the 
Commission’s risk management practice reflects a viewing o f the wider, non-scientifically 
documented concerns over the socio-economic impacts o f the commercialisation of 
agricultural biotechnology as incompatible with the technical, safety-focused orientation of 
the Deliberate Release framework.
Further, the Commission’s insistence on the need for decisions that would be based 
on ‘sound science,’ ‘objective’ and ‘rational’ estimations of risk624 has in fact ‘weakened’ the 
framework’s inclusive potential that the procedural, all-encompassing character o f its prior 
authorization structure entails. Even though ‘regarding deliberate release of GMOs, the 
development and definition of legally binding ethical aspects are of paramount importance for 
the Directive's range’625* and ethics has gained prominence in strategic decision-making and 
public policy: {...} also in the contemporary GMO debate,’626 no risk management or 
Commission authorisation decision has made any reference to the ethical questions or 
concerns related to the use o f genetic engineering.627 Its approach begs the question of
623 For more about the criticisms expressed against the way ethical issues are considered in the frame o f the Deliberate 
Release framework, see S. Carr and L. Levidow, ‘Exploring the links between science, risk, uncertainty and ethics in 
crop biotechnology regulation’ (2000) 12 Journal o f  Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32, S. Carr and L.Levidow, 
‘How Biotechnology Regulation Separates Ethics from Risk’ (1997) 26 Outlook on Agriculture 148; R. Grove-White 
and B.Szerszynki, ‘Getting behind Environmental Ethics’ (1992) 1 Environmental Values 285-296 and G. Vines, ‘How 
Far Should We Go?’ (1994) 141 New Scientist 12-13
624 Interview with various Commission officers in DG Environment, 19-22/2/2005
625 T. M. Spranger The Ethics and Deliberate Release of GMOs (2001) 11 Eubios Journal o f  Asian and International 
Bioethics 144
626N. Lindsey, M. Kamaraa, E. Jelsoe and A. Mortensen, Changing frames: the emergence of ethics in European policy 
on biotechnology (2001) 17(63) notizie di POLITEIA 80-93 and B. Salter and M. Jones, Human genetic technologies, 
European governance and the politics of bioethics (2002) 3 Nature Review Genetics 808-814.
627 See: G. L. Comstock, Vexing Nature? On the Ethical Case against Agricultural Biotechnology (Kluwer: 
Boston/Dordrecht/London, 2000) 297; J.D. Gaisford, J.E. Hobbs, W.A. Kerr, N. Perdikis and M.D. Plunkett, The 
Economics o f Biotechnology (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 2001) 151-168; R. Sherlock and J. D. Morrey (eds.), Ethical 
issues in biotechnology (Lanham, Maryland Rowman & Littlefield, 2002) 643; G.E. Pence, Designer Food: Mutant 
Harvest Or Breadbasket For The World? (Rowman & Littlefield, December 2001)
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whether the established technical character of the steps o f the risk assessment process and the 
scientific principles that underlie EFSA’s interpretation methodologies can be complemented 
with a legally binding procedure in which the Commission would be obliged to examine the 
relevant ethical considerations and socio-economic concerns. It should be further mentioned 
that despite the legal requirement for the compilation o f an evaluation report on the socio 
economic effects of the deliberate release and marketing o f GMOs,628 the Commission has 
not thus far conducted a relevant assessment. As has been noted; TSfeither the scientific 
debate nor the regulatory procedures give much regard to intrinsic concerns, i.e., concerns 
about the moral status o f the activity itself629 or of the entities involved in it.’630
The framework’s unresponsiveness to the concerns and objections that have so far 
been expressed in relation to the effects of GMO releases at the EU level can also be seen in 
the Commission’s non-use of its right to request an opinion from the European Group on 
Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE), which is attached to the Secretariat General 
of the Commission, upon the basis that ‘no ethical issues arise out o f the deliberate release of 
GMOs.’631 It should be mentioned that this Group, which was established in February 1998632 
and became the institutional successor of the Commission’s Group of Advisers on the Ethical 
Implications o f Biotechnology (GAEIB),633 has not, so far, made use o f its power to issue, on 
its own initiative, an Opinion on the ethical effects of agricultural biotechnology.634 To this 
end, it should be mentioned that this Group, as such, has interpreted its role at the level of 
risk assessment as one that should not respond to or discuss ad hoc ethical concerns. As a 
member of this Group noted, ‘EFSA, and not our Group, should be the organisation that 
needs to take into account, on a case-to-case basis, ethical concerns in agricultural 
biotechnology.’635 Due to the composition of EG E636 and the absence of any public
628 See on this issue, Preamble (62), ‘A report to be issued every three years by the Commission, taking into account the 
information provided by Member States, should contain a separate chapter regarding the socioeconomic advantages and 
disadvantages of each category of GMOs authorized for placing on the market, which will take due account o f the 
interest o f farmers and consumers’ and Art.31 para 7 of Directive 2001/18/EC
629 See on this issue in general, R.B. Flavell, “Plant Biotechnology. Moral Dilemmas” (2000) 3 Current Opinion in Plant 
Biology 143-146.
630 B.K.Myskja, ‘The moral difference between intragenic and transgenic modification o f plants’ (2006) 19 Journal o f  
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 226
631 Interview evidence with Commission officer in DG Environment, 17/2/2006
632 It was officially recognized by article 7 o f Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council o f 6 
July 1998 on the legal protection o f biotechnological inventions. L213, 1998-07-30, pp. 13-21, (‘The Commission’s 
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies evaluates all ethical aspects of biotechnology.’)
633 This Group had been set up in November 1991 as part of the Commission’s strategy to address those questions related 
to the public acceptance of biotechnology.
634 ‘The Group issues Opinions either at the request o f  the European Commission or on its own initiative.' Part E o f the 
Rules of Procedure-EGE 2005-2009, EGE Meeting, 21/12/2005. More in 
http://ec.europa.eu/europcan group ethics/mandate/docs/rules2005 09 en.pdf
635 Interview evidence with a member of the EGE (7/3/2007)
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participatory arrangement o f a consultative character in its operation, the institutionalisation 
o f the process for dealing with ethical aspects has framed another —apart from the one of the 
EFSA GMO Panel- expert ‘reading’ of the prior authorisation framework.
This expert approach ‘instrumentalizes the ethical debate by dictating a priori where 
its findings should lead’637 and perpetuates its market-oriented approach as the EG E attempts 
‘to enable the internal market to operate in accordance with Europe’s ethical values.’638 In 
view of the various antagonistic ethical viewings in relation to the issue o f biotechnological 
control,639 the institutionalization of a small group o f ‘ethics experts’640 has divided the public 
and expert communities in Europe creating a serious danger ‘o f suppressing the diversity of 
ethical opinions traditionally expressed within our societies, {among the different European 
countries} and, instead, imposing upon society the ‘ethics of the scientific establishment.’641 
This specific administrative practice indicates, on the one hand, the normative power of the 
institutionalisation o f the procedure for ethical consultation to impose a particular pattern of 
the legitimisation of the decision-making procedure for the commercialisation of plant genetic 
engineering from an ethical perspective without, on the other hand, providing the necessary 
procedural opportunities for EG E  or other ethical committees to submit their views in 
relation to the relevant prior authorisation process.
As a result o f this particular authorization practice, one can reach the conclusion that 
broader concerns about the effects of GMOs have remained external to the regulatory 
framework o f risk assessment. More specifically, the strict reliance of the Commission’s 
authorisation decisions on the scientific opinions offered by the EFSA and the establishment 
o f an immutable institutionalised pattern of expert control based on the consideration of only 
‘hard’ quantifiable factors have led to a lack of regard for and to a displacement of ‘soft’ non- 
quantifiable variables, such as concerns of an ethical or social character that relate to the
636 The vast majority o f the members o f the Group are Professors of Ethics in various European Universities. For more 
see: http://ec.europa.eu/euroDean group ethics/mandate/composition en.htm
637 H. Breyer, Committee on Energy, Research and Technology: Draft response to Bangemann report {CEC 1991}, 
December 1992, Luxembourg: European Parliament, typescript at 15. See also P. Wheale and R. McNally, 
‘Biotechnology policy in Europe: a critical evaluation’ (1993) 20(4) Science and Public Policy 274
638 European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE), General Report on the Activities o f the 
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission 1998-2000’, Brussels, 2001
639 See: L. Levidow, ‘Antagonistic Ethics Discourses for Biotechnology Regulation’ in R. von Schomberg, Contested 
Technology. Ethics, Risk and Public Debate. Series B: Social Studies of Science and Technology (International Centre 
for Human and Public Affairs: Tilburg, Netherlands, 1995) 179-189.
640 S. Welin, ‘Some issues in research ethics’ (1993) 2 Studies in Research Ethics, Gotenborg: Centre for Research 
Ethics 70
641 J. C Galloux,.A. T. Mortensen, S. de Cheveigne, A. Allansdottir, A. Chatjouli, and G. Sakellaris, ‘The institutions of 
bioethics: A comparison o f Denmark, France, Italy and Greece’ in M.W. Bauer and G. Gaskell, Biotechnology: The 
making o f  a global controversy (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2002) at 146
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broader effects of the commercialization of agricultural biotechnology. At the same time, 
these factors have also perpetuated EFSA’s projection of risk in the field of agricultural 
biotechnology as a neutral, a-political and objective concept that can always be identified, 
measured and quantified and can cause concrete and tangible effects, thus its assessment is 
not a question o f values, but solely of science.
The Commission has chosen not only to inform, but also to found its authorization 
decision solely upon the Opinions o f the EFSA GMO Panel, shrinking, in this way, its risk 
management responsibilities, weakening the ethical dimension o f agricultural biotechnology 
and leading to the establishment of an insulated institutional licensing setting that faces 
serious difficulties in capturing the nuances of the debate surrounding the acceptability o f the 
risks arising out o f the commercialization of agricultural biotechnology. This particular risk 
management practice which confers an all-encompassing normative value to science, 
challenges the rationale behind the separation o f the risk assessment from the risk 
management practice and leads to a paradox: the conceptualisation o f those non-technical 
concerns submitted at the risk assessment stage as irrelevant to the established science-based 
approach and the acknowledgment on behalf of EFSA of the absence of any (technical) 
genetic engineering risk, has ‘enabled’ the Commission to interpret its risk management in 
accordance with a technical approach towards genetic engineering safety.
6.2.2.3. National and sub-national responses towards the non-consideration o f non- 
scientific factors when assessing the acceptability o f the commercial release o f  
GMOs
In general, it should be stated that the combination of a wide array o f stakeholders in 
Europe that has addressed the need for formulation of common ethical principles in the field 
of agricultural biotechnology and of various international legal initiatives that make reference 
to this particular aspect o f genetic engineering highlights the gradual significance that these 
concerns are gaining in the biosafety debate. Despite the requests for the consideration of 
particular socio-economic parameters, as well as the initiatives assumed for the inclusion of 
non-scientific factors in the frame of various biosafety regimes, the Commission seems 
unwilling to re-frame its risk management approach and to make use o f the political character 
o f its responsibilities as the ultimate decision-maker. Thus, the examined regional and local 
initiatives indicate not only the weak normative force o f the Directive’s reference to the socio-
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ethical aspects o f agricultural biotechnology, but also the Commission’s reluctance to 
operationalise them so as to respond to those concerns that cannot be raised at the risk 
assessment stage. The following section examines the effects of the Commission’s particular 
fulfillment of its risk management duties in the frame of the revised authorization framework.
6.2.3. Effects of the established authorization practice
As a result o f the Commission’s ill-defined viewing of its risk management duties and 
its consideration o f non-expert opinions as being incompatible with the established ‘science- 
based interpretation model’, the relevant ethical and socio-economic concerns have in fact 
been kept out o f the scope o f its risk management perspective and the realm of the 
authorization framework for the deliberate release of GMOs. Further, due to this 
standardized risk management practice, the notification scientific data and, in general, the 
science-based risk assessment organizational structure has been insulated from wider societal 
and political questions and considerations. This has been the case despite calls for the 
establishment o f ‘a transparent procedure regarding these considerations and the opportunity 
for Member States, as well as for other stakeholders to contribute to such considerations’642 
The Commission’s approach confirms that, in the deliberate release framework, ‘ethics seems 
to be more important as a discursive construction than as a regulatory practice.’643 In other 
words, despite the fact that ‘GMOs constitute a clear example of a low-certainty, low- 
consensus situation,’644 the Commission has been consistent in marginalizing those actors that 
do not necessarily possess or might generate scientific data, but might contribute to the 
performance o f a comprehensive assessment o f the possible sustainable benefit o f the 
notified releases for the community. This institutional practice that indicates a shrinkage of 
the Commission’s responsibilities as a risk manager undermines, its own argumentation in 
relation to the need for the separation of the risk analysis framework between risk assessment 
and management.
The prioritization o f scientific or technical information for the grounding of prior 
authorization decisions, which have kept a broad spectrum of concerns out o f the
642 Joint-GMOs-Letter-to COREPER (Permanent Representations -  Environment Attach6(e)s) for 9 March 2006 
Council. Brussels, 22 February 2006 Re: GMO Policy debate -  9 March Environment Council at 5
643 N. Lindsey, M. Wambui Kamara, E. Jelsoe, A. T. Mortensen, ‘Changing Frames: The Emergence of Ethics in 
European Policy on Biotechnology’ (2001) X V II63, Notizie di Politeia 91
644 D. Winickoff, S. JasanofF, L. Busch., R. Grove-White and B. Wynne, ‘Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, 
Risk, and Democracy in World Trade Law’ (2005) 30 The Yale Journal o f  International Law 118
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authorization context, decreases their ethical and social acceptability and has caused severe 
tensions in the operation o f the authorisation framework.645 Namely, the established 
institutional assessment practice has in effect prevented any reinterpretation or questioning o f 
its scientific claims and has led to the transformation of the space for operation of the 
authorisation framework into an expert-driven domain. The structural and interpretative 
marginalisation o f non-scientific concerns and the isolation o f the safety assessment from 
other debates, such as socio-economic or ethical ones, seem to reflect the Commission’s 
preference for technical solutions that can be articulated in quantifiable terms. Despite the 
Commission’s official acknowledgment of the need for a ‘full and genuine participation of all 
stakeholders in the innovation process,646and for a consideration of non-scientific or 
unquantified risks,647 the institutionalised resort to expert advice has, in effect, led to the 
formulation of a ‘closed’ decision-making system. Such a line of reasoning in the frame of the 
prior authorization structure that views the genetic engineering issue through a ‘sound- 
science’ window and offers no substantial opportunities for meaningful participation to non- 
scientific actors, opposes the widely accepted remark that; ‘Technical expertise cannot 
substitute for values and priorities in ecological risk assessment; these are issues of policy, not 
science’648and in effect does not recognise the inherent conceptual diversity and value-plurality 
in the field of agri-food biotechnology.
The established authorisation practice seems insufficient in view of the fact that ‘such 
a system clearly neglects the value dimension o f issues related to sustainable development’649 
and prioritises the so-called ‘objective’ aspects of risk analysis against those elements that 
cannot be easily quantified, such as the perceptions o f the public. As a result, these technical 
evaluations are, in fact, conferred with disproportionate weight in relation to the evaluations 
of others stakeholders rendering important aspects o f the genetic engineering debate 
undetectable and untreatable. The striving for assessment in exclusively scientific, often only 
quantifiable, terms frequently results in a tendency among experts to overlook other aspects,
645 As it has been noted, ‘as to the areas falling within the precautionary principle, and especially genetically modified 
organisms, the cause for concern among the people is not insufficiency in scientific research but often, just the opposite: 
the increasing hold of science on the entire universe that surrounds us.1 In Z. K. Forsman, ‘Community Regulation of 
Genetically Modified Organisms: a difficult relationship between law and science’ (2004) 10(5) European Law Journal 
585
646In European Commission (2003), Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Innovations policy: updating the Union’s 
approach of the context of the Lisbon strategy’, COM (2003) 112, final, Brussels, 11 March at 13
See for example, WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
16-1-118, WT/DS26/AB/R&WT/DS48/AB/R, especially paragraphs 187-194
648 R. T. Lackey, ‘Ecological risk assessment: use, abuse and alternatives’ (1997) 21 Environmental Management 811
649 See on this in general, B. Zechendorf, “Sustainable Development: How can Biotechnology contribute?” (1999) 17 
Trends in Biotechnology 219-225.
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such as the social dimension o f the concept of sustainable development, which has 
transcended the shaping and the application of the Commission’s environmental policy.’650 
The need for the establishment of an inclusive, communicative decision-making structure that 
would render the established authorization framework sensitive towards the plurality of 
concerns related to the effects of GMO deliberate releases has been associated with the need 
for an alteration o f the dominant science-based interpretative frames.651 As has been noted; 
‘Contextualised science cannot be validated as (being) reliable by conventional discipline- 
bound norms; while remaining reliable, it must be sensitive to a much wider range o f ‘social’ 
implications.’652 In the case o f the examined prior authorisation structure, rather than meeting 
the need for an inclusive, all-encompassing and participatory framework, the procedural 
structure o f this particular reflexive framework has perpetuated the dominance of the 
established expert-based paradigm.
Technically speaking, ‘even if they only assess and communicate risk in separate 
organizational entities, scientists alone continue to bear the sole responsibility for defining the 
essential question o f what constitutes risk’653 leading to a ‘mere passive and conformational 
learning (Sve see no dangerous thing happening’).’654 In effect; ‘By acting as if assessments 
were completely objective, the values o f experts will often be given too much weight, and the 
values held by the public might be neglected’,655 thus ‘alternatives tend to disappear as 
scientists often portray the chosen path as the only viable one.’656 The prioritization of the 
‘objective’ and ‘quantitative’ language of regulatory science or o f ‘hard’ scientific facts to the 
detriment o f other forms o f public justification has exerted a divisive role within the EU.
Many member states and non-state actors persist in interpreting the main terms o f the 
prior authorization framework in ways that are more sensitive to traditional idioms and local
650 M. Karlsson, ‘Biosafety principles for GMOs in the Context of Sustainable Development’ (2003) 10 International 
Journal o f  Sustainable Development and World Ecology 21
651 A. Herwig, ‘Transnational Governance Regimes for Foods Derived From Biotechnology and their Legitimacy’ in C. 
Joerges, I.-J. Sand and G. Teubner, Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2004) 
221; See: S. Borras, ‘Risk society values and institutional change in the EU: the case of genetically modified organisms’ 
in K.Nielsen, C. Koch (eds.), Institutional Change, Values and Learning (Edward Elgar publishers, Cheltenham 2004)
652 H. Nowotny, P. Scott and M. Gibbons, Rethinking Science, Knowledge and the Public in an Age o f  Uncertainty 
(Polity Press: Cambridge, 2001) 199
S. Borras, (2006): ‘Legitimate Governance of Risk at EU level? The Case o f GMOs’ in (2006) 73(1) Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change 71
654 J. Jelsma, ‘Learning About Learning in the Development of Biotechnology’ in A. Rip, T.J. Misa and J. Schot,
Managing Technology in Society-The approach o f  Constructive Technology Assessment (Pinter, 1995) 149
655 M. Karlsson, ‘Science and norms in policies for sustainable development: Assessing and managing risks o f chemical 
substances and genetically modified organisms in the European Union’ (1 February 2006) 44(1) Regulatory Toxicology 
and Pharmacology 54
656 That was the case with the history of hybrid com as has been analysed by J.R.Kloppenburg, Jr. First the Seed: The
Political Economy o f Plant Biotechnology, 1492-2000 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1988)
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particularities and adopt their own normative standards and acceptability criteria that lie 
beyond the realm of the evaluation rationale of EFSA and in effect of the Commission as the 
‘ultimate’ arbiter of the pertinent risk assessment conflicts and divergences. In addition, the 
implicit acknowledgment of ‘scientific’ uncertainty as the sole type of uncertainty that is 
pertinent to the effects of genetic engineering as it refers only to a temporal lack of technical 
knowledge and o f measurable scientific evidence, despite the existence of empirical, 
theoretical, methodological and normative uncertainties, minimizes the public deliberation 
terrain and deprives actors that do not possess biochemical laboratories or similar 
infrastructure from articulating procedurally acceptable arguments based upon different types 
of uncertainty.
The exclusive resort to EFSA opinions as the sole frame of reference for the 
evaluation o f the effects and the potential risks arising from the notified releases and the 
stripping of the relevant risk management decisions from their socio-ethical and political 
elements have, in fact, decreased the sense o f collective ownership over the final 
authorization decision. Moreover, it has led to an inability to acquire the regulatory experience 
needed to formulate commonly acceptable normative standards and risk assessment criteria 
and to the gradual formation o f a shared regulatory culture. As a result, this experience does 
not allow for the ongoing enrichment of each representation and the creation o f ‘shared 
horizons of meaning — horizons that are not fixed but open’.6*7 As has been noted, ‘the 
unquestioned ‘factualisation of uncertainty’ serves to conceal the issue of scientific uncertainty 
itself from the public.,658As a result; ‘Arguments and evidence based on ‘pure science’ are 
unlikely to impress opponents of the technology, whose interests are driven by ethical or 
economic (fears of corporate dominance, protectionist aims) considerations or by diffuse 
fears over new technologies and the safety of the food supply.659 According to Kellow; 
‘Attempts by scientists to prevent what they might see as the intrusion o f non-experts into the 
process are not only unhelpful, but are likely to heighten public suspicion and 
apprehension.’660
657 A. Frank, “Ethics and the Postmodern Crisis in Medicine,” in P. KomesarofF (ed.), Expanding the Horizons o f  
Bioethics: Proceedings o f  the Fifth National Conference o f  the Australian Bioethics Association (Arena Publishing, 
Melbourne, 1998) 28
658 G. Meyer, A. Paldam Folker, R. Bagger Jorgensen, M. Krayer von Krauss, P. Sandoe & G. Tveit, ‘The factualization 
o f uncertainty. Risk, politics and genetically modified crops - a case of rape’ 22(2) Agriculture and Human Values 239
659 T. Bemauer, Genes, Trade and Regulation-The Seeds o f  Conflict in Food Biotechnology, (Princeton University Press, 
2003)170
660 A. Kellow, ‘Risk Assessment and Decision-making for Genetically Modified Foods’ (Spring 2002) 13 Risk: Health, 
Safety and Environment 126
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Moreover, despite the setting up of an institutional machinery for the mutual 
reinforcement and reconciliation of the various viewpoints on agricultural biotechnology and 
the establishment of an open-ended deliberation scheme, the institutionalised risk assessment 
and management practices with their instrumental focus and assumption of conflict have, in 
fact, led to the establishment of conditions of legitimate peripheral participation661 for those 
actors that are not considered as experts. These practices have left them with marginal 
opportunities to become meaningfully involved into the risk analysis process and have led to 
the augmentation o f the existing informational inequalities among the main stakeholders, 
perpetuating a limited understanding of the genetic engineering problem and to the 
obstruction o f meaningful communication between the different actors.662 In other words, 
the Commission approaches the authorization framework as a set of licensing rules that 
should focus on the safeguarding of the technical safety of GMO releases, without examining 
the potential broader effects of the commercial applications o f genetic engineering, 
perpetuating the flawed assumption ‘that the Commission should be linked to specific ethical 
problems that relate to the authorization o f GMOs, is erroneous; EFSA should have this 
role.’663
However, in view of the ethical and socio-economic concerns over the potential 
applications o f genetic engineering and the political character of the stage o f risk 
management, the Commission needs to acknowledge these concerns and address them, if not 
on a case-by-case basis, at least on the basis of some commonly agreed ethical principles and 
a socio-economic platform that would be adjusted to the particularities of the European agri­
food context. The acknowledgment o f these concerns from the Commission’s point o f view 
would comply with its all-encompassing, procedural and inclusive viewing o f the prior 
authorization framework. Within this frame, the viewing of risk in the deliberate release 
framework should include social and economic factors in order to ensure that the notified 
release is ethical and socially justifiable. To this end, a requirement for societal assessment that 
would focus on identifying the problems that a new GMO product seeks to solve, the 
available alternative ways o f solving the same problem and the effects o f its
661 For more about this concept see J. Lave, & E. Wenger, Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1990)
See for example on this the following: C. Adams, ‘Public consultation on GM crops ‘just a PR offensive’ (9th July 
2002) Financial Times; Genewatch UK 3rd March 2003. Press release: GM Public Debate ‘Meaningless’ Unless 
Government Halts GM Commercialisation Decisions; Mark Townsend 9th March (2003) ‘Fury over spin on GM crops’ 
The Observer.
663 Interview evidence with Commission officer, DG Environment, 19/11/2006
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commercialization upon the existing production structures in the field o f agriculture should 
be considered as a necessary addition to the structure of the authorization process.
Significant emphasis can also be placed on whether the deliberate release represents a 
benefit to the agricultural communities and a contribution to the development of the 
European farming sector. In addition, the all-encompassing character of the designed 
procedural framework indicates the need for the formulation o f a set of ethical principles for 
the guidance o f the decision-making process, so as to provide a means that would ‘balance the 
rights of, and benefits that would be obtained by, biotechnology companies, farmers, {...} 
distributors, and the public.’664 The ethical and socio-economic aspects o f the process o f the 
authorization of genetic engineered products need to be acknowledged for reasons of social 
legitimacy as well as for the Commission to arrive at better informed authorization decisions 
that would integrate the main aspects of the relevant risk debate.
6.3. Concluding Remarks
The Commission has chosen to focus on the scientific findings o f the EFSA GMO 
Panel as the sole form of information that should be taken into account for the formulation 
o f its authorization decisions. It has conceived the scientific opinions of EFSA not only as an 
input, but also as the decisive factor that leaves no space for an exploration o f broader ‘safety’ 
concerns about the potential effects o f genetic engineering and/or their acceptability upon 
the basis that its duties as a risk manager have been curtailed due to the conclusions reached 
at the risk assessment level that there is no risk that needs to be managed. The established 
institutional structure for the risk assessment and management o f GMO releases has framed a 
science-based interpretation paradigm that has, in effect, shielded it from societal intervention 
that might have led to the accentuation of the regulatory need for better informed and more 
responsive risk analysis conclusions.
The prioritization of the language o f ‘expert’ control has trivialized the main ‘merit’ of 
proceduralisation, which derives from its all-encompassing character that involves the need
664 ‘Policy Options for reconciling science-based considerations and broader socio-economic issues in regulating the 
products o f biotechnology-An addendum to International approaches to non-science issues in regulating the products of 
biotechnology’ prepared for Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee-Project Steering Committee-The Regulation 
of Genetically Modified Foods-December 2000 at 7
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for consultation and involvement of wider social constituencies about the implications of 
particular projects, in order to gather a diversity o f perspectives and reach a solution that 
would not only comply with what science says, but would also be responsive to a broader 
array o f concerns. Namely, as a result o f the fact that problems are only addressed from the 
point o f view of the science-based risk assessment requirements that focus, in principle, on 
environmental and in general physical, in nature, effects, major aspects of the genetic 
engineering issue are out of sight and prevent non-scientific actors from becoming 
authentically involved in the decision-making process. As the authority of scientific experts, in 
the form of the GMO Panel, conceals or rules out those criticisms that do not refer to the 
evidence requested in Annex II, the Commission’s exclusive resort to the EFSA opinions and 
the viewing o f non-expert views as merely incongruous with the established science-based 
authorisation model has so far obscured broader non-scientific concerns of a socio-ethical or 
economic nature.
Instead of corresponding to the inclusive and all-encompassing expectations that the 
procedural structure has created, the prioritization o f the ‘objective’ and ‘quantitative’ 
language of ‘hard’ scientific facts to the detriment of other forms o f public justification and 
argumentation has exerted a divisive role within the EU and has transformed EFSA’s 
evaluations from an informational decision tool to the sole decision-making standard that has 
developed legal effect. This particular line o f authorization reasoning that views the genetic 
engineering issue through a ‘sound-science’ window and considers only those potentially 
adverse effects that are scientifically conceivable and technically testable conceals those values 
and parameters that relate to ecological risk assessment, which are primarily issues of policy 
character, rather than objects of scientific analysis. In effect, it does not recognize the 
inherent conceptual diversity and value-plurality in the field o f agricultural biotechnology, 
leading to the establishment of a process-driven system that, though seemingly open to 
corrective influences and paradigmatic modifications due to its apparendy, open-ended, 
reflexive character, is actually self-reinforcing its technical orientation. The lack o f scrutiny of 
the broader justifications and purposes associated with the agri-environmental use of genetic 
engineering does not do justice to the complexity of the effects o f genetic engineering and the 
limitations o f science in this field of expertise and has institutionalized a systemic bias against 
concerns and views that do not conform with the established risk analysis paradigm.
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More specifically, the Commission’s viewing of the genetic engineering risk control 
problem as an issue o f scientific review and laboratory testing has shaped an authorisation 
practice that determines what should be the input information and how this should evaluated. 
The institutionalization of this authorization practice has trivialised any efforts or initiatives 
that question its inclusive and responsive qualities and its ability to address concerns that 
originate outside the realm of conventional scientific methodologies science or those ones 
that rest on substantially alternative standards o f acceptable evidence’665 and seems to ignore 
that even the best technical expertise cannot be decisive where issues o f value and principle as 
well as broader non-technical concerns are involved thus creating an illusion o f certainty on 
the conclusions.
This interpretative approach framing the genetic engineering control issue as a 
problem of technocratic control renders the promoted scientific rationale impenetrable and 
views the intensification of the process o f the generation o f scientific knowledge and the 
narrowing o f all relevant uncertainties as the sole means o f safety control oversight. It 
suggests a particular relationship between expert or science-based and lay or, in general, non- 
scientific forms of argumentation that questions the boundaries between risk assessment and 
management. As a result, the privileged positioning of a particular form of knowledge, such 
as the risk assessment conclusions of the EFSA GMO Panel, opposes the proceduralisation 
paradigm that is structured upon the assumption that there is no privileged viewpoint in the 
sense that none can claim to have an unquestionable understanding of problems, objectives 
and means. This paradigm has been also associated with the acknowledgment of the need for 
the establishment o f a structure for a non-laboratory, ‘social verification of the reliability o f 
the findings of regulatory science in view of the need for consultation of other knowledge 
producers and users and also wider social constituencies about the implications of the 
commercial applications o f agricultural biotechnology in order to gather a diversity of 
perspectives.’666 Further, this particular evaluation practice has caused broad distress 
considering that ‘the cause for concern among the people is not insufficiency in scientific 
research but often just the opposite:, the increasing hold o f science on the entire universe that 
surrounds us.’667
665 S. Jasanoff, ‘Commentary: Between risk and precaution-reassessing the future of GM crops’ (2000) 3(3) Journal o f  
Risk Research 280
666 Interview evidence with Commission officials in DG Environment and Agriculture (19/4/2006)
667 Z. K. Foreman, ‘Community Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: a difficult relationship between law and 
science’ (2004) 10(5) European Law Journal 585
204
In relation to the Commission’s framing of the prior authorisation structure, it is 
concluded that the reliance o f all authorisation decisions exclusively upon EFSA’s scientific 
conclusions has made it evident that proceduralism, as has been promoted by the 
Commission, seems to fall short of its expected outcomes in terms o f Svidening’ the decision­
making structures (i.e. safeguarding the participation o f a broad range of actors), questioning 
the traditional power o f experts and offering all-encompassing responses to risk challenges. 
The overlooking o f the social dimensions o f agri-biotechnology applications has deprived 
proceduralism of its responsive and knowledge generating capacities and has in effect 
perpetuated the underlying assumption o f the DRD framework that science can identify, 
evaluate and control all genetic engineering effects. Further, the ‘narrowing’ o f the risk 
management framework has in effect blurred the boundaries between risk assessment that 
could assess the magnitude of potential harm, and risk management that could define the 
acceptability of the potential risks.
This de facto blurring has signified the Commission’s viewing of ethical, political and 
economic arguments as factors that might distort the objective character o f the procedure for 
the scientific determination of risks and the capturing of the relevant prior authorisation 
framework by an expert-based constellation of institutional actors that perpetuates the re­
enforcement of a particular scientific argumentation in the form of the opinions o f the EFSA 
GM O Panel. In other words, EFSA’s expert control argumentation seems to have been used 
by the Commission strategically so as to remove and displace the less manageable and non- 
testable potential risks and concerns in the area o f agricultural biotechnology from the 
established authorisation framework. The chapter does not question the need to make use of 
sound scientific accounts and their inherently privileged position in a safety-oriented 
framework, or even the authority of official technical opinions to shape the acceptability o f 
the commercial releases o f GMOs, but highlights the need to develop appropriate platforms 
that would converge social and technological goals and interests. Public confidence in the 
credibility and legitimacy o f the established authorisation regime will be achieved only if those 
legislative provisions contained in the Deliberate Release framework that refer to the need to 
consider the socio-economic and ethical dimensions o f genetic engineering are activated in 
institutional and procedural terms.
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The integration of ethical and socio-economic concerns into the scope o f the prior 
authorisation framework would also comply with the Commission’s stated choice of 
proceduralism as an alternative model for achieving uniform regulatory outcomes and the 
objectives within that paradigm as a benchmark o f what should be done. In fact, the 
Commission’s focus on the procedural design and operation o f the licensing framework as 
the most suitable paradigm for the safety control of genetic engineering releases that would 
ensure the required space for reflection in a novel and uncertain regulatory field requires the 
consideration of non-expert views in the field o f agricultural biotechnology. The following 
chapter examines EFSA’s opinions and its particular risk analysis practice, which perpetuates 
the traditional flawed perception of science as intrinsically objective despite, inter alia, of the 
evident informational asymmetries. It will be argued that the established risk analysis structure 
fails to question the presented scientific evidence as a source of objective, impartial and 
unbiased regulatory information and to acknowledge its limitations and the relevant 
uncertainties, or in other words to recognize the inherently open-ended character of 
science,668and the value-laden character of risk assessment.
668 See on this issue, in general, R. Lidskog, “In Science We Trust? On the Relation Between Scientific Knowledge, Risk 
Consciousness and Public Trust” (1996) 39 Acta Sociologica 31-56.
Chapter 7: Scientific Evaluations in the DRD:
a case o f asymmetries and uncertainties
The GMO Panel of EFSA has effectively shaped the perception that its risk 
assessment practice and underlying evaluation rationale is intrinsically objective, neutral, 
context-free and devoid o f any normative features. By projecting its opinions as ‘objective’ 
evaluations based upon the ‘best available science’, it lays them forward as good foundation 
for sound licensing decisions that are incontestable in character. By doing so, EFSA’s 
evaluations leave practically no space for the examination o f other non-technical 
considerations at the level of risk management, where the decision on the acceptability of the 
potential effects and risks o f genetic engineering is made. That space could have been 
provided if the EFSA GMO Panel had acknowledged the inherent temporal and geographical 
limitations in the validity and representativeness o f its safety evaluations, the value-laden and 
normative character of its opinions, as well as the existence o f a certain degree of uncertainty 
or knowledge gaps, especially in assessing or predicting the potential long-term, cumulative or 
indirect effects and risks of the releases o f GMOs into the various natural or agricultural 
environmental contexts.
The procedure for the assessment o f the probability and severity o f potential risks 
and, in general, o f the multiple effects o f the open-field applications o f agricultural 
biotechnology is characterised by significant informational asymmetries and the absence o f a 
general scientific consensus on the main underlying assumptions and ecological points of 
reference. This chapter argues that, in view of these structural factors, the decisions that need 
to be made at the notification and risk assessment levels are a priori non-objective, based on 
inherently artificial benchmarks and assumptions, thus EFSA exerts an intrinsically normative 
task. The selection o f the comparator and the baseline that should be used for the evaluation 
of the safety of GM releases, the consideration o f the pertinent scientific uncertainties and 
scientific pluralism in the field of genetic engineering and the value conferred on the results of 
the various experimental releases, as well as on the specific artificial analogies used constitute 
evidence o f the inherently normative character of the risk assessment procedure. However, at 
no point have these choices been made explicit, nor has there been a recognition of their 
artificial character and/or their inherently limited, at least in temporal and spatial terms, 
regulatory value.
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More specifically, section one examines the informational asymmetries between 
notifiers and risk assessors in terms o f who generates and possesses the required technical 
knowledge. The section examines the main sources o f biosafety data in Europe and the 
prominent role of industrial actors in the generation o f knowledge in the field o f agricultural 
biotechnology. These asymmetries have in fact signified a paradox: the stricter the notification 
and risk assessment requirements become, from the environmental and, in general, safety 
point o f view, the more ‘elitist’ the prior authorisation procedure turns out to be in terms of 
decreasing the array of actors that can exert a thorough evaluation control o f notification data 
produced under particular, context-specific testing conditions. This strengthens the self- 
referential character o f the prior authorisation context. The second section focuses on 
EFSA’s portrayal of the notified field trial findings as an all-encompassing and objective basis 
for evaluation judgments and control measures in the DR framework. More specifically, the 
special regulatory weight conferred on field trials as the main source o f safety information on 
the various applications o f agricultural biotechnology at the level o f risk assessment seems to 
overlook their inherently subjective aspects considering that their results and the 
correspondent evaluation conclusions that stem from their performance mostly depend on 
their design and organisation, which in turn relies on the particular methodological focus and 
research priorities of those actors that have been in charge of their administration.
The chapter further argues that EFSA’s efforts to project its risk assessment opinions 
as the carriers o f a unified scientific approach over genetic engineering overlook the highly 
contested scientific basis of risk assessments in the field o f genetic engineering and the 
conditionality o f the generated knowledge. Also ignored, are the significant knowledge gaps in 
relation to the scientific understanding of the long-term or cumulative effects o f the notified 
releases. Section 3 examines whether EFSA recognises and addresses the plurality o f scientific 
approaches or technical interpretations that have been given to the same notification data, as 
well as how this pan-European risk assessor of GMO-related risks has so far reflected upon 
the absence o f a solid, commonly agreed, scientific threshold and evaluation framework in 
agricultural biotechnology and considered the relevant scientific uncertainties and its constant 
resort to the artificial analogy o f familiarity as the main means for shaping safety assessments.
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7.1. Authorising GMO products based on whose science?
The Prior Authorization Framework (PA) for the safe deliberate release of GMOs has 
seemingly become an information game in which winning depends on one’s ability to obtain, 
comprehend and analyse highly complex technical data on the safety of GMO releases. 
Notifiers, competent national authorities and Community scientific bodies are in a constant 
struggle to generate, gather and make use o f information that complies with the 
environmental risk assessment requirements of the Deliberate Release framework in a way 
that will allow them to construct acceptable —in regulatory terms- arguments and counter­
arguments regarding the level of safety and/or environmental behaviour o f GMOs. The 
efficient operation o f this licensing framework, and in effect the granting o f the release permit 
is almost entirely dependent on the timely generation, submission and verification of a pre­
defined form of scientific/technical information, as prescribed in Annexes II and III o f the 
Directive and in the relevant Commission’s Guidance Notes and Decisions. It has been noted 
that, ‘the risk assessment o f GMOs depends mainly on the application forms of the directives, 
which the applicants fill in and the authorities evaluate.’669
More specifically, the responsibility for the ex-ante provision o f the necessary 
information about the safe character of the proposed release has been delegated to those 
actors that propose the release of GMOs into the environment (notifiers), which should 
perform the required environmental risk assessment in accordance with article 6 (2) o f the 
DRD. This particular allocation of regulatory responsibilities within the licensing framework 
under examination can be attributed to the fact that these actors are, in principle, these ones 
that possess all the necessary resources and data regarding the life-cycle, behaviour and 
technical safety o f each GM product notified at the EU level, as well as to the need to render 
the relevant authorization procedure as not resource-intensive for public administrations and 
EU scientific committees for reasons of operational efficiency. Thus, the role of the notifier is 
extremely significant as it bears the responsibility of submitting a detailed notification dossier 
and carries the burden o f proof of safety for the proposed commercial release.
669 In R.A. Koivisto, K.M. Tdrmakangas and V.S. Kauppinen, Hazard identification and risk assessment 
procedure for genetically modified plants in the field -GMHAZID. (2001) 8 Environmental Science & 
Pollution Research 1
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As a result, the notified data constitutes the sole object of analysis at the risk 
assessment level, shaping, in effect, not only the context, but also the content of the relevant 
authorisation decisions. Thus, this section examines the source and the nature of knowledge 
utilized in the prior authorization framework as prescribed in the form of the established 
notification requirements. Also examined are the notifiers as those actors that set the prior 
authorization procedure into force, as well as the main sources of technical information and 
evidence on the general characteristics and safety features o f those GMO products destined 
to become authorized at the EU level. It is found that in the field of EU agricultural 
biotechnology, industrial notifiers have become the sole knowledge brokers and have 
monopolized the process o f knowledge generation. Considering the novelty of genetic 
engineering as a scientific field and the science-oriented assessment and management practice, 
but also in view of the dominant presence o f industrial notifiers, this section views the 
generated information not only as a significant input into the regulatory process, but also as a 
factor that exacerbates inequalities among those actors involved in the performance and 
evaluation o f the required risk assessment instead of moderating or even bridging them, 
according to a reflexive and non-hierarchical reading o f the introduced proceduralisation 
paradigm.
Consequently, as the relevant notification and risk assessment requirements become 
stricter, the informational asymmetries among the main actors involved become accentuated. 
This section then examines the challenges that the agenda-setting powers o f notifiers pose 
upon the procedural opportunities of both EFSA and the majority o f the competent national 
authorities to scrutinize the submitted data. It is argued that the concentration o f technical 
expertise in the hands of a small number o f biotechnology companies has provided the latter 
with gate keeping powers that enable them to control the process for the selection of which 
particular data will be disclosed for the compilation o f the notification dossier and how these 
technical data should be weighted in the frame of the risk assessment process. At the same 
time, this particular informational capture of the risk assessment structure, as well as o f the 
scientific research in the field of bio-safety, has led to the emergence o f information- 
dependencies by public institutions such as national biosafety committees and the EFSA 
GMO Panel. This has led to a bias in the type of information provided and to a self- 
referential institutional structure.
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7.1.1. The capture of research generation by private industry and informational
asymmetries
Considering that according to the prior authorization scheme established in the frame 
of the 2001/18 Directive, each release of GMOs becomes subject to a multi-actor risk 
assessment review of its features, the effectiveness of the risk assessment process depends on 
the capacities o f the competent national authorities and o f the European Food Safety 
Authority to exert substantive technical control over the notification data and of the 
knowledge claims contained in the respective notification dossiers. The source of the 
scientific information provided at the level o f notification o f the release o f a GMO product is 
examined first since, in light of the general scarcity o f biosafety data, the submitted 
notification evidence has become crucial in informing the relevant prior authorization 
decisions. In view of the predominantly private character o f biosafety research and the 
gradually increasing risk assessment requirements, the section examines the EU-wide risk 
assessment institutional structure’s capacity to execute a thorough evaluation control of the 
integrity of the submitted notification files within the prescribed timeframe and to make use 
of the procedural opportunities offered for an examination o f the soundness o f the submitted 
information.
More concretely, the biotechnology revolution, in terms of scientific discovery, 
production and distribution, ‘is largely a result o f innovation and capital in the private 
sector.’670 As has been noted, ‘genetic engineering is attractive to firms because the ability to 
register exclusive ownership over new varieties makes it more feasible for them to recoup the 
high costs of biotech R&D.’671 In fact, it should be mentioned that, especially in the EU, the 
overwhelming majority o f the applicants/organizers of experimental releases are private firms 
and five companies (Astra-Zeneka, Dupont, Monsanto, Novartis and Aventis) account for 
about 93% of the global market for GM seeds.’672 The prevalence of the private actor in the
670 P. Newell and D. Glover, ‘Business and Biotechnology: Regulation and the Politics of Influence’ Institute 
o f  D evelopm ent Studies Working Paper No. 192 (Brighton, Institute of Development Studies, 2003) 4
D. Glover, ‘Corporate dominance and agricultural biotechnology: implications for development’ 
D em ocratising Biotechnology: G enetically M odified Crops in D eveloping Countries B riefing Series, 
Briefing 3 (Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2003) 1
672 AgrEvo, Dupont, Monsanto, Novartis, and AstraZeneca. House of Lords Select Committee, House of 
Lords Select Committee on European Communities, ‘EC Regulation of Genetic Modification in 
Agriculture’, Second Report, 15 December 1998, Vol. 1 para. 1; T. Bemauer, Genes, Trade andR egula tion-  
The Seeds o f  Conflict in F ood  Biotechnology, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2003) 32; ‘The control
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field of biotechnology research can be attributed to the obvious commercial interests linked 
to the generation of data of a biosafety character in this high-technology area673 and most 
significandy to the high costs involved in biosafety research in general and in the organisation 
of a field trial in particular.674 According to a leading producer of GM crops, developing a 
GMO costs a minimum of $10m and takes several years.’675 In fact, the soaring regulatory 
expenditure associated with the procedure of obtaining the required high-quality data for 
highly complex technical issues such as molecular characterization, compositional quality, 
genetic transfer capability, pathogenicity, ecotoxicity, allergenicity, the volume of the required 
information and the long time frames needed for the pre-release testing of the notified GM 
products has led to the monopolization of the process for the generation o f scientific data on 
GMOs by private companies676 and, in effect, to the production of GMOs on the basis o f a 
privately driven research agenda. As a result, the production of reliable, context-specific, 
technical evidence has become the preserve o f a few industrial notifiers.
Further, it should be noted that in view of the high cost of biotechnology research, as 
well as o f the correspondent testing and approval procedures, public actors that do not 
possess the necessary resources are being deterred from undertaking research initiatives and
of transgenics is held by a handful of multinationals, and this makes many people very uneasy, due in part to 
previous experiences of dealing with multinationals following environmental disasters.’ In A.I. Myhr, & T. 
Traavik, T. ‘Genetically modified (GM) crops: Precautionary science and conflicts of interests’ (2003) 16 
Journal o f  Agricultural & Environm ental E thics 227-247; See more about the concentration of GM seed 
production into the hands of a small number of biotechnology companies, S. Mayer, ‘Genetic engineering in 
agriculture’ in M. Huxham and D. Summer, Science and  environm ental decision m aking  (Prentic Hall: 
Harlow, 2000) 94-117; C.F.Runge and L.A.Jackson, ‘Labelling, Trade and Genetically Modified Organisms’ 
(2000) 34 Journal o f  W orld Trade 111,112; Press Release, Rural Advancement Found. Int’l, World Seed 
Conference: Shrinking Club of Industry Giants Gather for Wake or Pep Rally? (Sept. 3, 1999); K. Lheureux 
and K. Menrad, K., ‘A decade of European field trials with genetically modified plants’ (2004) 3 
Environ.Biosafety Res. 105; GeneWatch UK, ‘Genetic modification: The need for special regulation’ 
GeneW atch Briefing, N um ber 21 (Tideswell, Buxton, Derbyshire, January 2003) 7
673 As has been noted, ‘The number of Part B applications depends largely on the potential for obtaining Part 
C consents’ in SBC (2004), 'Means to improve the consistency and efficiency o f the legislative framework in 
the field of biotechnology', study contract number B4-3040/2003/359058/MAR/C4, carried out by 
Schenkelaars Biotechnology Consultancy (SBC), NL, in cooperation with Risk and Policy Analysts Ltd, 
UK, on behalf o f the European Commission, April 2004 at 43
674 With regard to the costs of undertaking field tests, see Larson, B.A. and Knudson, M.K., ‘Public 
Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnology Field Tests: Economic Implications of Alternative Approaches’, 
American Agricultural Economics Association, November 1991
675 See Monsanto’s presentation of its product pipeline that states. Available at 
http://www.monsanto.com/products/pipeline.asp
676 As has been noted, ‘For GM crops, however, the intervention of the big companies was unusual in that it 
brought together into multinationals parties that normally had little to do with one another: pharmaceuticals 
(a big brother), chemicals (smaller), and seeds (smallest). The first wave of mergers, which continued into 
1998, resulted in six giants concerns -Monsanto and Novartis being the best known. Both of these 
corporations have since merged with other companies.’ In P.Pinstrup-Andersen and E.Schioler, Seeds of 
Contention-World Hunger and the Global Controversy over GM Crops (The John Hopkins University Press: 
Baltimore, 2000) 116
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organizing experimental releases.677 The relevant information production cost has in effect 
deprived those scientists that work for public authorities of the chance to elaborate on and 
acquire knowledge and experience in relation to each and every new GMO product designed 
in Europe prior to the initiation of the process for the assessment of their release. Also 
important has been public institutions’ reluctance to take charge of field trials, mostly due to 
general public discomfort with the deliberate release of GMOs,678 but also due to the fear of 
the destruction o f GM field test sites and o f other GM crop material as it has been the case in 
France, Germany, Greece and the Netherlands, where public interest groups and farming 
unions have attacked GM test sites as a means of radical protest against the 
commercialization of genetic engineering.679 Unclear and time-consuming registration 
procedures lead to high costs for developing and registering a GM variety. Coupled with the 
various regulatory uncertainties regarding the operation of the DRD (eg. in terms of the 
organization o f the necessary long-term monitoring projects680 national or regional 
moratoriums and public unease), ‘only the largest companies can afford these investments’681 
and ‘can afford to wait for future market access.’682 Within this frame, both public biosafety 
committees and small and medium-size enterprises have less capacity to meet these practical 
requirements, which accounts for the existence o f only a few independent agri-biotechnology 
SMEs, which have eventually been purchased by multinationals.683
The serious delays in the authorization process, stemming in part from differences in 
the interpretation of the main procedural requirements across the EU, the lengthy
677 As has been noted, ‘the larger the volume of knowledge, the larger the exposure to the unknown, the 
more the resources needed to reduce uncertainties become out of reach.’ In F.DI Castri, ‘Lecologie en temps 
eel’, in La terre outragee, les experts sont formels (Autrement, Collection Science en Societe, 1992), cited by 
J.Theys, ‘Expert contre citoyen? Le cas de I’environnement’, in C.Join-Lambert (ed.), L’Etat modeme et 
l’administration (Librarie generale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1994) 157
678 That has been the case with some public research initiatives in Austria, Greece, Portugal, Italy and 
France.
679 See: Marris, Claire, Stephanie Ronda, Christophe Bonneuil, Pierre-Benoit Joly (2004) Precautionary 
Expertise for GM Crops. National Report. Quality of Life and Management of Living Resources Key Action 
111-13: socio-economic studies of life sciences. May 2004, pp.18-37; Turner, Roger (2004) The field-scale 
evaluation of herbicide-tolerant genetically modified crops conducted in the UK (1998-2003), in: (2004) 
10(3) Journal o f  Com m ercial Biotechnology  228
680 See note 673 at 66
681 J. Bijman, and J. Tait, ‘Public policies influencing innovation in the agrochemical, biotechnology and 
seed industries’ (1 August 2002) 29(4) Science and  Public Policy  250
682 G.K. Rosendal, ‘Governing GMOs in the EU: A Deviant Case of Environmental Policymaking? 
(February 2005) 5:1 Global Environm ental Politics 92
683 E. Gravalos, A. Garcia and N. Barnes, ‘Innovation in SMEs. Policy Influences on innovation Strategies of 
Small and Medium Enterprises in the Agrochemical, Seed and Plant Biotechnology Sectors’ (2002) 29(4) 
Science a n d  Public Policy  277-285
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‘Community’ stage o f the prior authorization procedure,684 as well as from the lack of clear
guidance that should be provided to industry,685 have further augmented the regulatory cost o f
performing such experiments in the EU and have further contributed to the ‘gradual’
privatization of GMO field trials. As has been noted,
‘testing is primarily conducted by private companies, which are located in 
industrialized countries. {...} While concerns about health and biosafety has led 
governments to regulate transgenic crops in field trials to assess the potential risks 
associated with the release of GMOs, public sector institutions represent only a small 
percentage of the total field trials conducted in the world. Most of the approvals are 
granted to private sector corporations, which have the greatest investment in the 
technology.’686
With regard to the capacities of the various competent national authorities in 
examining the soundness and integrity of ‘huge and complex volumes of notification data’, it 
should be mentioned that the industrial capture of primary research in the field o f agricultural 
biotechnology and the limited administrative resources have circumscribed the capacity o f the 
majority o f national administrations to examine all technical aspects of the notification file 
and the relevant national reports in depth. ‘EFSA serves as a reference and a resource, 
especially for smaller countries without huge science-based food safety infrastructures.*687 In 
most o f the competent national authorities, usually one or two people are in charge o f the 
evaluation of huge technical files that contain complex assessments and multiple data. Thus, 
under these conditions, ‘it’s almost impossible to articulate a well-argued response to 
notification requests in a limited time frame’.688 Many expert officials in the competent 
authorities o f Greece, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and Portugal have raised the problem of 
the huge volume of data submitted, especially by Monsanto, which additionally are for the 
most part not well-structured.689 As Czech officials have noted; ‘The notification dossiers for
684 See on this Articles 14(2), 15(1), 18 and 30(2) of Directive 2001/18/EC and Decision no. 1987/373/EEC 
laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission, known 
as the ‘Comitology Decision’, of 13 July 1987, OJ L 197 18/07/1987, at 33-35, as replaced by Decision no. 
1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999, OJ L 184 17/07/1999, at 23-26
685 See note 673 at 29-44
686 In T. Josling and J. Babinard, The Political Econom y o f  GMOs: E m erging D isputes over F ood  Safety, the 
Environm ent a n d  Biotechnology, Institute fo r  International Studies Stanford  University, Draft prepared for 
discussion with the GMO project group, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois, 16th 
July, 1999 at 19-20; it has been further emphasised that biotechnology constitutes ‘the third strategic 
technology of the period since the Second World War, following nuclear power and information 
technology.’ In M. Bauer and G. Gaskell, ‘Towards a Social Theory of New Technology’ in M. Bauer, and 
G. Gaskell, Biotechnology: The M aking o f  a G lobal Controversy (Cambridge UP: New York, 2002) 379
687 Assessment of the Current Image of the European Food Safety Authority, March-April 2004 
http://www.efsa.eu.int/mboard/mb meetings/479/image mb!5 doc4 annexlenl.pdfat 14
688 Interview evidence with officers in the scientific authorities of the Baltic states (January 2007)
689 Interview evidence with various national officers in the Ministries of Environment in Greece, Italy, 
Slovakia, Baltic States and Cyprus (May-July 2006)
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placing GMO on the market in EU are quite voluminous. One application that was submitted 
consisted o f about 12 thick volumes.’690 As a result o f these significant informational 
asymmetries, most o f the competent national authorities remain mere recipients o f either 
notification files or o f national assessment reports, thus their contribution is rather marginal.
Also, EFSA, as the ultimate scientific authority on GMO-related effects and risks in
the EU, has neither its own laboratories nor its own research expertise for conducting open-
field or laboratory biosafety research. In comparison to the US Food and Drug
Administration, which has a staff of 9000 and an annual budget o f $1.7 billion, EFSA is
poorly equipped in terms of resources. As a spokesperson for EFSA noted; ‘Safety testing is
very time- and resource-intensive. EFSA does not have the legal remit, resources nor the
infrastructure (eg laboratories, greenhouses) to carry out such work.’691 According to an
independent evaluation report published in December 2005, EFSA is seriously understaffed
in terms of scientific experts and it faces a workload that is overstretching employees and
scientific advisers.692 As the former head o f EFSA had earlier noted, ‘It is an uphill struggle.
Staff are working very long hours and this is something which needs addressing. {...} we
would find it very difficult to take on any more responsibility without the necessary staff.’693
The limited resources have prevented EFSA from recruiting highly qualified staff to carry out
its scientific risk assessments.694 The move from Brussels to Parma had a negative effect on
recruitment considering that TEFSA is spending 750,000 euros just on shuttle costs and faces
a ten per cent increase in general staff expenses because o f the high cost o f living in Parma.’695
One interviewee stated; Tarma is hopeless because of the time it takes everyone to get there.
Parma might be a nice city but nobody wants to spend three days getting to and returning
from a one day meeting.’696 As was mentioned in the frame of the Evaluation Report of the
operation o f the EFSA:
‘Insistence on all meetings being held in Parma may be counterproductive. There is a 
widely held view amongst scientific and Authority interviewees that top rank people, 
who have many other activities and for whom being a member of an EFSA Expert 
Panel is not their main job, will find it impossible to come to meetings in the future,
690 Interview with officers in the Czech Ministry of Environment on 20/1/2007
691 ‘Italy wants EFSA to do its own GM research’ (June 20, 2005) 154 A graF oodB io tech  10
692 Look for more, Bureau van Dijk Ingenieurs Conseils with Arcadia International EEIG, Evaluation o f  
EFSA: F inal Report Contract FIN-0105 (Brussels, 5 December 2005). This report has been published on the 
EFSA website at: http://www.efsa.eu.int/mboard/mb_meetings/1276_en.html
693 M.Banks, ‘Food safety chief denies agency has pro-GMO bias’ European Voice, 16/12/04 at 6
694 ‘EFSA to battle for Grade A jobs’ (December 23, 2004) E U  F ood  Law  1
695 Interview with a former member of the EFSA Management Board (5/2/2006)
696 <EFSA staff bum out, says independent evaluation report’ (January 6, 2006) 239 E U  F ood  Law  1
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due to pressure in their full-time jobs, and thus the calibre of people available to the
GMO Panel may decline.’697
As a result, in 2006 there were 200 fewer applications to join the EFSA scientific 
panels and committees compared to three years before, even though by then there were ten 
more countries in the EU.698 In 2006, the European Parliament became very critical of the 
shortlist of 14 candidates for the EFSA Management Board, ‘questioning why only 55-60 
people applied from across Europe and whether the standard o f the shortlist was high 
enough.’699 As the Executive Director of EFSA stated, ‘EFSA needs to recruit highly 
qualified, experienced people and to do this it has to pay accordingly.’700 There has also been 
concern about the limited number o f high level management posts (known as A grades) 
approved by the Commission, as this parameter can affect not only the operational capacities 
and administrative autonomy o f this European Agency, but also the number and the quality 
of experts that might express an interest in working for the European Food Safety Authority, 
especially in view of the major EFSA budget cut between 2007 and 2013 currendy under 
discussion.701 EFSA’s capacity to exert a thorough evaluation control of the submitted 
notified data has also been seriously compromised due to the combination of a high number 
of risk assessment requests with tight time-frameworks within which it is required to deliver 
an Opinion, that has mosdy emerged due to the fact that it has ‘no control over the burden of 
its work and no control over the budget.’702
Because of the increasing privatization o f biosafety research and the limited capacities 
of both the EFSA GM O Panel and of the national biotechnology committees to exert 
comprehensive control o f the integrity and validity o f all data contained in the majority of the 
submitted notification files, in terms of the possession o f the required administrative 
resources and o f the aptitude of becoming a meaningful participant to the established prior 
authorization practice, high informational asymmetries between notifiers and public risk 
assessors (at the national and supranational level) have been developed. In fact, the significant 
divergences between industrial notifiers and the EFSA GMO Panel in terms of their capacity 
to conduct primary biosafety research, create knowledge platforms and informational datasets
697 Bureau van Dijk Ing^nieurs Conseils with Arcadia International EEIG, Evaluation o f  EFSA: F inal 
Report Contract FIN-0105 (Brussels, 5 December 2005) 18. This report has been published on the EFSA 
website at: http://www.efsa.eu.int/mboard/mb meetinas/1276 en.html
698 See more in ‘Fewer scientists apply to EFSA’ (March 31, 2006) E U  F ood  Law  8
699 ‘Council waits on EP’s opinion on EFSA candidates’ 1777 A graF oodBiotech, May 29, 2006 at 3
7°° ‘EpgA fails to recruit enough highly qualified staff (December 17, 2004) 193 E U  F ood  Law  1
701 See: ‘EFSA starved of funds’ 242 E U  F ood  Law, January 26, 2006 at 1-2
702 ‘Fees for EFSA’s survival if budget freeze goes ahead’ E U  F o o d  Law  March 31, 2006 at 5
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on the behaviour o f products of agricultural biotechnology and on the long-term 
development of open-field releases and develop empirical methodologies and testing 
protocols have created not only informational, but also self-reinforcing institutional 
asymmetries that have diluted the main raison d’ etre of the established proceduralisation 
paradigm as such. In other words, instead of moderating the structural asymmetries and 
inequalities in the field of biosafety assessment at the EU level, the established multi-stage 
control framework has led to the creation o f the following paradoxical situation: in view of 
the examined asymmetries, any further elaboration of the risk assessment data requirements 
o f the Deliberate Release framework, which in fact aims at the strengthening o f its 
environmental and safety character, minimizes not only the possibility of a scrupulous control 
of the notified technical information, but also the number of potential notifiers that can meet 
the cost o f participation to this lengthy licensing procedure.
More specifically, following the entry into force o f the revised DRD and the adoption 
o f the Council Decision 2002/812,703 as well as o f the Commission Decisions 2004/204 and 
2002/623704 which widened the scope of the required environmental risk assessment, the 
relevant informational risk requirements have been multiplied.705 A recent report 
demonstrated that, ‘several industry respondents suggest that the regulatory burden under 
Directive 2001 /1 8/E C  substantially increases research and development costs, which makes 
it unlikely for small companies and public research institutes to bring products to the 
market.’706 The required technical capacity for corresponding to the relevant procedural 
requirements and coping with the administrative challenge o f responding to the various 
comments and questions submitted by the various member states and the competent 
Community scientific bodies in the established multi-testing framework allows, in practice, 
only prosperous multinational companies to act as notifiers under the Deliberate Release 
framework and request a commercial permit release.
703 Council Decision of 3 October 2002 establishing pursuant to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council the summary information format relating to the placing on the market of 
genetically modified organisms as or in products
704 Commission Decision of 23 February 2004 laying down detailed arrangements for the operation of 
registers for recording information on genetic modifications in GMOs, provided for in Directive 2001/18/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Decision of 24 July 2002 establishing 
guidance notes supplementing Annex II to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
council on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing 
Council Directive 90/220/EEC
705 As has been noted, ‘Perhaps one of the greatest risks is caused by the regulatory process itself. Excessive 
regulation will increase the cost of releasing transgenic varieties and so reduce the numbers both of 
companies investing in genetic modification technology and of transgenes released.’ In J.K.M. Brown ‘Is too 
much risk assessment risky’? TRENDS in Biotechnology Vol. 19 No.4 April 2001 at 125
706 See note 673 at 55
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Considering that ‘good regulations build public confidence and increase the 
willingness of consumers to use products based on biotechnology/707 the strengthened 
authorisation requirements of the established regulatory framework, in fact, seem to serve not 
only the relevant consumer preferences but also the market interests of the bio-industrial 
sector.708 For reasons of industrial competitiveness, ‘large firms may lobby for stricter 
environmental or consumer regulations that would be too costly for smaller firms to 
implement, while smaller firms within the same industry and the same country oppose 
them.’709 The higher the regulatory authorization cost o f the prescribed process and of genetic 
engineering research and testing, in general becomes, the less likely it is for SMEs and 
administrative agencies to cope with and to bear the incurred financial burden. As has been 
stated,
‘...strict biotech regulation in a network-like (decentralized) regulatory setting favors 
large and vertically integrated firms. Such forms benefit from scale economies in 
implementing strict and complex regulation. And they are better able to fill control 
gaps that arise almost unavoidably in such regulatory systems. {...} In the long run, 
such a system promotes dominance by large multinational food firms of regulatory 
processes and schemes of industrial self-regulation.’710
Accordingly, multinational corporations are less affected by stringent rules compared 
to the small-scale firms.711 Thus, as the process for the generation o f biosafety data requires 
significant investment, the relevant notification procedure has, in principle, become accessible 
only to a small circle o f biotech industries and has decreased the array o f the potential 
notifiers. As a result o f the privileged position o f these private actors in the regulatory realm 
for the generation o f biosafety data, questions have been raised about the effects of the 
formulated asymmetries, as well as o f the dependence o f risk assessment upon information 
produced and owned by the very actors whose products are being assessed. Further, doubts 
exist as to the ‘objective’ and non-context specific character o f notified data coming from 
such a limited pool.
707 B. Ballatine and S.M. Thomas, Benchm arking the Competitiveness o f  B iotechnology in Europe, An 
independent Report for Europabio by Science Policy Research Unit at Sussex University (Brussels: 
EuropaBio, 1997) 61
708 See Life Sciences and Biotechnology: a Strategic Vision for Europe, COM (2002) 27 final, 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 2002, p. 14
709 J. Foster, Causes an d  Consequences o f  Regulatory D iversity: Im plications o f  D ivergent A uto and  F uel 
Standards Across and  Within N ations (MIT Center for International Studies, April 2001)
710 T. Bemauer, Genes, Trade and  Regulation-The Seeds o f  Conflict in F ood  B iotechnology  (Princeton 
University Press: Princeton, 2003) 173
711 See more in H.I. Miller, ‘The Real Curse of Frankenfood’ (1999) 17(2) N ature B iotechnology 133.
218
7.1.2. Embedded informational bias in scientific evaluations
As a result of the large volume of technical data required for the notification of the 
release o f a GM product, the significant cost of producing biotechnology information and the 
significant informational asymmetries between regulators and industrial notifiers, the 
notification data o f a proprietary character712 that enters the prior authorisation structure 
becomes, in essence, the sole object of risk assessment analysis at the national and EU levels. 
The prevalence o f notification data in the frame of the Deliberate Release framework has 
been further accentuated due to the absence of independent scientists — operating beyond 
state or industrial control- involved in providing data for the required environmental risk 
assessment and the post-market monitoring ‘so that this important information is not 
provided solely by the consent holders.’713 This is also due to the informational dependencies 
that the asymmetries in the capacity to conduct biosafety research and controls have created 
in the frame of the deliberate release framework.
More concretely, the absence o f basic scientific infrastructure in EFSA’s 
organizational framework and the scarcity o f independent biosafety studies714 have led to the 
limitation of the spectrum of risk assessment analysis to the scientific information contained 
in the notification dossiers. In other words, the GMO Panel has no hold on the production of 
the scientific information necessary to produce expertise. Considering the GMO Panel’s rare 
commissioning o f external scientific studies and technical reports and its lack of performance 
o f scientific tests or of an independent analysis to ascertain whether new genetically modified 
products are safe to use, its risk assessment control has been confined to the examination of 
the technical data that is contained in the required notification dossiers. These informational 
dependencies have also been accentuated also due to the noted existence o f ‘many 
commercial links between the biotechnology industry and the scientific community’715 that
712 This is the term that has been used to describe the confidential reports of findings and data that private 
companies are requested to submit. More in L. Busch, ‘The Homiletics of Risk’ (2002) 15 Journal o f  
A gricultural an d  E nvironm ental Ethics 25-26
71 As has been noted, ‘...it is likely that that the majority of scientists with the relevant experience to 
conduct such research either work for biotechnology companies or have some links with them.’ Thus it may 
be difficult to meet this demand for independent research.’ See note 673 at 68
714 See note 673 at 35
715 See note 6; see also, S. Rampton, and J. Stanber, Trust Us, W e’re Experts: H ow  Industry M anipulates 
Science an d  Gambles with Your Future (Jeremy P.Tarcker/Putnam: New York, 2000)
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‘may further create a conflict o f interests in the behaviour of scientists who take part in the 
risk assessment process.’716
The close links between scientists working in academic research institutes and the
industrial sector raise also questions about whether emphasis has been placed on those areas
o f knowledge in agricultural biotechnology in which public concerns about potential risks
have been expressed.717 The private leadership in research on biotechnology has gradually led
to a ‘reductionist’ scientific research that does not address the public interest since it operates
in a market-driven technological sector. Thus, due to the corporate funding of the applied
research work on GMO releases,718 the scientific research produced has been adjusted to the
commercial priorities o f particular bio-industries, rather than to the development of
methodologies and of extensive datasets on the long term or cumulative toxicological and
ecological effects o f the proposed open-field deliberate releases. As was noted in the frame of
the GM Nation Public Debate,
The involvement of scientists and industry in driving GM forward, and their 
motivations, may compromise testing, and the overall emphases in research. The GM 
industry has focused the direction of research to develop products that are primarily 
commercially profitable, rather than any that are needed socially’.719
Given the increasing influence of corporate funding in biosafety research, the collaboration of 
biosafety firms with university and government scientists has raised concerns about the risks 
associated with losing scientific autonomy and freedom720 and academic independence’721 and
716 S.J. Shackley, ‘Regulation of the release of genetically manipulated organisms into the environment’ 
(August 1989) 16(4) Science an d  Public Policy  212; R. G. Kristin, ‘Governing GMOs in the EU: A Deviant 
Case of Environmental Policy-making?’ (2005) 5(1) G lobal Environm ental Politics 99; See: P. Harremoks, 
D. Gee, M. MacGarvin, A. Stirling, J. Keys, B. Wynne, S. Vaz, ‘Introduction’ in P. Harremoks, D. Gee, M. 
MacGarvin, A. Stirling, J. Keys, B. Wynne, S. Vaz (eds), The Precautionary Principle in the Twentieth 
Century: late lessons fro m  early warnings (Earthscan: London, 2002) 201
717 S. Mayer, A. Stirling, ‘GM crops, for good or bad? Those who choose the questions, determine the 
answers’ (2004) 5(1) European M olecular B iology Organisation Reports 1023
718 See: W. Heffeman, D. Constance, ‘Transnational corporations and the globalization of the food system’ 
in A. Buonanno, L. Busch, W.H. Friedland, L. Gouveia, E. Mingione (eds), From  Colum bus to ConAgra: 
The Globalization o f  Agriculture and  F ood  (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, KS, 1994) 29-51 and R. 
Patel, R. J. Torres, P. Rosset, ‘Genetic Engineering in Agriculture and Corporate Engineering in Public 
Debate: Risk, Public Relations, and Public Debate over Genetically Modified Crops’ (2005) 11 International 
Journal o f  O ccupational an d  Environm ental H ealth  428-436; B. Kneen, ‘Restructuring food for corporate 
profit: The corporate genetics of Cargill and Monsanto’ (June 1999) 16(2) Agriculture a n d  E thical Values', 
J.R. Kloppenburg, F irst the seed: the politica l econom y o f  p la n t technology, 1492-2000  (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1988); B. Lambrecht, D inner at the N ew  Gene Cafe (St. Martin's Press: New 
York, Dec 19, 2002); I. Boyens, Unnatural Harvest. H ow  Corporate Science is Secretly A ltering Our F ood  
(Doubleday: Canada, 1999)
719 More in http://www.gmnation.org.uk/
720 See: S. Krimsky, ‘Regulating Recombinant DNA Research and Its Applications’ in D. Nelkin, 
Controversy-Politics o f  Technical D ecisions (SAGE Publications, 1992) 243
721 C. Juma, ‘Biotechnology in a Globalizing World: The Coevolution of Technology and Social Institutions’ 
(M arch 2005) 55(3) B ioScience  268
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‘has resulted in calls for greater moral steering of biotechnology research.’722 This cultural 
change in biological sciences has brought with it a new set of social relations between 
academic research and private industry, raising the question of ‘how would these new 
relations affect the practice and integrity of scientific work?723
Indeed, close links between the industrial sector and academia, the predominandy 
private-driven nature o f genetic engineering724 and the corporate character o f the procedure 
for the generation o f scientific knowledge for policy reasons,723 have also been factors cited 
for the extent to which this particular industrial sector is better informed —due to the fact that 
‘scientists are, of course, involved in both ‘pure’ research and commercial development,,726- 
and much more knowledgeable than other institutions on the nature and the complexity of 
the notified/examined genetically engineered organism. Its capacity to deliver the required 
benefits or to control specific potential effects of GMO releases is also much higher than that 
o f the public authorities' that are supposed to ensure the control of these risks.727 When 
science is the basis o f authoritative rule making, those who possess scientific expertise, such
722 See: R.K. Dhanda, G uiding Icarus: M erging Bioethics with Corporate Interests (John Wiley and Sons; 
Middendorf: New York, 2002): G. M. Skladany, E. Ransom and L. Busch, ‘New Agricultural 
Biotechnologies: the struggle for democratic choice’ in F. Magdoff, J.B. Foster and F.H. Buttel, H ungry fo r  
proflt-The agribusiness threat to farm ers, food , a n d  the environm ent (Monthly Review Press: New York, 
2000) 116-117; see also on this topic in general, D. Weatherall, 'Academia and industry: increasingly uneasy 
bedfellows’ (May 6, 2000) 355 The Lancet 1574; S. Wright and D. A. Wallace, ‘Secrecy in Biotechnology 
Varieties of Secrets and Secret Varieties: The Case of Biotechnology’ (March 2000) 19(1) Politics and  the  
Life Sciences 45-57 and G. S. McMillan, F. Narin and D. L. Deeds, ‘An analysis of the critical role of public 
science in innovation: the case of biotechnology’ (2000) 29 Research Policy 1 -8
723 S. Krimsky, “The Profit of Scientific Discovery and Its Normative Implications” (1999) 75(15) Chicago- 
K ent L aw  R eview  27-28
724 See on this issue, A.J. Hacking, Econom ic Aspects o f  Biotechnology  (Cambridge University 
Press:Cambridge, U.K. 1986); R. Acharya, The Em ergence and  Growth o f  Biotechnology: Experiences in 
Industrialised and  D eveloping Countries (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited: Northampton, 1999); P. Daly, 
The B iotechnology Business: A Strategic Analysis (Rowan & Allanheld, 1985)
725 See on this issue, M. Baumann, J. Bell, F. Koechlin & M. Pimbert (eds.), The Life Industry: Biodiversity, 
people an d  pro fits  (Intermediate Technology Publications: London, 1996) 76-85; R. Oakey, W. Faulkner, S. 
Cooper, and V. Walsh, N ew  Firm s in the Biotechnology Industry: Their Contribution to Innovation and  
Growth  (Pinter: London, 1990); L. Busch, W.B. Lacey, J. Burkhardt and L. Lacey, Plants, p o w er and  p ro fit 
(Basil Blackwell: Oxford, England, 1990), M. Lappe and B. Bailey, A gainst the grain: biotechnology and  
the corporate takeover o f  fo o d  (Common Courage Press: Monroe, Maine, 1998); R. K. Dhanda, G uiding  
Icarus: m erging bioethics with corporate interests (Wiley-Liss, Inc.: Chichester, New York, 2002); D. 
Charles, Lords o f  the Harvest: Biotech, B ig  Money, and  the F uture o f  F ood  (Perseus Publishing: Cambridge, 
MA, 2001); M.-W. Ho, ‘The Unholy Alliance’ (July/August 1997) 27(4) The Ecologist; see also D.G. 
Springham, and V. Moses (eds), Biotechnology: The Science and  the Business (Harwood Academic; 
Abingdon: Marston: Amsterdam, 1999)
726 M.J. Reiss, ‘Ethical considerations at the various stages in the development, production, and 
consumption of GM crops’ 2001 (14) Journal o f  A gricultural and  E nvironm ental Ethics 188
727 See on this in general, note 6; S. Wolf and D. Zilberman, ‘Public Science, Biotechnology, And The 
Industrial Organization Of Agrofood Systems AgBioForum’ 2(1) 7 The Journal o f  A grobiotechnology  
M anagem ent & Econom ics; M. Kenney, The ethical dilemmas of university-industry collaborations 
(February 1987) 6(2) Journal o f  Business E thics 127-135
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as government regulators and the developers of the technology or product being regulated,728 
can exercise significant influence upon regulatory outcomes. Thus, the informational 
advantage that industrial notifiers, as the sole suppliers of the required regulatory information, 
hold vis-a-vis the national and supranational regulators and recipients o f the required 
information,729 has rendered these actors as the main agenda setters of the prior authorisation 
framework considering that ‘those who know the most about how to manipulate the 
procedures control the discourse, the questions asked, and how they are answered.’730 In 
effect, the relevant risk assessment provisions requiring proponents to produce the necessary 
risk data and the inherent bias in favour of avoiding false positives have in fact created 
numerous opportunities for industrial actors to ‘impose’ their agenda in view of the fact that 
scientists are able to frame problems.
The informational bias has been strengthened due to the fact that traditionally risk
assessments have been predisposed toward proving that harm will not occur and found ‘to be
inherently biased in favour o f avoiding over-inclusive regulatory measures (i.e. the inclination
is to avoid false positives) for fear o f imposing undue costs on technological progress,
industry and on society.’731 In relation to this issue, Fairbrother and Bennett note that
‘This {bias} is inherent in statistical designs that aim to reduce type I error, that is to 
minimize false positives; the possibility of saying that harm will occur when it really 
won’t. {... }The reason for this bias lies in the application of science to the technology 
of risk assessment {...} {that} is reluctant to accept as true hypotheses about how 
things work unless these is a very strong basis for assuming that a hypothesis is 
true.'732
The structural advantage possessed especially by biotechnology engineers, the 
majority of whom work for biotechnology companies, has further institutionalised the 
regulatory and culturally advantaged position of the notifiers in terms of controlling the main 
core o f technical information regarding the effects of GMO releases. As a result of these 
informational imbalances and due to the fact that the information contained in the
728 G. Skogstad, ‘Regulating Food Safety Risks in the European Union: A Comparative Perspective’, in C. 
Ansell and D. Vogel (eds), W hat's the Beef? The C ontested Governance o f  European F ood Safety  (The MIT 
Press: Cambridge, MT, 2006) 216
729 See generally, J.S.Banks and B.R.Weingast, ‘The Political Control o f Bureaucracies under Asymmetric 
Information’ (May 1992) 36(2) Am erican Journal o f  Political Science  509-524
730 O.C. Funke, ‘Limitations of ecological risk assessment’ (1995) 1 Human and  Ecological R isk Assessm ent 
443-453; M.H. O’Brien, ‘Ecological alternatives assessment rather than ecological risk assessment: 
Considering options, benefits, and dangers’ 1995 1 Human and  E cological R isk Assessm ent 357-366.
731 See C. Christoforou, ‘The regulation of genetically modified organisms in the European Union: the 
interplay of science, law and politics’ (2004) 41 Common M arket Law  Review  687
732 A. Fairbrother and R.S. Bennett, ‘Ecological Risk Assessment and the Precautionary Principle’ (1999) 
5(5) H um an and  Ecological R isk Assessm ent 946
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notification dossier reflects the technological determinism of molecular biology, which 
normally is the expertise o f the compiler o f the notification dossier, the presented data and 
the correspondent EFSA opinions involve ‘a risk o f biases in the favour of those who hold 
the means and know-how’733 and echo a trust in the capacity of available scientific data to 
provide all-encompassing responses to the entirety of the genetic engineering risks.
EFSA’s informational dependence on the data provided through the relevant 
notification files has become an object o f severe criticisms from both public interest groups 
and member states such as Italy, Greece, Spain, Slovenia, Hungary and Luxembourg. The 
Italian Minister of Agriculture has stated; ‘EFSA needs to carry out its own experiments or 
provide a list o f laboratories able to carry out experimental checks on data provided by the 
body requesting authorisation.’734 In the frame of the March 2006 Environment Council, 
Slovenia noted that ‘independent data was needed,’735 whereas Malta’s Environment Minister 
Pullicino expressed his unease, stating that EFSA ‘shouldn’t rely on studies submitted by 
business to support an application for a GM O.’736 In a recent EU Environment Council, 
several member states asked for ‘more independent verification of scientific studies carried 
out by industry and a clear framework for resolving differences of opinion between EFSA 
and member state assessment bodies.’737 Environment Commissioner Dimas has questioned 
EFSA’s reliance on information provided by bio-tech companies and asked whether these 
companies are offering the ‘right information.’738 These remarks reflect an absence of political 
and institutional trust in the depth o f the GMO Panel’s scientific evaluations that has been 
accentuated due to the revolving door operating between business and government in the 
field o f genetic engineering.739
Levy and Newell note that ‘the relationship {between the state and business} is 
intensified in the case o f biotechnology because the interests o f industry coincide strongly
733 S. Henrik and N. Eckley, ‘Science, Politics, and Persistent Organic Pollutants: Scientific Assessments and 
their Role in International Environmental Negotiations in International Environmental Agreements’ (2003) 
3(1) Politics, Law  an d  Economics 21
734 ‘Italy wants better risk assessment procedures’ Bulletin Quotidien Europe 8958-1/6/2005-Commission 
Europeenne; 2657th meeting of the Council of the European Union (Agriculture and Fisheries), held in 
Luxembourg on 26 April 2005
735 More in ‘Environment Ministers criticize EFSA’s GMO risk assessments and call for change’ (March 10, 
2006) E U  F ood  Law  4
736 ‘EU ministers blast biotech approval system’ (March 13, 2006) F ood  C hem ical News 5
737 (Thursday 9 March 2006) E N D S Europe D aily  Issue 2055
738 ‘GM Panorama’ (April 10, 2006) 174 A graF ood Biotech 2
739 J. Ferrara, ‘Revolving doors: Monsanto and the regulators’ (September/October 1998) 28(5) The 
E cologist
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with governments’ own definitions o f their national interests, envisaged as generating growth 
through hi-tech development in the biotech sector.’740 Considering that ‘the professional 
characteristics of regulators are likely to be important, as a ‘revolving door’ with regulatees 
will aid capture’,741 the official representation o f the European food industry, as the main 
regulatee, in the Management Board of EFSA might become another ‘revolving door’ that 
could undermine the autonomous operation o f this European Agency.742 The revolving door 
phenomenon has been evidenced also in relation to the interlinkage between members of the 
national biosafety committees and members of the GMO Panel. This has been the case in 
many central European countries and in Denmark.743 It should be noted that nearly one-third 
-including the Chair- of the members o f the GM O Panel sit in national regulatory agencies, 
raising questions about the capacity of the GMO Panel to perform impartial scientific 
control.744 The EFSA Management Board’s and the GMO Panel’s statement that there is no 
conflict o f interests in the case of members of the scientific panels being involved in the 
national approval processes for the same issue or even product745 has been criticized in a 
report submitted to the EFSA Stakeholders Platform.746 The organizational co-existence of 
actors with divergent or even conflicting interests within the organizational structure of EFSA 
has raised questions about its impartiality as a scientific risk assessor in terms o f independence 
from national or organizational interests, a central issue in restoring the confidence of the 
European consumer and the credibility of the EU’s risk assessment structures.
740 In D.L. Levy and P. Newell, ‘Oceans Apart? Business Responses to Global Environmental Issues in 
Europe and the United States’ (2000) 42(9) Environm ent 13
741 M. Thatcher, ‘Regulation after Delegation: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Europe’ (2002) 9:6 
Journal o f  European Public Policy  958
742 Article 25(1) of Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 of the Council and European Parliament (OJ No. L31, 
1.2.2002, p.l)
743 As members of Danish non-governmental organizations have stated, ‘The national DK food safety 
assessor (Jan Pedersen) is line managed by the DK EFSA member (Iliona Jorgensen). They are sitting 
together in the same institution, so in reality DK has suspended the multilevel risk assessment that was 
intended in the directive 2001/18. That way DK never find faults in the EFSA opinions, so if EFSA say it is 
OK from a safety point of view then DK expert naturally says the same, and never ask for additional tests, 
no matter how many statistically significant differences there are observed in e.g. the feeding studies. 
Officially the administration maintain that they got confidence in both EFSA and their own risk assessment, 
but unofficially there is realization that the EFSA is a rubber stamp.’ Interview evidence with Danish NGOs 
on 8/2/2007
744 See more in Friends of the Earth Europe Throwing caution to the wind-A review  o f  the European F ood  
Safety A uthority an d  its w ork on genetically m odified foods and  crops, (Brussels, November 2004) 7-8
74 As was noted, ‘It is {..} normal that in certain cases, these experts are also involved in risk assessments at 
national level. EFSA does not take the view that the participation in risk assessment committees or panels at 
national level represents a conflict of interest.’ European Food Safety Authority, ‘EFSA Management Board 
reiterates its confidence in the independence and commitment to transparency of its Scientific Panels’ Press 
Release, 17 December 2004, available at http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale- 
1178620753812_1178620780565.htm
746See more in ‘The EFSA stakeholders challenge-working with civil society’, available at
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/stakeholders efsa/consultative platform/march 2006.html and at 
http://www.foeeurope.org/publications/2005/EFSA stakeholders challengc.pdf
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It should be mentioned that the imposition o f risk assessment fees, currently under 
discussion, on each notifier for each commercial release might further undermine EFSA’s 
projected autonomy in its operation, as this might be seen as a form of industrial sponsorship 
o f the process for the performance of independent risk assessments on which EFSA relies for 
its judgments.747 Additionally, it should be noted that the scientific background and 
experience o f the EFSA GMO Panel in judging ecological risks is limited due to the under­
representation of scientists with an environmental/ecological background, considering that 
only 2 out o f the 21 scientists o f the current composition of the GMO Panel are specialized 
in some fields o f ecology.748 Instead, the selection process for the EFSA Panels takes into 
consideration issues such as gender balance, geographical balance, the representation of the 
member states and average age.749 Finally, there are no performance indicators or quality 
review mechanisms in place that could be used to evaluate the operation o f the established 
scientific Panels.
The perpetuation o f the discrepancies evidenced in the prior authorisation structure in 
terms o f the potential to generate biosafety data and the infrastructure and expertise necessary 
for the assessment o f the notified safety information of technical character has set in doubt 
the introduced proceduralisation paradigm’s capacity to foster the development o f structures 
that would moderate the noted inequalities in power and information.’750 Due to the structural 
prevalence o f the industrial notifiers, the inherent advantages they enjoy in terms o f expertise 
and technical infrastructure in comparison to the public authorities at the national and EC 
level have diluted the reflexive character of the established licensing regime and have 
contributed to its industrial/commercial capture. In light of this information capture, the 
dependence o f EFSA’s opinions on the integrity o f the initial framing o f the prior 
authorization structure at the notification stage bounds in effect the resultant assessment in all 
its subsequent stages, perpetuates the inherent biases and assumptions o f the notifier and 
undermines its tabled ‘objective’ risk assessment conclusions.
747 See more in ‘New consultation to consider EFSA fees’ (May 29, 2006) 177 A graF ood Biotech  3; see also 
on this, E. Vos, N.C. Ghiollamath, F. Wendler, F., E U  F ood  Safety Regulation under Review-An  
Institutional Analysis, Report prepared for Work Package 5 of the ‘Safe Foods Project conducted under the 
6th EU Framework Programme (August 2005), available at www.safefoods.nl
748 See more at http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/science/gmo/gmo members.html
749 See: ‘Men dominate EFSA’s scientific panels’ E U  F ood  Law: May 2003 at 16-7
750 T. Prosser, ‘Theorising Utility Regulation’ (March 1999) 62:2 M odem  Law  Review  211
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The following section will shed light upon the inherent limitations o f field trials in 
providing ‘objective’ scientific information in the field o f the Deliberate Release framework 
and EFSA’s extensive resort to their findings as a sound technical basis for reaching safety 
conclusions.
7.2. Field trials in the frame of the Deliberate Release framework: source of
scientific evidence or regulatory convenience?
EFSA’s institutional projection of the notified field trial findings as an all- 
encompassing and objective basis for evaluation judgments and control measures in the field 
of the DR framework will now be examined. More specifically, the special regulatory weight 
conferred to field trials as the main source o f safety information on the various applications 
of agricultural biotechnology at the level o f risk assessment seems to overlook their inherent 
drawbacks as providers o f objective evidence. The section examines the risks that have 
characterized the performance of these experimental procedures, but more importantly the 
values and the limitations o f these regulatory mechanisms in informing the relevant risk 
assessment process.
7.2.1. Field trials as a source of objective, authoritative evidence in the GMO arena
Having become central to strategies of techno-scientific governance and designed to 
produce evidence conforming to the rules of general scientific validity,751 experimental 
releases enhance a perception of scientific soundness since their findings bridge gaps in the 
knowledge base o f authorisation frameworks. This section examines the role and the 
regulatory value of field trials as they are being institutionally promoted as the sole objective, 
authoritative basis for shaping risk assessment conclusions in the frame of the prior 
authorisation process.
Field trials are significant, or even irreplaceable, in terms o f the information they 
provide to scientists and regulators. Experimental releases, as trial-and-error procedures, are 
set up and designed as a scientific experiment in order to produce previously unavailable data 
and have been integrated positively into the deliberate release authorisation framework as
751 See more about this issue in S. Jasanoff, "The Idiom of Co-Production" in S. Jasanoff, States o f  
Knowledge: The Co-Production o f  Science and the Social Order (Routledge, 2004)
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distinctive opportunities that endorse a trial and error model of learning, according to which 
errors should be embraced as the Vehicle of scientific advance’. In the Deliberate Release 
framework, prior to the undertaking of a field trial with a GMO, a notification shall be 
submitted to the competent authority o f the member state within whose territory the release 
is to take place. This notification should describe the purpose of the trial along with several 
other prescribed technical requirements and parameters. The conduct o f open-field 
experiments serves the need to address scientific uncertainties related to the risks and effects 
of the applications o f agricultural biotechnology. It also strengthens the correspondent 
knowledge database upon which the regulators base their argumentation. In other words, field 
trials may structure or restructure the terms o f the regulatory decision-making upon the 
conditions, characteristic risks and the effects of the deliberate release of GMOs.
Since the outcome of these experimental releases in terms of the technical data 
produced normally constitutes the basis for the required environmental risk assessment and in 
essence o f the notification dossier submitted for commercial authorisation, their influence 
upon the authorisation process over commercial releases cannot be ignored. Their results 
bring forward new forms of justification or causation, but also novel uncertainties and this 
unavoidably may affect the scope and particular orientation o f the required environmental 
risk assessment, as well as of the respective notification dossier. Field releases constitute the 
main provider of in vivo scientific information about the environmental compatibility o f GM 
crops and their findings contribute to the establishment o f scientific standards and models on 
biosafety issues and to the improvement o f the understanding of the behavior o f GMOs.752 
Since the present state o f scientific knowledge that informs regulatory policies on issues 
related to the prediction and reduction of the potential ecological hazards and the 
mechanisms that govern the environmental interactions o f GMOs is still insufficient, 
experimental releases offer a particular guidance tool in monitoring and identifying the 
potential ecological consequences of GMO releases.
752 The value of field trials was recognized in the case of the Farm-scale Evaluations (FSEs) in the UK as a 
source of valuable knowledge on the ecological impacts of GMO deliberate releases. See for more, L.G. 
Firbank, Why we need  the fa rm  scale trials. Leading contribution to 'S p iked ' C M  debate , sponsored by 
NERC (2002): http://www.spiked-online.com/articles/Q0000006DA00.htm: Firbank, L. G., Heard, M. S., 
Woiwod, I. P., Hawes, C., Haughton, A. J., Champion, G. T., Scott, R. J., Hill, M. O., Dewar, A. M., Squire, 
G. R., May, M. J., Brooks, D. R., Bohan, D. A., Daniels, R. E., Osborne, J. L., Roy, D. B., Black, H. I. J., 
Rothery, P.& Perry, J.N., ‘An introduction to the Farm-Scale Evaluations of genetically modified herbicide- 
tolerant crops’ (2003) 40(1) Journal o f  A pplied  Ecology  2-16; G.R. Squire, D.R. Brooks, D.A. Bohan, G.T. 
Champion, R.E. Daniels, A.J. Haughton, C. Hawes, M.S. Heard, M.O. Hill, M.J. May, J.L. Osborne, J.N. 
Perry, D.B. Roy, I.P. Woiwod, L.G. Firbank, ‘On the rationale and interpretation of the farm-scale 
evaluations of genetically-modified herbicide-tolerant crops’ (2003) 358 (1439) Philosophical Transactions 
o f  the R oyal Society o f  London B  1779-1800.
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More concretely, the development o f GM plants usually runs through three stages: 
laboratory work, small-scale greenhouse experiments and outdoor field trials under realistic 
conditions. The aim of the latter is to test the stability o f the inserted gene, the characteristics 
of the GM crop variety compared to other GM varieties or to conventional ones, and most 
importantly, to assess any potential risk to human or animal health and the environment. As 
mentioned in the introductory chapter, it was the ecologists in the late 1980s who proposed 
extensive field tests, and more basic ecological research, before any GMO could be regarded 
as innocuous.753 The choice o f the appropriate field sites and the design o f the experiments 
including the formulation o f the methodologies and scientific models that define the 
organization o f such releases have become subject to an on-going technical debate, as GM 
science has not matured yet and these decisions depend on ad hoc scientific findings, very 
much in line with the learning by doing that characterises the proceduralisation paradigm. 
Having been viewed as an essential element of the notification dossier o f the correspondent 
risk assessment analysis, field trials have been formulated under the assumption that the 
resulting knowledge can provide sufficient certainty to predict the likelihood of any given 
hazard relevant to the scheduled use.
Experimental releases of GMOs have become a carrier o f difficult to obtain technical 
information in a rather unexplored scientific field. GMO field trials offer unique information 
about the ecological risks that may arise out of these deliberate releases or about how the 
growing o f one kind of genetically modified (GM) crop might affect the abundance and 
diversity o f farmland wildlife compared with growing conventional varieties o f the same 
crops. The information obtained from field trials constitutes a core part o f the information 
submitted to the authorizer for safety assessment. Biosafety research in the form of 
experimental releases has in fact become one o f the main research priorities o f the 
Commission.754
753 See more in J.M. Tiedje, R. K. Colwell, Y. L. Grossman, R. E. Hodson, R. E. Lenski, R. N. Mack and R. 
J. Regal, ‘The Planned Introduction of Genetically Engineered Organisms: Ecological Considerations and 
Recommendations’ (1989) 70 Ecology 298 -315.
754 Despite the predominantly national character of the experimental releases of GMOs, the Commission has 
undertaken various initiatives for the harmonization of the required ERA and of the scientific methods used 
in the member states, through the operation of the European Network of GMO Laboratories (ENGL), which 
aims at the development, harmonisation and standardisation of means and methods for sampling, detection, 
identification and quantification of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) or derived products. Further, 
the Commission in an attempt to disseminate the results of the various field trials organized throughout the 
EU and to provide information to the general public of all field trials carried out in the EU has standardized 
the procedure for the reception of all summary notifications of deliberate field trials (SNIFs), notified under
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Since these releases provide the scientific community, public authorities and notifiers 
with information on the stability and safety of the used transgenic vectors, the probability of 
gene transfer from crop to crop relatives, horizontal gene transfer, as well as on the negative 
impacts on surrounding ecosystems, the different kinds of evidence they produce may 
gradually become a legitimate basis for decisions o f a regulatory character. Experimental 
procedures have been approached as a direct and realistic method of extracting scientific 
evidence about the compatibility of GM farming with specific local environments and 
situational ecosystems and the data they produce have been seen as a unique legitimate 
safeguard o f science in terms o f identifying uncertainties related to the analysis and prediction 
of potential ecological and socio-economic impacts o f deliberate environmental releases.
Although it might never become possible to forecast all possible effects related to the 
planned introduction o f GMOs into the environment, the organization of field experiments 
of GMOs has become a common regulatory practice for those involved in the process of 
biosafety assessment since they offer the opportunity of assessing the consequences and the 
potential risks prior to the commercialization of any GM crop755 and as has been noted, can 
‘contribute gready to our ecological theories of invasion, just as our developing understanding 
of invasion ecology guides regulatory policy for agricultural biotechnology.’756 Even if 
‘regulators must compensate for missing data by conducting experiments to assess potential 
risks’757 and some consider this experimental method ‘as science’s most powerful device for 
producing truth’758or the setting up o f experimental procedures and the analysis of the data as 
the legitimate preserve o f science, it would be overly optimistic to assume that, on the basis of 
the limited number of prescribed tests that are in fact nothing more than field containments, 
one would be able to obtain '‘full knowledge’ o f the various ways in which GMOs might affect 
human health and the environment.
the DRD, through the creation of the SNIF database. Moreover, the Commission has also focused its efforts 
on establishing some further minimum common administrative requirements (including the requirements for 
public consultation), monitoring mechanisms and providing clear guidance to the notifiers of experimental 
releases.
755 See about this, H.I. Miller, ‘Risk-assessment experiments and the new biotechnology’ (August 1994) 12 
B iotopics,-TIBTEC H  292-295; A.J. Gray, ‘Ecology and government policies: the GM crop debate’ 12th BES 
Lecture, (2004) 41 Journal o f  A pplied  Ecology 1-10; United States National Research Council, F ield  Testing 
Genetically M odified Organisms: Fram ework fo r  D ecisions (National Academy Press: Washington, 1989)
756 I.M. Parker and P. Kareiva, ‘Assessing the risks of invasion for genetically engineered plants: acceptable 
evidence and reasonable doubt’ (1996) 78 Biological Conservation 201
757 V.M., Fogleman, ‘Regulating science: an evaluation of the regulation of biotechnology-Research’ 
(Winter, 1987) 17 E nvironm ental Law  200
S. Jasanoff, "(No?) Accounting for Expertise" (June 2003) 30(3) Science and  Public Policy  160
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7.2.2. EFSA’s use of field trials
Both the industrial notifiers and the GMO Panel o f EFSA have made extensive use of 
the results obtained through the performance of field trials so as to inform and articulate the 
risk assessment conclusions, as evidenced in the prevalent position that this experimental data 
possesses in the frame of the required documentation.759 Considering that the regulatory 
practice o f the authorization o f GMO releases has been based on a case-by-case approach, 
according to which the scale o f release is increased gradually, ‘only if the evaluation of the 
earlier steps in terms o f protection of human health and the environment indicates that the 
next step can be taken,’760 a commercial release would be approved only if the assessment o f 
earlier steps o f increased containment or decreased scale indicates that the next step should 
be taken. The GMO Panel o f EFSA, following a deductive rationale, has formulated its 
Opinions about the EU-wide safe character of the notified GM releases exclusively on the 
basis o f the results and findings o f those field trials that the industrial notifier has performed.
Despite the unique regulatory significance o f these results761 and the imminent need of 
the established risk assessment institutional structure for open-field information about the 
European environment in all its facets, the GMO Panel’s foundation of its opinions upon the 
basis that in vivo testing can provide sufficient scientific evidence o f an objective character 
capable o f guaranteeing the safe character of the notified release’762 overlooks their context- 
specific character and the limitations that are pertinent to science conducted in open systems. 
This section argues that EFSA’s extensive reliance on the results o f field trials perpetuates the 
flawed perception of its risk assessment practice as thoroughly objective, context-free and 
deprived o f normative features. EFSA’s extrapolation o f general EU-wide conclusions about 
the safety of the commercial release o f GMOs upon the basis of ad-hoc field trials seem to 
‘shield’ rather than to question the objective and authoritative character o f this particular 
scientific evidence.
759 See for this the notification dossiers and the Opinions of the EFSA GMO Panel on all authorisation cases 
after 2004, available at the website of EFSA and of the Commission’s Joint Research Center.
760 Paragraph 24 of the Preamble of the Deliberate Release Directive
761 See: J. N. Perry, P. Rothery, S. J. Clark, M. S. Heard and C. Hawes, ‘Design, analysis and statistical 
power of the Farm-Scale Evaluations of genetically modified herbicide-tolerant crops’ (2003) 40:1 Journal 
o f  Applied Ecology 17-31
762 Interview evidence with members of the GMO Panel (12/4/2007)
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The section’s aim is not to question the scientific integrity or the value of 
experimental releases in the field of agricultural biotechnology, but instead to assess whether 
EFSA’s excessive reliance on their results is void o f any normative assumptions, or from a 
‘cut and paste’ logic and whether this particular risk assessment approach can be justified in 
view of the structural limitations of these experimental procedures in providing all- 
encompassing data and the EU-wide dimension o f the EFSA Opinions. To this end, special 
reference is made to the particular spatial and temporal framework within which field trials 
take place that, in effect, prevents them from offering data on the behaviour of these 
products in all European bio-geographical regions, especially in light of the requirements of 
the NATURA 2000 framework and the need for a case by case approach in terms o f the 
places where the GMOs might be released commercially. It is argued that the special 
regulatory weight that the GMO Panel confers on field trials as the principal source o f data 
that is contained in the required environmental risk assessment disregards that the relevant 
findings are, in fact, context-specific, or in other words, sensitive to the particular questions 
raised, assumptions made as well as to the particular methodological focus o f the actors in 
charge o f their design and organization. In view of the heterogeneity o f contexts as well of 
interpretations o f the generated field data, EFSA’s reliance on this experimental information 
seems to overlook not only that ecological relationships measured on one spatial scale, may 
not pertain at other scales, but also, in general, the problems associated with the so-called 
‘experimental gap’ in light o f the requirement for ‘satisfactory field testing’ in those 
‘ecosystems which could be affected by their use’ and the subsequent need for a prior 
assessment of all potential effects of GMO releases upon the European fauna and flora.
Despite the valuable information gathered during field trials, according to some 
observers, ‘experiments to assess the risks o f transgenic species face a basic conflict between 
practicality and relevance’763 due to the fact that ‘{the experiment} yields results if it is backed 
up by preexisting, negotiated standards o f what counts as valid experimentation in a given 
scientific field.’764 In relation to the controlled environmental conditions to open field 
extrapolations, Power and McCarty have noted that; ‘What is wrong with extrapolation from 
controlled experimentation is not experimental integrity, but the unintended or inappropriate 
use o f experimental results. {...} The interpretation of relevance, however, requires insights
763 See note 756 at 197
764 H.M. Collins and R. Evans, ‘The third wave of science studies: studies of expertise and experience’ 
(April 2002) 32(2) Social Studies o f  Science 235-296
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into the functioning of ecological systems as a whole.’765 Considering that ‘commercial release 
involves a higher number o f GMOs being released, as well as different and more complex 
ecosystems’766 and the existence of experimental gaps that always make it theoretically 
possible ‘to question the results o f an experiment as insufficiendy representative of, or 
inapplicable to, the outside world,’767 such extrapolations are always based on subjective 
assumptions. As has been noted, Svhat is wrong with extrapolation from controlled 
experimentation is not experimental integrity, but the unintended or inappropriate use of 
experimental results.’768 Despite the increasing reliance on the findings of the experimental 
phase as ‘the last chance to observe and control the behavior of {...} new regulatory objects 
with precision, under conditions of realistic scale, but without provoking irreversible 
consequences’,769 EFSA’s non-recognition of the inherently subjective and context-specific 
character o f these findings further challenges the projection of its opinions as all- 
encompassing and objective.
765 M. Power and L.S. McCarty, ‘Fallacies in Ecological Risk-Assessment Practices’ (1997) 31(8) 
Environmental Science and Technology 374
766 A.I. Myhr and T. Traavik, ‘The Precautionary Principle: Scientific uncertainty and omitted research in the 
context of GMO use and release’ (2002) 15 Journal o f  Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 79
767 Y. Millo and J. Lezaun, ‘Regulatory experiments: genetically modified crops and financial derivatives on 
trial’ (April 2006) 33(3) Science and Public Policy 181
768 M.Power and L.SmcCarty, ‘Fallacies in Ecological Risk Assessment Practices’ (1997) 31(8) 
Environmental Science & Technology 374
769 See note 767 at 188
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7.2.2.1. G eographical/tem poral lim itations
Despite the fact that the results o f field trials included in the notification file usually 
refer to experiments that have been conducted in a particular ecological framework, EFSA’s 
GMO Panel considers the absence o f a negative effect in a single site of experimental release 
to be sufficient evidence of the safe character of the commercial release under review for the 
entirety o f agri-environmental contexts found in Europe.
For example, in its summary of the environmental risk posed by 1507 maize, the 
GMO panel concluded that “no unintended environmental effects due to the establishment and spread are 
anticipated’ upon the basis that “mai^e is winter-hardy only in parts of southern Europe.”110 Despite 
EFSA’s acknowledgement of the likelihood that this particular maize might behave differently 
in southern environments than it does in northern ones, the GMO Panel did not request the 
performance of field trials that would consider the particular features o f the Mediterranean 
biogeographical region. In the case o f the release of the GM potato line EH92-527-1, the 
submitted experimental findings were obtained through field trials that had been conducted 
only in Sweden, thus no ecological studies had been performed in different growing regions, 
such as Germany, the Netherlands, France, Denmark, Finland and Austria were starch 
potatoes are also grown.771 As it was noted in the case o f the UK field trials, their results ‘are 
likely to have little influence elsewhere in Europe, especially in Spain and Italy where the 
climate favors different crop varieties and agricultural methods.’777
Since the invasiveness o f any GMO is highly sensitive to local environmental 
conditions and the achievement of statistical confidence basically depends on the variety of 
experimental conditions, geographical distribution, agronomic methods used, site and habitat 
differences, the dependence of the opinions of EFSA on the results o f field releases 
performed either within the frame of a single type o f European habitat or in areas outside the
770 Opinion of the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms on a request from the Commission 
related to the notification (Reference C/NL/00/10) for the placing on the market of insect-tolerant genetically 
modified maize 1507, for import and processing, under Part C of Directive 2001/18/EC from Pioneer Hi- 
Bred Intemational/Mycogen Seeds*. (Question No EFSA-Q-2004-011) at 14
771 Opinion of the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms on a request from the Commission 
related to the notification (Reference C/SE/96/3501) for the placing on the market of genetically modified 
potato EH92-527-1 with altered starch composition, for cultivation and production of starch, under Part C of 
Directive 2001/18/EC from BASF Plant Science, (2006) 323 The EFSA Journal (2006) 1-20.
772 P. Mitchell, ‘Europe responds to UK’s GM field trials’ (12 December 2003) 21 Nature Biotechnology 
1419
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European continent773 does not seem to comply with the technical requirement for adequate 
prior field testing of the proposed GMO product in the specific ecosystem in which it is 
planned to be released.774 In the case o f Part C releases, this refers to the entirety o f European 
ecosystems. Although the DRD considers the need for ‘satisfactory field-testing at the 
research and development stage in ecosystems’775 and states the necessity for the deliberate 
release o f GMOs at the research stage,776 it does not require the inclusion o f findings of field 
trials organized specifically within the geographical area o f European Union in the relevant 
commercial notification files. As a result, the experimental information contained in the 
notification files does not respond to the regulatory need to provide an overall assessment of 
the potential effects o f the proposed GM releases upon, at least, the main biogeographical 
regions and habitat types met in the European continent. In the majority o f the authorization 
cases, notification files include the results o f field trials that have taken place in countries 
where public regulation of field trials and obligatory monitoring procedures are lax, such as 
for instance in India, Kenya, Egypt and Thailand. The inability o f small-scale trials to replicate 
the full complexity of farming structures and ecosystems poses real dilemmas for risk 
assessment and in view of the transnational character o f the requested authorization permits 
calls for the findings of field trials performed in different ecological contexts across the EU.
The absence o f large-scale field trials accounting for regional or ecosystem-level 
effects in various bio-geographical areas in Europe, which has been cited as a hole in the risk 
assessment research in the field of agricultural biotechnology,777 has raised questions about 
EFSA’s role in safeguarding the all-encompassing value o f its risk assessment conclusions. 
The GMO Panel seems, in fact, to perpetuate the notifiers’ confinement o f the case-by-case
773 In K. Lheureux, and K. Menrad, ‘A decade of European field trials with genetically modified plants’ 
(2004) 3 Environ.Biosafety Res. 100-101. See also K. Lheureux, M. Libeau-Dulos, N. Nilsagard, E. 
Rodriguez-Cerezo, K. Menrad, M. Menrad & D. Vorgrimler, Review o f  GMOs under Research and 
Development and in the pipeline in Europe, IPTS/DG JRC Technical Report. European Commission Joint 
Research Centre. Institute for Prospective Technological Studies. (EUR 20680 EN) Commissioned by DG 
Agriculture, 2003. It has further been noted that ‘They {the biotechnology companies} mainly focus on 
technological developments outside Europe; little research has been done on the situation within Europe.' In 
Rosendal, G. Kristin. Governing GMOs in the EU: A Deviant Case of Environmental Policy-making? (2005) 
5(1) Global Environmental Politics at 99; G. Gaskell, N. Allum and S. Stares, Europeans and Biotechnology 
in 2002:Eurobarometer 58.0. A report to the EC Directorate General for Research from the project Life 
Sciences in European Society. 21 March 2003 (2nd edition); A.Myhr Ingeborg and T. Traavik. ‘The 
Precautionary Principle: Scientific Uncertainty and Omitted Research in the Context of GMO Use and 
Release’ (2002) 15 Journal o f  Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 73-86.
774 R. Carpenter, ‘Limitations in Measuring Ecological Sustainability’ in T.Trzyna (ed.), A Sustainable 
World ( 1995) 175-197
775 Paragraph 25 of the Preamble
776 Paragraph 23 of the Preamble
777 R. Hails, ‘Genetically modified plants: The debate continues’ (2000) 15 Trends in Ecology and Evolution 
14-18.
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approach to the GMO product, rather to the particular spatial and temporal context o f those 
field trial findings contained in the notification files for the commercial authorization of 
GMOs under the DRD. This approach has led to various controversies between EFSA and 
the Maltese, Hungarian, Polish, Austrian, Belgian and Danish authorities and to the 
imposition o f various national bans on the commercial release o f GMO products.778 EFSA’s 
lack o f special focus on sites and ecosystems that have been granted the status o f ‘habitat 
types o f Community interest’ and enjoy a special status o f legal protection under the Habitats 
and Wild Birds Directives,779 on the basis of their distinctive phytogeographical and 
zoogeographical features,780 have led various Member States to criticize the GMO Panel for 
misreading the legal requirement for a ‘case-by-case’ environmental risk assessment that 
implies that risks have to be assessed according to the nature o f the receiving environment 
and that, as a result, ‘the required information may vary {...} depending on the potential 
receiving environment’.781
Further, it has been stated that ‘there will likely be substantial time lags between the 
introduction o f a transgenic plant and the emergence o f ecological problems related to its 
introduction, such as the escape of transgenes into wild relatives or the naturalization of 
transgenic crops. Long time lags are inherent features of many biological invasions’.782 
Therefore, considering that the field data contained in the notification dossier usually 
constitutes the outcome of an experimental procedure that lasts from a few months to 2-3 
years, they cannot offer sufficient information about the potential effects that the
778 Austria has banned the release of Maize T25, MON 810 and Btl76, France has banned the release of 
oilseed rape T19/2 and oilseed rape MSIBn, Luxembourg and Germany have banned the release of Btl76, 
Poland and Hungary have banned the release of MON 810 maize hybrid seeds and Greece has banned the 
release of oilseed rape T19/2.
779 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna 
and flora OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7-50 and Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the 
conservation of wild birds
OJL 103 , 25/04/1979 P. 0001 - 0018
780 See: B. Darvas et all. ‘Authors’ response to the Statement of the European Food Safety Authority GMO 
Panel concerning Environmental Analytical and Ecotoxicological Experiments Carried out in Hungary’ 
(2006) EFSA Journal
781 Annex II, point B and Article 4, paragraph 3 of the 2001/18/EC
782 In P. Kareiva and M.A. Marvier, An overview of risk assessment procedures applied to genetically 
engineered crops in Incorporating Science, Economics and Sociology in Developing Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Standards in International Trade. Proceedings of a Conference. Board on Agriculture and 
Natural Resources, (National Research Council, National Academy Press: Washington, D.C., 2000) 235. See 
also S. Mayer, "Is this a harvest fit for the world?” (18 August 1999) The Guardian; About the American 
experience on this issue, see M.A. Marvier, E. Meir and P.M. Kareiva, ‘How does the design of monitoring 
and control strategies affect the chance of detecting and containing transgenic weeds?’ in K. Ammann and 
Y. Jacot (eds), Risks and Prospects o f  Transgenic Plants, Where Do We Go From Here? (Birkhauser Press: 
Basel, 1999) 109-122; About the German experience, I. Kowarik, ‘Time lags in biological invasions with 
regard to the success and failure of alien species’ in P.Pysek, K.Prach, Mreijmanek, M.Wade (eds.), Plant 
Invasions: general Aspects and Special Problems (SPB Academic Publishing: Amsterdam, 1995) 15-38
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introduction o f GMOs might create during the ten-year duration of the commercial permit. 
As has been noted; ‘the biological significance of genetic information is to a great extent 
dependent on context, and that a gene product may have different biological meanings in 
different contexts {spatial and temporal relationships to other elements and structures}.’783 
Thus, the dependence of EFSA on this temporarily and geographically limited data seem to 
indicate a political preference to project this experimental data as an all-encompassing, 
objective basis for safety evaluations.
7.2.2.2. Inherent bias in experimental design
Although ‘experiments are difficult to ignore’,784 the value of the results 
obtained through the releases of GMOs under field conditions has been further compromised 
for several methodological reasons. EFSA’s portrayal of field trial results, in the context of 
the DRD framework, as an ‘objective’ and ‘sound’ basis for reaching risk assessment 
conclusions seems to disregard, for instance, that ‘the many interrelated factors affecting gene 
flow, ranging from variations in the genetic composition o f weeds to spatial relationships 
between plants and agricultural practices mean that prediction with any certainty how, when, 
where and with what outcome remains extremely difficult.’785 Despite the fact that, ‘each 
stage’s objective is more geared towards ensuring safety for this relevant stage, rather than 
planning for the following stages’ EFSA views field trials as the last step before the 
uncontrolled release of GMOs into the environment.786 The results of field trials demonstrate 
mostly that they have been conducted carefully as such and as it has been noted; ‘Regulatory 
controls had thus ensured a manageable practice of planning safe experiments, rather than a 
better scientific basis for preparing experiments with manageable intended effects on the 
environment.’787 Fjelland points out that; ‘there is a trade-off between control o f the
783 R. Kollek, ‘The Limits of Experimental Knowledge: A Feminist Perspective on the Ecological Risks of 
Genetic Engineering’ in V. Shiva & I. Moser (eds.), Biopolitics-A Feminist and Ecological Reader on 
Biotechnology (Zed Books: New York, 1995) 102
784 Y. Millo and J. Lezaun, ‘Testing times’ (Summer 2004) 7 Risk and Regulation, Magazine of the ESRC 
Centre fo r  Analysis o f  Risk and Regulation (CARR) 9
785 See more in European Environment Agency, ‘Environment in the European Union at the turn of the 
century,’ State o f  Environment report No 1/1999 (EEA Publications: Copenhagen, 01 June 1999) 255
786 See von Schomberg (1998) note 365 at 7
787 R. von Schomberg, ‘Netherlands: deliberating biotechnology regulation’ (June 1996) 23 Science and 
Public Policy 158-163
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conditions on the one hand and relevance to natural situations on the other: The better the 
field experiments, the less relevant they are.*788
Further, in light o f the absence o f standardized testing protocols that can guide the 
design o f field trials in agricultural biotechnology, or of common experimental design 
formulas and assessment methodologies, the empirical data produced ‘carries no information 
unless it is interpreted against the background of the specific design of the experiment that 
produced them.’789 Rather than assessing the impact on underlying natural processes, field 
trials have focused on the differences between the GM crops and conventional farming of the 
same crop in terms o f their ecological effects.790 As a result, each notifier employs a different 
methodological approach and selects a particular technical aspect of the biotic/abiotic 
environment as a benchmark for the assessment of the potential effects o f the experimental 
genetic engineering release, rendering the results o f the notified experimental releases 
vulnerable to multiple, mostly biased, interpretations.79/ Bias in this sense does not necessarily 
mean deliberate inaccuracy, but basically a pervasive inclination to see data come out 
favorably. In the case o f agricultural biotechnology, molecular biologists, who in fact 
constitute the vast majority of those scientists performing field trials, set up these 
experimental procedures by controlling the main experimental conditions in order to prevent 
any unintended consequences. As one molecular biologist has noted, ‘I have to define my 
system very precisely to get answers. If  I have too many variables which aren’t under my 
control, I usually can’t interpret the results.’792
The interactions of GMOs with the environment cannot be accurately deduced from 
the behavior o f such organisms under controlled conditions that cannot full replicate the 
complexities and the idiosyncracy of the ‘open’ environment. ‘There is, in reality, no smooth 
transition into dissemination outside the confines, but a brutal transition from confined use to
788 R. Fjelland, ‘Facing the problem of uncertainty’ (2002) 15 Journal o f  Agricultural and Environmental 
Ethics 160
789 A. van Dommelen, Hazard Identification o f  Agricultural Biotechnology: Finding Relevant Questions 
(International Books: Utrecht, The Netherlands, 1999) 70
790 M. J. Wilkinson, ‘Abandoning ‘responsive’ GM risk assessment’ (September 2004) 22(9) TRENDS in 
Biotechnology 439
791 As it has been noted, ‘individual EU member states have ambivalent attitudes to the results of a recent 
harm-scale evaluation (FSE) of three genetically modified (GM) crops conducted in the United Kingdom.’ 
In P. Mitchell, ‘Europe responds to UK’s GM field trials’ (December 2003) 21(12) Nature Biotechnology 
1418
792 S. Boschen, K. Kastenhofer, L. Marschall, I. Rust, J. Soentgen, P. Wehling, ‘Scientific Cultures of Non­
knowledge in the Controversy over Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO). The Cases of Moledular 
Biology and Ecology’ in (2006) 15/4 GAIA 298
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massive dissemination.’793 EFSA’s extrapolation of wide-ranging safety conclusions for the 
entirety of the potential environmental effects of GMO releases is inherently normative, due 
to the fact that the provided field data constitutes the outcome of a particular contextual 
interpretation and decisively depends on the underlying assumptions o f those in charge of 
their performance.
Many member states have criticised the deductive approach o f the GMO Panel 
towards the notified field trial findings upon the basis that the conclusions drawn are usually 
based upon too few sites and seasons, small plots, or that the assessed climate conditions and 
agricultural practices are not usually representative of the European agri-environmental 
features. Further, the factors affecting the comparative assessment are inappropriately 
considered and not described in detail (e.g. climate conditions; time of cultivation and 
harvesting, . on-site cultivation conditions, characteristics of the experimental plots, 
sampling).794 Considering that ‘evidence deemed reliable enough to generate a sufficient risk 
assessment in one regulatory context may fail in other contexts because of the different 
concerns, risk frames and particular circumstances,’795 the heterogeneity in the focus and 
interpretation of the generated evidence constitutes a significant indication of EFSA’s flawed 
effort to achieve an interstate acceptance o f the notified experimental data as an adequate 
indicator of the safe character o f the proposed release at an EU level.
In the frame of the UK Farm-Scale Evaluations of genetically modified herbicide- 
tolerant crops, it was noted that their results ‘cannot be, as widely interpreted, the final piece 
of the jigsaw before commercialization can proceed.’796 In other words, EFSA’s use of 
experimental findings in the frame of the DR framework overlooks the normative baselines 
and targeting o f the correspondent field trials findings contained in the notification dossiers. 
In general, the evaluations reached by the GMO Panel indicate that the latter does not seem 
to acknowledge the inherent limitations or the context-specific character of field trials as a 
source o f regulatory information o f an objective character but, instead, it views their findings 
as carriers o f undisputable value and certainty.
793 Special environment report on ‘O G M prudence ’ Le courier de I ’ INRA (1996) 12
794 See: ‘Issues to be considered in GMO risk assessment (Austria) 15 May 2006 (internal note)
795 D. Winickoff, S. Jasanoff, L. Busch., R. Grove-White, and B. Wynne, ‘Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: 
Science, Risk, and Democracy in World Trade Law’ (2005) 30 The Yale Journal o f  International Law 113
796 AEBC, ‘Crops On Trial-A Report by the AEBC’ September 2001 (Available at 
http://www.aebc.gov.uk/aebc/pdf/crops.pdf) 13
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7.3. EFSA’s unspoken assumptions and the non-recognition of uncertainties in 
the DRD
The Commission has made explicit reference to the need for EFSA, as a risk assessor 
in the deliberate release framework, to acknowledge the overall uncertainty of each identified 
risk, the assumptions about the role o f the notified data and existing methodological 
standards in assessing the risks o f genetic engineering that are embedded in risk analysis and 
the extrapolations made at various levels in the environmental risk assessment o f the effects 
o f genetic engineering.797 Despite the Commission’s guidance notes, the GMO Panel has thus 
far not made explicit reference to any o f these elements in the frame of its scientific opinions. 
It will be argued that EFSA’ s efforts to project its risk assessment opinions as objective, 
deprived of any subjective considerations and as the carrier o f a unified scientific approach 
over genetic engineering overlook the significant knowledge gaps in relation to the scientific 
understanding of the long-term and /o r cumulative effects of the notified releases, the absence 
of common epistemic grounds in genetic engineering sciences and of a biotechnology 
epistemic community, mostly due to scientific disputes, ethical debates and financial 
competition among researchers, and the multiplicity o f scientific approaches. These structural 
features of its assessment approach indicate EFSA’s inherently normative role as the GMO 
Panel is constandy required to make choices o f a subjective character in relation to the 
methodology, scientific approach and assessment baseline that should be followed for the risk 
assessment o f GMO releases.
In view of the scientific indeterminacy and uncertainties in the field of genetic 
engineering and in light of the corresponding scientific disagreements over the nature of the 
potential risks and to what constitutes ‘sufficient knowledge,’ it is argued that the Opinions of 
the GMO Panel can only reflect specific normative choices. Considering the inherent 
uncertainties and the variety of normative assumptions, the same technical genetic 
engineering information can be interpreted differendy depending on the particular viewpoint 
of the risk assessor. To this end, this section firsdy examines how the EFSA GMO Panel has 
so far approached the plurality o f different scientific accounts o f the genetic engineering risks. 
Then, the section sheds light on EFSA’s approach towards the issue of the inherent scientific 
uncertainties over the evaluation o f the long-term risks o f agricultural biotechnology. Finally,
797 See: 2002/623/EC: Commission Decision of 24 July 2002 establishing guidance notes supplementing 
Annex II to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the deliberate release 
into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC OJ 
L200/22
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the use of the analogy o f familiarity is examined against EFSA’s projection of its risk 
assessment conclusions as being rather than reflecting, a special scientific focus towards the 
idiosyncrasies o f genetic engineering.
7.3.1. Scientific disagreements at the level of risk assessment
The scientific controversies surrounding the assessment o f the effects of GM releases 
can be attributed to the multiplicity of scientific disciplines involved in the relevant debate 
including molecular biology, genetics, evolutionary biology, toxicology, plant and soil sciences, 
ecology, agricultural and medical sciences and to the lack of a wider epistemic consensus in 
the field o f biosafety. The scientific literature on the use of GMOs in an agri-environmental 
context and on the effects and risks of their releases evidences a fundamental epistemic 
debate between molecular biologists and ecologists,798 as two cultures divided along 
disciplinary fault lines.799 On the one hand, molecular biologists assume no inherent risk in the 
GMOs, founding their evaluations upon analogies between GMOs and hybrid crops from the 
practice o f conventional plant breading. In turn, ecologists assume a more risk averse 
approach based on the comparison between GMOs and invasive exotic/non-indigenous 
species. Further, ecologists view existing scientific evidence as insufficient to rule out possible 
risks arising from the use of genetic techniques, as it would be difficult to predict any specific 
impact o f GMOs on natural ecosystems.
These scientific disciplines work from diverging research perspectives, thus, ‘it is not 
surprising that the need for interdisciplinarity does not develop without confusion over 
concepts and questions.’800 In fact, as it has been noted,
‘molecular biology and ecology are rarely linked by interdisciplinary cooperation.
These disagreements have been extended even in the case of ‘an unambiguous
characterization of the technological risk-agent itself.’80’
When asked for an explanation of this situation, one interviewed molecular biologist referred 
to their divergent interests, belief systems and ideologies ‘as resulting in a gap between their
798 See note 437
799 See note 29 at 133-151
800 Ibid.
801 For instance, with GM plants, the precise insertion of the foreign gene is recognized not to be rigorously 
controlled in practice, leading to uncertainties about the precise biological agent, which has been created and 
released in commercial planting. Further development of the scientific understanding of these processes 
would presumably reduce uncertainty of this kind, increasing the reliability o f risk assessment. In H.-W. 
Choi et al., ‘High Frequency Cytogenetic Aberration in Transgenic Oat (Avena Satina L.) Plants’ (2001) 160 
Plant Science 763
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proponents and opponents that disables exchange and joint research’802 leading to scientific 
disagreement for instance ‘about the amount o f information needed to demonstrate that 
growing GM pest and disease-resistant crops is environmentally sustainable in the long 
term.’803 Controversies about the novelty, the volume and the nature of the risks associated 
with GMO releases have persisted in both political and scientific arenas804 and ‘scientific 
disciplines conflict in the very development of risk assessment.’805
The need for a risk assessor to acknowledge the relevant scientific disagreements in 
the field o f agricultural biotechnology has been specifically addressed in Commission 
Decision 2002/623 pursuant to which the GMO Panel should describe those scientific 
assessments and viewpoints that depart from its approach.806 Further, according to article 30 
o f Regulation 178/2002, when a substantive divergence over scientific issues has been 
identified, EFSA should cooperate with the national body to resolve the disagreement or 
prepare a joint public document clarifying the contentious scientific issues.807 Contrary to 
these legislative requirements, the opinions of the GMO Panel refer neither to the different 
approaches nor to the different weight given to various types of data by those scientific 
disciplines involved in the assessment of biosafety. Despite the Commission’s request to 
EFSA’s expert memebrs ‘to indicate if they disagree, why they disagree,’808 the examination o f 
EFSA’s risk assessment practice has shown that apart from the lack of explicit reference to 
the objections and to the comments submitted by the various member states, there has not 
been any acknowledgment o f receipt of these comments. The European Association of 
European Bioindustries has expressed its support for the Commission’s initiatives stating that 
‘EFSA should explain in detail why it rejected certain scientific arguments.’809
802 S. Boschen, K. Kastenhofer, L. Marschall, I. Rust, J. Soentgen, P. Wehling, ‘Scientific Cultures of Non­
knowledge in the Controversy over Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO). The Cases of Moledular 
Biology and Ecology’ (2006) 15(4) GAIA 297
803 GM Science Review, First Report, An open review of the science relevant to GM crops and food based 
on the interests and concerns of the public, prepared by the GM Science Review Panel (July 2003) at 14
804 R.v. Schomberg, ‘Controversies and political decision-making’ in R. v. Schomberg (ed.) Science, 
Politics, Morality. Scientific Uncertainty and Decision Making (Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht, 
1993) 7-26
805 C. Limoges et al,. Controversies over risks in biotechnology: A framework o f  analysis Proceedings in 
Managing Environmental Risks. Pittsburgh, PA (Air &Waste Management Association, 1990)167
806 See: point 4.2.4 of the Annex to the 2002/623/EC
807 Article 30 (3) of the Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 of the Council and European Parliament (OJ No. L31,
1.2.2002, p.l)
808 ‘Commission says that GMO risk assessments need improving’ (April 14, 2006) 252 EU Food Law 
Weekly 1
809 Commission says that GMO risk assessments need improving’ (April 14, 2006) 252 EU Food Law 
Weekly 3
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In its effort to conceal these disagreements and to project a unified risk assessment 
approach, the GMO Panel has marginalised ‘the inherent complexity and indeterminacy o f 
outcomes in biological communities — the source o f ‘ecological surprises’ that characterize 
outliers.’810 None of the EFSA Opinions makes reference to the regional ecological 
characteristics of the potential receiving environment, despite the explicit legal requirement 
that the ERA has to take them into account.811 Additionally, the GMO Panel has made no 
special reference to those areas that have been designated as areas o f special ecological 
importance in the frame of the NATURA network, despite the requirements o f Article 6 of 
Council Directive 9 2 /43/EC for an ‘appropriate assessment’ o f the potential implications ‘in 
view o f the site's conservation objectives’8^  and o f Article 19 3(c) o f the DRD according to 
which, The written consent {...} shall, in all cases, explicitly specify: {...the} conditions for the protection of 
particular ecosystems I  environments andj or geographical areas.813 In other words, the GMO Panel 
disregards the main feature o f ecological sciences that is the complexity and the idiosyncratic 
character o f each ecosystem and seems to engulf the approach o f molecular biology that 
avoids ecological peculiarities in order to produce the required ‘hard facts.’
EFSA’s silent treatment o f national objections and its concealment o f major scientific 
disagreements and uncertainties in the field o f biosafety research attracted significant 
criticisms in the case of the release of MON863 hybrids and the MON863xNK603 maize as 
some GMO panel members have acknowledged814 and became a major point o f controversy 
in the March 2006 Environment Council, vhere various member states (Denmark, Germany, 
Czech Republic, Italy) argued that the opinions from EFSA did not tally with views from 
Member States, whereas the justifications contained are quite general.815 Considering that 
‘knowledge is only power if it is consensual rather than contested, particularly in situations of 
uncertainty,’816 EFSA’s lack o f reference to those views that depart from its rationale 
illustrates its normative choice to project its risk assessment conclusions as the outcome of a 
de facto unified scientific reading of the relevant notification data, which in effect grants it an
810 R.K. Colwell, ‘Ecology and biotechnology: Erpectations and outliers’ in J.Fiksel and V.T.Covello (eds.), 
Risk analysis approaches fo r  environmental releases o f  genetically modified organisms (NATO Advanced 
Research Science Institute Series, Volume F, Berln: Springer-Verlag, 1988) 37
811 Article 4 paragraph 1 of the 2002/623/EC
812 Article 6 of Council Directive 92/43/EC
813 Article 19 3(c) of the Directive 2001/18/EC
814 See: Le Monde, 23 April 2004, ‘L’ evaluation scientifique des risques est opaque, les dossiers parfois 
incompletes, les delais tres brefs’; Le Monde, 9 Ffcruary 2006, ‘Nouveaux soupcons sur les OGM’
815 More in ‘Environment Ministers criticize EFSVs GMO risk assessments and call fro change’ (10, March 
2006) EU Food Law 4
8,6 See about the power of scientific ideas and kiowledge, A. Zito, Environmental Policy in the European 
Union (Macmillan: London, 1999)
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aura o f scientific objectivity and incontestability in accordance with its role as a scientific 
mediator.817 The GMO Panel’s silence in relation to the methods, criteria, range of views 
examined, quality of evidence submitted, source of data and benchmarks applied and their 
statistical power as well as to the scientific bibliography that it has used in arriving at its 
conclusions and its use o f vague, highly subjective concepts such as the term  ‘biological 
relevance’ so as to explain, for instance, significant differences in feeding trials,818 has further 
illustrated its keenness to project its opinions as the ultimate scientific judgment o f the case at 
hand.
In conclusion, it could be said that the choice of the GMO Panel not to reflect upon 
the various technical disagreements about the lack o f or the reliability of data nor to address 
the plurality o f ecological particularities at the local and regional level in Europe reflects a 
simplified approach towards what constitutes the European environment and an adherence to 
the rationale o f molecular biology, as evidenced in its emphasis on hard data as well as on 
direct and short-term hazards such as toxicity and pathogenicity. This particular risk 
assessment practice has effectively undermined the unitary character o f its opinions and has 
challenged their accommodating and inclusive potential.
7.3.2. Handling of uncertainties in the frame of EFSA’s opinions
The relatively short time period o f the open-field use of agricultural biotechnology, 
the lack of a comprehensive knowledge base on the effects o f the commercial releases - 
especially on the long-term and cumulative ecological ones -819 and the absence o f a public 
biosafety research agenda that could examine those areas o f genetic engineering that have
817 See: Article 30 of Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 of the Council and European Parliament (OJ No. L31,
1.2.2002, p.l)
8,8 The GMO Panel made use of this term in the case of the commercial release of the genetically modified 
maizeMON863, see on this its opinion on
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/grno/gmo opinions/381/opinion gmo 06 enl.ndf and
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/gmo/gmo opinions?383?opinion gmo 07 enl.ndf
819 As it has been noted, ‘Several reviews of the science have concluded that there is a relatively small 
knowledge base on which to confirm the ecological impacts from the process o f genetic engineering and the 
types of traits engineered into the crops.’ In R. Welsh & D. Ervin ‘Precaution as an Approach to Technology 
Development: The Case of Transgenic Crops’ (2006) 31(2) Science, Technology, & Human Values 158; see 
also, D. Ervin, S. Batie, R. Welsh, C. L. Carpentier, J. I. Fem, N. J. Richman, and M. A. Schulz, ‘Transgenic 
crops: An environmental assessment’ (2001) 15 Policy Studies Report Arlington, VA, H. A. Wallace Center 
for Agricultural and Environmental Policy at Winrock International; Royal Society of Canada, Elements o f  
precaution: Recommendations fo r  regulation o f  fo o d  biotechnology in Canada (Royal Society: Ottawa, 
Canada, 2001); L.L. Wolfenbarger and P. R. Phifer, ‘The ecological risks and benefits of genetically 
engineered plants’ (2000) 290 Science 2088-2093
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been kept out of the industrial focus constitute some of the structural limitations o f the 
submitted notification data (and in effect o f EFSA’s correspondent Opinions) in addressing 
the relevant scientific uncertainties. In view of the ‘poor understanding of what a gene actually 
does and where and when it should do it,’820 serious inherent uncertainties and knowledge 
gaps exist on the multiple effects of the interaction between GMOs and ecological processes, 
as for instance on the invasiveness of these transgenic organisms.821
Considering that questions on the long term effects o f genetic engineering upon the 
wide variety of European ecosystems are beyond the current capacity of science to resolve 
especially within the timeframe of the established decision-making process, major institutional 
actors in the EU have repeatedly recognised the need for the risk assessor to illustrate those 
areas o f scientific inquiry that remain under-analysed, explain in detail any kind of scientific 
uncertainty, alongside the techniques, assumptions and values employed for its interpretation 
and handling and reflect the uncertain nature of these estimates for the sake of their public 
credibility.’822 The Commission Decision 2002/623/EC has acknowledged the need to 
address these uncertainties in the frame of the relevant risk assessment opinions stating that, 
‘the overall uncertainty for each identified risk has to be describe d’,623 whilst the Communication o f the 
Precautionary Principle, which transcends the operation of the DR framework, notes that ‘the 
implementation o f an approach based on the precautionary principle should start with a 
scientific evaluation, as complete as possible, and where possible, identifying at each stage the 
degree of scientific uncertainty’.824
820 Eric Neumann, vice president of bioinformatics at Beyond Genomics Inc; J. Dodge, ‘Data glut’ The 
Boston Globe, USA,24 February 2003, http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/055/business/Data_glut+.shtmI; 
see more in S. Batie and D.E. Ervin, ‘Transgenic crops and the environment: missing markets and public 
roles’ (2001) 6 Environment and Development Economics 435-457
821 G.D. Gidding, ‘The Role of Modelling in Risk Assessment for the releases of genetically engineered 
plants’ in K.Ammann, Y.Jacot, G.Kjellsson, and V.Simonsen (eds.), Methods fo r  Risk Assessment o f  
Transgenic Plants.III. Ecological Risks and Prospects o f  Transgenic Plants (Birkhauser Verlag, Basel, 
1999)31-41
822 Bonss,W., R. Hohlfeld, and R. Kollek, “Soziale und kognitive Kontexte des Risikosbegriffs in der 
Gentechnologie,” in W. Bonns, R. Hohlfeld, and R. Kollek (eds.), Wissenschaft als Kontext -  Kontexte der 
Wissenschaft (Hamburger Institut fur Sozialforschung, Hamburg, 1993) 53-67
823 2002/623/EC
824 See Communication from the Commission on the precautionary principle, Brussels, 02.02.2000, COM 
(2000) 1 paragraph 4 of the Summery. In another part of the Communication, the Commission, in paragraph 
5.1.2, notes that ‘ Where possible, a report should be made which indicates the assessment o f  the existing 
knowledge and the available information, providing the views o f  the scientists on the reliability o f  the 
assessment as well as on the remaining uncertainties. I f  necessary, it should also contain the identification 
o f  topics fo r  further scientific research.'
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In its first Report on the Harmonisation of Risk Assessment Procedures, the 
Commission emphasised that ‘it is necessary that uncertainty is clearly addressed in each 
opinion, thereby informing the reader about the solidity of the statements made and the 
nature o f uncertainty in the judgment.’825 It should be noted that the Commission had 
acknowledged the inherendy limited character of the tool of risk assessment as such in view 
of the uncertainty that characterises the field of agricultural biotechnology before the 
adoption o f the revised version of the DR framework stating that:
. .even a thorough risk assessment on the environmental impact may not be able to 
give definitive answers to all the questions considered i.e. there is a high degree of 
uncertainty.’826
On this issue, the European Parliament has further noted that, ‘the experts’ report 
should describe {...} the assumptions used as a starting point, the margin of uncertainty and 
the degree of ignorance.’827 It’s worth referring to the remarks o f Environment Commissioner 
Dimas who noted the existence o f ‘scientific uncertainties surrounding the long-term safety of 
GM crops, infuriating the biotech industry.’828 Thus, the acknowledgment at the level of risk 
assessment o f the breadth o f uncertainty and the main assumptions reached for the 
formulation o f the necessary conclusions has evolved into not only a basic principle of good 
scientific practice, but also a necessary regulatory condition of the credibility of the relevant 
findings.
Despite these institutional calls for disclosing the uncertainty that surrounds its 
determinations, EFSA, in its opinions, has viewed biotechnological ‘interferences’ as a well- 
controlled and understood sector o f technological applications and, in turn, has not 
recognized or communicated either to the national risk assessors or to the Commission any 
uncertainties and limitations in the field of ecological risk assessment o f open-field genetic 
engineering releases. Its evidenced practice of not reflecting on the limits o f scientific 
knowledge on biosafety, which might be justified on the potential for the acknowledgment o f
825 European Commission, First Report on the Harmonisation of Risk Assessment Procedures’ Part 1: the 
Report of the Scientific Steering Committee’s Working Group on Harmonisation of Risk Assessment 
Procedures in the Scientific Committees advising the European Commission in the area of human and 
environmental health, 26-27 October 2000 at 129
826 European Commission, ‘A framework approach to environmental risk assessment for the release of 
genetically modified organisms’ Doc.: XI/087/96-Rev.4 at 2
27 In EP (2000) ‘Report on the Commission Communication on the Precautionary Principle’. Brussels: 
European Parliament [three different Committees] at 6
828 See: Dimas, S. Speech to EU Presidency Conference on GMO Coexistence, Vienna, 5 April 2006, Ref. 
SPEECH/06/224 and Euractive (2006), ‘Cracks start to show in EU GMO policy’, 6 April 2006, available at 
www.euractiv.com
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the relevant uncertainties to dilute the projection of its opinions as objective and all- 
encompassing and create space for ethical assessments and socioeconomic cost-benefit 
analyses to encroach into the process o f risk evaluation, has undermined its authority as a de 
facto epistemic gatekeeper in the field o f GMO releases and has further illustrated the 
subjective reasoning that informs its opinions.
Public interest groups and various member states have criticized this particular 
assessment approach and as Danish and German biosafety officials noted; ‘Our problem with 
EFSA is that even on grounds o f sound science, it does not recognise the high degree of 
uncertainty in most o f the data or non-data in the dossiers and their decisions are very often 
based on assumptions and not on sufficient data, thereby ignoring real gaps in the risk 
assessment.’829 The Belgian Biosafety Advisory Council has noted that; ‘The opinions o f the 
EFSA GMO Panel should be written according to scientific standards, providing detailed 
scientific justification and addressing {...} scientific uncertainties.’830
Its eventual requests for extra toxicology tests or o f statistical data has been the sole 
response o f the GMO Panel towards the limitations o f science when assessing the submitted 
notification files. This approach reflects its viewing o f uncertainties as a form of technical 
imprecision that could be reducible only through an increase of the relevant 
scientific/empirical research and reinforces the unspoken EFSA fact-finding perception of 
genetic engineering risks. Considering that uncertainty in the field of agricultural 
biotechnology seems to be more a built-in feature since biosafety knowledge is either 
unavailable or unattainable, EFSA’s informational requests overlook the complexity and the 
natural randomness o f ecosystems, ‘where’ as has been noted ‘uncertainty will always be the 
case, no matter how much knowledge is gathered about them.’831 In effect, EFSA’s focus on 
particular ‘hard facts’ indicates its adherence to the rationale o f molecular biologists that is
829 Interview evidence with Danish and German authorities (June/July 2006)
830 ‘Advice of the Belgian Biosafety Advisory Council on the procedures followed by the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA) for the scientific evaluation and the risk assessment of genetically modified 
organisms (GMO) food and feed use and on the European decision rules pertaining to the marketing 
authorizations given to these GMOs,’ Biosafety Advisory Council, O.ref.: WIV-ISP/BAC/2006_SC_375, 
11-05-2006 at 6
831 For more about this, see V. H. Dale, S. Brown, R. A. Haeuber et al., Ecological Principles and 
Guidelines fo r  Managing the Use o f  Land (Ecological Society of America (ESA), 1999). As van Asselt 
mentions, ‘Complex issues can in fact become harder to assess with more knowledge about the underlying 
processes.’ M. B. A. van Asselt, Perspectives on uncertainty and risk. The PR1MA approach to decision- 
support PhD (University of Maastricht: Maastricht, Netherlands, 2000)
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based upon a confidence to predict all risks and upon a viewing o f genetic engineering risks as 
tractable objects of scientific inquiry.
7.3.3. EFSA Opinions: biosafety control by resort to analogies?
The concept o f familiarity has been extensively used in the frame of various 
biotechnology-related regulatory frameworks as a standard o f comparison between a GMO 
and a non-GM O product. This can be seen in the technical reports o f the World Bank832and 
of the OECD.833 It comes from the chemical industry ‘where, if the structure and activity o f a 
chemical is known, then closely related chemicals, with nearly the same chemical structures, 
will behave the same way.’834 The GMO Panel of EFSA, echoing the rationale of the 
commercial notifier, implicitly employs the concept of familiarity as a baseline for hazard 
acceptability by comparing ‘new’ organisms such as GMOs with those already considered to 
be safe within the EU (familiar organisms) and assesses the potential effects of a release o f a 
GM crop without direct experience, but only via the consideration o f the biology of the plant 
species, the trait introduced, and the agricultural practices and environment used for crop 
production. According to the Directive 2001/ l8 /E C  article 7, a GMO may be deliberately 
released under the so-called simplified procedures, if an applicant can convince the competent 
authorities in a member state that this genetic engineering product is "familiar”, i.e. if 
sufficient knowledge is present on the correspondent non-modified plant concerning risks for 
human health and the environment. Further, pursuant to the principles for the environmental 
risk assessment contained in Annex II of the Directive; ‘Information from releases of similar 
organisms and similar traits and their interaction with similar environments can assist the 
environmental risk assessment, i.e. with the evaluation o f risks to human health and the 
environment, whether direct or indirect, immediate or delayed.’835
832 See about this issue, J.J. Doyle and G. J. Persley, Enabling the Safe Use o f  Biotechnology-Principles and  
Practice (World Bank: Washington, 1996)
833 OECD states: ‘The concept of familiarity is a major factor in all phases of the evaluation, since it is used 
to identify potential adverse effects (i.e. hazard identification), to determine the level of risk associated with 
these adverse effects, and to adopt risk management strategies.’ In OECD, ‘Safety Considerations for 
Biotechnology: Scale-up of Micro-organisms as Biofertilizers’ (OECD: Paris, 1995) 12.
834 In P. J. Regal, A brief history o f  biotechnology risk debates and policies in the United States, Occasional 
Paper of the Edmonds Institute, (Edmonds, WA: 1998). The National Academy of Sciences in the USA 
notes that, ‘it has been incorporated into the regulations of several countries as a “trigger” for risk 
assessments and has been adopted in OECD guidelines.’ In I. Scoones, ‘Science, Policy and Regulation: 
Challenges for Agricultural Biotechnology in Developing Countries’ (2002) 147 IDS Working Paper 20
835 Annex II of the Deliberate Release Directive
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Despite the fact that the concept of ‘familiarity’ has not been used explicitly as a 
formal evaluation benchmark, EFSA has used it as the main embedded criterion for the 
application of the simplified procedures linking —implicitly- judgments about predictability 
with those ones about acceptability.836 The introduction o f the familiarity principle has been 
based upon EFSA’ s assumption that the objective o f the risk assessment should be the 
appraisal o f the extent to which the replacement of non-modified organisms by modified 
ones gives rise to additional adverse effects. In view of the fact that the prescribed 
environmental risk assessment is only mandatory for genetically engineered crops not 
considered to be familiar, the resort of the GM O Panel to this contested concept indicates a 
normative choice that seems to trivialize the suigeneris features o f genetic engineering as such 
and the relevant scientific uncertainties. This particular risk assessment approach o f EFSA has 
reduced the required environmental risk assessment for GMOs as such to the identification 
of potential differences between the conventional plant and its GM counterpart or to 
conclusions drawn from the results obtained with the parental product.
Despite the international scientific recognition o f the value the concept o f ‘familiarity’ 
as a sound starting point for constructing detailed studies, it has been heavily criticised as 
hinging ‘on vague descriptions such as ‘essentially similar’ and ‘reasonable assurance’837 and in 
effect as a notion that cannot sufficiently safeguard the safety of GMO releases in scientific 
terms.838 OECD experts have further emphasised that ‘familiarity is not synonymous with 
safety.’839 In view of the relevant scientific disagreements as to what constitutes a safe 
organism, as well as o f the limited knowledge on the long-term and indirect effects o f GMO 
releases into different natural ecosystems, Regal has noted that ‘. . .how dangerous it can be to 
assume that one is sufficiently familiar with an organism to make predictions when the 
familiarity is not based on a detailed understanding o f the mechanisms of adaptation and
836 M. Dreyer and B. Gill. ‘Elite precaution’ along with continued public opposition. A study of the 
implementation of the EC Directive 90/220 within the EU research project: ‘Safety regulation of transgenic 
crops: Completing the internal market?’ A study of the implementation of EC Directive 90/220 Main 
contractor: The Open University, contract no. BI04-CT97-2215, 1997-1999 (1999) 21
837 A. van Dommelen, Hazard Identification o f  Agricultural Biotechnology: Finding Relevant Questions 
(International Books, Utrecht, the Netherlands, 1999) 134-135 and NAS {National Academy of Sciences}, 
Field Testing Genetically Modified Organisms: Framework fo r  Decisions (National Academy Press: 
Washington, DC, 1989)
838 NAS notes that ‘familiar does not necessarily mean safe’ in NAS {National Academy of Sciences}, Field 
Testing Genetically Modified Organisms: Framework fo r  Decisions (National Academy Press: Washington, 
DC, 1989)
839 OECD, Safety Considerations fo r  Biotechnology: Scale-up o f  Micro-organisms as Biofertilizers, (OECD: 
Paris, 1995) 12.
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range o f latent adaptive potentials o f the organism.’ 840 EFSA’s implicit use o f this non- 
scientific concept as a central risk assessment criterion has been questioned especially in the 
field o f GMO releases.841 Austria has officially protested about the standardized resort of the 
GM O Panel to the concept o f familiarity noting that there is; ‘Too much emphasis on 
assumption based reasoning (e.g. history o f safety use) and indirect evidence (e.g. homology 
comparison) instead o f proper direct toxicity testing.’842
In conclusion, it could be said that EFSA’s resort to this artificial analogy has, in fact, 
concealed the absence o f clear risk assessment criteria and the lack of adequate, necessary 
technical evidence in relation to the potential environmental effects of the proposed releases 
and has emphatically indicated the reliance o f its Opinions upon subjective grounds.
7.4. Concluding Remarks
The examination of the opinions o f the EFSA GMO Panel has shown that its 
particular institutionalised evaluation practice has, in effect, diluted the projection of its risk 
assessments in the field o f agricultural biotechnology as objective and comprehensive in their 
EU dimension. Neither the limitations of science in the field o f agricultural biotechnology nor 
the appropriate character o f the use of specific scientific methodologies as the sole basis of 
the required risk assessment, nor the capacity of the latter to respond to the risk challenges of 
genetic engineering constitute the objects of analysis here. Instead, the analysis has been 
focussed on the projection of the science-based risk assessment as a neutral, objective method 
of evaluating potential effects and risks deprived from any normative bias and contextual 
parameters, and the understatement of the complexity o f the subject matter, the absence of 
common scientific interpretative principles, and o f the corresponding scientific uncertainties. 
In concealing the subjective dimension of its tasks, in terms o f its institutional reliance on 
‘best available science’, the GMO Panel has perpetuated the portrayal o f its assessments as 
unifying, providing a seemingly sound, undisputed basis for the correspondent risk
840 P.J. Regal, ‘The true meaning o f ‘exotic species’ as a model for genetically engineered organisms’ (1993) 
49(3) Experientia 233
841 Provisional comments by Friends of the Earth Europe to the notification by Monsanto for the placing on 
the EU market of Roundup Ready (glyphosate tolerant) oilseed rape, event GT73. (notification number 
C/NL/98/11), Friends of the Earth Europe, 21 February 2003
842 See: EFSA/GMO/BE/2004/07, Austrian Comments, Bundesministerium fur Gesundheit und Frauen, 
BMGF-IV/B/12 (Biotechnologie)
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management and prior authorisation decisions. This particular institutional practice seems to 
be consistent with the insulation o f the risk assessment institutional structure from the wider 
socio-economic and ethical debates on the control and acceptability o f the commercial 
applications o f genetic engineering through the separation between an objective, analytical 
and factual process of the evaluation of risks and uncertainties and a political one that also 
considers non-technical factors.
Despite the evident informational asymmetries, the inherent scientific uncertainties 
and the plurality o f scientific approaches in the field of agricultural biotechnology, the 
examination of EFSA’s risk assessment opinions demonstrate a lack o f thorough exploration 
o f the quality o f the notified evidence, or o f any tests to the sensitivity of the established risk 
assessment approach against uncertainty and alternative assumptions. Its assessment 
approach floats on a sea o f subjective assumptions under the guise o f a sound-science 
narrative. The extensive resort to hypothetical non-tested artificial analogies, questionable 
extrapolation models and normative baselines without any explicit reference to their 
limitations within the risk assessment framework undermines the scientific soundness and the 
integrative potential of the generated conclusions and exaggerates the power o f EFSA 
opinions in exerting unconditional scientific control.
More importantly, it perpetuates the flawed notion that scientific risk assessments 
constitute the sole objective and incontestable means for shaping safety judgments that offer 
information o f all-encompassing regulatory value. In light of the dependence of risk 
management upon expert forms of control, the masking of the subjective and context-specific 
character of the risk assessment process and the portrayal o f EFSA’s opinions as the sole 
objective and a-political form of acceptable argumentation grant the correspondent 
authorisation decisions a false sense of ‘sound science’ and ‘objectivity’ that is effectively 
bound to create public distrust. The established assessment practice demonstrates EU 
decision-making structures at their worst: forcing through decisions on the basis o f entirely 
technocratic procedures and confidential expertise via the delegation of the risk assessment 
and management tasks to scientific data produced under conditions o f industrial bias and the 
scarcity o f scientific resources.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions
The thesis examines the normative force of institutional arrangements and 
organizational settings in shaping the outcomes o f decision-making procedures, through an 
analysis o f the Deliberate Release framework. It is found that both the chosen structure for 
the authorization framework and its operation to be, in practice, institutionally shaped. At a 
first level, the thesis finds evidence that in the case of the formulation and operation of the 
deliberate release framework, institutional arrangements and practices mattered in defining 
both the regulatory structure and the normative orientation o f the established prior 
authorisation framework. More specifically, it was found that the framework’s emphasis on 
the creation o f a web of procedural obligations reflects the Commission’s compromise 
decision to delegate the task o f the specification o f the framework’s terms of operation to its 
decentralized, procedure-driven implementation. This finding sheds light on a rather 
neglected aspect o f the decision-making modus operandi at the EU level that is the 
institutional framework within which EU norms are negotiated. This intra-Commission 
framework for the negotiation o f cross-sectoral and multi-purpose rules seems to develop 
particularly destabilising effects on the formulation o f the Commission’s regulatory objectives, 
as well as on the specification of the terms of operation of the under elaboration legislative 
context. Further evidence is found that the institutional context within which these 
authorisation rules operate has not only shaped their normative orientation —in terms o f its 
exclusive focus on the scientific opinions of the appointed expert committees— but has largely 
predetermined their implementation outcomes in terms o f prioritising specific forms of 
knowledge and excluding non-scientific considerations, thus granting an advantage to those 
who possess or generate particular forms o f expertise in a context of great informational 
asymmetries.
Secondly, this licensing framework has been developed upon the basis o f particular 
expert-driven institutional practices that have in turn perpetuated the Commission’s drawing 
o f artificial classifications and false dichotomies between procedural and substantive 
rationales, expert and non-expert opinions, scientific rationality and lay irrationality, as well as 
between objective quantifiable risk assessment accounts versus subjective, emotional, value 
based approaches. The examination of the operation of the prior authorisation framework for 
the control of GM releases provides important insights into the wider debates regarding the 
weight that should be given to scientific judgments in informing regulatory decisions in areas
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of high scientific complexity and uncertainty, the nature of expertise used in the notification 
and risk assessment stages, and the terms for the interaction between science and non-expert 
views in public regulatory decision-making. It is argued that a dual process of politisation of 
science and scientification o f politics is apparent in the evolution of this particular 
authorisation framework.
Finally, the thesis has, more broadly, sought to draw lessons regarding the 
proceduralisation paradigm as an example o f the Commission’s efforts to introduce 
alternative forms o f regulatory control for technological applications that could enhance the 
effectiveness and social legitimacy of the introduced licensing rules. This form of organisation 
o f decision-making in the EU is examined in terms o f its normative force as a regulatory 
technique to create inclusive forms of authorisation control that can in turn moderate the 
existing information asymmetries between risk managers and notifiers and provide space for 
the reconsideration of standards in an area o f risk regulation in which these are highly 
contested. It was thought that this particular decision-making paradigm would eventually lead 
to the fading o f expert-driven routine practices and to the establishment o f open-ended 
deliberation settings throughout the process for the assessment and control of technological 
risks. However, it is found that in the case of the deliberate release framework, the 
proceduralisation paradigm has been deprived of its potential to deliver inclusive and reflexive 
effects, thus to achieve a unified and thus acceptable in political and social terms, regulatory 
outcome. This has led to severe implementation tensions. Finally, the thesis suggests that 
sufficient legal guarantees should be provided for the safeguarding o f the consideration of 
non-scientific views at the risk management level and, that in any case, proceduralism should 
not be seen as an all-encompassing response to those problems and shortcomings habitually 
evidenced in the implementation o f technological control frameworks
8.1. Institutional settings: providing neutral arenas for deliberation or 
determining regulatory outcomes?
Taking into account the densely institutionalised character of the EU governance 
structures and the myriad o f organizational and micro-institutional arrangements established 
for the enactment o f policies, the thesis has assessed both whether the utilised institutional 
settings shaped the Deliberate Release Directive and the actual mechanisms under which this
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occurred as well as the full extent of their influence. It is found that not only did the 
institutional settings for the formulation o f a deliberate release framework influence the 
contents of the DRD, but also that the established institutional practices have effectively 
‘locked’ its development, allowing only for the consideration of particular expert driven 
accounts. The analysis of the empirical data suggests that the vague wording and the emphasis 
on a science-based process-based regulatory structure reflects a temporal compromise among 
the main actors involved in its drafting.
As was the case in the negotiation of the DRD, institutional actors, which take 
advantage of momentary historical or political circumstances, capture open-space 
organizational environments such as the Commission when issues of a cross-sectoral, 
horizontal character are under elaboration. In such contexts, institutional fragmentation can 
lead to unanticipated outcomes and to the establishment o f regulatory frameworks that reflect 
either temporary inter-institutional agreements (compromises) or the preferences of a single 
actor operating in an unconstrained negotiation environment. Through the historical analysis 
of the creation o f this licensing framework, we have seen how the absence o f a guiding 
definition o f the issue under elaboration, or of any formal coordinating structure, left space 
for haphazard historical choices such as the appointment of DGXI as chef de file in the 
drafting o f a horizontal regulatory framework, which effectively defined the route o f the 
consequent decision-making process. Initially, the absence of concrete institutional rules on 
inter-service coordination, in terms of the allocation of powers among the various levels and 
units o f governance and the unclear boundaries of the ‘object of regulation’, provided an 
open space for the participating D G s’ task and competence expansion. Although the process 
reflected the different stages in the evolution of product development, which provided 
incentives for various DGs to capture policy initiatives at different stages in the development 
o f the regulatory framework, it was the lack of a well-coordinated negotiation platform that 
allowed for the formulation o f strategies of purposeful opportunism and the territorialisation 
o f genetic engineering. As a result of this organisational vacuum, a momentary inter- 
institutional compromise between D G  Industry and D G  Environment on the need for a 
common set o f authorisation rules that would be based on the provision o f a predetermined 
type o f technical data set the grounds for the formulation of a licensing framework for the 
control of the deliberate releases of GMOs. At the same time, in view of the lack of any 
specific obligation for a chef de file to cooperate with other Commission DGs, the 
assumption of drafting duties by the Environment Directorate allowed it to articulate the
253
structure of the authorisation framework along environmental terms in accordance with an 
ecological, uncertainty-based, case-by-case viewing and handling o f GM risks.
The examined empirical evidence suggests that actors’ positions in this particular 
negotiating framework were at times shaped not only along the lines o f their immediate 
organisational interests of task expansion and competence maximization, but also pursuant to 
a careful consideration of the wider political and organisational context, which required intra- 
Commission compromises for the long term maximization of their interests. The negotiation 
context was characterised by: the absence o f specific rules for intra-Commission deliberation 
and coordination, the cross-sectoral and dynamic character o f the object o f negotiation and 
multi-factor pressures for enactment o f rules on genetic engineering. As a result, the main 
DGs involved chose to water-down their initial positions. Most noteworthy were D G  
Industry relenting on its reservations about the case-by-case evaluation o f GM risks and the 
emphasis on the uncertainty surrounding the long term effects and risks o f the open-field 
applications o f agricultural biotechnology, and D G  Environment on its reservations about the 
central role o f a science-based risk assessment structure and the inclusion o f internal market 
considerations into the authorisation procedure. The moderation o f their early positions 
reflected a careful consideration of their negotiating power at this particular stage of the 
process, of how much these DGs could gain based on an evaluation o f what their co­
negotiators wanted and an estimation of the higher or lower degree o f certainty provided by 
the negotiation context regarding other actors’ needs or requirements to cooperate. This 
mutual mitigation o f their agendas led to an eventual inter-institutional compromise that 
mirrored the interplay o f a multiplicity o f policy rationales (commercial competitiveness, 
internal market perspectives, the need for technical safety, environmental protection, as well 
as the protection of public health), and ultimately served each D G ’s institutional targets. D G  
Industry achieved a framing of the authorisation structure along an Internal Market 
perspective -pan-European assessment control and the central role of the Community 
institutions- and D G  Environment framed the risk assessment process along the lines o f a 
pollution framework that required notification and ex-ante evaluation procedures for each 
release separately.
Notwithstanding, the weak institutional structures for the coordination o f this 
particular drafting process, the fierce intra-Commission competence battles over the 
prioritization o f the different aspects of genetic engineering applications in the Community’s
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agenda, alongside the general uncertainty that characterises the negotiation o f controversial 
public policies, led to the gradual increase of organisational mistrust among the main DGs 
involved. Subsequently a compromise that was seen as a temporary solution, never intended 
to become the main legal tool of a horizontal character because of D G  Environment’s weak 
structural intra-Commission position, was reached. As a result o f this particular compromise, 
the negotiation o f the framework evolved, effectively inciting the negotiating actors to avoid 
discussions on substance. They chose to displace the responsibility on to the process and 
expert-based institutions for finding ‘objective’ and ‘rational’ answers to those questions that 
had been raised about the preferred form of control of GM risks, the role o f expertise and of 
other forms o f knowledge in the risk assessment process and the appropriate framing of 
terms such as ‘risk’ and ‘safety.’ Consequently, the compromised structure of the licensing 
regime became a permanent legacy of the framework, as the absence of detailed substantive 
risk analysis standards and guidelines regarding how non-scientific concerns and 
considerations could be taken into account, granted ‘science and experts’ all powers. This 
ultimately conferred, by the omission of not qualifying the substantive terms, a very clear 
science-based internal market dimension to the authorisation process.
The study has conferred particular significance to institutions also at the level of 
operation o f the established prior authorisation framework as the institutional structure 
established at the EU level for the assessment of the potential risks has ‘imposed’ a particular 
interpretative paradigm for the available scientific data and has shaped the definition of the 
main terms exclusively along technical lines. More specifically, the Scientific Committees in 
the Commission and their organisational successor in the face of the GMO Panel o f EFSA, as 
the risk assessors, and the Commission’s administrative bodies in their role as risk managers 
and supervisors o f the implementation of the Deliberate Release Directive, have 
institutionalised a line of reasoning that is based on the verification of the soundness o f the 
notified scientific and technical data and on an expert ‘reading’ o f the terms ‘safety’ and ‘risk.’ 
Thus, neither the risk assessor nor the risk managers have so far considered non-scientific 
concerns or interests or taken into account non-technical conceptualisations o f risk or safety, 
despite direct references being made in the framework to their consideration.
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8.2. Scientification of politics or politicisation of science?
The implementation o f this particular licensing framework also offers insights on the 
operation of knowledge-based rule-shaping processes, such as the exact relationship between 
expert and non-expert forms of knowledge in the frame of the risk analysis of the releases of 
GMOs, as well as on the operational value and the effects o f the separation of the risk 
assessment from the risk management framework. It is argued that a mutually reinforcing 
process is taking place in the frame of the deliberate release framework: a gradual 
scientification of the terms o f operation of a regulatory framework that attempts to respond 
to questions o f high political weight has also led to a politisation of the process of the 
provision of scientific advice.
Genetic engineering applications raise questions about science in society, technology 
and public participation, allowing for a re-consideration o f the links between expert and lay 
views, and those between scientists and policy-makers. The Commission’s preference for a 
science-driven authorisation approach can be, prima jade, attributed to the merits o f scientific 
argumentation as being apparently objective, neutral, rational and able to set aside non- 
quantifiable parameters and soft data for the purposes o f this regulatory framework. 
However, on the basis o f the examination o f the relevant institutional conditions, legal texts 
and authorisation decisions, it can be seen that despite the Commission’s reassurances about 
the special position o f risk management as the final stage o f risk analysis, in which social, 
ethical and economic concerns would be considered alongside the acceptability o f risk, there 
is an overriding scientification of the terms of operation of the EU decision-making process 
on agricultural biotechnology. The framing of the operation of the licensing framework along 
technical terms has led to an over emphasis on routine expert controls. This expert-driven 
approach seems to oppose the inclusive and reflexive objectives o f the introduced 
proceduralisation paradigm, which claims to offer a space in which no one form of 
knowledge or argumentation is considered to provide ‘all-encompassing solutions’, and has 
led to an over emphasis on science. As a result o f the developed risk assessment and 
management practices, proceduralism has been deprived o f its inclusive, participatory 
potential and has been transformed into a science-based model o f the organization of the 
decision-making process for the assessment of GM risks.
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The exclusive resort to expert forms of argumentation based on quantifiable scientific 
grounds, the non-activation o f the clauses of the framework that refer to the need for the 
consideration of the socio-ethical effects of the deliberate release of GMOs and the 
Commission’s absolute reliance, as a risk manager, on the opinions of the EFSA GMO Panel 
Opinions, have led to the trivialization of non-scientific concerns and to a stricto sensu expert- 
driven approach towards the potential effects and risks o f genetic engineering. In the case of 
the DR framework, the de facto delegation o f the task for informing authorisation decisions 
wholly to industrial notifiers and to the EFSA GMO Panel, which seems unwilling to take any 
public comments into account in a value-contested area of technological applications, has 
granted the risk assessment conclusions with a disproportionate normative and politically 
legitimizing power. It has ultimately transformed the submitted scientific evidence into the 
sole legitimate input for providing objective information and accommodating knowledge 
claims.
The Commission’s reliance on EFSA’s risk assessment conclusions has led to the 
marginalisation o f all the non-technical effects o f the applications o f agricultural 
biotechnology and to the transformation of the stage o f risk management into a thin disguise 
for the removal o f regulatory policy authority to experts, signifying a de facto replacement of 
the political locus o f deliberation at the EU level with a technocratic one that is based on 
expert routine controls. As a result o f the framing o f the concepts o f risk and safety, as well as 
of the entire risk analysis framework into purely technical terms, we notice the emergence of a 
gradual break up o f the linear sequence of political problem definition, scientific advice and 
political decision-making as it has been formed in various Community licensing frameworks 
and the prevalence of science-based forms o f argumentation to the detriment o f other forms 
o f knowledge and reasoning, especially those of a political nature.
Through an examination of the institutional environment within which risk 
assessment conclusions on the safety of GMO releases have been formulated, it is further 
demonstrated that EFSA’s and the Commission’s projection o f the relevant expert opinions 
as objective and reflexive constitutes a flawed characterisation o f the process. The analysis of 
EFSA’s risk assessment practice shows that the process for the formulation o f the risk 
assessment conclusions is not devoid of subjective assumptions and normative points of 
reference in view of the inherent limitations in the scientific knowledge on the effects o f the 
planed release o f GMOs, the lack o f a common episteme in the field o f biosafety, and existing
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and perpetuated informational asymmetries. Moreover, the Commission has resorted to 
quantifiable forms of argumentation leading to the instrumental use of scientific experts for 
political purposes at the level of risk management. What this study shows, in effect, is that 
when risk assessors facing serious material constraints are asked to deliver an opinion on the 
safety o f a technological application within a limited time framework in a policy field where 
industrial notifiers have an obvious informational advantage, there is high scientific 
uncertainty and a lack o f common epistemic grounds, they are almost forced to exert a 
political task. In view of the existence of several epistemological approaches to GMO safety, 
none o f which provide definite answers and each o f which has developed its own implicit 
value system regarding the interaction between human activities and nature, risk assessors’ 
choices among the many scientific sets of arguments imply an underlying political choice. 
Moreover, the acute informational asymmetries between industrial notifiers and all other 
actors involved in the process of risk assessment, make the provided notification data carry a 
‘biased’ approach towards genetic engineering risks and the power o f science to predict and 
assess them, thus further politicising the respective risk assessment mechanisms.
This exclusive dependence on science and the parallel non-recognition o f its 
limitations, poses severe pressures upon the structure o f scientific advice, as does the non­
recognition o f its normative character when used for regulatory purposes. These tendencies 
reflect an overestimation o f the authority of science to rationalize moral and political choices, 
raising questions about its credibility as an important source o f legitimacy for authorization 
decisions. The risk assessment practice, based on EFSA’s decision to project its opinions as 
unified responses to the increasingly divisive and fragmented politics of genetic engineering 
risks, fails to produce consensus over the acceptability o f genetic engineering applications and 
to function as a plausible means o f ‘rational’ mediation among actors with diverse interests. 
Additionally, socio-economic and ethical concerns, or even alternative scientific readings, are 
not taken into consideration because the designed public participation mechanisms and 
clauses remain inactive. Thus, no convergence o f the various viewpoints can be achieved, 
decision-making structures remain remote and the boundaries o f the established risk- 
assessment practice offer a poor match to the full range o f public values and concerns, as well 
as to the full diversity of public aspirations. The failure of the established authorisation 
framework to produce regulatory outcomes that would echo both the plurality of risk 
conceptualisations and the inherent limitations o f expertise in providing value-free and all- 
encompassing safety evaluations reflects the inadequacy o f the chosen organisational model
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to structure a dialectical process between expert and non-expert forms of argumentation that 
could deviate from one-dimensional readings, embrace rather than deny complexity and bring 
up the plurality and richness of conceptualizations, rather than conceal the breadth, 
complexity and diversity o f views.
The institutionalized interpretation practice conceals those discursive commitments 
embedded in the established organizational arrangements, as the resort to scientific opinions 
and judgments has been traditionally associated with an objective, solid, un-contestable 
rational interpretation of facts. The Commission’s choice, as the ultimate decision-maker, to 
found its decisions upon the opinions of the EFSA GMO Panel cannot, at least within the 
frame of the established authorisation framework, be questioned in strict legal terms due to 
the quantifiable and verifiable form of grounding. Moreover, EFSA as the ultimate risk 
assessor cannot be held accountable on legal grounds (apart from the case o f the EFSA 
GMO Panel, which does not seem to follow the regulatory prescriptions to make clear the 
uncertainties and complexities or to state the relevant scientific disagreements) for simply 
choosing to interpret the notified data in one way or another. In other words, political 
responses to the risk problems of genetic engineering are being sought in scientific debates 
and areas o f particular forms of expertise, rather than in wider social deliberations regarding 
the acceptance and the terms o f application of genetic engineering where structures of checks 
and balances are in place. As a result o f the institutionalisation o f this regulatory paradox, 
that is the close association o f the process o f scientification o f the inherently political process 
of risk management and acceptability with a parallel, almost reciprocal politicisation o f the 
process o f scientific advice that has become the main device of the conceptualisation of 
technological risks, a gradual fading o f the traditional notion of accountability across the EU 
decision-making structures and the emergence of an expert-based array of actors that exercise 
political power and deliver technical judgments o f significant normative influence have 
emerged. The standardised resort to authorisation decisions exclusively upon scientific 
opinions perpetuates not only the projection of experts as the sole carriers of objective and 
rational knowledge claims that have a problem-solving capacity, but also the structural denial 
to recognise the predominantly political character o f the process o f the evaluation of 
technological risks, formulation of acceptability standards and weighting of the relevant costs 
and benefits.
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8.3. N ew  forms o f governance: proceduralisation as an ‘alternative’ approach to 
the organisation of EU decision-making
The proceduralisation paradigm, introduced as an alternative form of organisation of 
regulatory decision-making and designed to create decentralized legal structures for 
deliberation, inclusion and reflection, which departs from the traditional ‘Community 
M ethod’ o f regulation through legislation, has been incapable o f delivering participatory and 
unified outcomes in the case of the control of GMO releases. It has ultimately failed in its 
stated objective o f rendering the Commission’s authorisation decisions socially robust and 
legitimate. Given the Commission’s traditional emphasis on scientific conclusions and 
findings provided by particular experts and the general regulatory ‘appeal’ of hard facts, any 
proceduralisation initiative is very likely to be implemented only superficially. The primary 
obstacles faced by efforts to introduce a ‘truly’ proceduralised paradigm are: the absence of 
established methodologies for assessing socio-ethical concerns, the ‘thin’ operation standards 
and the necessity to conform to the norms of efficiency and effectiveness that underlie the 
operation o f authorization frameworks in the EU context.
Firstly, it is apparent, that the Commission’s focus on the institutional design o f a 
decentralised framework for the evaluation and authorization of GM releases, which in print 
provides various procedural opportunities for participation, has not produced the expected 
all-encompassing risk analysis structure in which the limitations of science and other 
predominant expert forms of control could be recognised. The operation of this 
administration paradigm, as a system of procedural obligations, has been manipulated and 
subjected to the normative power of apparently ‘neutral’ and ‘rational’ forms of 
argumentation through an expert-based institutional structure effectively perpetuating the 
conventional dichotomy between ‘hard’ science and ‘soft’ cultural values. As proceduralism 
does not operate in a vacuum and in view o f the framework’s unutilised participatory clauses 
and the absence o f any guiding definition o f terms, such as genetic engineering risks and 
safety, its capacity to produce inclusive and reflexive effects has become dependent and, in 
effect, conditioned by and bound up in the institutionally defined evaluation patterns.
The prioritization o f a technical or physical sciences ‘reading’ of genetic engineering 
risk issues by the institutional constellation of actors in charge of the operation o f the 
framework and the interpretation of its provisions, has deprived procedural rules of their
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nonaligned and unbiased character and has rendered them capable o f ‘speaking’ very clearly to 
the shape and the contents o f the final decision. It has ultimately defined the actual number 
and type o f actors that can have a meaningful engagement in the process. More specifically, 
one could conclude that in areas of high scientific uncertainty and value contestation, 
proceduralised forms o f regulatory control tend to become attached to forms o f expertise that 
provide quantifiable and verifiable hard data, which can offer solid grounds to licensing 
decisions due to their apparent objectivity and neutrality. Thus, as a result of the appealing 
character of such forms of expertise and for reasons o f regulatory convenience or 
administrative efficiency, the established decentralised deliberation structures seem deprived 
o f their potential to incorporate and legitimize other forms o f argumentation, ensure that all 
actors involved are in a position to make a meaningful evaluation o f the relevant data and to 
question the institutionally embedded bias towards the shielding of the regulatory credibility 
o f science.
Proceduralism has proven unable to penetrate specific embedded institutionalised 
patterns o f interpretation and assessment o f expert data and o f handling uncertainty. The 
procedural rationality o f decision-making structures is inherently constrained in institutional 
terms and dependent on the concrete organizational structures, decision-making norms and 
context-specific interpretation practices. In the case o f the public control of the deliberate 
release o f GMOs, the limitations o f proceduralism in developing inclusive, all-encompassing 
regulatory outcomes become particularly evident in view of the establishment of a centralised 
risk assessment structure (EFSA GMO Panel), the significant knowledge gaps and high 
informational asymmetries. These patterns o f interpretation have led to the establishment of 
a dense institutional constellation of actors that operates upon an exclusively technical 
conceptualisation of genetic engineering risks and safety. As a result, a significant distance 
between prescribed procedures designed to steer decision making in a participative and 
reflexive direction and the actual decision-making processes has been created. The latter are 
being shaped by specific normative circumstances and particular institutional interests, and 
have in effect predetermined the end outcome of the respective decision-making risk analysis 
structures.
Also, evidenced is a twofold mis-representation o f proceduralism, as it has been 
deprived o f its inclusive, pluralistic features and its reflexive qualities. This takes us back to 
the institutional structures that operate at the EU level. Despite the various organizational
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reforms and institutional reshufflings in the frame of the Deliberate Release framework, the 
standardized resort to traditional interpretations o f the main concepts at hand and to fixed 
distinctions that either do not reflect their pluralistic character or are simply not context- 
specific, shows institutional conservatism and a political unwillingness to depart from fixed 
institutional practices, despite the persistence of a variety of socio-economic tensions and the 
augmentation of the relevant implementation challenges. The Commission’s uniformity 
targets, standardization tendencies and its quest for measurable, comparable and precise 
technical data, primarily by concealing any non-technical concerns, seem to defeat the 
paradigm’s purpose in the field of genetic engineering, to the detriment o f scientific pluralism 
and value diversity, diminishing of the scope for legitimate political debate. The GMO 
problematique shows Europe at its worst: designing authorization frameworks of a regulatory 
character that are devoid o f substantive and normative orientation, thus creating a regulatory 
space inhabited exclusively by institutional actors that can generate and possess the required 
technical information. In fact, founding risk assessment and management decisions upon 
scientific data produced under conditions o f industrial bias and scarcity of scientific resources 
has transformed the generated information from a key source o f evidence for policy into its 
very essence.
More specifically, the analysis of the collected and analysed empirical findings 
demonstrates the blurred, ambiguous and provisional boundaries between procedural and 
substantive rationality in view of both the conceptual vagueness of proceduralism as a model 
o f organising decision-making within the institutional settings that operate upon the basis of 
contested forms o f traditional argumentation as well as in light of the Commission’s 
unwillingness to provide enforceable avenues for the consideration of non-scientific 
concerns, for the contextualisation of scientific knowledge and for a multi-prism evaluation 
control o f the notification data and official technical opinions provided. The inability o f the 
proceduralisation paradigm as such to deliver the expected inclusive and reflexive outcomes 
lies first o f all in its low normative and institutional force, which stems from the fact that its 
projection as an alternative form of governance has not been accompanied with the provision 
o f guiding definitions o f its main terms of operation, o f the necessary institutional guarantees 
and /or of clearly defined objectives and principles that would orientate its implementation 
beyond simplistic or traditional conceptualisations o f participation and value-pluralism.
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As has been shown, its conceptual thinness becomes evident not only because its 
terms o f operation, priorities and normative commitments remain under-defined and/or 
mechanistically mentioned, but also because the links among the various principles that 
underlie its design and operation seem unelaborated, thus o f a hybrid nature in regulatory and 
normative terms, whilst it has not articulated an in-depth analytical legal reasoning as to how 
an inclusive, reflexive outcome can be achieved. Furthermore, proceduralim’s low normative 
power lies in its rather myopic and narrow conceptualisation o f ‘inclusiveness’ as it 
approaches participation and deliberation, through an idealistic prism, as an end in itself 
without providing any indication as to how this process-based approach can in practice lead 
to an all-encompassing, socially robust handling o f a particular risk problem or uncertainty 
without taking into account the fact, more often than not, that the designed deliberation does 
not take place among equals.
Proceduralism does not provide any indication as to how the targeted convergence of 
risk approaches can be achieved, leading to generic and rather vague references to 
communication, learning and mutual understanding, to moderate the existing informational 
asymmetries and accommodate the various national idiosyncrasies and local particularities. 
The non-hierarchical structure of the proceduralisation paradigm does not seem to signify a 
radical departure from traditional expert-driven centralized forms o f decision-making. The 
regime’s targeting and terms o f operation remain ambiguous, as does the very important 
process o f the identification o f those actors that will be affected and in effect should become 
involved. In light o f the underdeveloped character o f proceduralism and its inherent 
vagueness in its substantive targeting and methodological structure, this paradigm seems to be 
a soft tool of regulatory governance not only in legal terms, but also in institutional and 
normative ones, thus it remains of minimal operational value.
When this administrative paradigm operates in fields of public policy where there is a 
variety o f possible interpretations of the available scientific data, competing interests, high 
scientific uncertainty and a multiplicity o f risk approaches, proceduralism’s conceptual 
vagueness and blind faith in the capacities of deliberation procedures, as such, to achieve 
inclusive, unified outcomes proves to be inadequate to resolve conflicts o f a political nature, 
to eradicate long-standing informational asymmetries and power inequalities or to address 
high levels of mistrust among the main institutional players. The introduced proceduralisation 
paradigm is underdeveloped and lacks sufficient guarantees to ensure the consideration o f all
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relevant viewpoints. Consequently, the non-hierarchical and open-ended structure suggested 
by this administrative model, leaves space that was destined for deliberation and reflection to 
be captured, in normative terms, by dominant institutional practices.
8.4. Some recommendations
How, then, might the various tensions and implementation problems evidenced in the 
operation o f the DRD be eradicated, without compromising either proceduralism’s unifying 
role or its operative value?
First o f all, there is a need to introduce legally-binding regulatory requirements into 
the authorisation framework that would make specific reference to the need for risk managers 
and decision-makers to take into account well-founded non-scientific forms o f knowledge 
and to ensure that risk assessors make direct comments on the limitations o f scientific 
knowledge, high scientific uncertainty and the various scientific disagreements. Furthermore, 
efforts need to be made to ensure the re-activation o f those legislative provisions and clauses 
already contained in the Deliberate Release framework that refer to the consideration and 
examination o f socioeconomic views and ethical concerns, via further legislative specification. 
The ambiguity and vagueness that surround the normative force and actual content of these 
provisions must be eradicated. The activation of these clauses should be accompanied by the 
strengthening o f the relevant institutional mechanisms that could guarantee the enforcement 
o f the respective participatory clauses and the integration o f the European Group on Ethics 
in Science and New Technologies into the risk analysis framework. These initiatives should be 
accompanied by a renegotiation of the boundaries between lay and expert knowledge, as well 
as between system effectiveness and citizen participation, but also by an acknowledgement of 
the potential difficulties that might arise out of the assessment of non-quantified forms of 
argumentation and the exposure of the public to complex forms of evidence.
As seen in recent efforts made in various jurisdictions across the world, as well as in 
studies undertaken for the development o f new forms o f participatory governance in the 
frame of the existing risk analysis frameworks that depart from traditional models of 
representation, the consideration of non-technical factors might in fact be conducive to an 
effective and socially legitimate operation o f the prior authorisation procedure. A pluralistic 
conceptualisation o f ‘expertise’ and the articulation o f multi-stakeholder initiatives might
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prove instructive in surpassing the rather rigid epistemological division between public 
engagement and scientific expertise. At the same time, there is a need for recognition of the 
limited problem-solving capacity of formal public participation mechanisms in terms of 
responding to intense implementation challenges and for penetrating the existing expert- 
driven patterns of governance and the high entry barriers o f a technical character. The 
effectiveness o f these initiatives and the prevention o f the appearance o f new ‘participatory 
myths’ can primarily be achieved through the elaboration o f the necessary legislative and 
institutional measures that would bring a change in the Commission’s culture o f governance 
and practice of interaction and introduce evidence-based, pluralistic expert systems.
Legislative specification should focus first on strengthening the obligation o f the 
competent institutional actors to acknowledge the limitations o f technical opinions in offering 
all-encompassing, value-free knowledge. Any authorization decisions must recognize the 
complexity and multi-dimensional features o f the knowledge base o f genetic engineering, the 
breadth of its potential effects and risks and the persistent uncertainties in relation to the 
prediction of its long-term cumulative impacts on different natural or agricultural 
environments and ecosystems, as their elaboration is carried out in a largely unexplored field 
o f expertise that is centered on the estimation o f complex ecological effects and novel risks. 
Furthermore, legislative efforts should also compel risk assessors to bring forward scientific 
disagreements and epistemic controversies when delivering their evaluation conclusions and 
safety verdicts, in recognition of the fact that questions regarding the effects o f genetic 
engineering constitute an inter-disciplinary object of scientific inquiry. The institutional 
development o f these clauses would in fact reinforce the Commission’s commitment and 
reliance on proceduralism as the prevalent administrative paradigm that can contribute to the 
establishment o f an inclusive and all-encompassing risk analysis regulatory structure for the 
assessment o f GMO-related risks, by realising its potential to provide space for the 
consideration of a plurality o f concerns and views on genetic engineering and for the 
acknowledgment o f the limitations and the subjective character o f the provided scientific 
advice.
Institutionally, the risk analysis framework needs to be reconceptualised not only in 
terms o f recognizing the blurred and artificial boundaries between risk assessment and 
management stages, since such a division does not correspond to the implementation reality 
or the particular political dimensions of genetic engineering. Also, social scientists and other
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stakeholders must be included both in the process of risk characterization and in broadening 
the breadth o f the tasks included at the risk management stage, in order to explicitly 
incorporate issues such as risk acceptability, risk tolerance and a broad cost-benefit analysis. 
The perpetuation of this tripartite risk analysis framework, which is based upon the false 
dichotomy between expert and political judgments, as well as between objective, rational and 
subjective, emotional evaluations can be reversed through a re-design of the risk framing 
process that should become a distinct stage of the risk analysis framework and involve a 
broad range o f actors. In view of the importance o f defining the risk questions, the main 
interpretation parameters, and what needs to be discussed and assessed at the subsequent 
stages, the Commission should focus its attention on ‘opening’ the space for public 
deliberation and bringing scientific experts, lay people and other stakeholders together at the 
very early stages in which the boundaries o f the risk problem are being established. 
Concretely, issue framing should cease to be an almost exclusive part of the duties of 
technical risk assessors. Further, the risk framing process should become an institutionally 
distinct stage in the authorization process that should precede the risk assessment phase.
Secondly, since the shaping o f the terms o f operation o f the risk-assessment structure, 
as well as of the context of interpretation o f the respective procedural provisions, ultimately 
depends on the interpretation and assessment practices o f the institutional constellation of 
actors that is in charge o f the risk analysis framework, further legislative specification might 
not be sufficient in delivering inclusive and reflexive regulatory outcomes without a 
consideration of the relevant institutional conditions and settings within which risk 
assessment and authorization decisions are shaped. Thus, apart from inserting and developing 
regulatory provisions that would enhance the reflexive and participatory dimensions o f the 
authorization procedure, the Commission needs to focus its attention on the institutional 
design o f those decision-making structures related to the assessment and control of 
technological risks as the assessment o f risks and the evaluation of the potential 
environmental effects cannot be performed beyond its specific institutional manifestations 
and patterns o f interpretation. Considering that current sub-optimal solutions have primarily 
been caused by institutional factors, this review process should focus, first of all, on the 
reformulation o f the composition o f the risk assessment mechanisms. There is a need for 
EFSA as the main risk assessor on GMO issues to include social scientists in its GMO Panel 
so as to widen its risk assessment spectrum and make sure that not only technical risks and 
considerations are taken into account in the frame of this authorization procedure.
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Additionally, the risk management process should be approached not as the last stage of the 
traditional sequential licensing procedure, as there is a need to introduce a fourth part to the 
traditional risk framework that should center on the issue of risk acceptability, which in turn 
should involve the consideration of a broader array of institutional factors, whilst the 
introduction of a societal cost-benefit analysis should also be considered as part of the efforts 
for the redesign o f the relevant institutional framework.
Moreover, the main focus of the proposed changes in the terms o f operation o f the 
risk assessment process should be on the reconfiguration o f the precise object of analysis of 
the prescribed authorization procedures. It is proposed that there is a need for a new 
institutional framing of the genetic engineering issue that would be more sensitive to the local 
constitution o f expertise, sub-national concerns, regional particularities and non-expert 
judgments, and would ensure reflection upon the limitations of science in a novel and 
uncertain regulatory field. Contrary to the Commission’s and EFSA’s assurances that what is 
needed is a better risk communication strategy to improve the interface between scientific 
disciplines or to define clear boundaries between risk assessment and management, the 
establishment of institutional spaces within which concrete, contextualised and reflective 
processes o f knowledge generation and validation will operate is proposed. The issue of 
context, in particular the locally-specific ecological factors and characteristics that are of 
utmost importance when evaluating the effects of the releases of GMOs into the 
environment, should be placed high on the Commission’s risk analysis agenda. The mosaic of 
ecological conditions and environmental parameters found in the European continent call for 
the abandoning o f transnational standardised, homogeneous conclusions on the safety and 
compatibility of GM crops in favour o f more context-specific interpretations that will take 
local particularities into account. It should be clarified that what is proposed is neither the 
abandoning o f cosmopolitan, unitary forms of Community control, nor the imposition of 
self-government structures, but simply a particular attention to contextual particularities that 
might moderate the tensions between uniformity and diversity, even if this implies facing the 
risk o f them being used as a smoke-screen for protectionist or parochial approaches. 
Although, the need for an assessment and management approach adjusted to sub-national 
particularities might seem as opposing or undermining the EU ’s Common Market objectives 
and potentially threatening the efficiency o f the prior authorisation framework, in fact, the 
findings suggest that it will ultimately safeguard the compliance o f all actors involved with the 
relevant authorisation decisions through a more careful consideration of all risk concerns and
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the parallel acknowledgment o f the limitations o f expert forms o f control to function as EC- 
wide guarantees of the predictable and acceptable character of GM risks.
European governance structures offer the procedural and organisational platforms for 
shaping regulatory policies beyond one-dimensioned standardised approaches that tend to 
conceal local idiosyncrasies o f an environmental and socio-cultural character. Thus, what is 
proposed is the formulation of contextual frames of deliberation, especially at the Community 
level, that will move beyond reductionist ‘readings’ which suggest one-dimensional 
approaches to risk (either precisely quantifiable or socially constructed). The Commission 
should guarantee and support the development of organisational structures o f deliberation 
among the main stakeholders, as well as o f open-ended reflection mechanisms about the 
limitations o f science, in its role as the main intellectual resource for those public policies that 
deal in particular with the control o f modem technological applications in fields of policy 
characterised by high scientific uncertainty and lack o f epistemic consensus. Directly 
addressing the inherent inadequacies of science to offer all-encompassing, objective 
information for regulatory purposes can, potentially, lead to the formulation o f more 
transparent and accountable risk analysis practices. Further, the Commission should foster the 
integration o f social disciplines with physical sciences in a coherent manner, but also develop 
new forms of scientific practice that will bring forward those contextual factors, contested 
values and sources of uncertainty that relate to the production and use o f biosafety data for 
regulatory purposes. Both the risk assessors and the Commission should acknowledge the 
limitations o f technical knowledge. As a result, space for debate and deliberation at the risk 
management level will be ensured.
The plurality o f local environmental particularities and the multiplicity of risk 
conceptualisations should not be approached either through balanced interest representation 
exercises or through the formulation of a single line of risk analysis that would contain or is 
even composed o f all views expressed on the issue at hand, since a ‘one size fits all’ platform 
for discussion cannot guarantee the establishment o f operative deliberation platforms. Rather, 
the role of the regulatory framework should be to secure mediation in terms o f not only 
providing equal procedural opportunities to all carriers o f biosafety-related argumentation and 
information, but also safeguarding the acknowledgement and consideration o f the whole 
range o f concerns and risk views expressed at the level o f risk assessment. The purpose of 
this discussion forum should be not to reduce complex questions over the broader effects of
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technological change to a series o f procedural questions o f a predominandy technical 
character, but rather should be approached as a social and political debate on the desirability 
and acceptability of particular technological applications that can provide opportunities for 
illustration, critical exposure and scrutiny o f a variety o f expertises and forms of 
argumentation, but also trace concrete points of convergence in which each could respond to 
the challenges o f the other. The operation o f this deliberation platform should be based on 
the departure from normative assumptions about the power of ‘best expertise’ and the 
complementary role o f public participation and should, above all, aim at challenging 
institutionalised practices o f scientific governance, facilitating the reconnection o f experts 
with society in its multiple formations, widening the respective information base and viewing 
the existence or the development of a variety of conceptualisations and ‘readings’ in the field 
o f the risk control o f technological applications as an inherent feature of risk controversies 
that should not be concealed, but rather brought up and analysed.
It is proposed that the Commission should re-design the relevant institutional 
arrangements and organizational structures, viewing risk assessment as part of a wider process 
o f the evaluation o f economic, political, moral and ethical concerns complementary to the 
necessary scientific predictions and assessments. The risk management procedure should 
safeguard the consideration and accommodation of those societal concerns that stem from 
the technological applications as such. In other words, in view of the novel nature of genetic 
engineering applications and the plurality of interests, interpretations and conceptualisations 
o f what constitutes genetic engineering risks and safety, there is an imminent need for the 
modification o f the existing institutional practices in order to address the need to reinforce an 
expert-lay interface, strengthen public participation in technical decision-making structures 
and respond to a diverse set of goals and ends, whilst ensuring the relevant scientific and 
technical evidence and analysis remain a key component of the debate.
Finally, the Commission should view the GMO case as an opportunity to 
reconceptualise the exact role, scope and position o f the process of public participation in the 
frame o f a risk regulation framework, before assuming any initiative in strengthening citizen 
involvement in the frame of the deliberate release framework. The value and limitations of 
proceduralism as the sole model of shaping the terms o f operation of risk regulation 
frameworks and in effect delivering inclusive and reflexive outcomes, should be reconsidered. 
Moreover, the expectations that the Commission has placed upon this form of regulatory
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governance are rather high considering the limited extent o f its implementation, low 
normative force and weak institutional guarantees. Thus, there is a need to water down these 
political expectations and for the Commission to re-evaluate those assumptions and 
commitments that underlie its culture of governance. The issue o f developing an efficient 
and social and politically legitimate control framework requires the development o f alternative 
ways o f converging different risk paradigms and prioritising the achievement o f a multitude 
o f seemingly incompatible objectives. In other words, the deadlock that the authorisation o f 
GMO releases has created at the social and political level calls for the Commission to re­
evaluate its role in the contemporary modus operandi of EU decision-making as a neutral 
mediator between opposing interests that continuously attempt to provide compromise 
solutions o f low binding force and acceptability, which ultimately keep almost all stakeholders 
unhappy with the final decision-making outcome.
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